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PRACTICING THE LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY: 
A STORY OF ‘SOMETHING MISSING’ 
By Matthildi Chatzipanagiotou 
 
The philosophical underpinnings of what may be called the meta-dimension of 
the law of human dignity trigger a question that surpasses the boundaries of the 
discipline of law: how could the transcendental as an aspect of human dignity 
meaning be portrayed? The insistence on non-determination of the Menschenbild 
[human image] or ‘God’ in the Preamble to the German Basic Law [Grundgesetz] 
reflected in German legal doctrine, paired with the commitment to case-by-case ad 
hoc concretization of what human dignity means inspire this story of ‘something 
missing’. In postmodern fashion, this story portrays the law of human dignity as a 
Trojan Horse and provides hermeneutic and literary foundations for an affirmative 
stance towards ‘emptiness’ talk in legal discourse. The research question rekindles 
and twists polemically framed ‘emptiness’ and ‘black box’ contentions: Why does the 
legal concept of human dignity appear ‘empty’? Or, how is it ‘empty’? Why and how 
is it a ‘black box’? How do manifestations of the concept appear abstract as universals 
and concrete as particulars? The ontological, linguistic-analytical, and 
phenomenological philosophical insights presented in Chapter One compose the lens 
through which five benchmark Bundesverfassungsgericht cases – on abortion, life 
imprisonment, transsexuals, state response to terrorist attacks, and the guarantee of a 
dignified subsistence minimum – are analyzed in Chapter Two. The philosophical 
sources are not bracketed as moments in the long course of human dignity in the 
history of ideas.  
 
Keywords:  
Human dignity, fundamental rights, Leerformel [empty formula], empty box, 
redundancy theories, non-determination, ‘something missing’, metaphysical, God, 
ontological, Presocratic Heraclitus, Catherine MacKinnon, Jacques Rancière, 
linguistic-analytical, Ludwig Wittgenstein, field of sight, language game, limit, 
phenomenological, Emmanuel Levinas, self, other, hospitality, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court], abortion, life imprisonment, 
transsexuals, Luftsicherheitsgesetz [Aviation Security Act], dignified subsistence 




Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Meta-Dimension des Rechts auf 
Menschenwürde lösen eine Fragestellung aus, die die Grenzen der Disziplin des 
Rechts übertrifft: wie könnte das Transzendentale als ein Aspekt der Bedeutung von 
Menschenwürde dargestellt werden? Das Beharren auf der nicht-Bestimmung des 
Menschenbildes oder auf dem Begriff ‚Gott’ in der Präambel des Deutschen 
Grundgesetzes,  wie es  sich  in der Deutschen Dogmatik widerspiegelt, gepaart mit 
dem Bestreben nach einer Fall-zu-Fall ad hoc Konkretisierung dessen, was 
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Menschenwürde bedeutet, inspiriert diese Untersuchung von ‚etwas fehlt’ 
[‘something missing’]. In postmoderner Art und Weise beschreibt diese Geschichte 
das Gesetz der Menschenwürde als Trojanisches Pferd und bietet hermeneutische und 
literarische Grundlagen für eine affirmative Haltung gegenüber einer 'leeren' Rede im 
juristischen Diskurs. Die Forschungsfrage erweckt und umkreist die polemisch 
verbrämten Begriffe von ‚Leere’ und ‚Black Box’: Warum erscheint der 
Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde ‚leer’? Oder wie ist er ‚leer’? Warum und wie ist 
er eine ‚Black Box’? Wie erscheinen Manifestationen des Konzepts abstrakt wie 
Universalien, aber im Einzelnen konkret? Die ontologischen, sprachlich-analytischen 
und phänomenologischen philosophischen Erkenntnisse, vorgestellt im ersten Kapitel,  
bilden die Linse, durch die  fünf maßgebliche Fälle des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes – 
über Abtreibung, lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe, Transsexualität, staatliche Reaktion auf 
Terroranschläge und die Gewährleistung eines menschenwürdigen 
Existenzminimums – im zweiten Kapitel analysiert werden. Die philosophischen 
Quellen werden nicht als Momente im langen Verlauf der Menschenwürde in der 
Geschichte der Ideen eingeklammert. 
 
Stichwörter: 
Menschenwürde, Grundrechte, Leerformel, Redundanz Theorien, nicht-Bestimmung, 
‚etwas fehlt", metaphysisch, Gott, ontologisch, vorsokratisch, Heraklit, Catherine 
MacKinnon, Jacques Rancière, sprachlich-analytisch, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Gesichtsfeld, Sprachspiel, Begrenzung, phänomenologisch, Emmanuel Levinas, 
selbst, andere, Gastfreundschaft, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Abtreibung, lebenslange 
Freiheitsstrafe, Transsexualität, Luftsicherheitsgesetz, menschenwürdiges 
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‘second generation’ of scholars and served as my supervisor since my first day as a 
doctoral researcher. There are no words to express my gratitude for our Doktormutter-
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me to critically reflect on my methods and argumentation; at the same time, with 
sensitivity and trust, her guidance and direction were a catalyst for me to open my 
mind and heart, and to find my own voice. I am addressing and offering to Susanne 
Baer, with the gratitude and humility one feels before a true teacher, the thoughts that 
are, to me, most precious in this book. I also feel grateful for the relevatory 
experience, on occasion of the stimulating discussions post-Forschungskolloquia, of 
how generous and amical academic exchange can/should be.  
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The purpose of this introduction is to delineate the research objective, locate 
the analysis in state-of-the-art research on the law of human dignity, and present 
premises to questions triggering this study, the central thesis underlying a story of 
‘something missing’, the methodology applied, and the spine of this argument. 
A. Delineation of the research objective and location of the analysis in the state 
of the art 
Spurred by the philosophical underpinnings of what may be called the 
transcendental dimension of the law of human dignity, meaning the insight that the 
legal concept operates also at a meta-level, I pose a question that surpasses the 
boundaries of the discipline of law. The question raised is triggered first by the 
insistence on non-determination of the Menschenbild [human image] or ‘God’ as in 
the Preamble to the German Basic Law in German legal doctrine. Commitment to 
non-determination is paired with the requirement of case-by-case ad hoc 
concretization. This then leads to the question of whether and how the meta-
dimension of the law of human dignity can be portrayed apropos the mutually 
complementary stances of non-determination and ad hoc concretization to enhance 
our understanding of how this law is practiced. To answer this question, I delve into 
the respective areas of discussion in German legal doctrine. In addition I turn to 
continental-European and Anglo-American literature, not only as indispensible sides 
of a trans-Atlantic dialogue-in-progress, but also because resorting to both permits a – 
slighter or greater – constant shift of perspective that reinforces critical reflection.  
Indeed, the plunge into the above issues resonates an ‘oceanic feeling’1 in that 
the abundance of perspectives found in the literature sparks infinite cohesive                                                         
1 In Civilization and its Discontents, the father of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud notes, ‘[…] [I]n 
making any general judgment […] we are in danger of forgetting how variegated the human world and 
its mental life are. […] [There] is a feeling which he [an anonymous friend of Freud, later revealed to 
be French Nobel Prize winner Romain Rolland, a dramatist, novelist, art historian and mystic] would 
like to call a sensation of “eternity”, a feeling of something limitless, unbounded – as it were, 
“oceanic”. This feeling, he adds, is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith; it brings with it no 
assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source of the religious energy which is seized upon by 
the various Churches and religious systems, directed by them into particular channels, and doubtless 
also exhausted by them. One may, he thinks, rightly call oneself religious on the ground of this oceanic 
feeling alone, even if one rejects every belief and every illusion. The views expressed by the friend 
[…] caused me no small difficulty. I cannot discover this “oceanic” feeling in myself. It is not easy to 
deal scientifically with feelings. […] If I have understood my friend rightly, he means the same thing 
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inceptions of human dignity conceptualizations, that is, could stimulate a profusion of 
hermeneutic projects. This also renders any clearly delineated, systematic approach an 
essentially reductive account of the subject matter, and necessitates even more the 
careful location of my analysis apropos state-of-the-art research. Mapping aspects of 
the controversy around how to understand and mobilize human dignity in law allows 
us to perceive why this task presents a particular challenge. 
My study is a drop in this ocean of contemplation and discourse. For that, I 
first present broad waves, with the purpose of illustrating how this drop contributes to 
state-of-the-art research. The focal point being the constitutional guarantee of human 
dignity in Germany, that is, a persevering quest for determination of meaning, I am 
aware that I delve into a subject matter that has been pondered by many thinkers 
within the discipline of law. However, it is my intention to locate my study amidst 
this body of reflections, which is why I will first refer to approaches to the normative 
status and function of human dignity in the constitutional order of the Basic Law, to 
then proceed with highlighting areas in the legal discourse of pertinence to the 
delineation of my inquiry. 
The controversy around how the law of human dignity is to be practiced 
mirrored in German and Anglo-American legal scholarship and equally ensuing from 
an overview of human dignity manifestations in constitutional courts’ jurisprudence2 
significantly feeds on the abundance of perspectives on the meaning of human 
dignity. The discourse on issues concerning the practice of the legal concept has not 
faded since the dawn of the United Nations that marked the emergence of a new 
multilevel constitutionalism reality. In seeking to portray how the transcendental 
character of the law of human dignity is mobilized in text as an aspect of judicial 
practice, this study takes Art. 1 sec. 1 GG as a case in point. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG reads:  
Human dignity shall be inviolable [ist unantastbar]. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. 
                                                                                                                                                              
by it as the consolation offered by an original and somewhat eccentric dramatist to his hero who is 
facing a self-inflicted death. “We cannot fall out of this world.” [Christian Dietrich Grabbe, 1801-
1836], Hannibal: “Ja, aus der Welt werden wir nicht fallen. Wir sind einmal darin.”] That is to say, it is 
a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole.’ Sigmund Freud, 
Civilization and its Discontents (Standard Edition with a Biographical Introduction by Peter Gay, first 
published in German in 1930, New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1989) 10-12 
2 The constitutional courts implied are those prevalent in German and Anglo-American legal 
scholarship on the practice of the law of human dignity, for instance the Canadian, the Israeli, the 
South African, the Indian, the Hungarian constitutional courts.  
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The dignity of the human being is seen as the highest value [das oberste Gut, 
Höchstwert] of the German constitutional order3, and the cornerstone of the Basic 
Law’s value order [Wertordnung]. This is confirmed by the constitution’s eternity 
clause in Art. 79 sec. 3 GG.4 The state’s commitment to respect for and protection of 
the dignity of human beings under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG develops third party effects 
[Drittwirkung] directly deduced from the constitutional clause. Recognition of the 
high rank of the legal concept exceeds, of course, German borders and crosscuts 
levels of constitutionalism.5 Parallels can be drawn6 between the formulation of the 
human dignity guarantee in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and other constitutional texts, European 
Union law and international law treaties7. Human dignity language in the text of the 
Basic Law declares the state’s self-understanding8. Similarly, other constitutional, EU 
law and international law human dignity clauses reflect the distinct self-understanding 
of the respective entities, while establishing a sense in which diverse and unique self-
understandings stand side by side9.                                                          
3 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 4; Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar 
(2012) para 1 
4 Herdegen, ibid 
5 See Udo Di Fabio, ‘Die Grundrechte als Wertordnung’ (2004) JZ 1, 5 [highest value of global law]; 
Reiner J. Schweizer & Franziska Sprecher, ‘Menschenwürde im Völkerrecht’ in Jurt Seelman (ed), 
Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff, (1st edn, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005) 127, 127ff.; Peter 
Häberle, Europäische Verfassungslehre (7th edn, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011) 286 [human dignity 
belongs to the cultural anthropological premises of Europe] 
6 Kunig (n 3) para 2  
7 See infra, Chapter Two, Part A  
8 Kunig (n 3) para 3 
9 The reality of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ corresponds to a complex experience of personal 
pluralism, indeed formative of the self-understanding of human beings, namely the experience of being 
the bearer of human dignity and fundamental rights across levels of constitutionalism. Ingolf Pernice, 
‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) 5 Walter Hallstein-Institut für 
Europäisches Verfassungsrecht 1, 2 [‘“Multilevel constitutionalism” is meant to describe and 
understand the ongoing process of establishing new structures of government complementary to and 
building upon – while also changing – existing forms of self-organisation of the people or society. It is 
a theoretical approach to explaining how the European Union can be conceptualised as a matter and 
creature of its citizens as much as the Member States are a matter and creature of their respective 
citizens. The same citizens are the source of legitimacy for public authority at the European level as 
well as – regarding their respective Member State – at the national level, and they are subject to the 
authority exercised at both levels.’]; See ibid, ‘Fundamental Rights and Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
Europe’ (2004) 7 Walter Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht; See also, Maya 
Hertig ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’ (2003) 7(1) Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 26 [relations and functions between layers of governance]; Dieter Grimm, ‘Stufen der 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Zur Exportfӓhigkeit einer westlichen Errungenschaft’ (2009) 64(12) JZ 596 [the 
rule of law is not a closed concept; rather, it is layered and its adoption and realization is contingent on 
inter-state cooperation and the activity developed by international organizations on matters such as 
international financial support to states]; Anna Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 
16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 397; Fritz Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the multilevel 
European polity’ (2009) 1(2) European Political Science Review 173 [stressing need for the initiation 
of ‘communicative discourses’ in the national public space in view of the multilevel reality and 
drawing the ‘liberal’-‘republican’ distinction]; Andreas Voßkuhle, ‘Multilevel cooperation of the 
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Negative, violation-based determinations of human dignity meaning are 
premised on an understanding of respect as abstention from interference and can be 
associated with the Basic Law’s reaction to the National-Socialist past of the German 
state. Positive determinations correspond to the objective duty of the state to 
guarantee human dignity and can be associated with the interpretation of dignity 
apropos the notion of duty in the history of ideas, for instance in Cicero or Thomas 
Aquinas and, more generally, Christian doctrine.10 Illustrative attempts to theorize 
positive determinations are the Leistungstheorie [performance or achievement 
theory], the Mitgifttheorie [endowment theory], and the Kommunikationstheorie 
[communication theory]11. Other approaches to the determination of the law of human 
dignity are negative violation-based definitions12 and the famous thesis of non-
interpretation.13 Can the law of human dignity serve as the basis of claims addressing 
questions of our time, such as issues in biomedicine and bioethics?14  
In German constitutional law, human dignity is a legal norm, despite the high 
degree of conceptual indeterminacy. The normative quality of the concept does not 
depend on parameters such as density of substantive content, need for interpretation,                                                                                                                                                               
European Constitutional Courts: The Europӓische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’ (2010) 6(2) European 
Constitutional Law Review (2010) 175 [the hierarchy of courts in this multilevel order is not simplistic, 
and it advances dialogue in human rights; Voßkuhle focuses on  the cooperation between the FCC, the 
ECtHR and the ECJ]; Neil Walker, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German 
Debate’ (2010) LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series [distinguishing between multilevel 
constitutionalism senso stricto, as per Pernice, and senso lato] 
10 For an overview of the concept’s course in the history of ideas, see Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG 
Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) paras 7-13 
11 Hasso Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’, in ibid (ed), Verfassungsrechtliche 
Perspektiven: Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1980-1994 (first published: (1993) 118 AöR 353; Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1995) 104, 104ff.; ibid 111 [human dignity as social recognition]  
12 BVerfGE 1, 97 (104) (1951) [Hinterbliebenenrente I]; BVerfGE 27, 1 (6) (1969) [Mikrozensus]; 
BVerfGE 30, 1 (25) 72, 105 (115ff.) (1970) [Abhörurteil]; Wolfgang Vitzthum, ‘Die Menschenwürde 
als Verfassungsbegriff’ (1985) JZ 201, 202f. [flexibility as an advantage of negative violation-based 
interpretations of the law of human dignity] 
13 The ‘nicht-interpretierte These’ by Theodor Heuß. See Paul Tiedemann, Menschenwuerde als 
Rechtsbegriff. Eine philosophische Klärung (Schriftenreihe des Menschenrechtszentrums der 
Universitaet Potsdam, Bd. 29, 2nd edn, Potsdam: BVW – Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010) 68ff.; 
ibid 70 [critique on the nicht-interpretierte These of Theodor Heuß and comparative insights]; ibid 71 
[‘Als in diesem Sinne “nicht interpretierte These” hat die Würdeklausel keinerlei Inhalt. Ohne Inhalt 
kann ihr aber auch keine rechtliche Bedeutung zukommen. Die Menschenwürdeklausel des 
Grundgesetzes darf deshalb nicht als ein ‘letzlich nicht Fassbares,’ sondern sie muss als ein 
Formelkompromiss verstanden werden.’] 
14 Dreier, for instance, responds in the affirmative, underscoring, however, that human dignity should 
not be viewed as the solution to any and all questions arising in law. While it can be applied in treating 
various issues, ranging from physical contingency and personal identity to psychological integrity, it 
cannot function as a solution to all conceivable fundamental rights cases, or else practice would be 
inflated and trivialized and openness to particularistic ethics could precipitate manipulative practice. 
Horst Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, in Horst Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz. Kommentar (seit 1996, Bd. 1, A. 1-19, 
2nd edn, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004) para 41; See also Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 
‘Menschenwürde als normatives Prinzip – Die Grundrechte in der bioethischen Debatte’ (2003) JZ 809 
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or ambiguity of meaning, but rather on the structure of the norm, namely on whether 
it is only an appeal or aspiration, or, equally, an enforceable proposition.15 The 
practical relevance of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG to lived experience is contingent on the 
normative structure of the law of human dignity. Another parameter of relevance to 
lived experience is the relation between the law of human dignity and other 
fundamental rights. In line with correspondence theories, the guarantee of human 
dignity is a fundamental proposition operating in correspondence with other 
fundamental rights; thus, the legal protection of human dignity presents no deficit, as 
the abstraction that would detract from the enforceability of that law and its relevance 
to the realm of life is remedied through such correspondence.16 As famously framed 
by Hannah Arendt, the right to human dignity is ‘the right to have rights’17. The 
Ausstrahlungseffekt [radiation effect] of human dignity, indeed a prominent claim in 
German legal doctrine, indicates how the law of human dignity permeates all other 
fundamental rights and law in its entirety.  
One of the fundamental questions raised in legal discourse is whether the law 
of human dignity should be interpreted as an objective legal proposition or, also, as a 
subjective right.18 The grammatical and systemic interpretation of the legal concept, 
the constitutional history [Entstehungsgeschichte] of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Federal 
Constitutional Court [FCC, Bundesverfassungsgericht] jurisprudence are at variance 
with respect to whether the legal concept of human dignity only has the normative 
structure of a fundamental principle, value and proposition of rhetorical19 and 
programmatic nature, rather than, also, of a fundamental right.20 Why are such 
distinctions of significance? The normative structure of human dignity defines how 
that law is to be practiced and concretized21 and how meaning is to be produced. For 
instance, a principle grants legal actors considerable latitude in determining the 
                                                        
15 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 18 
16 Tim Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde – Ansätze zu einer Metatheorie der Menschenwürdetheorien’ in Carsten 
Bäcker & Sascha Ziemann (eds), Junge Rechtsphilosophie (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2012) 187, 194f.  
17 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: André Deutsch, 1986)  
18 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 6 
19 Rhetoric as an aspect of law’s practice is contingent, among other things, on legal and professional 
culture. See also Binder, Guyora & Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000) 366  
20 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 124 fn 417-18 
21 Werner Krawietz, ‘Gewährt Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG dem Menschen ein Grundrecht auf Achtung und 
Schutz seiner Würde?’ (1977) GS. F. Klein 245, 261; See also Kunig (n 15) 
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content of the guarantee – usually practiced in conjunction with another value22 – and 
concretizing the law of human dignity ad hoc, in other words producing meaning.  
Another decisive parameter of meaning is the constellation of fundamental 
rights and the position of the law of human dignity apropos other legal norms. The 
position of human dignity in a system and the architecture of the system as such affect 
the production of meaning and, consequently, the portrayals of practice. Conceiving 
of the relation between the three fundamental rights, dignity, liberty and equality, as a 
triangular system23, rather than a pyramid with human dignity at the apex requires the 
inclusion of the interplay between the three corners in portrayals of the practice of the 
law of human dignity.  
Scholars identify different functions of the law of human dignity. The 
standard-setting function is paired with the inventive or creative24 function, which at 
once originates in and fosters the openness of the concept to new meaning, hence to 
evolution. The concept presents a high degree of adaptability to the multifarious 
instantiations of the human condition. To the extent that the law of human dignity 
prescribes rather than simply marks openness, it can be relationally portrayed in light 
of James Boyd White’s point on commitment to ‘many-voicedness […] against the 
single voice, the single aspect of the self or culture dominating the rest.’25 The 
principle of human dignity serves a scandalizing and irritative function in a pluralistic 
world.26 
Turning our sights to the practice of the law of human dignity, there are 
certain identifiable formative factors of the meaning produced, which should not 
escape our attention. The pre-understanding [Vorverständnis]27 of legal actors, legal 
                                                        
22 The recurrent phenomenon, especially in FCC jurisprudence, of practicing the law of human dignity 
in conjunction with the general right to personality or the right to life, intimates how the cumulative 
effect of pairing that law with other legal concepts is formative of human dignity meaning. 
23 Susanne Baer, ‘Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism,’ 
(2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 417  
24 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’, 
(2010) 41(4) Metaphilosophy 464, 467f.; See also Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4)  EJIL 655, 721f.  
25 James Boyd White, Heracle’s Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison: Univ. 
of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 124  
26 Susanne Baer, ‘Menschenwürde zwischen Recht, Prinzip und Referenz – Die Bedeutung von 
Enttabuisierungen’ (2005) 4 DZPhil 571, 588  
27 See Josef Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung: Rationalitätsgrundlagen 
richterlicher Entscheidungspraxis (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1972); 
Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (first published: 1975, London, New York: Continuum 
Publishing Group, 2004) 294 [‘Hence the most basic of all hermeneutic preconditions remains one’s 
own fore-understanding, which comes from being concerned with the same subject.’] 
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doctrine, theoretical accounts28, methods employed in practicing that law29, and the 
history of the idea [Geistesgeschichte] are all parameters influencing the meaning that 
ensues from the mobilization of human dignity language in law. The critical tension, 
and challenge for legal actors, consists of the reconciliation of the abstract and 
universal – or, better, abstract as universal – character of human dignity with the 
multifarious concrete particulars that arise in law’s practice.  
As regards universals30, some scholars examine the prospect of consensus on a 
universal minimum core of human dignity meaning31 and discuss how broad or 
narrow, minimal or inclusive32 this core should be. Others opt for a methodical 
approach to establishing the universal validity of a theory of human dignity. 
Tiedemann postulates the validity of argumentation as a method enjoying universal 
comprehensibility33; notes how grounding universal validity on argumentation brings 
about the necessary distancing or alienation from oneself [Selbstdistanzierung] for 
elevating an opinion into a thesis34; and identifies the range of arguments composing 
the arsenal of the methodical approach: formal-logical35, transcendental36, conceptual                                                         
28 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 170 [‘Dworkin characterized law as a practice 
of arguing that conduct is required or permittedy by authoritative sources. Since disagreement about 
what counts as a source of law is a recurrent experience in legal practice, he reasoned, different 
theories of what law is are themselves sources of law.’]; See also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) 74 [‘Our controversies about justice are too rich, and too 
many different kinds of theories are now in the field.’]; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? 
And Other International Dialogues (2006) 34 [‘New theories help make new realities. […] Theory 
appropriates reality in a certain way – its way is method – to make the world accessible to 
understanding and change. It is a way of getting a grip on things.’]; ibid 35 [MacKinnon’s account of 
theory is synopsized as making ‘theory out of practice […] to build a piece of theory of the kind we 
need rather than to talk about how theory is or should be done.’] 
29 Dieter Grimm, ‘Methode als Machtfaktor’ in Helmut Coing et al (eds), Europäisches Rechtsdenken 
in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Festschrift für Helmut Coing zum 70. Gebusrtstag (Bd. 1, München: 
Beck, 1982) 469; See also Esser (n 27) 
30 See MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 53 [‘[…] the idea that there is nothing essential, in the 
sense that there are no human universals, is dogma. Ask most anyone who is going to be shot at 
dawn.’] 
31 The pictorial rendering of human dignity meaning is endearing to legal doctrine and scholarship in 
general. Figurative approaches have great suggestive force, could be reflecting complex psychological 
and social findings, and draw attention to fundamental rights doctrine. See Ralf Poscher, 
‘Menschenwürde und Kernbereichsschutz – Von den Gefahren einer Verräumlichung des 
Grundrechtsdenkens’ (2009) JZ 269, 276 
32 See Eric Hilgendorf, ‘Instrumentalisierungsverbot und Ensembletheorie der Menschenwürde’ in 
Hans-Ulrich Paeffgen, Martin Böse, Urs Kindhäuser, Stephan Stübinger, Torsten Verrel & Rainder 
Zaczyk (eds), Strafrechtswissenschaft als Analyse und Konstruktion – Festschrift für Ingeborg Puppe 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010) 1653 
33 Tiedemann, Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff (2010) 177 
34  ibid 180 
35  ibid 185 
36  ibid 187 ff.; ibid 187 f. [On account of linguistic-analytical insights – specifically, the thought of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein – in Chapter One allowing the spatial rendering of the transcendental character of 
the law of human dignity, the following are worth noting: ‘Das Wort “transzendental” ist mehrdeutig. 
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analytical37, phenomenological38, empirical39, evaluative40. Of those alternatives, the 
first four intimate aspects of the three stories told in Chapter One, the ontological, 
linguistic-analytical and phenomenological accounts of human dignity, namely the 
three lenses devised to look at and portray the practice of the law of human dignity in 
the text of judicial decisions. Other scholarly positions depart from efforts to 
substantively conceive the basis of universal validity41 and restrict themselves to the 
realm of judicial practice, emphasizing instead ‘the institutional use of the concept in 
human rights adjudication’42 and proposing the ‘establishment of a recognizably 
workable system of judicial interpretation and application of human rights.’43  
Of the various issues traced in legal discourse on the law of human dignity, the 
delineation of the present study calls for emphasis on theoretical claims of 
redundancy44, discord on the interpretation of human dignity as a meta-legal 
[metajuristischer] or positive law term45, the meaning of inviolability                                                                                                                                                               
Es bezeichnet zum einen ein Seiendes, das jenseits der Erfahrungswelt existiert und deshalb über die 
Möglichkeiten unserer Erfahrung hinausgeht. Zum anderen aber auch eine Idee, die zwar nicht 
Gegenstand einer Erfahrung sein kann, insofern also auch jenseits der Erfahrung liegt, aber in der 
Reflexion über die logischen Bedingungen der Erfahrung doch erkannt werden kann. […] 
Transzendentale Argumentation ist wie die formale Logik eine Technik des reinen Denkens. Sie 
unterscheidet sich jedoch von der formalen Logik darin, dass es ihr nicht darum geht, aus gegebenen 
Prämissen eine Konklusion deduktiv abzuleiten. Vielmehr geht es ihr darum, die kokludenten 
Voraussetzungen einer Behauptung ans Licht zu holen, also jene Voraussetzungen, die mit der 
Behauptung schon immer mitgedacht sein müssen, wenn die Behauptung überhaupt sinnvoll sein 
soll.’]; See also Otfried Höffe, Gerechtigkeit als Tausch? Zum politischen Projekt der Moderne 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991); ibid, Political justice: foundations for a critical 
philosophy of law and the state (Jeffrey C. Cohen tr, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; Cambridge, MA: B. 
Blackwell, 1995)  
37 Tiedemann (n 33) 191 ff. 
38  ibid 195 ff. 
39  ibid 198 ff. 
40  ibid 200 ff. 
41 McCrudden (2008) 655, 710 ff.; Mutually responsive arguments: Paolo G. Carozza, ‘Human Dignity 
and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply’ (2008) 19(5) EJIL 931, 933 f.; McCrudden, ibid 
712 f. 
42 McCrudden, ibid 712 
43 ibid 713 [‘In this context, the concept of human dignity provides a useful, but limited, language with 
which to address certain institutional difficulties to which human rights adjudication gives rise.’] 
44 Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde’ (2012) 187, 194ff.; ibid 197f. Other theoretical tendencies identified are: 
correspondence approaches, see Héctor Wittwer, ‘Ein Vorschlag zur Deutung von Artikel 1 des 
Grundgesetzes aus rechtsphilosophischer Sicht’ in Jan C. Joerden, Eric Hilgendorf, Natalia Petrillo & 
Felix Thiele (eds), Menschenwürde und moderne Medizintechnik (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011) 161; 
coherence approaches: Wihl, ibid 195f.; consensus approaches: Wihl, ibid 196f.; evidence approaches: 
Peter Badura, ‘Generalprävention und Würde des Menschen’ (1964) JZ 337 [violation-based 
perception of human dignity]; Wihl, ibid 197; and mixed theoretical approaches. Ultimately Wihl 
introduces a republican account of human dignity in a political process and demonstrates the 
supefluousness of the legal concept of human dignity, affirming, however, that it develops a 
progressive force and can bring about change. Wihl, ibid 199f. 
45 The meta-dimension and positive law character of human dignity are intertwined in the presently told 
story of ‘something missing’ and this is particularly evident in the phenomenological account, where 
parallels are drawn by reference to infinity and totality in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. 
 17
[Unantastbarkeit], the prohibition of objectification and the practice of the guarantee 
of human dignity with reference to categorical imperatives or, rather, also through a 
balanced-out total consideration [bilanzierende Gesamtbetrachtung]46, and the 
assessment of how international and comparative law influence the production of 
human dignity meaning at the level of constitutional law47. The following analysis is 
woven around those issues. 
Inviolability bespeaks the transcendental in that it introduces a tautological 
proposition into the text of the Basic Law and, as will be demonstrated in the analysis 
of case law in Chapter Two, tautologies signal transcendence in that they substantiate 
the limit to be traversed. The language of inviolability in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG brings forth 
the absolute character of the legal concept: the law of human dignity resists 
balancing.48 In the recent Aviation Security Act Case the FCC, repeating established 
doctrine, noted: 
Human life is the vital basis of human dignity as the essential 
constitutive principle, and as the supreme value, of the constitution 
[citing cases]. All human beings possess this dignity as persons, 
irrespective of their qualities, their physical or mental state, their 
achievements and their social status [citing cases]. It cannot be 
taken away from any human being. What can be violated, however, 
is the claim to respect which results from it [citing cases].49 
The Court’s argument originates in Art. 1 sec. 1, and demonstrates, according 
to a somewhat reversed reading of this passage, first, that the inviolability 
(Unantastbarkeit) of human dignity as an ‘essential constitutive principle’ and the 
highest value of the Basic Law is de facto immanent to human beings by virtue of 
being human, and, as such, cannot be deprived from them. Consequently, Art. 1 sec. 1 
provides that the state shall – but also, it appears, can only – guarantee the claim to 
respect and protection of human dignity founded precisely on the recognition of – de 
facto – inviolability.50                                                          
46 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 6 
47 ibid 
48 Dieter Hömig, ‘Die Menschenwürdegarantie des Grundgesetzes in der Rechtsprechung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ (2007) EuGRZ 633, 640; Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 4 
49 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152); Doctrine: BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) (1975) [Abortion I]; 72, 105 (115) (1986) 
[Life Imprisonment]; 109, 279 (311) (2004) [Großer Lauschangriff] 
50 One could imagine possible courses of critical reflection on this doctrine. Undoubtedly, it refines the 
meaning of the constitutional guarantee. Could it be understood as drawing on Habermas’ distinction 
between facts in discourse and objects of experience, followed by relevant insights in the work of other 
theorists? By establishing a distinction between facts and objects of experience, Habermas effectively 
locates discourse, here legal discourse, at a level eclectically detached from experience, yet related to it 
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Hermeneutics is integral to doctrinal discourse. Hoerster argues that the 
meaning of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG ensues from a harmonized reading of sent. 1 and sent. 2 
leading to the assertion that the phrasing ‘ist unantastbar’ in sent. 1 establishes a 
‘shall’ [soll] rather than merely a ‘can’ [ken]51. The distinction might be seen as a 
benign definitional remark; nevertheless, its significance lies in the manifest effort to 
refine the meaning and practice of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG by striving for ‘clear and                                                                                                                                                               
thanks to his definition of the notion of fact. Habermas’ consensus theory of truth, in maintaining 
rational argumentation at the intersection between the ‘factual’ and the ideal speech situation, preserves 
internal coherence. Habermas draws a sharp distinction between normative statements and value 
judgments on the one hand and empirical statements on the other. While justification of the former 
rests on their correctness, empirical statements’ justification is conditional on their truth. The 
interdependence of correctness and truth is the core theme of Habermas’s consensus theory of truth. 
See Jürgen Habermas, ‘Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen 
Kompetenz’ in Jürgen Habermas & Niklas Luhmann (eds), Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie – Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971) 101, 119; 
Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (first published in English in 1922, with an 
Introduction by Bertrand Russell, F. R. S., C. K. Ogden ed and tr, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co., Ltd., New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1922, Project Gutenberg EBook 
5740, release date: October 22, 2010) (4.061) [‘If one does not observe that propositions have a sense 
independent of the facts, one can easily believe that true and false are two relations between signs and 
things signified with equal rights. […]’]; ibid (4.062) [‘[…] For a proposition is true, if what we assert 
by means of it is the case. […]’]; ibid (6.1222) [‘This throws light on the question why logical 
propositions can no more be empirically established than they can be empirically refuted. Not only 
must a proposition of logic be incapable of being contradicted by any possible experience, but it must 
also be incapable of being established by any such.’]; For Strawson ‘[f]acts are what statements (when 
true) state; they are not what statements are about.’ In Peter Frederick Strawson, ‘A Problem about 
Truth: A reply to Mr. Warnock’ in George Pitcher (ed), Truth (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1964) 32, 38; According to Patzig, facts are ‘essentially language-dependent’ in Günther Patzig, ‘Satz 
und Tatsache’ in ibid, Sprache und Logik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970) 39; Habermas 
distinguishes between two forms of communication, Hanldung (action) and Diskurs (discourse). In 
both forms speech acts pass on the asserted meaning. In Handlung claims to validity, albeit unstated in 
speech acts, are nevertheless recognized as implicitly present. See Jürgen Habermas, 
‘Wahrheitstheorien’ in Walter Schultz & Helmut Fahrenbach (eds), Wirklichkeit und Reflektion, 
Festschrift für Walter Schultz zum 60. Geburtstag (Pfullingen: Verlag Gunther Neske, 1973) 211, 214. 
Diskurs is occupied with examining the soundness of controversial claims to validity. In light of the 
Handlung and Diskurs distinction, fact is ‘what a discursively justifiable statement states.’ See also 
Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation – The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of 
Legal Justification (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 107; 
ibid 103-107; Whether this theory amounts to an appropriate, or sterilized – as compared to other 
approaches – account of the practice of human dignity in law cannot be estimated without resort to 
alternatives. Reference to one alternative is deemed necessary here. MacKinnon notes: ‘The fact that a 
norm is not lived up to or delivered upon with consistency does not mean that it is not a norm. […] 
Virtually no one says they support sex discrimination. […] Despite the level of acceptance of sex 
equality as a principle, women’s actual second-class status continues to be concealed, therefore 
maintained, by pervasive practices, among which is the tendency of law to present functioning 
divisions of power as a discourse of ideas of right and wrong, garbing politics as morality. If the 
equality of the sexes is recognized to be a fact, equalizing socially unequal groups is merely a problem 
to be solved. But if sex equality is seen as a value, it can be accepted or rejected as one side in a 
normative discussion. In policy, a fact is either reflected or distorted; a value can be debated endlessly. 
Its recognition ebbs and flows with time and place, majorities and hegemonies.’ In MacKinnon, Are 
Women Human? (2006) 10; The two approaches are premised on different perceptions of the notion of 
‘fact’. This has implications not only for the treatment of values, but also, with a view to present 
purposes, for how practicing the law of human dignity could be portrayed. 
51 Norbert N. Hoerster, ‘Zur Bedeutung des Prinzips der Menschenwürde’ (1983) Heft 2 JuS 93 
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meaningful speech’52. In that sense, what spurs this doctrinal remark stands close to 
the methodology and ends of the present analysis.  
The doctrinally established distinction between inviolability, on the one hand, 
and the claim to respect guaranteed in the Basic Law on the other is directly related to 
the debate on the descriptive or prescriptive meaning of the phrase ‘ist unantastbar’, 
translated into ‘is’ or ‘shall be inviolable’, in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in German legal 
doctrine.53 Looking at the doctrinal distinction through the presently instituted lens 
conveys new facets of the complexity of practicing human dignity language in law; 
the descriptive and the prescriptive overlap and feed on each other. The presence of 
the word ‘human’ in ‘human dignity’ and the tautology prevalent in the proposition 
that the Basic Law guarantees the dignity of human beings qua beings attest to such 
overlapping and mutual responsiveness between the two understandings.54 
In German legal doctrine and FCC jurisprudence55 the Objektformel put 
forward by German constitutional scholar and lead Basic Law commentator in the                                                         
52 Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 144-145 
53 For a comprehensive reference to sources of arguments in this debate among German legal scholars, 
see Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 131 fn 428; Questioning the importance of this 
doctrinal debate, Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde’ (2012) 187, 188 [‘Geradezu klassisch ist die Fragestellung, ob 
Menschenwürde als deskriptiver oder als normativer Begriff zu deuten ist. Ihr wird hier oftmals 
Ambiguität bescheinigt und daraus gelegentlich ein rechtliches Problem konstruiert. Doch ist dieses 
Problem wenigsten rechstdogmatisch gar keines: Denn da die Menschenwürde im Kontext ihrer 
postulierten Unantastbarkeit steht, ist es gleichgültig, ob man das Wort “ist” als “soll sein” liest oder 
schon die Menschenwürde selbst als normativ versteht. In beiden Fällen misst man ihr einen 
normativen Rang zu.’] 
54 Dieter Grimm, Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar (Vortrag auf dem Festakt der Stiftung 
Bundesprӓsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus zum 60jӓhrigen Bestehen des Grundgesetzes am 8. Mai 2009) 
10 [referring to reactions to the phrasing of the proposition under Art. 1 GG, Grimm explains that the 
misunderstanding lies in that the Basic Law is a legal text and legal texts are normative texts. That is, 
even when they indicate, they do not describe a reality, but rather formulate a ‘shall’, a prescription. It 
should be noted that the emphasis on the descriptive meaning of human dignity is defined by the 
methodological lens through which this proposition is looked at, namely the hermeneutic and literary 
approach to the constitutional text.] 
55 Established fully in BVerfGE 27, 1 (6) (1969) [Mikrozensus] [‘Im Lichte dieses Menschenbildes 
kommt dem Menschen in der Gemeinschaft ein sozialer Wert- und Achtungsanspruch zu. Es 
widerspricht der menschlichen Würde, den Menschen zum bloßen Objekt im Staat zu machen [cited 
cases omitted]. Mit der Menschenwürde wäre es nicht zu vereinbaren, wenn der Staat das Recht für 
sich in Anspruch nehmen könnte, den Menschen zwangsweise in seiner ganzen Persönlichkeit zu 
registrieren und zu katalogisieren, sei es auch in der Anonymität einer statistischen Erhebung, und ihn 
damit wie eine Sache zu behandeln, die einer Bestandsaufnahme in jeder Beziehung zugänglich ist.’]; 
Cf. BVerfGE 30, 1 (25f.) (1970) [Abhörurteil] [‘Allgemeine Formeln wie die, der Mensch dürfe nicht 
zum bloßen Objekt der Staatsgewalt herabgewürdigt werden, können lediglich die Richtung andeuten, 
in der Fälle der Verletzung der Menschenwürde gefunden werden können. Der Mensch ist nicht selten 
bloßes Objekt nicht nur der Verhältnisse und der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, sondern auch des 
Rechts, insofern er ohne Rücksicht auf seine Interessen sich fügen muß. Eine Verletzung der 
Menschenwürde kann darin allein nicht gefunden werden. Hinzukommen muß, daß er einer 
Behandlung ausgesetzt wird, die seine Subjektqualität prinzipiell in Frage stellt, oder daß in der 
Behandlung im konkreten Fall eine willkürliche Mißachtung der Würde des Menschen liegt. Die 
Behandlung des Menschen durch die öffentliche Hand, die das Gesetz vollzieht, muß also, wenn sie die 
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1950s, During56, embodies what has been registered as the Kantian57 prohibition of 
human beings’ instrumentalization on account of the absolute value of reason-
determined existence. The Objektformel58, according to, first, During and, later, FCC 
jurisprudence, prohibits rendering the human being a mere object59 of state action, 
and, so it is argued, encapsulates the Basic Law’s reaction to National Socialism60. 
Deviation from the absolute guarantee of human dignity and engagement in 
balancing, that is, specifically in practicing the principle of proportionality, is justified 
only in human dignity v. human dignity collisions.61 Does the absolute character of 
human dignity call for formal adherence to a categorical imperative, or for balancing 
and ad hoc appreciation of a violation? Those opting for ‘bilanzierende 
Konkretisierung’ [concretization ensuing from balancing] and ‘worsened 
                                                                                                                                                              
Menschenwürde berühren soll, Ausdruck der Verachtung des Wertes, der dem Menschen kraft seines 
Personseins zukommt, also in diesem Sinne eine "verächtliche Behandlung" sein.’]; Cf. first cases in 
that direction BVerfGE 5, 85 (204) (1956) [KPD-Verbot] [‘In der freiheitlichen Demokratie ist die 
Würde des Menschen der oberste Wert. Sie ist unantastbar, vom Staate zu achten und zu schützen. Der 
Mensch ist danach eine mit der Fähigkeit zu eigenverantwortlicher Lebensgestaltung begabte 
"Persönlichkeit". Sein Verhalten und sein Denken können daher durch seine Klassenlage nicht 
eindeutig determiniert sein. Er wird vielmehr als fähig angesehen, und es wird ihm demgemäß 
abgefordert, seine Interessen und Ideen mit denen der anderen auszugleichen. Um seiner Würde willen 
muß ihm eine möglichst weitgehende Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit gesichert werden.’]; BVerfGE 7, 
198 (205) [Lüth] [‘Diesen Sinn haben auch die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes, das mit der 
Voranstellung des Grundrechtsabschnitts den Vorrang des Menschen und seiner Würde gegenüber der 
Macht des Staates betonen wollte. Dem entspricht es, daß der Gesetzgeber den besonderen 
Rechtsbehelf zur Wahrung dieser Rechte, die Verfassungsbeschwerde, nur gegen Akte der öffentlichen 
Gewalt gewährt hat.’] 
56 Günter Dürig, ‘Die Menschenauffassung des Grundgesetzes’ (1952) 7 Juristische Rundschau 259; 
ibid, ‘Der Grundrechtssatz der Menschenwürde – Entwurf eines praktikablen Wertsystems der 
Grundrechte aus Art. 1 Abs. I in Verbindung mit Art. 19 Abs. II des Grundgesetzes’ (1956) 81 AöR 
117, 127; ibid, Art. 1 Abs. 1, in Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig (eds), Grundgesetz: Kommentar 
(Erstbearbeitung, Bd. I, München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1958) para 28   
57 Hoerster (1983) 93, 93 
58 Christian Starck, ‘Menschenwürde als Verfassungsgarantie im modernen Staat’ (1981) JZ 457, 459f. 
[lists cases of objectification]; Grimm, Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar (2009) 13 
[‘prӓzisierungsbedürftig’ as human beings are often objectified without thus experiencing a violation 
of their human dignity] 
59 BVerfGE 30, 1 (25f.) (1970) [Abhörurteil] [expressing scepticism with respect to the applicability of 
the Objektformel]; Friedhelm Hufen, ‘Erosion der Menschenwürde?’ (2004) JZ 313, 317 [not all 
instances of objectification are prohibited, but rather those rendering the human being ‘merely’ an 
object]; Matthias Mahlmann, ‘Human Dignity and Autonomy in Modern Constitutional Orders’ in 
Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 370, 379 fn 54; See also Michael Köhne, ‘Abstrakte 
Menschenwürde?’ (2004) GewArch. 285; See further distinctions and examples of objectification of 
human beings in Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1996) 91f. 
60 Hufen (n 59); Cf. Gerald Neuman, ‘On Fascist Honour and Human Dignity: A sceptical response’ in 
Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe – The Shadow of 
National Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2003) 267 
61 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 133 
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Gesamtwürdigung’ [overall evaluation assessment] approaches62, sophisticatedly 
argue for balancing anterior to actual practice in the legal text of judicial decisions.  
How are objectification language and the principle of proportionality of 
relevance to the present enterprise? The former is strongly evocative of a specific 
image and, from a literary and hermeneutic perspective, incites critical reflection on 
the meaning produced and the human image portrayed in human dignity language 
games where it is practiced. How should this doctrine be understood when practiced 
as language to secure law’s humanism? What could the, literary and hermeneutic, 
implications of instituting it within legal language games be? Practicing the latter, as 
shown in the phenomenological account of human dignity, marks the meta-dimension 
of law. Where the principle of proportionality is applied in legal argumentation, 
namely found in the legal language game produced regardless of whether it is 
considered ultimately a constitutionally permissible tool for deciding the human 
dignity conflict, it occasions the formation of an intersubjective space within the legal 
text, namely a field of dialogue and, at the same time, an opportunity for the 
origination of meaning in pluralism. 
That the subjective protective scope of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG [des Mencken] in 
German legal doctrine includes every human being and is deliberately left open, 
triggers an ontological story of ‘something missing’ in Chapter One, grounded in 
reflections on rights in the thought of French philosopher Jacques Rancière. Solely the 
origin from a human being determines who the human being is.63 The Menschenbild 
of the Basic Law has no prescribed specific characteristics, and thus remains attuned 
to the pluralism of human images and lived experience. Lehmann’s Leistungstheorie, 
in line with Hegel’s understanding of human dignity as an acquired quality rather than 
a worth attributed to human beings by virtue of being human is, hence, for the most                                                         
62 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 46 ff.; See also Winfried 
Brugger, ‘Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?’ (2001) 4 JZ 165 
[revisiting the taboo subject of torture]; Günter Frankenberg, ‘Torture and Taboo: An Essay Comparing 
Paradigms of Organized Cruelty’ (2008) 56(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 403 
[comparative approach to torture and misunderstandings about torture as organized state cruelty; 
deconstruction of the exceptionalism of ‘modern torture’ based on the contention of a nexus between 
law and the rescue motive] 
63 Dreier draws attention to the fact that human dignity is, nevertheless, a constitutional concept, a 
fundamental right; hence, the meaning of ‘des Menschen’ in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG does not imply an 
expansion of the concept’s subjective scope quantitatively to include beyond Germans, for instance, 
Americans, Greeks etc. as human beings, but rather emphasizes that human dignity is guaranteed in the 
Basic Law to all, in other words regardless of specified characteristics. The fact of mere existence is 
the critical parameter for attributing human dignity paradigmatically even to the unborn life. In 
BVerfGE 132, 134 (2012) [Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz] the FCC extended the guarantee of a 
dignified existence minimum to foreigners living in Germany. See Dreier (n 61) 
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part, not applauded by legal scholars. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG guarantees the human dignity 
of each individual, not of humanity as an abstract notion; this clarification has 
implications particularly for the practice of human dignity in cases where qualitative 
aspects of the character and actions of human beings are considered vital in the 
assessment of the gravity of the violation. 
The meta-dimension of the law of human dignity is presently interpreted and 
understood as being interwoven with the Menschenbild64 of and the preambular 
reference to ‘God’ in the Basic Law. Put differently, the transcendental character of 
the law of human dignity and fundamental rights is associated with the ethics 
surfacing in the constitutional text. Former Justice and constitutional scholar 
Böckenförde stresses65 the importance of holding on to the pre-state and meta-
constitutional fundamental provision of human dignity [vorstaatlichen und meta-
verfassungsrechtlichen Grundsatz der Menschenwürde]66 as the basis of a prohibition 
of balancing the law of human dignity with other fundamental rights.67 Of course, the 
concrete human dignity of those experiencing harm or deadlock should not be 
obscured by the meta-conceptualization of the guarantee of human dignity.68 
Emphasis on concrete particulars is, thus, imperative and, granted, foundational to the 
interrelation between human dignity and equality.69 Minding that the anthropological 
image of the constitution, the Menschenbild of the Basic Law, is portrayed as a self-
determined yet socially bound individual70, practicing the duty to respect and protect 
human dignity humanely71 presupposes understanding this law as both a principle of 
                                                        
64 Christian Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, in Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein & Christian Starck (eds), 
Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Kommentar (seit 1953, 6th edn, München: Verlag Vahlen, 2010) para 7 [‘Die 
Verantwortung vor Gott im Zusammenhang mit der Verantwortung vor den Menschen bringt ein 
Menschenbild zum Ausdruck, das metaphysische Wurzeln hat […]’]; Wolfgang Spellbrink, ‘Zur 
Bedeutung der Menschenwürde für das Recht der Sozialleistungen’ (2011) DVBl 661, 661 [‘Whoever 
speaks about human dignity, must at the same time clarify its Menschenbild.’] 
65 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Die Menschenwürde war unantastbar’ Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (3 September 2003) 33 
66 Hufen (2004) 313, 314 
67 Hufen ibid; Starck (n 64) 
68 Böckenförde (n 65) 
69 Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417 
70 Ulrich Becker, Das ‘Menschenbild des Grundgesetzes’ in der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts (1st edn, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) 
71 Christos Yannaras, The inhuman character of human rights [Η απανθρωπία του δικαιώματος] 
(Athens: Domos, 1998) [Yannaras inquires into how human rights can be humane, rather than rejected 
altogether. He criticizes the formal, impersonal, face-less, thus inhuman, portrayal of the human being 
in human rights. Parallels may be drawn between his ideas and the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, in 
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity – An Essay on Exteriority (first published in 1961, with an 
Introduction by John Wild, Alphonso Lingi tr, Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969)] 
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the state [Staatsgrundsatz] and a subjective right72 that enables individual human 
beings to institute their own image within the realm of law.   
The practice of the constitutional guarantee of human dignity in courts’ 
jurisprudence could be rendered as systematic and non-transcendental, merely the 
result of abiding by time-honored doctrine and actuating the methods of interpretation 
at our disposal. The transcendental is understood here as the threshold of escape from 
the cluster of what lies before our eyes and is thus at our disposal, and as an 
intimation of the meta-dimension extending beyond the broad waves of the ocean of 
discourse on human dignity and the universals and particulars surfacing in the 
practice of the law of human dignity. Those who understand constitutional law as a 
closed system or, adopting the language of French philosopher Emmanuel Levin’s73, 
as a totality, tend to reject the transcendental as irrelevant or nonsensical: what is 
ungraspable has no place within a totality structure. 
The Preamble to the German Basic Law, however, points to law’s meta-
dimension. The Preamble states the tasks, the genesis, the meaning and purpose of the 
Basic Law. Composing it presented challenges of distinctly literary and rhetorical 
nature, as the text had to retain a legal tone, while disclosing the Pathos driving the 
pouvoir constituant74. The drafters concluded on the final form of the Preamble after 
much consideration, emending and contemplation about the factors that rendered the 
Basic Law exceptional a constitutional document.75 Preambular propositions 
encapsulate the spirit of constitutional propositions and are thus a valuable source of 
insights for interpreting those and addressing questions of political nature.76 The 
Preamble to the German Basic Law reads: 
Conscious of their responsibility before God and human beings, 
moved by the purpose to serve world peace as an equal part in a 
unified Europe, the German People have adopted, by virtue of their 
constituent power, this Constitution. […]                                                         
72 Hufen (n 66) 314f.  
73 French philosopher of Lithuanian Jewish ancestry. 
74 Hermann von Mangoldt, Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Kommentar (Berlin, Frankfurt a.M.: Franz 
Vahlen GmbH., 1953) 29; ibid 29 [‘[…] in wenigen markanten Strichen […] Das in Kürze zu tun, 
dabei im Gesetzstil zu bleiben und doch auch das Pathos zu wahren, das zu einem Vorspruch nun 
einmal gehört, bot bei der Fülle der anzuschneidenden Fragen erhebliche Schwierigkeiten.’]; From a 
hermeneutic and literary perspective, the stylistic direction to produce a text that is short and impactful 
and the struggle to achieve compliance with legal-style phrasing, while communicating the passion and 
aspirational tone of the Preamble all convey consciousness of and intention to grant this text a specific 
rhetorical character and significance. 
75 ibid 30 
76 ibid 
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This preambular formulation of responsibility evidently conveys the desire of 
the drafters of the Basic Law to distance the thereby established constitutional state 
from the historical background of National Socialism. How is the German people’s 
consciousness77 of their responsibility ‘before God and human beings’78 to be 
interpreted and understood? In this study, preambular reference to ‘God’ is 
understood as a substantiation of the meta-dimension of the Basic Law and is 
associated with the notion of the limit, that is, the limit of the state and of law79 as, 
respectively, the self with critical authority over meaning and the lens through which 
that self looks when practicing the law of human dignity.80 This excerpt is the 
distillation of the state of knowledge ‘on the limits of human capability’81. In 
accordance with the original intent of the representative of the Free Democratic Party 
in the Parliamentary Council and first President of the Federal Republic, Theodor                                                         
77 For a critical appreciation of collective consciousness apropos the modern notion of human dignity, 
which touches on possible pitfalls of the authority over meaning portrayed in the linguistic-analytical 
account infra, see Aurel Kolnai, ‘Human Dignity Today’ in Graham McAleer (ed), Politics, Values and 
National Socialism (Francis Dunlop tr, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2013) 215 [‘Let us 
not forget the increase of universal “nationalism” in its contemporary sense: that is, the demand of 
every self-nominated “nation”, or rather of every social milieu determinable in any way (even when it 
is no more than experimental and programmatic) […] that it be made capable, or that promises be made 
to make it capable, of constituting itself as a unit of collective consciousness and politcall will, … the 
demand, I say of every “nation” in some sense of the word, to be governed by its own human kind, so 
to speak; […] humanity tends not to tolerate the sovereignty over him of any other human type […]. 
We may perhaps sum up the modern rise of human dignity in the following words: the attempt to bring 
about the integral self-rule of man qua man, of man qua any human being, and for that reason of man 
qua integrated humanity, is in the ascendant; a self-rule inseparable from the penetration and 
subjugation of extra-human reality. In this context human dignity appears primarily under the aspect of 
human power – human in its full sense, but for that reason, apart from the intellectual proficiency such 
power implies, having moral implications regarding the web of relations within the human 
collective.’]; See also on consciousness of collective identity and collective consciousness, as well as 
whether these amount to ‘kollektive Güter’, Michael Anderheiden, Gemeinwohl in Republik und Union 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006) 571-75 
78 Theodor Maunz, Präambel, in Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig (eds), Grundgesetz: Kommentar 
(Erstbearbeitung, Bd. I, München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1958) para 20 [Responsibility before human 
beings suggests the commitment to actions compatible with the constitution, rather than a concrete duty 
vis-à-vis other legal actors in the state.]; In German legal scholarship this commitment is associated 
predominantly with a distancing from the National Socialist regime, the limits of the pouvoir 
constituant, and the rejection of totalitarian state models, see Christian Starck, Präambel, in Hermann 
von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein & Christian Starck (eds), Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Kommentar (seit 
1953, 6th edn, München: Verlag Vahlen, 2010) para 36  
79 See also BVerfGE 30, 1 (26) (1970) [Abhörurteil] [‘[…] Die Behandlung des Menschen durch die 
öffentliche Hand, die das Gesetz vollzieht, muß also, wenn sie die Menschenwürde berühren soll, 
Ausdruck der Verachtung des Wertes, der dem Menschen kraft seines Personseins zukommt, also in 
diesem Sinne eine "verächtliche Behandlung" sein.’] 
80 Parallels can be drawn between this portrayal of law as a lens applied by state actors with authority 
over the production of meaning and Günter Frankenberg, Autoritӓt und Integration: Zur Grammatik 
von Recht und Verfassung (2003) [Frankenberg critically approaches the authority of the constitution 
and law more generally to produce binding decisions and further social integration. The model I put 
forward constitutes merely a figurative representation of the constellation of dynamics in these 
processes.] 
81 Starck (n 78) para 36 
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Hues82, who proposed the introduction of this clause into the Preamble, the asserted 
limit serves to harmonize differences of opinion in an ideologically pluralistic state.83 
Insisting on the interpretation of this proposition apropos the notion of the 
limit, the phrase ‘before God’ suggests that the state, as an institution84, is not 
limitless in practicing the law within its jurisdiction, in other words may not touch on 
all aspects of human life. Allusion to ‘God’ in the Preamble as paired with the notion 
of responsibility is not an invocation Dei85, according to the majority of voices in 
German legal scholarship, though critical remarks on the inclusion of such language 
in the Preamble are also uttered. The latter express scepticism as regards the 
contented intention of the drafters to retain neutrality and permit pluralism; rather, it 
is argued, reference to ‘God’ implicitly attests to a collective recognition of 
transcendence.86  
The stance adopted here is responsive to both positions. Telling a story of 
‘something missing’, I identify the meta-dimension or ‘God’ with ‘something always 
missing’, an infinite plane, void of meaning, potentially enabling all concrete 
particular beliefs to manifest themselves in life and law. In that sense, my account 
proposes an alternative portrayal of the former position on the one hand. The story of 
‘something missing’ moreover discharges the scepticism of the latter position; 
collective recognition of transcendence need not foreclose the possibility of pluralism 
                                                        
82 Hermann von Mangoldt, Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Kommentar (1953) 20 [‘Nach erfolglosem erstem 
Wahlgang wurde Prof. Dr. Theodor Heuss mit 416 von den abgegebenen 800 Stimmen gewählt […]’] 
83 Maunz (n 78) para 18 
84 Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 27 [In a decent society institutions do not humiliate people by 
any means, and especially so by law.] 
85 Cf. the preambular presence of ‘God’ in the constitutions of Switzerland (1874), Ireland (1937) and 
Greece (1975); Starck (n 78) para 36 fn 115; See also Dieter Grimm, ‘Conflicts between General Laws 
and Religious Norms’ (2009) 30 Cardozo Law Review 2369 
86 Cf. Christian Hillgruber, ‘Kommentar’ in Horst Dreier (ed), Säkularisierung und Sakralität. Zum 
Selbstverständnis des modernen Verfassungsstaates (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2013) 119, 128 
[‘Was die religiöse, in Sonderheit christliche Imprägnierung des positiv geltenden Verfassungsrechts 
angeht, so sind die frühen Länderverfassungen der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit eine wahre 
Fundgrube; aber auch im insoweit deutlich zurückhaltenderen Grundgesetz finden sich immer noch 
mehr als nur Spurenelemente. Dies beginnt bereits mit der von Dreier nicht erwähnten nominatio dei in 
der Präambel. Die Formel von der “Verantwortung vor Gott” wird zumeist, auch von Horst Dreier, als 
bloße Demutsformel abgetan. Die Absage an staatlich Hybris und Allmachtsphantasien hätte indes 
auch religionsneutral bzw. –frei ausgedrückt werden können. Nach einer im Parlamentarischen Rat 
geäußerten Auffassung sollte indes mit der angesprochenen Verantwortung vor Gott auch verdeutlicht 
werden, dass das Grundgesetz “seine fundamentalen Wurzeln letzen Endes auch im Metaphysischen 
findet”. Selbst wer dies kritisch sieht, wird indes nicht bestreiten können, dass das Deutsche Volk, 
indem es sich als Verfassunggeber Gott gegenüber verantwortlich erklärt, sich kollektiv zur 
Transzendenz bekennt und implizit den Atheismus ablehnt, ohne damit – versteht sich – den Einzelnen 
zu einem Gottesglauben verpflichten zu können oder auch nur zu wollen.’] 
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and intersubjectivity87. What is more, those who exclude themselves from a collective 
transcendence thus conceived are not thereby excluded from the realm of law or life, 
since all that is not ‘something missing’ is essentially ‘what is there’. In other words, 
my approach imbues the affirmative stance towards ‘something missing’ in the 
interpretation of ‘God’ in the Preamble to the Basic Law.    
It is argued that ‘God’ signals the rejection of totalitarian state models,88 and 
essentially underscores that state power is limited.89 In uttering a statement of 
responsibility ‘before God and human beings’ in the Preamble, the members of the 
Parliamentary Council proclaimed that their authority to create the Basic Law was not 
grounded in unlimited and unconditional state and popular sovereignty. This stance 
permeates the unbroken practice of the Basic Law to date90. Many of the members of 
the Parliamentary Council were convinced of the existence of norms that supervene 
upon and precede the state91, regardless of how they are established. Pre-state norms 
cannot be exceeded even by the constituent assembly in the practice of its pouvoir 
constituent.92 One prominent commentator of the Basic Law stated:  
Responsibility before God and human beings neither denies nor 
impairs the pouvoir constituent of the people, but rather delimits its 
inherent decision-making function [Entscheidungsfunktion].93   
How is this ‘inherent decision-making function’ delimited? The meaning of 
the limit is not further specified in this account94. A parallel can be drawn between the                                                         
87 In the same direction, see Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International 
Regimes’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 621 [legal pluralism is not necessarily 
antithetical to constitutionalism] 
88 Starck, Präambel, GG Kommentar (2010) para 36 fn 115; Peter Häberle, ‘“Gott” im 
Verfassungsstaat’ in Walther Fürst, Roman Herzog & Dieter C. Umbach (eds), Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Zeidler (Bd. 1, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1987) 3, 11f.; Horst Dreier, Präambel, in 
Horst Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz. Kommentar (seit 1996, Bd. 1, A. 1-19, 2nd edn, Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2004) para 28; Ingo von Münch, Präambel, in Ingo von Münch & Philip Kunig (eds), 
Grundgesetz-Kommentar (seit 1974, Bd. 1: Präambel bis Art. 69, 6th edn, München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 
2012) para 8 
89 Starck, ibid para 36 [The metaphysical position of the human being professes the relativity of all 
state power and the relativity of meaning: ‘Der Staat soll begrenzt sein und soll nicht über alles 
verfügen dürfen.’]; ibid para 37 [‘Diese Absage an jeden prometheischen Größen wahn und Mahnung 
zur Bescheidenheit verbieten z.B. eine Politik, die den Menschen kulturrevolutionär verändern, den 
“wahren Menschen” erst hervorbringen will, die den im Menschen steckenden homo religiosous nicht 
anerkennt, der nach Anfang, Ende und Sinn des Daseins fragt, der rational nicht erklärbares Vertrauen 
und Hoffnung hat.’]; Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 7 [metaphysical basis and 
ontological-anthropological foundations of the law of human dignity] 
90 Maunz, Präambel, Grundgesetz: Kommentar (1958) para 17 
91 See Christoph Enders, Die Menschenwürde in der Verfassungsordnung: zur Dogmatik des Art. 1 GG 
(Jus Publicum, Bd. 27, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997) 414ff. 
92 Maunz (n 90) 
93 ibid para 17-18 
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ad hoc determination of the meaning of the limit95 and the proposition that the 
concretization of human dignity should only be performed ad hoc in FCC 
jurisprudence96. Dreier concludes that the meaningful practice of the objective law of 
human dignity presupposes concentration on the concrete subject, the particular 
human being97. The law of human dignity guarantees respect for the individual worth 
of every human being vis-à-vis interference by the state and society.98 The limit 
signifies the self-relativization [Selbstrelativierung]99 of legally bound state power, 
which emanates directly from the responsibility of the German people before God and 
human beings100, as much as it conveys the anthropocentricism of the state.101 As 
binding on all branches of state power and directly valid under Art. 1 sec. 3 GG102, 
fundamental rights seal the Basic Law’s anthropocentric orientation. 
The Preamble institutes the limit to the inherent decision-making function of 
all state power, alludes to the limits of the human condition, and declares the dual 
responsibility before the ‘other’, fellow human beings, and the ‘Other’, as indicated in 
the thought of Levin’s, or ‘God’ as in the Preamble to the Basic Law. This study 
adopts an affirmative stance towards the implications of the limit introduced 
exceptionally by the constitutional guarantee of human dignity into the Basic Law, 
and puts forward an understanding of the limit as the ontological, linguistic-analytical 
and phenomenological prerequisite of escaping towards the infinite, of transcending.  
This reference to oneself is precisely what one states when one 
speaks of the identity of being. Identity is not a property of being, 
and it could not consist in the resemblance between properties that, 
in themselves, suppose identity. Rather, it expresses the sufficiency 
of the fact of being, whose absolute and definitive character no one,                                                                                                                                                               
94 ibid para 17 
95 ibid 
96 Established in BVerfGE 30, 1 (25) (1970) [Wiretapping Case, Abhör Urteil]; For a minimalist and 
context-specific delineation of human dignity meaning see Hilgendorf, ‘Instrumentalisierungsverbot 
und Ensembletheorie’ (2010) 1653, 1653ff.; Critically, Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto 
Law Journal 417, 447 [‘One may feel tempted, indeed, to supplement the abstract notion of a 
foundational right or value with the very concrete notion of dignity as a right against extreme cases 
such as torture or cruel and degrading punishment. While this understanding of dignity served as 
building block for a global consensus, at least for a while, it also removed cases from more precise 
ways of inspecting them as violations of fundamental rights. Dignity has been seen as inviolable and of 
untouchable importance, but this has also left us unable to address what happens when human dignity 
is violated.’] 
97 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 117 
98 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 1 
99 ibid 
100 ibid 
101 ibid, para 2 
102 ibid, para 4 
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it seems, could place in doubt. And Western philosophy, in effect, 
has never gone beyond this. In combating the tendency to 
ontologize [ontologisme], when it did combat it, Western 
philosophy struggled for a better being, for a harmony between us 
and the world, or for the perfection of our own being. Its ideal of 
peace and equilibrium presupposed the sufficiency of being. The 
insufficiency of the human condition has never been understood 
otherwise than as a limitation of being, without our ever having 
envisaged the meaning of ‘finite being’. The transcendence of these 
limits, communion with the infinite being, remained philosophy’s 
sole preoccupation…103  
 As demonstrated in the elaboration on the Preamble to the Basic Law supra, 
positions on law’s meta-dimension and the transcendental, indeed indicative of 
divergence in the discourse, are not premised on an affirmative stance towards 
‘something missing’. This does not mean that they all necessarily adopt a negative 
stance; for instance, those upholding the presence of ‘God’ in the Preamble, clarify 
that ideological neutrality is retained and essentially opt for non-definition. Those 
criticizing the implied participation in a collective transcendence consider allusions to 
transcendence as such problematic, because they, automatically, associate this with 
the requirement of connotation of a specific, personal ‘God’. It could be said that only 
those advancing ‘empty box’ or ‘black box’ criticism or Leerformel contentions are 
probably negatively predisposed against a story of ‘something missing’.  
How is an affirmative stance towards ‘something missing’ understood in my 
approach? I set up a model through which instances of practicing the law of human 
dignity can be portrayed. The three layers of this model, the ontological, grounded in 
the thought of the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus, the feminist legal scholar 
Catherine MacKinnon, the French philosopher Jacques Rancière and the Argentinean 
political theorist Ernesto Laclau, the linguistic-analytical, drawing predominantly on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractates Logico-Philosophicus (1922), and the 
phenomenological, premised on concepts in Totality and Infinity – An Essay on 
Exteriority (1961) by French philosopher Emmanuel Levin’s, set up a lens through 
which I invite jurists to look at the practice of the law of human dignity. All three 
accounts spring from a literary and hermeneutic emphasis on the ‘human’ component 
of the composed term ‘human dignity’, contribute elements to the constructed model, 
and offer insights into the transcendental, law’s meta-dimension, the notion of the                                                         
103 Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape/De L’ Evasion (first published in 1935, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003) 51  
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limit, what lies within it and how we conceive of the infinite space beyond it, the dual 
sense of ‘something missing’, the human image, as well as language encountered 
often in the practice of the law of human dignity, such as the notion of the absolute or 
morality, and concepts, such as freedom or equality.  
In the following pages I set up a lens through which to look at the mobilization 
of human dignity language in legal texts. Then, applying that lens, I portray how the 
meta-dimension of the law of human dignity, that is, its transcendental character, is 
actually practiced in the text of seminal instances of FCC jurisprudence. The lens 
carved in Chapter One reconciles the abstractness incidental to the transcendental 
with both abstract universals and concrete particulars encountered in the practice of 
human dignity language in law, in particular legal texts.104 The application of the lens 
to the texts of five seminal instances of FCC jurisprudence in Chapter Two results in 
actual portrayals of this reconciliation.  
The practice of the transcendental aspect of the meaning of the law of human 
dignity is subject to criticism in German legal scholarship.105 Critics predominantly 
premise their argumentation on the controversy that originates in the pluralism of 
understandings of God and, consequently, of the meta-dimension of human dignity. 
Specifically, they appear reluctant to accept that practicing the meta-dimension of the 
law of human dignity need not be limited to connoting either that specific 
metaphysical foundations, for instance Judeo-Christian monotheism106, are preferred 
over others, or that abstract metaphysical standards are applied in concretizing 
meaning107 in light of the particulars of lived experience. I present two of possible 
shortcomings following from such lines of criticism. In doing so, I aim to refine the 
delineation of the presently furthered thesis and to explain how my approach forms an 
alternative that essentially deviates from the aforementioned pitfalls of investing in 
the meta-dimension of the law of human dignity to interpret and understand its 
practice.  
                                                        
104 An important point to be kept in mind for the purpose of refining the objective of my study is that 
abstractness can be associated with both the transcendental and the universal. The linguistic-analytical 
account of the law of human dignity in Chapter One portrays the spatial rendering of the transcendental 
vis-à-vis the universal and clarifies the distinction between the two aspects of meaning. 
105 See Nettesheim, ‘Die Garantie der Menschenwürde zwischen metaphysicher Überhöhung und 
bloßem Abwägungstopos’ (2005) 130 AöR 71 
106 See Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 6 
107 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 19 
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The first shortcoming of portraying how the meta-dimension of the law of 
human dignity is practiced concerns the danger of a clash between competing 
understandings of human dignity in a multicultural and, in particular, religiously 
heterogeneous society.108 What is more, epiphanies found in natural law doctrine109 
are in tension with an open, pluralistic legal and social order, traditionally 
safeguarded by positivism and marked by traits such as the impersonal, the neutral, 
the foreseeable: metaphysical assumptions and theological references as aspects of 
human dignity meaning cannot be resorted to for the concretization of the 
constitutional guarantee of human dignity. Rather, if one wants to attribute ideological 
neutrality to the Basic Law, one needs to resist particular metaphysical 
interpretations.110  
What if, instead of emphasizing conceivable diverse concretizations in a 
pluralistic legal and social order and identifying the picture of ideological neutrality 
as a remedy for the danger of clashing conceptions, we associated the transcendental 
character of the law of human dignity, that is, its meta-dimension, with ‘something 
missing’? If the law of human dignity is empty, then how is it empty, and how can we 
interpret and understand the textual practice of that law as an affirmative stance 
towards ‘something missing’? In short, listening and learning from lived experience 
affirms that there is no neutrality in the practice of law111, and this contradicts 
insistence on neutrality asserted by voices in legal scholarship112. In practicing the law 
of human dignity, a concrete particular Menschenbild is put forward. The 
mobilization of human dignity thus renders a concrete human image present within 
the realm of law and at once indicates ‘something missing’; ‘something missing’ 
                                                        
108 ibid 
109 Erhard Denninger, ‘Die Wirksamkeit der Menschenrechte in der deutschen 
Verfassungsrechtsprechung – Zur Geltung der Menschenrechte jenseits von Naturrecht und 
Positivismus’ (1998) JZ 1129, 1130f. 
110 Nettesheim (2005) 71 
111 Susanne Baer, Rechtssoziologie – Eine Einführung in die interdisziplinäre Rechtrsforschung 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011) 147 [Law is a source of power and at the same time a technique of 
legitimizing that power and concealing it under this veil of legitimacy.] 
112 Badura (1964) JZ 337, 340 [‘Es ist zwar stets möglich, Rechtssätze unter dem Blickwinkel einer 
bestimmten Vorstellung vom Menschen zu betrachten, doch können sich aus diesem 
rechtssoziologischen und rechtsphilosophischen Ansatz nicht ohne weiteres Aussagen über 
Rechtsfolgen ergeben. Demgegenüber besitzt das weitere Argument, daß die personale Anthropologie 
und die materiale Wertethik in dem Forum, in welchem über ihre Stichhaltigkeit zu entscheiden ist, 
nähmlich im Forum der Philosophie, starken Einwänden ausgesetzt sind, nur zweiten Rang. Immerhin 
aber wird dadurch insofern das Augenmerk auf die notwendige Unterscheidung von Sätzen der Ethik 
und des Rechts gelenkt als die rechtliche Geltung und die rechtliche Bedeutung des Art. 1 I GG nicht 
mit dem Schicksal einer bestimmten philosophischen Lehre verknüpft sein können.’] 
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corresponds to an empty space reserved for the part of those who have no part as 
articulated by Rancière. In practicing the law of human dignity this empty space is 
filled with a concrete and particular Menschenbild. How ‘something missing’ within 
the realm of law relates to the transcendental will be discussed extensively infra; for 
now it suffices to rethink the claim to neutrality in light of these reflections. Could 
pledging to opt for neutrality be understood as an expression of the commitment of 
the pouvoir constituent to leave space within the realm of law for the manifestation of 
concrete particular human images composing a pluralist reality? 
The second shortcoming of inquiring into the meta-dimension of the law of 
human dignity by resorting to philosophical grounds is related to the epistemological 
implications of the postulate that justification for the inclusion of supra-positive 
standards into the normative heritage [zum normativen Erbe]113 of humanity must be 
sought in the history of ideas114. Such grounds for reluctance towards metaphysical 
interpretations presume that practicing the supra-positive law of human dignity must 
mean employing metaphysical standards for its concretization.115 German philosopher 
Norbert Hoerster appears disinclined to associate the meaning of human dignity as 
capability to self-determination in freedom with metaphysical indeterminism.116 
According to German public law scholar Nettesheim, this could lead to the 
substitution of legal method for a doctrine introducing a meta-legal epiphany117. 
Another legal scholar, Hydrogen, argues that resisting references to transcendence is 
more attuned an epistemological stance towards the constitutional meaning of the law 
of human dignity than drawing concrete instructions for practicing that law from a 
particular metaphysical order and, as a result, producing unsound judgments.118 
However, scholarly disinclination within the discipline of law to refer to 
transcendence [Transzendenzbezug] as in the European history of ideas and in modern 
ethical approaches to human dignity119 is not necessarily in accordance with actual 
instances of practice of the transcendental aspect of the law of human dignity, and                                                         
113 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 19 
114 ibid 
115 ibid 
116 Hoerster (1983) 93, 96 fn 17 
117 See Nettesheim (2005) 71  
118 Herdegen (n 107) 
119 Herdegen ibid; Ludger Honnefelder, ‘Menschenwürde und Transzendenzbezug’ (2009) 57 DZPhil 
273, 273ff.; ibid 273, 276ff., 283ff. [Thomas von Aquin understood the personal claim to respect for 
dignity to be grounded in anthropological foundational assumptions and to be associated with the 
vulnerability of human beings.] 
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certainly does not foreclose other associations between the supra-positive and 
concrete particulars. To wit, adopting an affirmative stance towards the transcendental 
as ‘something missing’ in practicing that law effectively guarantees human beings the 
space that belongs to them by virtue of being human within the realm of law.  
Three further reflections refine the point put forward here as a response to this 
line of criticism: First, the project of portraying the meta-dimension of the law of 
human dignity as ‘something missing’ employs ontological, linguistic-analytical and 
phenomenological philosophical insights as foundations. These are derived from 
sources that are not bracketed as moments in the long course of human dignity in the 
history of ideas sketched out in German and Anglo-American legal literature. Be that 
as it may, this should not be misunderstood as a challenge to the commonly 
documented philosophical background or the value of drawing supra-positive 
standards therefromth. Rather, this hermeneutic and literary approach to the practice 
of the law of human dignity opposes the arbitrary assertion that supra-positive 
standards are to be sought only there.  
Second, three philosophically grounded accounts of the transcendental 
character of the law of human dignity are established in Chapter One; I tell three 
stories of ‘something missing’. These stories are merely three conceivable approaches 
to the transcendental. Their distinct significance lies, first, in that they decisively 
depart from approaches tailoring the meaning of the legal guarantee to the 
assumptions of a specific metaphysical order. The three accounts proposed on the 
contrary allow for pluralism of understandings of the transcendental and of portrayals 
of its imprint on universals and particulars in the practice of the law of human dignity. 
Redundancy theoretical approaches120 bespeak perhaps a niche in the discourse about 
the meaning of the law of human dignity and can thus be regarded as an appropriate 
point of departure for reasoning an affirmative stance towards ‘something missing’. 
That said, the three stories of ‘something missing’ are not to be perceived as stories of 
redundancy. Rather, ‘something missing’ is found to be an essential aspect of human 
dignity meaning of exceptional value to the practice of law, precisely because it is 
presupposed by the humane practice of law.  
Third, an important underlying proposition to the presently initiated argument 
is that the mobilization of meta-standards in the practice of the law of human dignity                                                         
120 Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde’ (2012) 187, 197f. 
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need not call into question the indispensability of doctrinal formulations in applying 
that law to concrete cases. The former deepen our understanding and cultivate our 
consciousness of what cannot be grasped, totalized, exhaustively determined, and put 
into words once and for all. The latter are indispensible for the consistent and 
coherent applicability of the legal guarantee as they reversely render aspects of human 
dignity meaning graspable within the realm of law.  
Positivist doctrinal approaches establish totalities that set many things straight; 
at the same time totality traits alone cannot portray the transcendental character of the 
law of human dignity as practiced in legal texts. Resting our case on the portrayal of 
that law as a totality structure suspends inquiry into pressing questions. Is human 
dignity practiced only when enforced in comprehensive arguments, or even when it 
merely, yet consciously, appears as language in legal texts? How does the practice, 
namely respect and protection, of the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as an account 
of the meta-meaning of the law of human dignity guarantee law’s humanism, while 
recognizing the importance of law’s pragmatism? 
What human dignity is constitutes a problem, because it is not 
obvious, even though or perhaps precisely because, it might seem so 
initially. The problem of identifying exactly what human dignity is, 
is a problem that underlies the related problem of insuring that 
human dignity is recognized.121 
Ultimately, philosophical grounds are called for. Then, legal science can 
follow, at least, two conceivable courses of action122. The one would be to refine our 
doctrinal tools, for instance to invest in constructive disagreement with a view to 
clarifying the law and the legal doctrine already existent. The other would be to turn 
our sights tenaciously to the language and the concept itself for answers, and ‘listen’ 
to human dignity language and phrasal context. This constitutes admittedly a 
hermeneutic and literary approach to law. The two paths sometimes run parallel to 
each other and sometimes coincide. For instance, recognizing the absoluteness of the 
guarantee of human dignity, or granting it the legal character of a fundamental right 
equally ensue from ‘listening’ to the notion’s meaning, in particular meaning as 
significance. Significance is context-sensitive and admits of various understandings,                                                         
121 Mette Lebech, On the Problem of Human Dignity – A Hermeneutical and Phenomenological 
Investigation (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann GmbH, 2009) 17 
122 Far from questioning the value of either one of these alternatives, as demonstrated in Chapter One, 
bouncing to and fro guarantees an informed, and humane, practice of the law of human dignity. 
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as for instance, varying interpretations of human dignity in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in light of 
National Socialism and the atrocities of the World War II demonstrate.123 
Reflection on the empirically observed ambiguity and controversy re the 
practice of human dignity in legal arguments is evident in legal scholarship124. 
Ambiguity and controversy can be understood as ‘something missing’; if meaning 
denotes both signification and significance or value, then ‘something missing’ can 
refer to ellipsis in both senses. Principally, a distinction is drawn between first, 
‘something missing’ by analogy to Wolfgang Isere’s Leerstelle concept in literary 
theory125 and, second, ‘something always missing’ signifying the transcendental 
character or the meta-dimension of law.  
The first sense refers to a gap in meaning, which incites turning to other text 
segments, that is, transposed to the practice of human dignity in law, turning to 
context. The presumption of emptiness of human dignity in redundancy theoretical 
approaches126 inspires the perception of the concept as a Leerstelle and can be 
hermeneutically associated with legal actors’ efforts to scout for other textual-
contextual and empirical data in interpreting, understanding and availing themselves                                                         
123 See Neuman, ‘On Fascist Honour and Human Dignity: A sceptical response’ (2003) 267 [deviation 
from the time-honored association of the constitutional guarantee of human dignity with the National 
Socialist German past] 
124 Ambiguity and controversy as indications of ‘something missing’ are empirical observations re, 
first, the argumentation developed by legal scholars, who, seen from a hypothetical higher point of 
view, indeed seem to be talking past each other; second, re positive law manifestations of human 
dignity across cultures and levels of constitutionalism; third, re the judicial practice of human dignity, 
particularly as pictured in legal scholarship. See also Hoerster (1983) 93, 93; McCrudden (2008) 655 
[emphasis on judicial interpretation]; Spellbrink (2011) 661, 662 [the semantic content of Art. 1 GG is 
indeterminate and open] 
125  Wolfgang Iser, Der Akt des Lesens: Theorie ästhetischer Wirkung (4th edn, München: Fink, 1994) 
238-39 [‘Thema und Signifikanz sind folglich nur Konstituenten der Vorstellung. Ein Thema bildet 
sich für die Vorstellung über die vom problematisierten Wissen des Repertoires erzeugte 
Aufmerksamkeit. Die Signifikanz des Themas bildet sich für die Vorstellung aus der Leerstelle des 
Themas, die dadurch entsteht, daß das Thema nicht Selbstzweck, sondern Zeichen für das in ihm noch 
nicht Gegebene ist. So produziert die Vorstellung ein imaginäres Objekt, in dem das zur Erscheinung 
gelangt, was der formulierte Text verschweigt. Doch das Verschwiegene entsteht aus dem Gesagten; 
deshalb muß das Gesagte so modalisiert sein, daß das Verschwiegeene vorstellbar wird.’]; ibid 284 
[‘Ergeben sich Leerstellen aus den Unbestimmtheitsbeträgen des Textes, so sollte man sie wohl 
Unbestimmtheitsstellen nennen, wie es Ingarden getan hatte. Leerstellen indes bezeichnen weniger eine 
Bestimmungslücke des intentionalen Gegenstandes bzw. der schematisierten Ansichten als vielmehr 
die Besetzbarkeit einer bestimmten Systemstelle im Text durch die Vorstellung des Lesers. Statt einer 
Komplettierungsnotwendigkeit zeigen sie eine Kombinationsnotwendigkeit an. […] Durch sie ist die 
im Text ausgesparte Anschließbarkeit seiner Segmente signalisiert.’]; ibid 302 [‘Leerstellen sind als 
ausgesparte Anschließbarkeit der Textsegmente zugleich die Bedingungen ihrer Beziehbarkeit. Als 
solche indes dürfen sie keinen bestimmten Inhalt haben; denn sie vermögen die geforderte 
Verbinbarkeit der Textsegmente nur anzuzeigen, nicht aber selbst vorzunehmen. […] Immer dort, wo 
Textsegmente unvermittelt aneinander stoßen, sitzen Leerstellen, die die erwartbare Geordnetheit des 
Textes unterbrechen.’] 
126 Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde’ (2012) 187, 197f. 
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of human dignity as a legal concept. ‘Something missing’ as a Leerstelle constitutes a 
hermeneutic and literary tool for portraying the tension between universals and 
particulars127, which, from a skeptical and rhetorical perspective, features as circulus 
in probando argumentation, namely as a circular movement from the particular to the 
universal and, again, to the particular128 from which there is no escape.  
Another concept of special pertinence to ‘something missing’ is the empty 
signifier in the thought of political theorist Ernesto Laclau. The empty signifier is 
‘incarnating the moment of universality’129, and stands for ‘a signifier without a 
signified’130. ‘Something missing’ is to be understood by analogy not only with the 
‘empty’ but also with the ‘floating’ signifier131 in the thought of Laclau, because 
‘something’ in ‘something missing’ points to the ‘overdetermination or […] 
underdetermination’132 that prevents fully fixing the meaning of human dignity, that 
is, alludes to ambiguity133 rather than emptiness.  
[…]  if the universal results from a constitutive split in which the 
negation of a particular identity transforms this identity in the 
symbol of identity and fullness as such, in that case, we have to 
conclude that: (1) the universal has no content of its own, but is an 
absent fullness or, rather, the signifier of fullness as such, of the 
very idea of fullness; (2) the universal can only emerge out of the 
particular, because it is only the negation of a particular content 
that transforms that content in the symbol of a universality 
transcending it; (3) since, however, the universal – taken by itself –                                                         
127 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London, New York: Verso, 1996) 13 [‘[…] conceiving the 
relationship between universalism and particularism which differs from both an incarnation of one in 
the other and the cancellation of their difference and which, in fact, creates the possibility of new 
discourses of liberation.’]; ibid 14 [‘the relation between particularity and universality is an essentially 
unstable and unpredictable one.’] 
128 Mary Mills Patrick, Sextus Empiricus and Greek Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism 
(accompanied by a Translation from the Greek of the First Book of the ‘Pyrrhonic Sketches’ by Sextus 
Empiricus, Cambridge: Deighton Bell& Co.; London: George Bell & Sons, 1899; Project Gutenberg 
EBook 17556, release date: January 20, 2006) 55  [The fifth of the five Tropes, the circulus in 
probando, ‘arises when that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the thing to be 
proved.’]; ibid 46 f. [‘[…] no one is free from the influence of all conditions of body and mind, so that 
he can be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be established that can be shown to be true, 
but on the contrary, whatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterion and the proof will be 
thrown into the circulus in probando, for the truth of each rests on the other.’ In critically reflecting on 
coherence theories on human dignity, Wihl touches on the distinction between a criterion and a 
definition of truth encountered in grounding approaches in this theoretical strand. See Wihl, ‘Wahre 
Würde’ (2012) 187, 195 f.]; See also Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonic Sketches [Πυρρώνειες 
Υποτυπώσεις]. First Book (164-186, 209-241), Second Book (1-133) (with a Commentary by Tereza 
Pentzopoulou-Valala tr, Hellenistic Philosophy, The Sceptics: Arkesilaos, Karenadis, Filon, Antiohos, 
Stylianos Dimopoulos, Thessaloniki: Zetros [Ζήτρος], 2007) 546ff.  
129 Laclau (n 127) 55 





is an empty signifier, what  particular content is going to symbolize 
the latter is something which cannot be determined either by an 
analysis of the particular in itself or of the universal. The relation 
between the two depends on the context of the antagonism and it is, 
in the strict sense of the term, a hegemonic operation.134 
The negation of a particular content generates the symbolic, ‘the symbol of a 
universality transcending it’135, an ideatum that surpasses the idea136. In Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Tractates Logico-Philosophicus the symbolic is associated with 
tautology137. In tautology ‘the conditions of agreement with the world […] cancel one 
another, so that it stands in no presenting relation to reality’ and it ‘leaves to reality 
the whole infinite logical space […]’138. Starting, perhaps, to fathom the links 
between the inviolability of human dignity in the Basic law, tautological schemata 
and symbolical meaning, one becomes aware of how an affirmative stance towards 
‘something missing’, a notion analogous to the empty and floating signifiers, carries 
the promise of relinquishing the exceptional hermeneutic and literary potential of 
human dignity language in law. Laclau also indicates the nature of the tension 
between the universal and a particular: antagonism, ‘a hegemonic operation’139, a 
process that leads one particular to reign over others in representing the universal, a 
polemos as per the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus. The process and outcome are 
essentially highly dependent on context. Laclau stresses, ‘only if the signifiers empty 
themselves of their attachment to particular signifieds and assume the role of 
representing the pure being of the system – or, rather, the system as pure Being – […] 
[is] such a signification […] possible.’140 
The second sense of something escaping our grasp, which constitutes the 
mainspring of this thesis, is framed as ‘something always missing’. The treatment of 
the universals-particulars tension supra apropos ‘something missing’ set the stage for                                                         
134 ibid 14 f. 
135 ibid 
136 For the purpose of avoiding confusion it is vital to distinguish between ‘universals’ as used in the 
present analysis and Laclau’s ‘symbol of a universality’. Universals are not identified with the 
transcendental in my argument. The ‘symbol of a universality’, however, in the thought of Laclau 
indeed evokes the idea of infinity. According to Levinas, what is exceptional about the idea of infinity 
is that ‘its ideatum surpasses the idea’, in Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 49; ibid 289 [‘[…] the idea of 
infinity, the presence in a container of a content exceeding its capacity […]’]; See also Günter 
Frankenberg, ‘Constitution-Building In Times Of Transition’ (2001) 4 Politička Misao 103 
[Constitutions per se are instruments and symbols; the instrumental nature can be associated with law’s 
pragmatism, while the symbolic is indicative of representatation, understood as a literary term.] 
137 See infra, Chapter One, B 
138 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.462); ibid (4.463) 
139 Laclau (n 127) 43 [‘The presence of empty signifiers […] is the very condition of hegemony.’] 
140 ibid 39 
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associating ‘something always missing’, the transcendental, with the infinite rather 
than the universal. Framing thus the meta-dimension of the law of human dignity, I 
emphasize the difference between the modus operandi of the tension between 
universals and particulars in practicing that law, a circular process and ‘something 
always missing’, the transcendental that breaches the circle. The transcendental, what 
cannot be ‘said’ but only ‘shown’, borrowing language from Wittgenstein’s Tractates, 
is practiced distinctly when the law of human dignity is mobilized in legal texts.  
With respect to ‘something always missing’ all that can be ‘shown’ is a 
demarcating line, namely the limit between what is there, and something consistently 
missing. Discussing the limit, what cannot be ‘said’ but only ‘shown’, allows for that 
which can neither be ‘said’ nor ‘shown’ to be understood by revealing the shape of its 
shadow. The shadow metaphor hints at the nothingness (lack of light) corresponding 
to the shadow of a given object, which is representational of the object’s shape, in 
other words, limits. If the notion of the limit is incorporated into the meaning of 
human dignity as practiced in law, then this meta-conceptualization of human dignity 
stands on the borderline between content and form, signification and significance; as 
regards the meta-dimension of human dignity, all human beings can sense is their 
absolute separation from ‘something always missing’. 
The point of departure for telling a story of ‘something missing’, namely the 
empirical observation of ambiguity and controversy re the practice of human 
dignity141 as a legal concept, cannot provide a sound justificatory basis for the dual 
sense of ‘something missing’. Be that as it may, it constitutes de facto grounds for the 
probability142 of ‘something missing’ and the reasonableness of scrutinizing this 
proposition as an articulation of what forms an integral aspect of human dignity in the 
                                                        
141 Arthur Schopenhauer’s critique of the human dignity proposition as understood from a Kantian 
viewpoint, namely the thesis that human beings should be treated as ends rather than means to end, 
centers on the highly vague, indeterminate character of the concept, which renders it insufficient and 
elliptical [wenigsagend] unless concretized. Schopenhauer stresses the need for explanation, definition 
and modification of human dignity meaning as a prerequisite for any sort of practice. As in Hoerster 
(1983) 93 
142 Cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.155) [‘The unit of the probability proposition is: The circumstances 
– with which I am not further acquainted – give to the occurrence of a definite event such and such a 
degree of probability.’]; ibid (5.156) [‘Probability is a generalization. It involves a general description 
of a propositional form. Only in default of certainty do we need probability. If we are not completely 
acquainted with a fact, but know something about its form. (A proposition can, indeed, be an 
incomplete picture of a certain state of affairs, but it is always a complete picture.) The probability 
proposition is, as it were, an extract from other propositions.’] 
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most profound sense.143 To be sure, the ambiguity and controversy traced in the legal 
discourse can only serve as a starting point to a story of ‘something missing.’ De facto 
grounds point to the reasonableness of engaging in further research. 
A story of ‘something missing’ could be viewed as a contribution to non-
definition144 or negative determination145 approaches as conceivable remedies to the 
necessity of value decisions in practicing the law of human dignity. Minimalist 
approaches reflect an effort to assert the intersubjective basis of moral legitimacy. 
‘Black box’146, ‘leerformelhaft’147, or ‘smokescreen’148 contentions, or, as Wahl puts 
it, redundancy theories149, are not extensively problematized in legal literature. The 
dual sense of ‘something missing’, I argue, does not merely descriptively denote 
missing parts of human images and lacunas in the practice of the law of human 
dignity; more importantly, it serves an analytical function reinforced by the empirical 
observation of the elliptical character of human dignity manifestations in legal 
texts.150 To be more specific, the present approach is – in postmodern fashion151 – a                                                         
143 The claim that a genuinely inherent to the concept of human dignity quality can be articulated, and, 
what is more, that this quality could be trailed in the practice of the concept in legal texts must be 
subject to critical reflection. According to Popper, some theory is always implied even in the simplest 
of sentences. Since acceptance of ‘basic statements’ as valid is necessarily mediated by a given – 
unavoidably subjectively selected – theoretical approach, the claim that I unveil an integral to human 
dignity language feature is not absolutely uncontestable and fixed, precisely due to its definitional 
nature. ‘Basic statements’, due to the ‘universal names’ that stand for their meaning, are essentially 
always hypotheses, which could be verified or falsified. Only the systematic and sound justification of 
the sources and steps of interpretation can outweigh the risks of a hermeneutical and definitional 
project. See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (first published in Vienna: Verlag von 
Julius Springer, 1935; London, New York: Routledge Classics, 1968) 94-95; ibid 104ff.  [Acceptance 
of ‘basic statements’ depends necessarily on an underlying agreement that renders further discourse 
possible.]  
144 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 51; See also para 51 fn 159 [Theodor Heuß’s 
‘nicht interpretierte These’] 
145 See Badura (1964) JZ 337; Dreier ibid para 51 
146 Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417, 420 
147 Hoerster (1983) 93, 96 
148 McCrudden (2008) 655, 722  
149 Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde’ (2012) 187, 197f. 
150 Hoerster (n 147) [Hoerster notes the elliptical [leerformelhaft] character of the principle of human 
dignity in the legal reality [‘in unserer Rechtswirklichkeit’] of practice in Germany.]   
151 I presently use the term in light of Butler’s reflections and understanding in Judith Butler, 
‘Contingent foundations: feminism and the question of postmodernism’, in ibid, Feminists theorize the 
political (New York, London: Routledge, 1992) 3, 6f. [‘I don’t know about the term “postmodern,” but 
if there is a point, and a fine point, to what I perhaps better understand as poststructuralism, it is that 
power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms, including the subject 
position of the critic; and further, that this implication of the terms of criticism in the field of power is 
not the advent of a nihilistic relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, rather, the very precondition 
of a politically engaged critique. To establish a set of norms that are beyond power or force is itself a 
powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, disguises and extends its own power play 
through recourse to tropes of normative universality.’]; ibid 15 [‘To deconstruct is not to negate or to 
dismiss, but to call into question and perhaps most importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a 
reusage or redeployment that previously has not been authorized.’]; Cf. MacKinnon’s line of criticism, 
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Trojan Horse within the walls of negative significations and polemic ‘emptiness’ 
talk152 and an affirmative stance towards ‘something missing’153, enkindling neglected 
questions in the legal discourse, such as: Why does the legal concept of human 
dignity appear ‘empty’? Or, how is it ‘empty’? Why and how is it a ‘black box’? How 
do manifestations of the concept appear abstract as universals and concrete as 
particulars? 
Intending to elucidate the meaning of the law of human dignity, the present 
analysis considers the transcendental character of human dignity and law’s 
Menschenbild, and anchors the relevance and merit of the three philosophical 
accounts offered in Chapter One to their hermeneutic value as tools for advancing 
another understanding of language that features dominantly in legal texts, drawing 
specifically on positive law, case law and legal literature. Though evidently pertinent 
to the metaphysical and transcendental154 aspects of the law of human dignity, the 
argument considerably departs from the abstraction of metaphysical approaches155.                                                                                                                                                               
reacting particularly to how postmodernism does not pay justice to feminist theory and method, 
MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 49 [Granted, what postmodernism involves is elusive. 
‘Postmodernism is a flag flown by a diverse congeries, mostly because lack of unity is their credo and 
they feel no need to be consistent.’ According to MacKinnon this ‘trend in theory’ targets on reality. 
‘Postmodernism, I will argue – or more narrowly, the central epistemic tendency in it that I am 
focusing on – derealizes social reality by ignoring it, by refusing to be accountable to it, and, in a 
somewhat new move, by openly repudiating any connection with “it” by claiming “it” is not there.’]; 
ibid 54 [‘Postmodernism as practiced often comes across as style – petulant, joy-riding, more posture 
than position. But it has a method, making meta-physics far from dead. Its approach and its position, its 
posture toward the world and tis view of what is real, is that it’s all mental. Postmodernism imagines 
that society happens in your head. Back in the modern period, this position was called idealism.’]; ibid 
63 [‘Their critically minded students are taught that nothing is real […] that reality is a text (reading is 
safer than acting any day), that creative misreading is resistance (you feel so radical and comfortably 
marginal), that nothing can be changed (you can only amuse yourself).’].  
152 Hoerster for instance frames emptiness as an aspect of the problem of necessary value decisions in 
practicing the law of human dignity. The principle of human dignity is rendered a Leerformel, an 
empty formula, when decisions are taken on which forms of human self-determination correspond to 
the ‘morally legitimate’, in lack of intersubjectively accepted criteria. Be that as it may, Hoerster 
clarifies that a legal concept is not a Leerforel simply because of the controversy involved in practicing 
it in certain cases, in Hoerster (1983) 93, 95 
153 Wihl, ‘Wahre Würde’ (2012) 187, 198 [The affirmative stance towards the dual sense of ‘something 
missing’ is at once an account of how the ‘Ebenenverwechslung’ noted in Wihl’s account of the 
redundancy theory operates in the practice of the law of human dignity particularly in instances in FCC 
jurisprudence.] 
154 The analysis is premised on the distinction between the meta-dimension of human dignity and the 
transcendental; the latter intimates a movement, namely the traversal of a limit towards the meta-level, 
involves critical reflection, and underlines the processual dimension of the practice of the law of human 
dignity and the possibility of ascendence to an understanding of the concept’s meaning. See, in a 
similar direction, Stöcker’s critique of the Leerformel in Hans A. Stöcker, ‘Menschliche Würde und 
kritische Jurisprudenz – Zur utilitarischen Auslegung des Art. 1 I GG’ (1968) JZ 685, 686 [‘[...] 
Rechtsagnostizismus […] macht die Jurisprudenz zu einer Farbenlehre für Blinde, womit der Gipfel, 
auf dem sich die menschliche Würde entfaltet, mit Sicherheit ebenfalls nicht erklommen wäre.’] 
155 At the same time this approach departs from inquiry into sociological aspects of the law of human 
dignity. See Stöcker (n 154) 685 
 40
Methodologically, this approach resists both raw empiricism and metaphysical 
obscurity156, seeking, rather, to construe and apply a model through which we can 
abstract from particulars only to understand them anew.157 Language is a foundational 
theme in all three accounts as well as the centerline of the methodological approach in 
both Chapter One and Chapter Two. Once the construction of the multilayered model 
is completed one understands language as lived experience.158 
Where does this approach stand vis-à-vis the scholarly quest for determination 
of human dignity as a legal concept? There are obviously good reasons why jurists 
concentrate their efforts on rendering the practice of human dignity workable – even 
more, universally159 workable – by pursuing the establishment of a universal 
minimum core, or a harmonized system and process of constitutional interpretation. 
However, such approaches are only partially satisfying, as the scope of the research 
question does not necessarily trigger critical reflection. Minding that a particular can 
be methodically tackled, framed, and, ultimately, doctrinally baptized a workable 
universal, could positivist approaches160 or rigidly applied legal doctrine go so far as 
to translate such workability into a perception of the constitutional guarantee that 
effectively totalizes all other particulars arising in practice? Totality signifies the 
perception of the world; the world is included, in its entirety, within the boundaries of 
our vision. Since all we assume we need to see and know is gathered right before our 
eyes, totality structures advance law’s – strict sense – workability. Certainty, 
uniformity and foreseeability of outcomes in the practice of the law of human dignity 
could be bracketed as totality traits in view of phenomenological insights elaborated 
on in Chapter One. 
Practicing the law is associated with pragmatic considerations, as it constitutes 
an outcome-oriented process that entails – to varying extents, depending on the                                                         
156 ibid 686 
157 Stöcker, ibid 686; The present argument initiates a linguistic-analytical discourse with the intention 
of guaranteeing clear and meaningful speech and, consequently, meaningful practice of human dignity 
language in law. See Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 191 
158 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 12 [Introduction by John Wild]  
159 Admittedly, a universally attuned, workable system of judicial interpretation founded on a universal 
consensus on the content or the form, the substance or the function, or, holistically, the meaning of 
human dignity seems to be a utopia. At the level of constitutional courts’ jurisprudence, judicial 
interpretation seems more workable, despite the concept’s relative abstractness and indeterminacy. The 
criticism of conceptual ambiguity and controversy in constitutional courts’ practice is, at times, 
inflated. See McCrudden (2008) 655, 712 f.; Cf. Carozza (2008) 931; See Neomi Rao, ‘On the Use and 
Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2008) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 201; 
Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity’ (2010) 464 
160 Erhard Denninger, ‘Über das Verhältnis von Menschenrechten zum positiven Recht’ (1982) JZ 225 
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methodological disposition of legal actors towards lived experience – a constant 
confrontation with reality.161 In practicing the law of human dignity legal actors 
produce meaning162. As noted supra, totalities render parameters taken into account in 
the practice of law surveyable, hence also manageable, and are presupposed by sound 
justification of decisions in accordance with requirements of due process and equality 
before the law. The point of concern, however, is not whether or how totalities are 
necessary and useful in the practice of law, but rather whether they amount to 
adequate portrayals of such practice, in view of the foundational character of the law 
of human dignity in the order of the Basic Law or any order that adheres to the 
guarantee and aspiration of humanism.  
The succeeding analysis demonstrates that developing a totality view of the 
practice of human dignity in law, constitutes just one of two parallel stories. The 
totality story allows for grasping the multi-dimensionality of human dignity meaning 
through a broadening of our vision’s horizons, for instance through comparative 
juxtaposition, contextualization, or inter- and transdisciplinary reflection. Turning to 
the context of a Leerstelle within the boundaries of a totality in quest for meaning 
affords sociological, historical, theological163, cultural and legal findings. At variance 
with what can be found within a totality structure, the transcendental tightly linked 
with ethics and aesthetics, the Good and the Beautiful, denotes a movement towards 
                                                        
161 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 316 [‘The law is always deficient, not because it is 
imperfect in itself but because human reality is necessarily imperfect in comparison to the ordered 
world of law, and hence allows of no simple application of the law.’] 
162 See Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 153 [‘[…] meaning is simply whatever 
interpreters seek. […] Interpreters may seek to identify an author’s intent, a text’s verbal meaning, or 
the response of some group of readers. Any of these becomes the meaning of the text insofar as an 
interpreter seeks it. That meaning is reducible to the practice of interpreters is a ‘theory’ of meaning 
with no implications for that practice. Hence, neither lawyers nor literary critics can learn how to 
interpret by achieving a correct philosophical account of meaning. From this it follows that legal and 
literary interpretation are not necessarily alike. If there are reasons for lawyers and critics to interpret in 
similar ways, they do not arise from the nature of meaning or the nature of language.’]; ibid 189 [‘[…] 
meaning consists in the world of purposes, projects, and possibilities discernible to participants in a 
given context – the ‘horizon’ disclosed by a particular vantage point. The Gadamerian interpreter first 
seeks to reconstruct the horizon within which the text was written, and then asks how and how much 
her own horizon coincides with that of the text. […] text and interpreter participate in a dialogue or 
hermeneutic circle.’]; See also Sanford Levinson, ‘Law as Literature’ in Sanford Levinson & Steven 
Mailloux (eds), Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988) 161 [Commenting on the views of Stanley Fish, Levinson 
observes: ‘Meaning is created rather than discovered, though the source of creative energy is the 
particular community within which one finds him- or herself.’] 
163 Rev. John J. Coughlin O.F.M., ‘Pope John Paul II and the Dignity of the Human Being’ (2003-
2004) 27(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 65; John D’ Arcy May, ‘Human Dignity, 
Human Rights and Religious Pluralism: Buddhist and Christian Perspectives’ (2006) 26 Buddhist-
Christian Studies 51 
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‘something always missing’ and the breach of law’s totality, namely an opening 
towards infinity. 
B. Premises, research question, central thesis 
A deft start requires setting forth premises to research questions and the thesis. 
These are summarized here, to be further analyzed where necessary infra. 
First, ‘practice’ refers to the mobilization of human dignity language in legal 
texts164; granted, legal texts can reflect just an aspect of practice.165 Mobilizing law 
means setting law in action, practicing law. At the same time, ‘practice’ denotes, for 
present purposes, the production of meaning by individuals professionally practicing 
the law, stereotypically designated in German with the masculine ‘die Juristen’, the 
jurists.166 Consciousness, awareness, and knowledge of the law are subjective factors 
influencing the meaning produced.167 Attention is focused predominantly on texts of 
German constitutional law and FCC jurisprudence, as well as international law 
treaties, European Union law, constitutions, and other constitutional courts’ 
jurisprudence. The context of practice cannot be cast aside; it is yet another source of 
human dignity meaning. The emphasis on illustrative instances of practice of the law                                                         
164 Erhard Blankenburg, Mobilisierung Des Rechts: Eine Einführung in Die Rechtssoziologie 
(Springer-Verlag, 1995) 26ff.; ibid 35ff.; Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 209 [Mobilization refers to the 
use [Nutzung], the practice of law, while validity (being in force) or impact refer to the consequences 
of law, the effects. Whether law becomes law ‘in action’ depends both on subjective and objective 
factors. The critical question is why actors follow specific rules. This is a highly complicated issue 
from a sociological point of view, because individuals, also individuals within institutions, are driven 
by ‘bundles of motives’ [Motivbündeln], which are not necessarily accessible to systematic 
assessment.]; ibid 212ff. [What one can do is identify certain formative subjective factors of 
mobilization, such as legal consciousness [Rechtsbewusstsein], knowledge of the law [Rechtskenntnis] 
and Anspruchswissen, namely the subjective claim that one has enforceable rights, that one is able to 
claim a right, which requires self-mobilization. Self-mobilization is at the same time a process of 
becoming a subject. Anspruchswissen should not be confused with Anspruchshaltung, namely a sense 
of entitlement.]; Showing how practice is broader than legal text, ibid ‘Praxen des Verfassungsrechts: 
Text, Gerichte und Gesprӓche im Konstitutionalismus’ in Michael Bӓuerle, Philipp Dann & Astrid 
Wallrabenstein (eds), Demokratie-Perspektiven: Festschrift für Brun-Otto Bryde zum 70.  Geburtstag 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013) 3 [Verfassungstextualitӓt; critical reflection on the proposition that 
law is text; Textlücke are filled, through construction or reconstructions of a historical will, selectively; 
Der Text als Interpretationsauftrag; Verfassungsgerichtsgesprӓchpraxis] 
165 See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (3rd edn, New 
York: Basic Books, 1983) 30 [‘Even more than “game” or “drama”, “text” is a dangerously unfocused 
term, and its application to social action, to people’s behavior toward other people, involves a 
thoroughgoing conceptual wrench, a particularly outlandish bit of “seeing-as.” Describing human 
conduct in the analogy of player and counterplayer, or of actor and audience, seems, whatever the 
pitfalls, rather more natural than describing it in that of writer and reader.’]; Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) 
417, 446 [‘[…] text is not all there is to constitutional law […]’]; Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 166 
[the mobilization of language in the context of judicial proceedings is an example of other aspects of 
practice, beyond text]  
166 Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 209  
167 ibid 
 43
of human dignity in FCC jurisprudence necessarily assumes the formative influence 
of normative and institutional, political, historical, sociological and cultural context 
on meaning. The realities of legal pluralism168 and multilevel constitutionalism 
constitute organic aspects of the portrayal of the practice of law169 today, prove 
quintessential determinants of the ‘legal’ concept’s substantive content, and certainly 
underlie the production of human dignity meaning in judicial practice.170 
Second, the ‘legal’ character of the concept, widely affirmed in legal literature 
and, particularly, in German legal doctrine, is associated here with the empirically 
assessed event of human dignity language manifestations171 in legal texts.172  The 
‘legal’ – at least in the narrow sense173 – character of human dignity in preambles, in 
isolated en passant references in the jurisprudence of international and constitutional 
courts174, or in cases of implicit practice in positive law, for instance in the text of the 
European Convention of Human Rights [ECHR] or constitutional law175, as in the 
Canadian example176, is often vague or contested.177 
For present purposes, it suffices to stress that practicing the law, irrespective 
of how we theorize it, entails contouring legal language games, that is, language 
                                                        
168 See Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869; Baer (n 166) 88-
89 
169 Denninger (1998) JZ 1129 
170 See also Shirley van Buiren, Dieter Grimm & Elke Ballerstedt, Richterliches Handeln und 
technisches Risiko (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1982); Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Multiple loyalties and 
dual preliminarity: The pains of being a judge in a multilevel legal order’ (2012) 10(3) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 871 [examination of the challenges to the work of the judge raised by 
the multilevel constitutionalism reality in the example of dual preliminarity] 
171  As inferred from the ontological approach to human dignity as a legal concept infra, regardless of 
whether the concept is enforceable, whenever human dignity language is practiced in legal texts, the 
inherent quality of ‘something missing’ has effects that are indispensible to the humane operation of 
fundamental rights. 
172 Immersing in the discourse on the nature of law, what the law is, exceeds the purposes of the present 
analysis. Reference to legal positivist, doctrinal and non-mainstream responses to that question will be 
made where deemed necessary. 
173 Denninger (1982) JZ 225; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations – A critical analysis of its 
fundamental problems (New Jersey, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, LTD, 2000) 
174 My argument draws on such examples, particularly manifestations in ECtHR case law, for 
comparative insights. 
175 Tiedemann, Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff (2010) 35 [on ECHR]; ibid 51-56 [on France, 
Poland, Switzerland, Austria, Israel] 
176 Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417, 445ff. [the example of Canadian 
constitutional law]  
177 See Tiedemann, Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff (2010) 57 f. [on Great Britain]; ibid 58 ff. [on the 
USA]; See also  Michael J. Meyer, ‘Introduction’ in Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent, eds., The 
Constitution of Rights – Human Dignity and American Values (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1992) 1-9 
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games sui generis178, to wit a particular kind of logos that substantiates the production 
of meaning by legal actors179. Drawing the boundaries of legal language games is 
essential a task to the practice of law and to portraying such practice; an affirmative 
stance towards the dual sense of ‘something missing’ defines how these are to be 
sketched. The argument futhered is that the presence of the law of human dignity 
within a constitutional order calls for delineating those boundaries not only on the 
basis of what lies within them, but also mindful of something ungraspable beyond 
them. Justification for the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of law’s practice requires transcending 
the finite total of the legal language game. In the pages that follow, I demonstrate 
three accounts of how human dignity language within law guarantees the possibility 
of transcendence.  
Transcendence assumes a meta-level of meaning, namely ‘that’180 there is a 
meta-level, otherwise any process of justification in practicing fundamental rights and 
the law of human dignity per se becomes self-referential, and the questions of ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ are rendered logically nonsensical. The linguistic-analytical and 
phenomenological accounts infra explore how the production of meaning reflected in 
legal language games presupposes and is sparked by ‘something missing’; how the 
project of filling ‘something missing’ ad hoc interferes with the boundaries of the 
legal language game; and how ‘something always missing’, mirrored in the face of 
human beings, wherever these are traced in the portrayal of judicial practice, distorts 
the rigidity of law as a demarcated totality.  
                                                        
178 Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 50 [characterizes moral and legal discourse 
language games sui generis] 
179 ‘Meaning’ is understood holistically, not only as comprising content and form, substance and 
function, but, here, additionally, beyond the signification and significance of the uttered statement, as 
ensued from the texture or tone of language employed. Interpretation occurs within a context, 
essentially also linguistic context or language perceived, in accordance with Saussure’s structural 
linguistics, as a system of signs expressing ideas; signs are at once the signifier (signifiant) and the 
signified (signifié). Saussure further distinguishes between langue, the abstract system of language, and 
parole, namely the concrete act of speech in practicing language. These remarks are of pertinence to 
the portrayal of how the judge practices the law of human dignity in the text of judicial decisions. See 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Charles Bally ed, Charles Bally, Albert 
Sechehaye & Albert Riedlinger trs, Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1986); Iser’s Leerstelle 
concept treats the issue of gaps identified in portraying practice and how they can be filled by recourse 
to the language already there. In Wolfgang Iser, Der Akt des Lesens (1994) 301ff. Consequently, the 
delineation effectuated when language is practiced as a legal concept influences the overall quality of 
the language game in various respects. A systematic classification of the range of factors influencing 
meaning in law is left to those most competent to perform it; the proposition that practicing law entails 
limiting – not in the sense of reducing, but rather in the sense of taming – language, will suffice for the 
presently furthered argument. 
180 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.44) 
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Third, the argument springs from the composed nature of the term ‘human 
dignity’ [Menschenwürde], or ‘dignity of the human being’ [die Worde des Mencken]. 
Why is this – perhaps banal on the face of it – linguistic observation material to the 
research question, central thesis and analysis? What could be perceived as banality 
from a mainstream positivist perspective, presents an intriguing point of departure for 
a hermeneutic and literary enterprise. 
The English expression ‘human dignity’ consists of the predicate 
‘human’ and the noun ‘dignity’. The adjective qualifies the noun so 
as to determine the kind of dignity in question as being of the 
human kind. (The adjective has a similar function in the expression 
‘human being’. Here it qualifies the noun ‘being’, to determine the 
kind of being in question as being of the human kind.) Because of 
this qualification, the expression cannot function adjectively in 
English. That is, we cannot say, without doing violence to language, 
the ‘human dignitiness’ of someone (or ‘human dignifiedness’ of 
someone), anymore than we can say the ‘human beingness’ of 
someone181. […] this is because we refer, by the expression ‘human 
dignity’ to a value we by the expression designate as fundamental. 
A fundamental value is not essentially a quality; it is essentially 
fundamental, and thus it does not call for an adjectival use, only a 
substantive one. ‘Human dignity’ can function grammatically only 
as a substantive. Moreover: when ‘human’ and ‘dignity’ are used in 
conjunction they form the expression ‘human dignity’, which is not 
simply an equivalent of ‘dignity’. ‘Dignity’ could be predicated of 
many different species in each their own way, whereas ‘human 
dignity’ is reserved to human beings.182 
                                                        
181 In the following analysis, the term ‘human being-ness’ – hyphenated so as not to conceal ‘the 
violence to language’ – is employed to denote a fundamental, rather than adjectival, use that 
corresponds to the experience of indignity in the world today on the one hand, and important work on 
framing human rights apropos human capabilities on the other. Since the question ‘Are human beings 
human?’ by analogy with MacKinnon’s question ‘Are women human?’ is unfortunately still current in 
law and life, the term ‘human being-ness’, despite its arbitrariness, may still stand as reference to the 
existence, essence, or identity of human beings. Another comparative advantage of using this term is 
that it connotes various modes of being-ness, such as existence, essence or identity; this enhances the 
intelligibility and fluency of the analysis, in that it facilitates talking about the diverse modes, without 
neglecting their differences. Inquiry into each of these manifestations of human being-ness or their 
distinction exceeds the scope of this meta-approach to the law of human dignity. On the identification 
of human capabilities see Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice – Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership (Cambridge, MA & London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2006); The term ‘human being-ness’ is employed to enhance the fluency of the present hermeneutic 
and literary enterprise, and receives a distinct ontological, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological 
signification in the respective philosophically grounded accounts under Chapter One. References to the 
Dasein, Sosein, existence, essence, and identity are all bracketed with ‘human being-ness’. Employing 
the term ‘human being-ness’ should not be misunderstood as taking a stance in the doctrinal discussion 
about whether the bearer of human dignity is the concrete individual human being or abstractly ‘being 
human’ [Menschenwesen] or humanity [Menschheit] as a whole; in line with the dominant opinion in 
doctrine, the human being is understood in its individuality, yet as part of the community. See also 
Köhne (2004) 285, 286 
182 Lebech (2009) 21 
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Underscoring the composed nature of the term sets the stage for zooming in on 
and reading the ‘human being’ component first separately, only to then re-read both 
components in unity. The analysis is premised on the possibility of disentangling the 
components for the purpose of better scrutinizing each – or, here, mainly the former – 
and, eventually, of recomposing the term in light of a new, enhanced understanding of 
its meaning183. The ontological, linguistic-analytical, and phenomenological 
interpretations of ‘human dignity’ infra bring to focus the ‘human’ or ‘human being’ 
component in view of its significance for interpreting the practice of the meta-
dimension of human dignity.  
Fourth, a link is drawn between the empirical observation of ambiguity and 
controversy184 and the complexities integral to the reconciliation of universals in need 
of concretization with particulars framed as claims to universals. Portrayals of the 
competence and responsibility of judges185, as reflected in the text of decisions, to 
treat such complexities in practicing human dignity language differ significantly from 
analogous portrayals of actors’ competence and responsibility in lawmaking or legal 
scholarship. In general terms and e contrario this distinction is plain to see in that the 
degree of concretization required, or desired, in lawmaking, differs from how legal 
scholars treat concrete particulars in producing meaning under less strict institutional 
and doctrinal constraints. The imprint of particulars on ‘something missing’ within 
legal language games is context-specific and the result of reflexivity between (a) law 
as a lens and human beings and the world looked at through that lens on the one hand, 
and (b) human beings and the world on the other. The quality of the surface on which                                                         
183 Butler, Feminism and the question of postmodernism (1992) 3, 15 [deconstructing means calling 
into question] 
184 With regards to the phenomenological account in Chapter One, Part C, setting the empirical 
observation as the point of departure is aligned with the first prong of the phenomenological triptych in 
the work of Edmund Husserl and his student Edith Stein, namely empirics; the other two prongs are 
eidetics, and constitution. See Lebech (2009) 18  
185 Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 230f. [Psychology is an important source of insights into how a 
judgment comes into being. Rational justification is just one side of judicial proceedings and decisions. 
The judgment depends on a variety of factors. Preconceptions, bias, stereotypes, phobias of different 
sorts can influence the production of meaning by the judge. Legal sociology stimulates our feelers for 
identifying such influences on ostensibly rational, objective, neutral decisions and for strictly 
scrutinizing value judgments where involved. The judge confronting value judgments re fundamental 
rights conflicts has the responsibility to competently consider and attend to preconceptions. The judge 
carries the responsibility to self-critically reflect on his or her own Vorverständnis. The concept of the 
Vorverständnis surfaced in German legal sociology in the 1970s. The judge should enhance his or her 
competence, in view of his or her responsibility, to critically reflect on the Vorverständnis underlying 
the practice of the law. For instance, precedent and, more generally, reasoning in previous judicial 
decisions can be professionally-intuitively examined as to their correctness and soundness. Exercising 
scrutiny at the level of the Vorverständnis can proactively forbid excesses, arbitrariness, manipulation 
and unsound assumptions.] 
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something is imprinted is also a determinant of the imprint; institutional setting, 
political, sociological and cultural factors affect how ‘something missing’ is filled 
with concrete, particular meaning. 
Could the empirically observed ambiguity and controversy of the practice of 
human dignity language in law be portrayed and understood by recourse to 
philosophical insights into human nature, language, or the transcendental, conceived 
apropos the notion of the limit and ‘something missing’? Chapter One effectively 
responds to this question in the affirmative. Chapter Two illustrates how the 
introduced portrayal of the practice of the law of human dignity permits another view 
on the text of seminal instances in the relevant FCC jurisprudence. Ultimately, this 
enterprise demonstrates the hermeneutic value of philosophical insights, and signals 
why the proposed interpretation constitutes a desideratum, at least for looking at the 
German example.  
The documentation of ambiguity and controversy and the assertion that these 
ensue predominantly from the tension between universals and particulars are well-
established courses of criticism in legal scholarship; legal scholars problematize the 
proneness of the concept to arbitrary practice, or even malpractice, in law due to its 
abstractness and openness. Beyond the tension between universals and particulars, 
which transpires before our eyes and thus ist non-arbitrary resolution depends on us as 
actors, as argued here, the assumption ‘that’186 there is a meta-dimension from which 
actors are separated and towards which transcendence is possible is a vital element of 
the portrayal of practice. While the aforementioned tension, seen in isolation, 
reasonably brings to focus interpretive problems linked specifically to ‘something 
missing’ in the practice of human language in law, understanding the therefrom 
ensuing ambiguity and controversy in light of ‘something always missing’, namely 
the meta-dimension of law, reveals conversely the interpretive opportunities borne by 
the presence of human dignity language in law, most importantly the opportunity to 
practice law humanely and to be constantly vigilant that law is thus practiced. This is 
the rationale behind adopting an affirmative stance towards the dual sense of 
‘something missing’. 
[…] identifying exactly what human dignity is and why, surfaces 
when human dignity is dismissed as being merely a quaint religious 
dogma, a poetic conceit, a rhetorical device or a romantic ideal. It                                                         
186 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.44) 
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presents itself when human dignity is seen as a convenient legal 
fiction, a social construction or an ethnocentric belief. In all these 
cases it is taken for granted that the expression is meaningless, 
although it has some political and legal use. This again means that 
the ambition to found human rights on human dignity frequently is 
accompanied by a modicum of ironic superiority: ‘human dignity is 
for preambles and solemn occasions, but it really doesn’t have any 
specific content or meaning, it means anything you like’.187  
From the standpoint of a jurist studying how we talk about human dignity, a 
further type of inflation can be discerned in legal literature, namely argumentative 
inflation in legal syllogisms composed of bold major premises that fall short of minor 
premises. Contentions re the proneness of human dignity to ‘manipulative’ judicial 
interpretation188 or ‘merely rhetorical’189 use in legal literature are rarely furnished 
with concrete examples portraying such practice. Posing questions such as ‘how is it 
abstract?’ or ‘how is it empty?’ can be seen, at the same time, as an implicit criticism 
of or reaction to the utterance of inflated polemic arguments that lack theoretical 
explication and demonstration of supporting findings.  
The progression from these premises to the central thesis, namely the 
affirmative stance towards the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as an inherent 
characteristic of human dignity language that trails the practice of the concept in law, 
is mediated by the following research questions: First, how do philosophical – 
ontological, linguistic-analytical, and phenomenological – insights enhance our 
understanding of the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as an aspect of the meaning of 
the law of human dignity apropos the Menschenbild and meta-dimension of law, 
particularly German constitutional law? How do ontological, linguistic-analytical and                                                         
187 Lebech (2009) 17 
188 McCrudden (2008) 655, 655; ibid, 710 [‘By its very openness and non-specificity, by its 
manipulability, by its appearance of universality disguising the extent to which cultural context is 
determining its meaning, dignity has enabled East and West, capitalist and non-capitalist, religious and 
anti-religious to agree (at least superficially) on a common concept.’] 
189 An interpretation of what ‘merely rhetorical’ signifies, and why it is problematic is found in Binder 
& Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 24 [‘[…] the efforts of some liberal rhetoricians to 
model vague virtues like judiciousness and impartiality, without favoring any particular conception of 
the good, can produce a hollow shell of rhetoric, principled in tone without particular principles.’]; 337 
[James Boyd White ‘suggests that if we see law […] as a rhetorical practice, we will be less disturbed 
by textual ambiguity and discretion in the application of law.’] citing White, Heracle’s Bow (1985); 
David N. Weisstub, ‘Honor, Dignity, and the Framing of Multiculturalist Values’ in David Kretzmer & 
Eckart Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) 263, 265 [recognition of the rhetorical value of claims about human dignity 
despite malleability, that is, lack of tightness of the concept’s logic]; McCrudden (2008) 655, 722 
[‘[…] as merely rhetorical. The courts use the concept of dignity merely to disguise, for example, the 
absence of theory on how to resolve the conflict between incommensurable values. Instead of making a 
choice between conflicting rights, they present the conflict as an issue internal to dignity.’] 
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phenomenological accounts of the law of human dignity sharpen our understanding of 
the practice of human dignity in the illustrative instances of FCC jurisprudence under 
scrutiny? 
Second, how can we portray the practice of human dignity? Applying the 
model designed in Chapter One to actual instances of judicial practice understood as 
legal language games advances another construal of the legal concept’s meaning. To 
the limited extent that the text of judicial decisions, the primary material subject to 
interpretation in Chapter Two, mirrors judicial practice190 and, more broadly, the 
production of meaning by the constitutional judge, who is simultaneously an 
institution and a human being, where does the human factor lie in the portrayed legal 
language games? The presently introduced hermeneutic and literary prism permits 
identifying191 and portraying the human factor within legal language games, in other 
words centers on the faces of human beings, individuals or groups192, within 
institutional frameworks193. How does the dual sense of ‘something missing’ 
influence the breadth of legal language games and the rigidness of their boundaries? 
Third, how and why is ‘something missing’ incidental to legal language 
games, and when is ‘something missing’ first perceived? How does the FCC as the                                                         
190 Susanne Baer, ‘Thematisierungen – Körper, Sprache und Bild im Prozeß’, in Klaus R. Scherpe & 
Thomas Weitin (eds), Eskalationen – Die Gewalt von Kultur, Recht und Politik (Tübingen, Basel: A. 
Francke Verlag, 2003) 109, 117 [other facets of practice] 
191 Legal sociology and cultural studies are also suitable for identifying the human factor within the 
legal language game and, specifically, within institutions.  
192 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 17 [Art. 1 sec. 1 provides respect and protection for the 
human being not only as an individual, but also as an individual in a group. Kunig includes, under fn. 
101, a fragment from the BGHZ 75, 160 Case addressing the special personal relationship of Jewish 
people who live in Germany to their co-citizens: ‘[…] in diesem Verhältnis ist das Geschehen auch 
heute gegenwärtig. Es gehört zu ihrem personalen Selbstverständnis, als zugehörig zu einer durch das 
Schicksal herausgehobenen Personengruppe begriffen zu werden, der gegenüber eine besondere 
moralische Verantwortlichkeit aller anderen besteht, und das Teil ihrer Würde ist’.]  
193 See Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 48 [‘For Lieber, all linguistic expression 
is linked to religious and aesthetic feeling and aims to articulate the self in a concrete, sensuous, and 
inherently social medium. Thus, meaning is not conferred on language by private intentions that 
preexist their articulation; instead, meaning inheres in language’s use by groups of language users, 
especially institutions.’]; ibid 476 [‘[…] Bourdieu is particularly interested in practices like law, where 
decision-making discretion is vested in office. By virtue of their office, particular decision-makers 
exercise a personal power that, because it is not reducable to force or wealth, is ‘symbolic,’ that is, an 
effect of meaning.’]; ibid 373 [‘[…] a ‘character’ is primarily an interpretation of the relationship 
between one’s institutional roles and one’s subjective inner life, a strategy for accommodating one’s 
dignity as a supposedly self-determined person to the reality of bureaucratic power.’]; Francis Lieber, 
Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and 
Politics: with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities (originally published in Boston: C.C. Little and 
J. Brown, 1839; reprinted in Union, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, LTD., 2002) 13-17; See also Gerald 
Frug, ‘Argument as Character’ (1988) 40(4) Stanford Law Review 869; Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 
(with an Introduction by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, Hugh Lawson-Tancred, ed and tr, London: Penguin 
Classics, 1992) [see character in Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric] 
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speaking self and author of judgments practice the law of human dignity in different 
contexts? Are other selves and their – not necessarily legal – language games 
represented in the judicial practice of human dignity? Does the self demonstrate 
responsibility towards the other, namely human beings before the court, i.e. 
individuals, groups, and society more generally? What is the meaning of 
responsibility in abstractor and how is it defined in concreto in the instances of 
judicial practice under scrutiny? Which portrayal of the relation between the self and 
the other corresponds to and allows for the humane practice of the law, even of the 
law of human dignity as such? How does the FCC, to wit the critical self producing 
human dignity meaning in the present study, engage in self-reflection? Are there 
allusions to the meta-dimension of the law of human dignity in the text of cases 
analyzed in Chapter Two? 
The central thesis of this hermeneutic and literary project is: the transcendental 
meaning of the law of human dignity, which assumes ‘something always missing’, is 
activated where and when that law – first and foremost as language – is practiced. The 
law of human dignity operates at the limit between ‘what is there’, the finite totality 
of legal language games and the plane where ‘something missing’ can occur, and 
‘something always missing’, the infinite beyond the limit. Transcendence signifies a 
movement, that is to say, a process, that results in the institution of infinitely new, 
diverse imprints of human being-ness within the realm of law, in the space where 
‘something was missing’; ‘something missing’ then corresponds to the part of those 
who have no part.194 Understanding the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as an 
essential aspect of human dignity meaning is attuned to the humane practice of the 
law of human dignity, that is, mobilization entailing critical reflection. ‘Something 
missing’ and ‘something always missing’ trigger and provide for the initiation of 
critical reflection on the meaning produced.  
Critical reflection presupposes the portrayal of practice, and the quality of the 
former is contingent on the aptitude of the latter to intricacies of the production of 
human dignity meaning, such as balancing considerations and the reconciliation of 
universals and particulars mentioned supra. If, as argued in the phenomenological                                                         
194 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 35 [‘Politics exists insofar as the people is not identified with a race or a 
population, nor the poor with a particular disadvantaged sector, nor the proletariat with a group of 
industrial workers, etc., but insofar as these latter are identified with subjects that inscribe, in the form 
of a supplement to every count of the parts of society, a specific figure of the count of the uncounted or 
of the part of those without part.’] 
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account, the formation of an intersubjective space within the legal language game195 
fosters the humane practice of the law of human dignity, then the intersection of a 
legal language game comprising human dignity language with other language games 
could be an indication of intersubjectivity, thus a starting point for further inquiry and 
critical reflection. The methodological approach I opt for is attuned to the 
commitment to critical reflection. In the remaining part of the Introduction, the 
hermeneutic and literary methodological approach to the textual practice of the law of 
human dignity is elaborated on and the evolution of my argument is outlined. 
C. Methodological approach and evolution of the argument 
The methodological approach chosen is the hermeneutic and literary treatment 
of the law of human dignity in texts196 as elements of judicial practice; to these ends 
philosophical insights are employed to construct a model. The argument advances a 
genuinely affirmative stance towards the dual sense of ‘something missing’. What are 
the methodological implications and the advantage of opting for a hermeneutic and 
literary approach? As regards the former, recourse to hermeneutics and literary 
criticism to construct a model for portraying the practice of the law of human dignity 
in seminal cases in FCC jurisprudence, and to thereby bridge philosophy and law 
brings about transdisciplinarity. The main advantage of a hermeneutic and literary 
approach to law is the fluency it grants for drawing parallels between concepts 
developed across disciplines and its aptness to highlight the human factor, even within 
institutions, and to portray manifestations of human being-ness. The hermeneutic and 
literary methodological approach197 aims to improve our understanding of the dual                                                         
195 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 290 
196 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 392 [‘[…] written texts present the real hermeneutical 
task. Writing is self-alienation. Overcoming it, reading the text, is thus the highest task of 
understanding. Even the pure signs of an inscription can be seen properly and articulated correctly only 
if the text can be transformed back into language. As we have said, however, this transformation 
always establishes a relationship to what is meant, to the subject matter being discussed.’]; ibid 396 
[‘Everything written is, in fact, the paradigmatic object of hermeneutics. […] The horizon of 
understanding cannot be limited either by what the writer originally had in mind or by the horizon of 
the person to whom the text was originally addressed.’]  
197 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) ix [‘[…] the many ways we can view law as a 
kind of literary or cultural activity […] law as a practice of making various kinds of literary artifacts: 
interpretations, narratives, characters, rhetorical performances, linguistic signs, figurative tropes, and 
representations of the social world […] law as a process of meaning making and as a crucial dimension 
of modern cultural life.’]; The Gadamerian strand of hermeneutics as the ‘a general theory of the 
understanding and interpretation of texts’ in most pertinent to the present approach. See Gadamer, 
Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 321; ibid 366 f. [‘The most important thing is the question that the text 
puts to us […]. […] The voice that speaks to us from the past – whether text, work, trace – itself poses 
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sense of ‘something missing’ through interpretation in light of the philosophical 
insights in Chapter One, and engages accordingly in literary analysis and criticism of 
legal texts198 in Chapter Two. Working with the law means working with texts199; 
approaches to law are, considerably, approaches to texts. 
Hermeneutic criticism ‘treats interpretation as the basic mode of literary action 
[…].’200 The claim underpinning hermeneutic criticism is that ‘law is most 
fundamentally a practice of interpretation.’201 Gadamerian hermeneutics’202 emphasis 
on the speaking text203, enabled by detachment of ‘what is spoken’ from ‘the speaker’ 
and ‘the permanence that writing bestows’204, and on the ‘nature of the thing coming 
to expression’, instead of ‘designating the human subject […] as the fixed point of 
                                                                                                                                                              
a question and places our meaning in openness.’]; See also Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: 
Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1969) 201 [‘Fundamental to Gadamer’s conception of language is the 
rejection of the “sign” theory of the nature of language. Over against the emphasis on form and 
instrumental functions of language, Gadamer points to the character of living language and our 
participation in it.’]; ibid 202-203 [language is not a symbolic form] 
198 Palmer (n 197) 12 [‘The roots for the word hermeneutics lie in the Greek verb hermeneuein, 
generally translated “to interpret” and the noun hermeneia, “interpretation.” An exploration of the 
origin of these two words and of the three basic directions of meaning they carried in ancient usage 
sheds surprising light on the nature of interpretation in […] literature […].’]; ibid 13 [‘[..] the […] verb 
hermeneuein and noun hermeneia point back to the wing-footed messenger-god Hermes, from whose 
name the words are apprently derived (or vice versa?). Significantly, Hermes is associated with the 
function of transmuting what is beyond human understanding into a form that human intelligence can 
grasp. The various forms of the word suggest the process of bringing a thing or situation from 
unintelligibility to understanding. The Greeks credited Hermes with the discovery of language and 
writing – the tools which human understanding employs to grasp meaning and to convey it to others. 
[…] traced back to their earliest known root words in Greek, the origins of the modern words 
“hermeneutics” and “hermeneutical” suggest the process of “bringing to understanding,” especially as 
this process involves language, since language is the medium par excellence in the process.’]; ibid 14 
[‘Interpretation can refer to three rather different matters: an oral recitation, a reasonable explanation 
and a translation from another language [….] in all three cases, something foreign, strange, separated in 
time, space, or experience is made familiar, present, comprehensible; something requiring 
representation, explanation, or translation is somehow “brought to understanding” – is “interpreted.”’]; 
ibid [‘Literary interpretation […] involves two of these processes and often a third. Literature makes a 
representation of something which must “come to be understood.” […] The task of interpretation must 
be to make something that is unfamiliar, distant, and obscure in meaning into soemthing real, near, and 
intelligible. The various aspects of this interpretation process are vital to literature […].’] 
199 See Friedrich Müller, Ralph Christensen & Michael Sokolowski, Rechtstext und Textarbeit (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1997) 
200 Binder & Weisberg (n 197) 20 
201 ibid 
202 ibid 133 [‘Gadamer insists that because his hermeneutics both implicates and depends upon the 
interpreter, it should not be seen as a method. Instead, it is a challenging process of Bildung or self-
cultivation.’]; See also Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 62 [Dworkin contends that Gadamer’s account 
of interpretation ‘as recognizing, while struggling against, the constraints of history strikes the right 
note.’] 
203 See Binder & Weisberg, ibid [on ‘Gadamer’s tendency to anthropomorphize the text’, according to 
David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle: Literature, History, and Philosophical Hermeneutics 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1982)] 
204 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 396 
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reference’205, render this account most germane to the presently adopted 
methodological approach. Interpretation presupposes that the ‘horizons’ of the 
interpreter and the text overlap to some extent206. Tracing and depicting the human 
factor in portrayals of the practice of the law of human dignity sets off from exploring 
the meaning conveyed by the language employed in legal language games. The 
themes and insights introduced thereby shall label the range of issues on which this 
analysis sheds light, which are indeed diverse as material- and subject-matter-
oriented, in other words, as escaping classification under a distinct strand of thought 
and discourse. How does emphasis on the human factor advance a more humane 
perspective on law, thus, also, law’s humane practice? 
Literature can offer a complex, multilayered experience that 
transcends rigid categories, alerting us to the plurality and 
dynamism of the meanings we attach to social life.207 
[…] associations evoked when we are exhorted to experience law in 
a more literary way. We are urged to express our authentic selves 
and escape alienating roles and to value passion – especially 
empathy, mercy, love – over reason and rule. Yet we are also urged 
to be detached rather than engaged, decorous rather than vulgar, 
gracious rather than grasping, and to value each other aesthetically 
rather than instrumentally. We must be prepared to decry big 
institutions as heartless and small ones as petty and provincial. We 
are encouraged to be inventive, eloquent and refined. 208 
Methodological clarity calls for appreciation of the risks209 lurking in pairing 
the disciplines of law and literature. Sentimentalism210, ‘a facile sophistication that 
mistakes skepticism211 for criticism and dishonors good causes with bad 
arguments’212, and ‘a genteel authoritarianism’213 are three conceivable risks. The 
                                                        
205 Palmer (1969) 204 
206 Gadamer (n 204) 301; ibid 305 [‘[…] understanding is always the fusion of these horizons 
supposedly existing by themselves.’]  
207 Binder & Weisberg (n 197) 4 
208 ibid 16 
209 ibid 4-7 
210 ibid 16 [‘[…] in which passion is never cruel or self-indulgent or muddle-headed, invention is never 
destructive or dishonest, and civility is always inclusive and never elitist.’] 
211 For one conceivable definition of skepticism see ibid 17 [‘Skepticism is the disposition to view 
practices as illegitimate unless they can be shown to rest on some justificatory foundation independent 
of human purposes. In legal thought, skepticism usually demands that legal thought or practice justify 
itself by reference to some kind of objective knowledge – of moral truth, linguistic meaning, or popular 
will. Skeptical criticism of law tends to vastly overestimate the role of metaphysics and epistemology 
in justifying the authority of political institutions and thereby evades political argument and grapples 
with strawmen. In the field of Law and Literature, skeptical criticism often involves the additional vice 
of equating the literary with the merely subjective, thereby reducing it to a pejorative epithet.’] 
212 ibid 16 
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thoroughgoing validity of the proposition that ‘law is […] myopic while literature is 
subtly perceptive […]’214 may also be challenged. Besides being ‘a kind of language’, 
literature ‘is also an institution with its own interests and jurisdictional turf.’215 Law 
and literature are ‘historically specific disciplines’216 and, as such, strive to 
monopolize ‘the indispensable and inextricable cultural functions of defining 
authority and making meaning’217 respectively, but fail to do so. 
[…] we may identify ‘the literary’ narrowly with the work of a 
particular profession, or more broadly with imagination, complexity 
of perception, density of meaning, and the qualities of dramatic and 
aesthetic interest. If we conceive ‘the literary’ in these broader 
terms, it becomes a meaning-making function that pervades social 
life. It is when we take law and literature in theses broad senses that 
the relation between them becomes the richest and most 
interesting.218 
In terms of its theoretical underpinnings, this inquiry could be viewed as a 
regression to natural law doctrine219; an effort to complement the evolution of human 
dignity in the history of ideas220; an attack on legal positivism221, legal doctrine 
[Rechtsdogmatik], and the theory of legal argumentation as limited prisms222 through 
which to approach, understand, and design the practice of human dignity in law, and,                                                                                                                                                               
213 ibid [‘[…] that restricts the aesthetic to the role of ornamenting institutionalized power and 
becalming the spirit of discontent.’] 
214 ibid 4 
215 ibid 5; See also, Tony Sharpe, ‘(Per)versions of Law in Literature’ in Michael Freeman & Andrew 
Lewis (eds), Law and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 91 
216 Binder & Weisberg, ibid 5 
217 ibid 
218 ibid 
219 Denninger (1998) JZ 1129, 1130f.; Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) 
para 19 [Naturrechtliche Vorstellungen]; See also Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 61 [The 
Enlightenment generated criticism in different parts of Europe regarding the treatment of questions on 
justice in light of ‘some kind of metaphysical (literally: standing over the real)’ existence. The core of 
religious philosophical foundations of justice was the notion of physis, the Greek word for nature, 
discussed in relation to metaphysics and techne in the philosophical works of Aristotle. Justice in 
natural law doctrine is grounded in the nature of human beings, is, in other words, social-
anthropological. Natural law philosophers composed the human image or icon (Menschenbild) in 
different ways. ‘In any case, from the empirical, allegedly objective, physical is (Sein) derived a 
normative, legal should (Sollen). For law what follows is that there is a measure of justice, which is not 
positively established, found in neither human rights, nor a constitution or laws, but is in force – just as 
belief – “beyond the law”.’ (M. Ch. tr).]; ibid 62 [‘The natural law doctrine understands justice […] as 
a kind of basal rule of humanity.’] 
220 Franz Josef Wetz, Illusion Menschenwürde – Aufstieg und Fall eines Grundwerts (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2005) 14ff. [cultural history of dignity] 
221 See Denninger (1982) JZ 225; ibid (1998) JZ 1129, 1130 [positivist v. natural law perception of the 
law of human dignity and fundamental rights in the order of the Basic Law]; Gadamer, Truth and 
Method (1975, 2004) 511 
222 The gap-filling function of legal hermeneutics apropos legal dogmatics enhances the contention that 
these approaches constitute limited prisms for understanding the practice of the law of human dignity. 
See Gadamer, ibid 321  
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what is more, as theories often misunderstood to be fortresses of objectivity. Critical 
reflection on the practice of the meta-dimension of the law of human dignity 
emphasizes the transcendental rather than, just, metaphysical meaning of the legal 
concept, and thereby assumes the dynamism of a relational account of practice, rather 
than the static rendering of ‘something always missing’.223 Irrespective of intersection 
with the indicatively enumerated theoretical discourses the argument is oriented 
towards the more concrete goal of advancing a genuinely affirmative stance towards 
the dual sense of ‘something missing’.  
[…] we will encourage legal scholarship that explores and enhances 
the expressive and compositional power of legal thought and 
practice in the specific political and economic worlds in which they 
operate. Such a scholarship recognizes the literary as a constitutive 
dimension of law rather than a redemptive supplement. If law is 
inevitably literary, the call to make it so is not just pointless but 
deceptive: it implies that if only law becomes more literary, 
criticism of law will no longer be necessary. To recognize the 
constitutive literary dimension of law is not to commend law as 
inevitably humane or redemptive, however. Law’s creations may 
starve the poor or demean the weak; they may arise out of struggle, 
strategy, and violence. They demand critical evaluation. 
Nevertheless, laws, legal judgments, and legal transactions all have 
expressive meaning, and to miss law’s meaning is to miss a part of 
what needs criticism. Thus, there is no reason why the literary 
reading of law must be laudatory. To say that law is literary is also 
to admit that literature is, like law, an arena of strategic conflict. 224 
The following clarifications substantively delineate the research objective: (a) 
the dignity of states, courts, professions, and, more generally, institutions225 as 
                                                        
223 Stöcker (1968) 685, 685f. [Stöcker identifies the sociological, metaphysical and critical 
methodological aspects of the concept of human dignity and understands the latter as the process of 
abstracting from particulars only so as to improve the environment at the level of particulars.]; William 
N. Eskridge Jr., ‘Gadamer / Statutory Interpretation’ (1990) 90(3) Columbia Law Review 609, 614 
[Drawing on Gadamer’s Truth and Method and the ensuing philosophical debate Eskridge notes: ‘[…] 
interpretation is not merely an exercise in discovery, but involves a critical approach to the text. The 
interpreter questions the text, the presuppositions of which may be attenuated or undermined over time. 
In turn, the interpreter uses the experience to re-evaluate her own pre-understandings, to separate the 
enabling, truth-seeking ones from the disabling, false ones.’] 
224 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 19 
225 Illustrative examples of such practice of dignity language in ECtHR jurisprudence are: Le Compte, 
Van Leuven and de Meyere v. Belgium (Application no. 6878/75; 7238/75) [23/06/81] [‘dignity of the 
profession’]; Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (Application no. 60115/00) [20/07/04]; Nikula v. Finland 
(Application no. 31611/96) [21/06/02]; Kyprianou v. Cyprus (Application no. 73797/01) [15/12/2005] 
[‘dignity of the court’]; Kudeshkina v. Russia (Application no. 29492/05) [26/02/09]; See Stéphanie 
Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A human dignitas? Remnants of the ancient legal concept in contemporary dignity 
jurisprudence’ (2011) 9(1) I•CON 32, 53 [‘[…] dignitas is not specifically human: institutions, the 
state, its emblems, and the like may be dignified in that sense.’] 
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opposed to human beings, individuals or groups,226 is not relevant to present 
purposes; (b) while acknowledging the philosophical and semantic importance of 
distinguishing between the various formulations of human dignity language in legal 
texts other than ‘human dignity’ or the ‘dignity of the human being’, those 
considerations are deliberately cast aside in the present analysis. Conscious of the rich 
discourse in philosophy and law on the terms ‘person’227 and ‘personality’228 and 
admitting the terminological divergence of the different phrasings, the argument is 
confined to the terms ‘human being’229 and ‘dignity’, both of which are fundamentally 
implied in other variations. The risk of feebleness230 is assumed in order to enhance 
the intelligibility and directedness gained by this limited, yet not exclusionary, 
phraseology; (c) emphasis on the ‘human’ component of ‘human dignity’ serves as a                                                         
226 An example of human dignity language associated with group rights in international law documents 
is the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973) 
[Article II: ‘[…] the term ‘crime of apartheid’ […] shall apply to the following inhuman acts 
committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons 
over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them: (a) Denial to a member or 
members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty of person: [ii] By the infliction upon 
the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their 
freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment;’] 
227 Etymologically the term ‘person’ comes from the Latin persona or the Greek πρόσωπον, and can be 
associated to προσωπεῖον, the Mask. Robert Spaemann, Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied 
zwischen „etwas’ und „jemand’ (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996) 33; ibid 253; See also Joachim Ritter, 
Karlfried Gründer & Gottfried Gabriel (eds), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Bd. 7 (P-Q), 
Darmstadt, Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1989) 269  
228 BVerfGE 9, 167 (171) (1959) [Economic Crime Act] [‘Ist aber der Bereich der sittlichen 
Persönlichkeit des Menschen überhaupt nicht berührt, so scheidet ein Verstoß dieser gesetzlichen 
Regelung gegen die Menschenwürde aus […].’]; See Badura (1964) JZ 337, 340; Linda Zagzebski, 
‘The Uniqueness of Persons’ (2001) 29(3) The Journal of Religious Ethics 401 [considers five 
definitions of ‘person’: ‘(1) an individual substance of a rational nature (Boethius), (2) a self-conscious 
being (Locke), (3) a being with the capacity to act for ends (Kant), (4) a being with the capacity to act 
for another (Kant), and (5) an incommunicably unique subject (Wojtyla)’]; Hans-Gregor Nissing, 
‘Vorwort’ in ibid (ed), Grundvollzüge der Person – Dimensionen des Menschseins bei Robert 
Spaemann (München: Institut zur Förderung der Glaubenslehre, 2008) 7; Tiedemann, Menschenwürde 
als Rechtsbegriff (2010) 9-20 [commenting on Jan Christiaan Smuts’ opting for, at first, the word 
‘personality’ and, after the rejection of the first proposal, the word ‘person’, rather than ‘human being’ 
in the United Nations Charter]; ibid 16 [‘[…] damit [mit dem Begriff Persönlichkeit] verbindet sich die 
Vorstellung einer besonders distinguierten Form von Menschsein, während Person jeder Mensch ist, 
zumindest aber jeder handlungs- und zurechnungsfähige Mensch. Das Menschsein und das Personsein 
konnte Smuts der farbigen und schwarzen Bevölkerung seines Landes schwerlich absprechen, die 
Persönlichkeit schon. Es scheint mir daher nahe liegend, dass Smuts deshalb dem Wort Persönlichkeit 
den Vorzug gab, weil dies ihm erlaubt hätte, das Würdekonzept von verneherein nur auf die weiße 
Rasse anzuwenden […].’]; ibid 85; ibid 244 
229 See Menachem Mautner, ‘From ‘Honor’ to ‘Dignity’: How Should a Liberal State Treat Non-liberal 
Cultural Groups?’ (2008) 9 Theor.Inq.L. 609 [associates dignity with humanness rather than the notion 
of the ‘person’] 
230 The seriousness of the distinction between ‘being a person’ and ‘being an individual human being’ 
is indicated by Zagzebski (n 228) 401, 404 [‘[…] some recent ethicists have used the conceptual 
distinction between “person” and “human being” to argue that some human beings are not persons and 
some persons are not “human” – and that it is persons that have the moral rights.’] 
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starting point for exploring qualities of human being-ness and portraying relations 
among human beings within the realm of law, instead of relying on biological 
sameness [Gattungswürde231]; (e) exploring the ‘human’ in human dignity language 
denotes juxtaposition with non-‘human’ dignity232. The distinction between human 
beings and other living organisms233 is prevailing in the discourse. This discussion 
also exceeds the purposes of this approach234.  
The overview centers on scholarly discussions about the constitutional 
guarantee of human dignity in the Basic Law. In addition, I resort to Anglo-American 
literature to accord this argument comparative relevance235. Methodologically, this 
effectuates an alienation or distancing from the German perspective that enhances the                                                         
231 Cf. Vitzthum (1985) 201; Dan Egonsson, Dimensions of Dignity – The Moral Importance of Being 
Human (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) [Dan Egonsson proposes identifying a distinct 
moral status in the biological origin of the homo sapiens.]; Nettesheim (2005) 71; See also Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice (2006) 179ff. [the species norm]; Tiedemann, Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff 
(2010) 80 f. 
232 Nussbaum ibid 325-407 
233 See Robert Spaemann, ‘Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde’, in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde & 
Robert Spaemann (eds), Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde. Historische Voraussetzungen – 
säkulare Gestalt – christliches Verständnis (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987) 295, 297 [‘Von Würde 
sperchen wir in bezug auf einen Löwen oder ein Zeburind ebenso wie […] auf eine jahrhundertealte 
alleinstehende Eiche.’]; ibid 307 [‘Außermenschliche Wesen können den Zweckzusammenhang, in den 
sie selbst von außen hineingezogen werden, nicht zu ihrem eigenen machen’]; Nussbaum, Frontiers of 
Justice (2006) 325-407 [‘Beyond ‘Compassion for Humanity’: Justice for Nonhuman Animals’]; 
Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 26; Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 16 
[‘[…] denoch ist Art. 1 Abs. 1 für die Beurteilung des Umgangas mit Tieren ergiebig, sofern er als 
Staatszielbestimmung ein Leitbild ist.’]; See also Günter Dürig, ‘Die Menschenauffassung des 
Grundgesetzes’ (1952) JR 259, 260f.; Badura (1964) JZ 337, 339 [‘Nach nahezu einhelliger 
Auffassung hat Art. 1 I GG die Anthropologie der idealistischen, “personalen“ Ethik 
verfassungsrechtlich verankert, wonach der Mensch “Persönlichkeit“ sei, dadurch, daß er anders als 
das Tier zu verantwortlichem ethischen Handeln befähigt sei; der Verfassungsbefehl gebiete, alle 
staatliche Tätigkeit an dieser Auffassung vom Menschen auszurichten, und verbiete alle staatliche 
Tätigkeit, die diese Auffassung vom Menschen mißachte.’] 
234 See, however, the ban on ‘alligator-man fights’ in an entertainment park, grounded on the 
helplessness of the animal – comparable to the helplessness of a minor – and expressly recognizing the 
alligators’ dignity in Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Spa Village Inc Case (1997) 1648/96 of the 
Supreme Court of Israel. The practice of dignity language and the analogy drawn between human 
dignity and non-human dignity in this case is of pertinence to the present hermeneutic and literary 
project. See McCrudden’s comment on the case in McCrudden (2008) 655, 708 
235 See Günter Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison: Re-thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal 411; ibid, ‘How to do Projects with Comparative Law – Notes of an 
Expedition to the Common Core’ (2006) 6(2) Global Jurist Advances 1535 [in group comparative 
projects this distancing is more obvious]; ibid, ‘The IKEA theory revisited’ (2010) 8(3) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 563 [Despite diversity among constitutional documents, demonstrated in 
comparative law scholarship, it can be contended that constitutions across the globe take the form of a 
single written document that appears to comprise similar types of constitutional provisions across the 
globe. Though local, that is, particulars, constitutions are subject to ‘globalization’ and this is not only 
a globalization of texts, but also one of viewpoints. The IKEA theory furthers that these particulars are 
transferred to the ‘global constitution’ and are then hosted anew in a local environment.]; See also, Jaye 
Ellis, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (2011) 22(4) European Journal of International Law 
949 [emphasis on the universals connoted in ‘general principles of international law’ results in missing 
on the richness of particulars of legal systems outside international law]; See also Günter Frankenberg, 
‘Comparative Constitutional Design’ (2013) 11(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 537 
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critical view on the practice of the law of human dignity. The validity of my argument 
beyond the German example and the contribution of the FCC-centered analysis in 
Chapter Two to future comparative projects is not foreclosed; references to illustrative 
instances of practice in other legal orders hint at the probable – hence reasonable – 
relevance of my observations beyond Germany and the FCC. The personal aspiration 
underlying this argument is that the model put forward in Chapter One is resorted to – 
where necessary with possible appropriate modifications – in hermeneutic and literary 
approaches to the jurisprudence of other courts. The value of turning to comparative 
insights deduced from constitutional law, European Union and international law to 
enrich our understanding of human dignity meaning and to appreciate appropriate 
standards for concretizing the constitutional concept is already established in German 
legal doctrine.236 Art. 1 sec. 2 GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG can be viewed together as 
normative impetus for engaging in comparative research.237 
Recourse to comparative sources of insights serves the relativization of what 
amounts to a violation of human dignity and triggers a process of constant reflection 
on actual practice that is essential to preventing or correcting risks238, such as, first, 
the tendency of trivialization and inflationary argumentation famously put as 
rendering the legal concept ‘kleine Munsee’ [small change]239, thus devaluing the 
guarantee of respect and protection; second, state paternalism240, namely protecting 
individuals from their own actions241 in view of certain established values; third, 
value absolutism, in which case, instead of protecting the individual human being, the                                                         
236 See BVerfGE 131, 268 (295) (2012) [Sicherungsverwahrung] [exploring the relation between the 
Basic Law and the ECHR; affirmation of the international dimension of the Basic Law]; Herdegen, 
Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 3 [The consecutive association of the 
guarantee of human dignity with ‘inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human 
community, of peace, and of justice in the world’ in Art. 1 sec. 2 GG bridges the Basic Law order and 
the international law community by instituting fundamental rights and, at once, proposes ‘universally 
valid standards for the concretization of the “humanitarian minimum” [humanitären Minimums’]in Art. 
1 sec. 2 and 1 GG’. (trans. M. Ch.)] 
237 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 3 
238 As demonstrated infra, the practice of human dignity involves necessarily the confrontation of 
universals with particulars and vice versa, and this confrontation is circular, namely a circulus in 
probando argumentation. 
239 Dürig, Vorauflage, Grundgesetz: Kommentar (1958) para 29; Grimm, Die Würde des Menschen ist 
unantastbar (2009) 13 [‘Ich halte diese Trivialisierung für ebenso schӓdlich wie die Superlativisierung 
der Sprache, weil sie das Unterscheidungsvermӧgen beeintrӓchtigt.’] 
240 Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) 417, 457ff. 
241 Michael Köhne, ‘Abstrakte Menschenwürde?’ (2004) GewArch. 285, 286 [the Objektformel does 
not apply in instances of infringements of human dignity being the result of one’s own actions]; ibid 
287 [Fundamental rights are conceived primarily as defense rights of the citizen against the state. This 
does not mean that Art. 1 sec. 2 GG can provide grounds for protecting the human being from him or 
herself [‘vor sich selbst’].] 
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law of human dignity is practiced so as to protect humanity or the human species [den 
Mencken als Gattungswesen]242; and fourth, extremism243, in other words reducing 
the practice of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG to the prohibition of apocalyptical brutalization244. 
Reference to two illustrative versions of baffling mainstream argumentation 
fine-tunes the delineation of this approach apropos scholarly discussions on the 
desirability of resorting to the history of ideas for determining the legal guarantee in 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and elucidates the orientation of this analysis. Warnings against the 
adoption of particularistic ethics and deference to a distinct philosophical conception 
of human dignity in the long245 history of ideas as critical to the concept’s 
constitutional interpretation are reasonable.246 The idea cuts through antiquity, 
Christian doctrine, the natural law tradition, Renaissance and Enlightenment, the 
thought of Pico della Mira Ndola, who considered the human being a microcosm of 
‘being possibilities’, a plastes and a fictor; of Kant, who introduced an original 
metaphysical sense of the concept and refined the reason-determined autonomous 
existence of human beings; and the political and social dimensions of the concept that 
developed in the 19th and 20th century.247 Distinguishing any of the above as decisive, 
at least at the level of legal doctrine, would be tantamount to arbitrarily opening the                                                         
242 See the Peep Show Case, Federal Administrative Court, BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981); See also 
Hoerster’s commentary on the Peep Show Case in Norbert Hoerster, N., ‘Zur Bedeutung des Prinzips 
der Menschenwürde’ (1983) Heft 2 JuS 93, 95-96 [The principle of human dignity in actuality enables 
giving individual and frequently very personal valuations a pseudo-objective ostensible legitimacy.]; 
Köhne (2004) GewArch. 285, 285 ff. [Köhne stresses the free will of individuals involved in cases such 
as the Peep Schow Case, the Dwarf-throwing Case of the UN Human Rights Committee 
Communication No. 854/1999; the ‘Tanz der Teufel’ Case BVerfGE 87, 209; the Laserdrome Case, 
Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaustellungs GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 
C-36/02 (ECJ, 2004)]; ibid 287 [the law of human dignity guarantees human beings self-determination 
and, consequently, their self-determined portrayal in law]; See also Henning v. Olshausen, 
‘Menschenwürde im Grundgesetz: Wertabsolutismus oder Selbstbestimmung?’ (1982) NJW 2221, 224 
[the real social relevance of an alleged violation of human dignity should be scrutinized] 
243 Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) 417, 459 [on the tendency of extremism in “filling” human dignity meaning] 
244 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 35; See also Michael Kloepfer, ‘Leben und 
Würde des Menschen’ (2001) 77, 97; Deviating, cf. Karl-Eberhard Hain, ‘Konkretisierung der 
Menschenwürde durch Abwägung?’ (2006) 45 Der Staat 189, 205 
245 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 2 [long can also mean burdensome] 
246 For a positivist perspective, see Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 
20; The concept’s philosophical background, as valuable a source of insights for deepening our 
understanding of its evolution in the course of time, cannot adequately determine its meaning and 
practice in law, and should neither pose constraints nor direct legal actors in interpreting Art 1 sec. 1 
GG. See Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 19 [“The concept of human dignity concentrates a 
variety of cognitions and evaluations concerning human beings, the role of the state and the society, the 
meaning of its existence, which have been formulated by philosophy and theology, as well as modern 
social sciences, without succeeding in reaching generally valid statements under a high level of 
abstraction.”]  
247 See Wetz, Illusion Menschenwürde (2005) 14ff. [cultural history of dignity]; Tiedemann, 
Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff (2010) 109-174  
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door to particularistic ethics. The present argument decisively deviates from inquiries 
into the philosophical background of the idea, or even interpretations of the legal 
concept in light of a specific historical signification248. Finding answers to ‘how’, 
‘why’ and ‘when’ the dual sense of ‘something missing’ is practiced within the realm 
of law in the history of the idea of human dignity is quite unlikely, since conceptions 
ensuing therefrom either compete in defining, positively, its content, or define it as 
content-less249. 
These two projects, anchoring the concept’s practice in law to conceptions of 
human dignity in the history of ideas and employing, as presently, philosophical 
insights in a hermeneutic approach to the legal concept250, share one fundamental 
similarity: they bridge philosophy and law.251 Their difference lies in that the former                                                         
248 See Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A human dignitas? Remnants of the ancient legal concept in 
contemporary dignity jurisprudence’ (2011) 9(1) I•CON 32-57; See also Jeremy Waldron, ‘Dignity and 
Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos’ (2007) 2 Archives Europénnes de Sociologie 201 
249 See Arthur Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality (1837) (Über die Grundlage der Moral, with an 
Introduction by Arthur B. Bullock tr, 2nd edn, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005)  
250 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 466 [“[…] the value of such research resides 
not in any confirmation of the power of a single method to subject an ever broader domain of data to a 
sovereign theory, but in an artful disjunction of method and data to illuminate a particular society’s 
images of and beliefs about itself.”] 
251 The methodological approach adopted bridges philosophy and law, while, at the same time, 
introducing a further disciplinary perspective, that of hermeneutics and literary criticism. The 
unavoidable clumsiness of such analysis can be viewed in light of Geertz’s remark on the 
‘discomposing’ nature of applying theories and methods of one discipline to another. See Geertz, Local 
Knowledge (1983) 8 [Bridging disciplines is ‘discomposing not only because who knows where it will 
all end, but because as the idiom of social explanation, its inflections and its imagery, changes, our 
sense of what constitutes such explanation, why we want it, and how it relates to other sorts of things 
we value changes as well. It is not just theory or method or subject matter that alters, but the whole 
point of the enterprise.’]; 23f. [“It is not interdisciplinary brotherhood that is needed, nor even less 
highbrow eclecticism. It is recognition on all sides that the lines grouping scholars together into 
intellectual communities, or (what is the same thing) sorting them out into different ones, are these 
days running at some highly eccentric angles.”]; The variable understandings of what inter- and 
transdisciplinarity entail render careful delineation imperative. See Jürgen Mittelstraß, Wissen und 
Grenzen – Philosophische Studien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001) 89, 92f. [interdisciplinarity 
defined “in truth” as transdisciplinarity necessitated by the research project at hand]; Herald Vӧlker, 
‘Von der Interdisziplinarität zur Transdisziplinarität?’ in Frank Brandt, Franz Schaller & Herald Völker 
(eds), Transdisziplinarität – Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven – Beiträge zur THESIS-
Arbeitstagung im Oktober 2003 in Göttingen (Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2004) 9; 
Philipp W. Balsiger, Transdisziplinarität (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005) 135; Oliver Lepsius, 
‘Sozialwissenschaften im Verfassungsrecht – Amerika als Vorbild?’ (2005) JZ 1, 1-4 [division of work 
in interdisciplinary projects undertaken by more than one researchers]; Eric Hilgendorf, ‘Bedingungen 
gelingender Interdisziplinarität – am Beispiel der Rechtswissenschaft’ (2010) JZ 913, 914 f.; ibid 921f. 
[ambiguity of the term “interdisciplinarity” and necessity of clear delineation, framing and phrasing to 
overcome it]; See the overview of the discourse on interdisciplinarity in the presentation of the 
methods of the interdisciplinary work of Nora Markard, Kriegsflüchtlinge (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2012) 9-10. Analogies can be drawn from inter- and transdisciplinarity in gender studies, Susanne 
Baer, ‘Interdisziplinierung oder Interdisziplinarität? – Erfahrungen mit Geschlechterstudien an der 
Humboldt Universität Berlin’ in Alexandra Stäheli & Caroline Torra-Mattenklott (eds), Eine Frage der 
Disziplin – Zur Institutionalisierung von Gender Studies (Zürich: UniFrauenstelle 2001) 39; See also 
Heike Kahlert, Barbara Thiessen & Ines Weller (eds), Quer denken – Strukturen verändern – Gender 
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assesses the affinity between the legal concept and a historically specific idea as a 
source of signification or significance, while the latter seeks to unveil 
hermeneutically, namely through interpretation252, another understanding of the 
meaning of human dignity, that is, what it is in relation to how (and why) it operates 
(as it does) in law, its content and form, substance and function, signification and 
significance253. The former turns for answers to the idea’s philosophical background. 
The latter aspires to offer philosophical grounds for an original, genuinely affirmative 
stance towards “something missing”254, rather than supplement the state of the art re 
human dignity in the history of ideas. Insofar as I turn to philosophy as an auxiliary 
source of insights for looking at law, the present project could be perceived as 
“interdisciplinary”, “multidisciplinary”255 or “transdisciplinary”256. To the extent that 
this argument seeks to advance another understanding of the law of human dignity 
through a hermeneutic and literary approach, namely methodology that transcends 
disciplinary boundaries in that it centers on language, that is, an elemental layer of 
meaning, it can be designated a transdisciplinary enterprise.                                                                                                                                                               
Studies zwischen den Disziplinen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005); Susanne 
Baer, ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ in Christina von Braun & Inge Stephan (eds), Gender-Studien – Eine 
Einführung (2nd edn, Stuttgard, Weimar: Metzler Verlag, 2006) 149; Susanne Baer, ‘Interdisziplinäre 
Rechtsforschung – Was uns bewegt’ (2010) FS 200 Jahre Juristische Fakultät 917; Susanne Baer & 
Antje Lann Hornscheidt, ‘Transdisciplinary Gender Studies: Conceptual and Institutional Challenges’ 
in Rosemarie Buikema, Gabriele Griffin & Nina Lykke (eds), Theories and Methodologies in 
Postgraduate Feminist Research: Researching Differently (New York: Routledge – Taulor & Francis 
Group, 2011) 165 
252 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 390 [“[…] language is the universal medium in which 
understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting. […] All understanding is interpretation, 
and all interpretation takes place in the medium of language that allows the object to come into words 
and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own language.”] 
253 See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Charles Bally ed, Charles Bally, Albert 
Sechehaye & Albert Riedlinger trs, Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1986) [Distinguishing 
between value and signification, Saussure emphasizes that terms are not isolated from their system, and 
one should start from the interdependent whole and analyze it to get to the terms. Saussure’s structural 
linguistics emphasize the function and value of terms, namely consider terms as more than the union of 
sound to concept.] 
254 This approach is, hence, not an expression of polemics against the terms of the existing dialogue in 
doctrine; rather, it aspires to be an enhancement of the legal discourse to date. 
255 See Hilgendorf (2010) 913, 914 [Interdisciplinarity is defined as the cooperation of researchers 
coming from different disciplines in a common project, while multidisciplinarity or pluridisciplinarity 
is the mere “side-by-side” co-occurrence of different disciplines within a project]. Legal philosophy is 
concerned with the question whether the practice of law is right in the sense of just, ethical, and 
justifiable. Far from being a legal philosophy enterprise, the present analysis employs philosophical 
insights to engage in a hermeneutic and literary approach to law to portray its practice. See Baer, 
Rechtssoziologie (2011) 25 
256 Transdisciplinary approaches transcend rigidly demarcated disciplinary boundaries impeding the 
advancement of knowledge. See Mittelstraß, Wissen und Grenzen (2001) 89, 93 [the instrumentality of 
transdisciplinarity]; Hilgendorf (2010) 913, 915; Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 53 [Interdisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary have a stronger potential of breaching presuppositions, bias, stereotypes, 
prejudice, fear of what is strange and other.] 
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Premising the reasonableness of the research questions on the empirical 
observation of de facto ambiguity and controversy as indications of ‘something 
missing’, minding the normative and social context of practice, and legal texts’ ‘own 
voice’, referring to the FCC as the ‘self’, touching on legal actors’ competence and 
responsibility, and on the coincidence of the human being and the institution in the 
role of the judge, all have implications of interest to legal sociology or cultural 
studies. Hermeneutics and literary criticism could fall under the rubric of cultural 
studies257 or Law as Literature258 within the Law and Literature movement259, and 
certainly border on cultural studies’ discourse analysis260 and cultural criticism261, the 
concept’s cultural history262, semantics, and theology.263                                                          
257 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) ix [‘Literary studies have become ‘Cultural 
Studies,’ applying the methods of the humanities to the subject matter of the social sciences to reveal 
and interpet a ‘social text.’ The literary criticism of law […] should be seen as part of this larger 
development within literary studies.’] 
258 ibid [‘[…] the use of the methods of literary criticism in understanding and evaluating laws, legal 
institutions, and legal processes […].’] 
259 ibid 3 [The relevance of Law and Literature to the present enterprise of inquiring into ‘produced 
meaning’ in the mobilization of human dignity language in FCC jurisprudence is traced in the goals of 
early Law and Literature scholars, who ‘set themselves the twin tasks of defending judicial discretion 
and informing its exercise with Kantian liberal values.’ The dawn of the Law and Literature movement 
was marked by characterizing ‘legal argument and judgment as interpretive activities necessarily 
affording their practicioners wide latitude for creativity, but nonetheless constrained by craft values 
that were unltimately aesthetic […]’ and by associating aesthetic concerns with the empathetic 
sensibility of legal actors ‘as a restraint on and reproach to what they saw as the heartless utilitarianism 
of the new legal economics.’]; Cf. Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 
(Cambridge, MA, London, England: Harvard University Press, 1988) [criticism] 
260 See Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 264 [discourse analysis in cultural studies]; Distinguishing 
between my methodological approach and cultural studies’ discourse analysis is compelled by their 
close resemblance. Engaging in discourse analysis, namely seeking certain formations in the text of 
laws, or courts’ judgments, would require associating the findings of inquiry with constitutional history 
and culture, i.e. motifs and stereotypes distinct to the particular cultural context. For instance, I would 
have to demonstrate responsiveness to what it means, culturally, to be a prisoner, a transsexual, or a 
foreigner in Germany. Scientific answers to such questions presuppose exhaustive surveyance of the 
cultural context of ‘othering’ in Germany. Discourse analysis of law is also occupied with how certain 
core legal terms, such as human dignity, are treated in different legal texts. The proximity of this 
project to mine is obvious. Still, discourse analysis would probably aspire to treat the identification of 
patterns of human dignity as a legal concept systematically as a historically evolving phenomenon, in 
the sense of cohesively tracing the evolution of the concept in time and in different kinds of legal texts. 
The interpretative task undertaken here is restricted to scrutinizing an indeed restricted, yet illustrative 
subtotal of seminal human dignity FCC decisions, rather than all, or a representative subtotal. I 
approach a collection of historical instances that are exceptionally celebrated in legal literature as 
human dignity case law, while trying to be contextually and comparatively relevant. No systematically 
constructed cultural argument is furthered here.  
261 Binder & Weisberg (n 257) 18 [‘The most promising literary criticisms of law are not particularly 
aimed at defending legal interpretation against majoritarian politics or defending human dignity against 
utilitarian rationality. Instead they interpet law as a cultural datum and analyze legal processes as 
arenas for generating cultural meaning. In such ‘cultural studies’ […] the stable self-sufficient persons 
of Kantian ethics give way to a more complex and contingent picture of the self.’]; ibid 19 [Cultural 
criticism rejects the dichotomy between the literary and the instrumental analysis in contemporary legal 
discourse maintained in Law and Literature.]; ibid 26 [‘While the different genres of criticism portray 
law as the composition of different kinds of artifacts, each portrays law as a practice of composition; 
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The ‘human’ component of ‘human dignity’ is, substantively, a topes across 
disciplines, just as hermeneutics and literary criticism are integral to the production of 
meaning regardless of the disciplinary and institutional realm within which this is 
performed. Research questions are not tackled through systematic treatment of human 
dignity practice in law as a sociological phenomenon, nor by seeking to draw 
scientific conclusions from a comprehensive assessment of the cultural phenomenon 
of human dignity in German constitutional law and jurisprudence264, nor from the 
composition of the cultural setting of FCC jurisprudence, nor, finally, by means of 
semantic analysis of the term ‘human’ and the composed term ‘human dignity’. As 
regards the affinity of this project to semantic analysis, it should furthermore be 
noted, that, while the portrayals performed are of semantic value since they propose 
an understanding of language, they are literary approaches rather than systematic 
semantic accounts. Moreover, the hermeneutic approach, while intersecting in certain 
respects with the purpose of legal hermeneutics as defined by Gadamer, namely ‘not 
to understand given texts, but to be a practical measure filling a kind of gap in the 
system of legal dogmatic’265, is not identified with this more specific enterprise here. 
The conceivable parallel readings of the thesis affirm the felicity of the ‘oceanic 
feeling’ metaphor and the inherent multi-dimensionality of the subject matter on the 
one hand, while hinting at the lurking pitfall of methodological insufficiency of any 
single, reductive approach on the other. These clarifications, at this early point, are 
deemed indispensible to the overall economy of the succeeding analysis.                                                                                                                                                               
and the different accounts they give of the practice of literary composition exhibit a certain family 
resemblance: each can be described as a process of appropriating and reshaping old materials.’] 
262 See Wetz, Illusion Menschenwürde (2005) 14 ff. 
263 The perplexity of forcing adherence of such methodological approaches to a common rubric should 
be noted here. For instance ‘hermeneutics’, or ‘literary criticism’ could be classed as one strand of the 
Law and Literature, specifically Law as Literature, movement. At the same time the strand of 
‘hermeneutics’ per se grants wide latitude to those availing themselves of methodological approaches 
implied therein. One can claim that wherever meaning is produced, hermeneutics is practiced; or define 
‘hermeneutics’ as ‘historical hermeneutics’ and draw on historicity and the process of the critical circle 
as ensued from the work of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, or Friedrich 
Schleiermacher – just to mention a few of the prominent names in this theoretical discourse. See Hoy, 
The Critical Circle (1982); Likewise, Law and Literature encompasses radically diverse 
methodological approaches to law, ranging from narrative and poetics, to deconstruction, 
postmodernism, and philosophy of language. For present purposes, the hermeneutical and literary 
approach to the law of human dignity plainly denotes the emphasis on texts as sources of meaning and 
representations of (a) reality. 
264 See James Q. Whitman, ‘On Nazi “Honor” and the New European “Dignity”’ (2003) 243, 246 [‘I 
want to ask, not about the philosophy of dignity, but about the culture of dignity – to ask what it is that 
has made “dignity” a value that seems meaningful and important to ordinary Europeans. As we shall 
see, inquiring into the sources of the culture of “dignity,” rather than the philosophy, puts the Nazi era 
in quite a new light.’] 
265 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 321 
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The hermeneutic and literary approach to law is evident in the evolution of the 
argument as a whole, as well as in each distinct part of the analysis. The structure of 
the inquiry could be branded teleological266, ‘the emerging of the core meaning’ in 
Chapter One being expounded only later in tackling the practice of the legal concept 
in FCC jurisprudence in Chapter Two.267 Chapter One sketches out three possible 
stories of ‘something missing’, three philosophical understandings of how human 
dignity is practiced in law, that is, distills insightful conceptualizations of themes 
crosscutting the legal discourse on human dignity from renowned philosophical 
works, to enable a different portrayal of the concept’s practice as documented in 
selected legal texts. In that sense, the hermeneutic project undertaken pertains to 
interpretation as explanation.268 The analysis in Chapter Two is occupied with 
seminal instances of human dignity in FCC judicial practice, indeed presently the 
most elaborate constitutional court jurisprudence on the law of human dignity, and 
discussed extensively in both continental-European and Anglo-American legal 
scholarship.  
In rereading formative cases from FCC jurisprudence through the lenses 
delineated in Chapter One, I interpret texts as mirrors reflecting – to be sure, just one 
aspect of – human dignity practice. Comparative perspectives, drawing on positive 
law and case law from international, European (EU) and other national constitutional 
orders269, are included to signify the potential reach of philosophical insights put 
forward in Chapter One as ways of understanding constitutionalism beyond the state 
portraying practice beyond the German example. 
This book is written for students and scholars of law, with the intent to offer a 
philosophically grounded understanding of the foundations of the law of human 
dignity in Chapter One, and to trigger interaction between or transcendence of                                                         
266 See also Palmer (1969) 22 [‘The telos of the process [of enunciation] is not to move the emotions 
(poetics) or to bring about political action (rhetoric) but to bring understanding to statement.’] 
267 Lebech (2009) 20 
268 Palmer (1969) 20 [‘Interpretation as explanation emphasizes the discursive aspect of understanding; 
it points to the explanatory rather than expressive dimensions of interpretation. Words, after all, do not 
merely say something […]; they explain something, rationalize it, make it clear. […] The cryptic 
messages from the oracle at Delphi did not interpret a preexistent text; they were “interpretations” of a 
situation. (The messages themselves required interpretation.) […] They brought into a verbal 
formulation the “meaning” of a situation; they explained it, sometimes in words that concealed as much 
as they revealed. […] Thus while in one sense the oracles simply said or enunciated, as explanation 
they moved toward a second moment of interpretation – to explain or account for something.’] 
269 Reference and discussion in German, continental-European, and Anglo-American legal literature on 
human dignity are the criteria guiding the selection of human dignity manifestations in positive law and 
case law employed in the analysis. 
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disciplinary boundaries270 in understanding how the law of human dignity is 
practiced, in Chapter Two. Rather than postulating answers, this affirmative stance 
towards the dual sense of ‘something missing’ aims to identify language requiring 
further critical reflection and to raise questions through three alternative portrayals of 
the practice of the law of human dignity in FCC jurisprudence. The points highlighted 
are opportunities and impetus for further inquiry within the disciplines of law, 
sociology and cultural studies, and welcome comparative approaches to employ the 
introduced model. General readers will receive a non-mainstream glance at seminal 
instances of FCC jurisprudence. The non-mainstream character of this approach 
translates essentially into exceeding and challenging the boundaries of legal doctrine 
[Rechtsdogmatik] on the basis of their insufficiency as sources of insights for 
understanding and thereby enhancing the practice of law, particularly of the law of 
human dignity.271 Significantly, far from claiming that the present reading is pertinent 
to the challenges of everyday practice, it nevertheless sensitizes272 practitioners as to 
how human dignity language is mobilized in law.  
The practice of the law of human dignity in FCC jurisprudence and German 
legal doctrine presents unquestionably one of the most sophisticated, persistent and 
astute examples of mobilization. The German legal discourse may seem at times 
unwieldy and precise to the extent that it excludes correspondence to the Anglo-
American literature. Bringing the two strands of discourse together and creating a 
model of hermeneutic and literary analysis grounded on divergent philosophical 
bases, aims to constructively interfere with the properness of that discourse. As a 
native Greek speaker I experience an alienation from both English and German, while 
for the native German speaker the use of English and the translations of the texts of 
                                                        
270 Binder & Weisberg (n 257) 5 [Binder and Weisberg identify an implicit logic shared by 
interdisciplinary importations, namely that ‘[t]he host and guest disciplines are in one sense 
interchangeable – each can illuminate the same phenomena.’ They note: ‘Yet their powers of 
illumination differ in quality and quantity. The guest discipline can correct the host’s deficiencies, 
either improving it or displacing it altogether. To import literature into law is therefore to see the two 
enterprises as potential collaborators or competitors in the same enterprise.’] 
271 See Dieter Grimm (ed), Rechtswissenschaft und Nachbarwissenschaften (2 Bde., 2nd edn, München: 
Beck, 1976) 
272 For accounts of how law and literature approaches sensitize legal actors practicing the law, see 
Binder & Weisberg (n 257) 3 [‘[…] an empathetic sensibility that could alert the good lawyer or judge 
to the effect of legal decisions on the personhood or dignity of parties.’]; ibid 4 [Of particular 
pertinence to the value of the Subsistence Minimum Case analysis infra ‘[…] a literary perspective 
could […] encourage the lawgiver to eschew mechanistic regulation in favor of an open-minded 
pluralism, to become an empathetic, inclusive, and imaginative architect of the common good.’] 
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decisions have the effect of alienation, that is, the text ‘speaks’ to them in a manner 
that provokes per se critical reflection.  
Alertness to gendered language is imperative in reading Chapter One and 
Chapter Two, that is, both the philosophical and the legal material. Philosophical 
insights are deduced predominantly from the work of male thinkers, Heraclitus as per 
Heidegger, Rancière, Wittgenstein, and Levin’s. Side-by-side, female thinkers, 
chiefly MacKinnon, afford this analysis phrasing and framing patterns for the 
backbone questions, and enhance critical reflection on the texts under scrutiny in 
Chapter Two, in that they offer non-mainstream conceptualizations of law, thus a 
switch from traditional perspectives. Wherever ‘gender alerts’ arise in the succeeding 
pages, they are discretely indicated or more meticulously addressed. My personal 
disposition, as author and reader, to the range of instances of gendered language, 
bearing in mind that several of the texts studied presently are not recently written, is 
to contextualize gender alerts, tailor language carefully to avoid reproducing them, 
and ‘restore’, where possible, the inequality of assumed perspectives. For purposes of 
fluency, economy and intelligibility of the analysis and in view of the emphasis of this 
inquiry on concrete images corresponding to the Menschenbild in each case under 
scrutiny, I use the phrase ‘the transsexual human being’ in treating the Transsexual I 
Case in Chapter Two; it should be noted at the outset that I refer to human beings 
‘who are transsexuals’, namely to an identity or, as presently framed, a manifestation 
of human being-ness, rather than an adjective, a label, an unattended to grouping of 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF HUMAN DIGNITY AS A LEGAL 
CONCEPT: THREE STORIES OF ‘SOMETHING MISSING’ 
 
What does human dignity mean in law? In particular, how is it empty? The 
answer to this question is explored through the demonstration of the dialogue between 
three philosophical accounts: an ontological (Part A), a linguistic-analytical (Part B), 
and a phenomenological (Part C). The coming-into-being of human beings within the 
realm of law, specifically fundamental rights, can be rendered as the traversal of a 
limit, which brings about their ontological presence as subjects of fundamental rights 
within that realm and defines their relation to other human beings, termed ‘the other’ 
in the thought of Levin’s, the world, and ‘the Other’, referred to as ‘something always 
missing’ in the presently told story. The traversal of limits eventuates in the polemos 
or dispenses. Practicing the law of human dignity scandalizes and irritates,273 thus 
triggers and catalyzes the traversal of the limit. The transcendental character of human 
dignity surfaces most tangibly in relational portrayals. The linguistic-analytical and 
phenomenological accounts enable relational portrayals of practice. Premised on the 
linguistic and semantic relatedness of ‘human’ and ‘human dignity’ they show how 
the dual sense of ‘something missing’ is practiced in law whenever the law of human 
dignity is mobilized in legal texts.  
The ontological account of human dignity is grounded on an enigmatic 
fragment by the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus and a contemporary 
interpretation, feminist argumentation, and postmodern political theory concepts – 
granted, with special affinity to equality considerations – as sources of analogies. 
Ontological insights spark a penetrative, though somewhat crude, story of ‘something 
missing’ towards the end of advancing an ‘ontological account’ rather than ‘an 
ontology’ of human dignity. Thinkers resorted to in Part A do not restrict themselves 
to ontological remarks274, which is why I should clarify at the outset that I only claim 
to turn to certain ideas and reflections found in their work to ground an ontological                                                         
273 Baer, ‘Menschenwürde zwischen Recht, Prinzip und Referenz – Enttabuisierungen’ (2005) 571, 588  
274 As a matter of fact, Rancière explicitly resists the branding of his point on the whole as ontological. 
See Jacques Rancière, ‘The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics’, in Paul Bowman & 
Richard Stamp (eds), Reading Rancière: Critical Dissensus (London, New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2011) 12ff. 
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perspective on the law of human dignity that, whilst composed and practiced, shall be 
in turn subject to critical reflection as regards its methodological appropriateness. 
Ontological insights set the foundations for the introduced model, yet fall short of 
grasping and communicating the relational and dynamic aspects of practice. 
The linguistic-analytical account affords the figurative rendering of the texts 
of judicial decisions – indeed, partial reflections of judicial practice of the law of 
human dignity – as legal language games, and sets the foundations for the 
phenomenological account. The distinction between what can be ‘said’ and what can 
only be ‘shown’ in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractates Logico-Philosophicus275, the 
ethical and the aesthetic as the transcendental, the appreciation of what the limit 
means drawing on the symbolic sense of tautologies, and the graph of the eye and the 
field of sight borrowed to depict where the metaphysical subject stands apropos the 
world are examples of the material that fleshes out the linguistic-analytical account of 
practicing the law of human dignity. ‘Something missing’ can be identified within the 
limits of our language as our world, understood however not in terms of pure logic, 
but rather as lived experience. ‘Something always missing’ refers to what lies beyond 
the limit. The legal language game represents the text of the judicial decision and 
corresponds to what is broadly referred to as the realm of law in the ontological 
account.  
The phenomenological account is grounded in insights derived and analogies 
drawn from Emmanuel Levin’s’ Totality and Infinity – An Essay on Exteriority 
[henceforth, Totality and Infinity]. The thesis that the ethical precedes ontology                                                         
275 The hermeneutic and literary methodological approach to law permits drawing on concepts and 
graphs in the early work of Wittgenstein, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and, to a lesser extent, in 
the later thoughts collected in the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein revisited and rejected to a 
considerable extent his early philosophy in his later work; what is more, the methodology and style of 
the former is significantly different to that of the latter.  In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, facts, 
that is, propositions of language, namely our world, are understood and evaluated as to whether they 
are sensible in view of the logical form beyond our world. Propositions and reality are pictorially 
related. In his Philosophical Investigations, language approximates lived experience. The perception of 
language thereby essentially departs from propositional logic: language games, and family 
resemblances among them, represent the variety of modes of practicing language and convey the 
dynamic evolution of language and all that is expressed in using it. Differences are, granted, 
foundational. The changes in the thought and style of Wittgenstein over time, however, do not affect 
the value of insights deduced from his early work in the present argument. The rigid and clear form and 
content of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in fact serve, in methodological terms, the enterprise of 
setting up a model, a figurative representation of the practice of the law of human dignity. 
Substantively, the emphasis on the pictorial rather than representational nexus between propositions 
and reality is attuned to the notion of the Menschenbild as a conceptual pillar of this analysis. While 
cognizant of the shift, for the purposes of this argument, the analysis goes past it. See Anthony Clifford 
Grayling, Wittgenstein – A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)  
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indicates that Levin’s’ positions in Totality and Infinity, indeed abounding in 
language and variety of ideas, refer to pre-ethics, the ethics inhering in the practice of 
language and rendering the relation with the other in responsibility, generosity, 
hospitality, fraternity, solidarity and morality possible. Perceiving the other as Other 
denotes the transcendental quality of human being-ness. The humanism of the face-to-
face encounter with the other, in other words of a relation instituted in language and 
motivated by desire for someone absolutely separated and other than the self, and the 
pluralism of the intersubjective space enhance this phenomenological portrayal of the 
transcendental. 
The distinction between totality and infinity and, accordingly, between 
totalizers and infinitizers adds a further, phenomenological layer to the introduced 
model. Totality and infinity are two sides of the story of ‘something missing’ 
presently told; both are indispensable for delivering upon the commitment to 
humanism and the responsibility before God and human beings. The etherealness of 
ideas composing Levinas’ account of pre-ethics is at the same time masterly rooted in 
lived experience. Language is the platform of the infinitizer, while vision of the 
totalizer; ‘something missing’ can be filled with meaning unfolding in real 
conversation with the other. The humane practice of the law of human dignity 
additionally rests on the breach of totalities and the possibility of transcendence 
towards infinity, ‘something always missing’. 
Critical reflection is the process that guarantees the humane practice of the law 
of human dignity; all three accounts furthered in Chapter One affirm this proposition 
and offer insights into the prerequisites of this process and its modus operandi. 
Understanding critical reflection as the processual meaning of the law of human 
dignity influences the interpretation of dominant language and time-honored concepts 
in legal theory and doctrine featuring in the cases under scrutiny in Chapter Two. The 
ontological account is a prelude to the linguistic-analytical and phenomenological 
accounts concerned with language as the foundation of society and communication. 
Together the three philosophically grounded accounts of the law of human dignity 
compose a multilayered, multifocal lens for looking at illustrative instances of FCC 
jurisprudence.276                                                         
276 On the processual meaning of the law of human dignity see Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar 
(2010) 10 [‘Den es kommt nicht nur auf das humanistische Ziel an; auch der Weg, auf dem das Ziel 
erreicht werden soll, muss human sein.’]; Ontological conceptualizations imply the imposition of a 
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A. An ontological account of practicing the law of human dignity 
The ontological ‘account of’ the law of human dignity laid out is, at the same 
time, exposed to critical reflection. The analysis demonstrates that the employment, 
single-handedly, of an ontological lens results in inadequate portrayals of the dynamic 
process277 of practicing human dignity in law and warns about ontological traps278 in 
treating this account as more than a prelude to the succeeding relational 
understandings. In German legal doctrine ‘human’ in ‘human dignity’, has, more than 
descriptive, prescriptive meaning.279 In defending the descriptive meaning of the law 
of human dignity, that is, emphasizing the fact rather than just the law of human 
dignity, this study does not come into conflict with the dominant doctrinal position,                                                                                                                                                               
status quo, and the portrayals ensuing from looking through an ontological lens are static. This is 
particularly evident in the doctrine of the protection of a core [Kernbereichschutz] of human dignity. 
Similarly to the space corresponding to the part of those who have no part in the thought of Rancière, 
the Kernbeichschutz according to Poscher, either physical or ideal, can cause the sealing of that space. 
Poscher opts for a relational account of the claim to respect. Similarly, the present hermeneutic and 
literary approach to the law of human dignity sets off from ontological considerations – acknowledging 
their insufficiency for the portrayal of the concept’s practice – and enhances those with two relational 
accounts. See Poscher (2009) 269, 269; ibid 270ff. [Kernbereichschutz, the spatial – physical and ideal 
– rendering of the guarantee of human dignity]; See Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ 
(1995) 104  
277 The dynamism of that process is, for instance, suggested in the requirement of concretization of 
claims to respect for human dignity. See Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 
2009) para 50; Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will And Idea (first published in 1818, R. B. 
Haldane & J. Kemp trs, 7th edn, London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner & Co., 1909, Project Gutenberg 
EBook 38427, release date: December 27, 2011) 447 [450] [Addressing the vagueness and 
indefiniteness of the Kantian proposition that ‘Man must always be treated as an end, never as a 
means,’] 
278 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 67 
279 Hoerster (1983) 93, 96 [Human dignity is not an a priori determined concept, the violations or 
protection of which can be objectively established. The concept of human dignity is not of purely 
normative nature. Rather, it has a descriptive element, that is, the human being is by nature in priciple 
self-determined in freedom. Value decisions are required in the practice of the law of human dignity, in 
order to ascertain which forms of free human self-determination are sittlich legitim [morally 
legitimate].]; 96 fn 17 [Hoerster declares explicitly his reluctance towards associating the capability to 
self-determination in freedom as a descriptive account of the meaning of human dignity with 
metaphysical indeterminism. Minding that Hoerster does not elaborate on the grounds of his 
reluctance, no reaction can be offered here; to the extent, however, that his stance is relevant to the 
approach taken on at present, this remark is worth mentioning.]; Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) 
para 1 [‘[…] die Feststellung des Seins als nachdrücklichste Form einer Anmahnung des Sollens.’]; 
The majority of voices in the doctrinal discourse on the inviolability [Unantastbarkeit] of human 
dignity in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG upholds the prescriptive – rather than descriptive – meaning of the 
proposition, thus reinforce leaning towards this understanding of “human” in the law of human dignity. 
See also Bernhard Giese, Das Würde-Konzept. Eine normfunktionale Explikation des Begriffs Würde in 
Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1975) 46; Krawietz (1977) 245, 255f.; Heinz Müller-
Dietz, Menschenwürde und Strafvollzug (Berlin, New York: Walter de Grzuyter, 1994) 8; Hofmann, 
‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 111-12 fn 36 [‘Nach beiden Autoren [Nipperdey, 
Dürig] ist Würde unzerstörbares Faktum (Natur oder Wesen des Menschen) und gleichzeitig etwas, 
worauf ein subjektives oder wenigstens ein objektives, in jedem Fall aber verletzbares Recht besteht: 
Würde also etwas Wirkliches, was verwirklicht werden soll, unzerstörbare Natur des Menschen, auf die 
er ein Recht hat.’]; Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 131; Gröschner & Lembcke 
(eds), Das Dogma der Unantastbarkeit (2010) 
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because it does not purport to be taking a stance in the doctrinal discourse. This 
hermeneutic and literary study intends to portray that – and how – the transcendental 
meaning of human dignity is practiced, and that practicing the meta-dimension of the 
law of human dignity is vital to ensuring law’s humane mobilization280; it, thus, does 
not aim at detracting argumentatively from the doctrinal significance of prescriptive 
meaning. 
Kunig notes that the ascertainment of being is the most emphatic form of a 
reminder of ought.281 Who is that being?  Are human beings human within the realm 
of law? The answer to that question depends on whether ad hoc instances of practice 
comply with the ought282 implied in ‘human’. The process of verifying or falsifying 
compliance presupposes ‘something missing’. Understanding that ‘ought’ and the 
thereby justified constitutional guarantee apropos ‘something missing’ opens up a 
space for reflection through dissensus: Who is human?  
Practicing human dignity language in law evokes – and, I argue, at once 
activates – law’s humanism.283 Methodological emphasis on the human factor in the 
texts analyzed here attests, at the same time, to the effort to trace such humanism. 
Heidegger understands the word ‘humanism’ processually and ‘in its broadest sense’, 
‘in its essence’284.  
[…] In that regard ‘humanism’ means the process that is implicated 
in the beginning, in the unfolding, and in the end of metaphysics, 
whereby human beings, in differing respects but always 
deliberately, move into a central place among beings, of course 
without thereby being the highest being.285 Here ‘human being’                                                         
280 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 33 [‘Dass die Menschenwürde “unantastbar” ist, 
bedeutet nicht die Feststellung eines Faktums oder eine Beschreibung, wie die geschichtliche 
Erfahrung lehrt. Vielmehr soll die Menschenwürde nicht angetastet werden.’]; Cf. para 8 [‘Neben der 
christlichen gibt es eine humanistische Tradition, in der die Menschenwürde innerweltlich begründet 
wird. Schon die Beschreibung des “Faktums” Menschenwürde “als Fundament meines Vertrauens in 
mich selbst und in die anderen, auf das meine Existenz und Koexistenz im Bewusstsein prinzipieller 
Personalität und Solidarität überhaupt gründet”, spiegelt noch die metaphysische Basis des 
Würdebegriffs. [footnotes omitted]’] 
281 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 1 
282 ibid 
283 See Yannaras, The inhuman character of human rights (1998) 
284 Heidegger M, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ in ibid, Pathmarks (William McNeill ed, Thomas Sheehan 
tr, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 155, 181 
285 Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, New Ways of Ontology (first published in Stuttgart by W. Kohlhammer in 
1949; with an Introduction by Predrag Cicovacki, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012) 
11 [‘Unlike most traditional philosophers, Hartmann opposes the view that the real world is relative to 
man, in the sense that human beings are the highest and final purpose of the world order, and that all 
forms and relationships in the world must be ordered toward man. In Hartmann’s view, just the 
opposite is the case. Even as a spiritual being, man cannot be understood without the world in which he 
finds himself, and it is necessary to define his essence from this point of view.’] 
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sometimes means humanity or humankind, sometimes the 
individual or the community, and sometimes the people [das Volk] 
or a group of peoples.286  
Bearing in mind the linguistic and semantic overlapping287 of the terms 
‘human being’ and ‘human dignity’ or ‘the dignity of the human being’, the ‘human’ 
component, undoubtedly persistently present in the concept’s course in the history of 
ideas288, is first considered separately. The ‘human’ component alludes to law’s 
Menschenbild, namely to the human image or the portrayal of human beings in law. 
The ontology of human beings, as mirrored in texts, is of pictorial form, a Menschen-
bild. This image should be self-determined in light of the law of human dignity.289  
The focus on human being-ness reflects an anthropocentric metaphysics. The 
insight that humanism signifies a process spurs the analysis on to inquire into the 
character of that process. The strong presumption that the law of human dignity and 
fundamental rights encapsulate law’s humanism feeds on the values they deliver and 
evinces in the granted higher legal status; yet, precisely for that reason, fundamental 
rights present an impeccable ‘cloak of force’ 290. This is why the substantiation of 
humanism in practicing the law of human dignity should be persistently subject to 
critical reflection and actively verified on a case-by-case basis.   
What is always at stake is this: to take ‘human beings’ who within 
the sphere of a fundamental, metaphysically established system of 
beings are defined as animal rationale, and to lead them, within that 
sphere291, to the liberation of their possibilities, to the certitude of 
their destiny, and to the securing of their ‘life’. This takes place as 
the shaping of their ‘moral’ behavior, as the salvation of their 
immortal souls, as the unfolding of their creative powers, as the 
development of their reason, as the nourishing of their personalities, 
as the awakening of their civic sense, as the cultivation of their 
bodies, or as an appropriate combination of some or all of these 
‘humanisms.’ What takes place in each instance is a metaphysically 
determined revolving around the human being, whether in narrower 
or wider orbits. With the fulfillment of metaphysics, ‘humanism’ (or 
                                                        
286 Heidegger (n 284) 
287 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (first published in 1953, P. M. S. Hacker & 
Joachim Schulte eds, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte trs, revised 4th edn, 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 5e [‘Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the 
word. It is the object [Gegenstand] for which the word stands.’] 
288 Wetz, Illusion Menschenwürde (2005) 14ff.  
289 Köhne (2004) 285, 287 [Selbstdarstellung] 
290 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989) 237 
291 The phrase ‘within that sphere’ can be viewed as an indication of a totality structure (see infra under 
Part C).  
 73
in ‘Greek’ terms: anthropology) also presses on to the most extreme 
– and likewise unconditioned – ‘positions’.292 
For this is humanism: meditating and caring, that human beings be 
human and not inhumane, ‘inhuman,’ that is, outside their essence. 
But in what does the humanity of the human being consist? It lies in 
his293 essence.294 
Cautious of the didactic tone in the least – if not underlying paternalism – in 
Heidegger’s conception of humanism295, availing nonetheless ourselves of the supra 
definition initiates an understanding of the abstract idea of humanism. Heidegger 
identifies systemic premises to metaphysics, enumerates various manifestations of 
human beings’ unfolding296, and communicates a concrete criterion for identifying 
and verifying whether law’s practice accords with law’s anthropocentrism, namely the 
ascertainment of ‘meditating and caring, that human beings be human’, in other words 
attuned to their essence. Four remarks are deemed crucially important in proceeding 
with the construction of a philosophically grounded model to approach the practice of 
the law of human dignity.  
First, attention should be drawn to the spatial restriction on the unfolding of 
human beings ‘within the sphere of a fundamental, metaphysically established system 
of beings’. Does this phrasing suggest the subsumption of human being-ness under a 
totality structure?297 Second, transposing the various specified ‘humanisms’, as 
Heidegger calls them, to the realm of law could lead to state paternalism298 as regards 
the concretization of what it means for a human being to be human. Third, according 
to Heidegger, the human being occupies a central position not only in a 
metaphysically established system, but also in a metaphysically determined dynamic 
process, namely one ‘revolving around the human being, whether in narrower or 
wider orbits’. Fourth, ‘inhuman’ translates into being outside one’s essence. Invoking 
the philosophical connotations of ‘human’ in ‘human dignity’ triggers anew the 
                                                        
292 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ 155, 181 
293 Gender alert! 
294 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in ibid, Pathmarks (first edition 1949, William McNeill 
ed, Frank A. Capuzzi tr, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 239, 244 
295 On state paternalism see infra the analysis of the Abortion I Case (see infra under Chapter Two, Part 
B).  
296 See the word ‘entfalten’ [to unfold] in BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) (1977) [Life Imprisonment Case]. 
297 The notion of totality is elaborated on infra, under the phenomenological account in Part C.  
298 See Henning v. Olshausen, ‘Menschenwürde im Grundgesetz: Wertabsolutismus oder 
Selbstbestimmung?’ (1982) NJW 2221 
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question about who the human being is. Dealing with this interrogative demands de- 
and reconstructive disobedience to disciplinary boundaries.299 
Who is the human being? Diverse allusions to the meaning of this ontological-
metaphysical question300, and a range of possible responses are conceivable301 and 
certainly nuanced by motivations underlying this interrogative and its theoretical and 
methodological framing. That said, the promise carried by this opening question to 
spark an inquiry into the meta-dimension and Menschenbild of law is hardly far-
fetched. The question expresses the desire to explore different manifestations of 
human being-ness, for instance existence, essence or identity; unless delineated it can 
release the Winds of Aeolus. Baer notes, ‘[w]ho the human being is and what follows 
from it, is controversial everywhere.’302 The abundance of theoretical and empirical 
scholarly approaches across disciplines on each of the connoted manifestations of the 
human being, which can be attributed to the question’s multi-signification and high 
degree of abstraction, gives an inkling of what is enjeu in exploring and laying out an 
ontological account of human dignity in law. 
Who is the human being in law? The question might seem at first glance 
redundant or utterly provocative; is it not self-evident who the human being is within 
the realm of law? Catherine MacKinnon’s efforts towards a feminist theory of the 
state are a source of insight into the imprint of law’s Menschenbild on being a 
woman, and conversely the influence of the reality of women on the Menschenbild of 
law. For present purposes, MacKinnon’s theoretical endeavor allows for drawing 
analogies to elucidate the practice of human dignity as a legal concept. Ontological                                                         
299 An interesting insight into the value of ‘contesting disciplinary boundaries’ can be deduced from a 
comment on how the philosophy of Jacques Rancière refuses ‘the mastery and authority of 
methodological and disciplinary territory.’ By challenging disciplinary boundaries ‘for producing 
knowledge about politics […] Rancière’s work each time seeks to reassert the equality of the 
democratic subject of history with the authoritative voice of the historian or philosopher’. In Paul 
Bowman & Richard Stamp, ‘Introduction: A Critical Dissensus’, in Paul Bowman & Richard Stamp 
(eds), Reading Ranciere: Critical Dissensus (London, New York: Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2011) xiii; Alex Thomson, ‘On the shores of history’ in Paul Bowman & Richard Stamp (eds), 
Reading Ranciere: Critical Dissensus (London, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2011) 200, 205 
300 The question is ontological-metaphysical in the sense that it is occupied with the meaning of being 
qua being. Despite the broad substantive scope of ontology, and the acknowledged elusiveness of 
definitions of metaphysics as a philosophical strand, this analysis is confined to philosophical insights 
re the meaning of the human being as such. 
301 The origin from human beings is a most celebrated response to the question. Cf. Jan Ziekow, Über 
Freizügigkeit und Aufenthalt - Paradigmatische Überlegungen zum grundrechtlichen Freiheitsschutz 
in historischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997) 378; Kunig, 
Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 12 [Commenting on‘Mensch ist, wer von Menschen gezeugt 
wurde.’] 
302 Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 104; ibid 107 [controversy] 
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considerations303 are central in her early and more recent work. Most importantly, 
transposing the essence of her arguments to this inquiry surely suggests: who is 
‘human’, who really counts as ‘human’, is never self-evident. 
Law actively participates in [the] transformation of perspective into 
being. In liberal regimes, law is a particularly potent source and 
badge of legitimacy, and site and cloak of force. The force 
underpins the legitimacy as the legitimacy conceals the force. When 
life becomes law in such a system, the transformation is both formal 
and substantive. It reenters life marked by power.304 
The chosen phrasing, ‘law’s Menschenbild’, evidently implies law’s305 
dominion over the meaning of the Menschenbild. MacKinnon’s remarks capture by 
analogy how this dominion eventuates. MacKinnon asks in 1989 ‘What really, is a 
woman?’306, and in 2006 ‘Are women human?’307 Both questions are of penetrative 
rhetorical force308; are they also ontologically important? The latter explicitly casts 
the focus on women’s human being-ness, an issue explored further later on in the 
analysis of the FCC Abortion I Case in Chapter Two. 
Who is the human being? Heidegger famously treats the question in his 
interpretation of the Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus. In An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, Heidegger observes:  
Who the human being is, according to the word of Heraclitus, first 
comes forth (edeixe, shows itself) in the polemos309, in the 
                                                        
303 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 [‘A jurisprudence is a theory of the relation between life and 
law. In life, “woman” and “man” are widely experienced as features of being, not constructs of 
perception, cultural interventions, or forced identities. Gender, in other words, is lived as ontology, not 
as epistemology.’] 
304 ibid 
305 The personification of law rests on the correspondence of actual human beings to the institutional 
dimension of legal actors.  
306 MacKinnon (n 303) 38 
307 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 41 [‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines 
what a human being is. In 1948, it told the world what a person, as a person, is entitled to. It has been 
fifty years. Are women human yet?’]; ibid 7 [‘[…] the spread and effectiveness of international 
equality rights provide sensitive and striking indicators of women’s progress in becoming human in the 
legal sense.’]; ibid 9 [‘As more and more of the substantive reality of women’s deprivation of humanity 
has been reflected in law, recognition of sex equality as a preemptory international norm has 
advanced.’] 
308 ibid 41ff. [MacKinnon poses a series of ‘If women were human, would…?’ questions.] 
309 Heraclitus, fragment 53, πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς 
ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ  ανθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους; Charles H. Kahn, The Art 
and Thought of Heraclitus – An edition of the fragments with translation and commentary (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979) [War is father of all and king of all; and some he has shown as 
gods, others men; some he has made slaves, others free]; note to the translation, Kahn, ibid 25 
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disjunction of gods and human beings, in the happening of the 
irruption of Being itself.310 
‘Irruption’ grasps and transmits how forcibly the disclosure of being occurs. 
Speaking of ‘the disjunction of gods and human beings’ can connote, first, the 
separation of ‘human beings’, who are essentially particulars and concretely311 ‘here’, 
from ‘gods’, understood as universals312 and abstractly313 ‘beyond’. The disjunction 
of universals and particulars314 underlines the appropriateness of scrutinizing the 
ontology of instances of human being-ness ad hoc315; indeed, as noted supra, there is 
an abundance of alternative images of who the human being is in the practice of 
law316. Second, an analogy can be drawn between the notion of polemos or war and 
the tension between particulars and universals. This tension submits to different 
understandings: rethinking ‘the distinction drawn since the Enlightenment between 
the universal and the particular was revealed to be false, because what had been called 
universal was the particular from the point of view of power.’317 Their disjunction is a 
                                                        
310 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (originally published: Einführung in die Metaphysik 
in Tübingen by Max Niemeyer Verlag in 1935; Gregory Fried & Richard Polt trs, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000) 149 
311 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 316 [‘[…] Aristotle shows that every law is in a 
necessary tension with concrete action, in that it is general and hence cannot contain practical reality in 
its full concreteness. […] Clearly legal hermeneutics finds its proper place here. The law is always 
deficient, not because it is imperfect itself but because human reality is necessarily imperfect in 
comparison to the ordered world of law, and hence allows of no simple application of the law.’] 
312 Different philosophers interpret the polemics of the term ‘universal’ differently, and this pertains to 
the term as used in the philosophical accounts in this thesis.  
313 Köhne (2004) 285, 287 [An ‘abstract human dignity’ is incompatible with the the Basic Law] 
314 The multifaceted phenomenon of the practice of law – particularly of the law of human dignity, at 
once general and casuistic – is imbued with the tension between universals and particulars, or whole 
and parts. Methodologically, the expressive conception of literature is particularly apt to revisiting 
particulars. See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, ‘Manuscript 3 – Hermeneutics: The Compendium of 
1819 and the Marginal Notes of 1828’ in Heinz Kimmerle (ed), James Duke & Jack Forstmann (trs), 
Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts (Missoula, Mon.: Scholars Press, 1977) 95, 113 
[‘Complete knowledge always involves an apparent circle, that each part can only be understood out of 
the whole to which it belongs, and vice versa.’]; On circulus in probando in Sextus Empiricus, see 
Mills Patrick, Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, 55 
315 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 309 [‘[…] discovering the meaning of a legal text and 
discovering how to apply it in a particular legal instance are not two separate actions, but one unitary 
process.’] 
316 Understanding the law of human dignity presupposes the distinction between abstract universals and 
concrete particulars. In that sense, the distinction is part of the concept’s meaning. At the same time, 
human dignity language bridges the pre-state and meta-constitutional character of human dignity and 
the subjective right conceptualizations. Hufen (2004) 313, 314-15; See also Stöcker (1968) 685, 685 
[‘Erst dann lichtet sich der mit dem Wertphilosophen aufgeladene Nebel, wenn die Kasuistik der 
Vorschrift entfaltet wird.’]; 686 [the critical aspect of the concept of human dignity carries the promise 
of reconciling the abstract with the concrete]; Spellbrink (2011) 661, 662 [the fundamental problem of 
Art. 1 GG is the misunderstanding between the highly abstract guarantee of and the concrete claim to 
human dignity; danger of rendering the legal concept ‘kleine Münze’] 
317 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 46 
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prerequisite, most importantly, to the self-determination of human beings318, which 
should, first, not be impaired and, moreover, should be fostered319. The ‘irruption of 
Being’, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of Heraclitus, effectuates the 
disclosure of human being-ness320. The disjunction from ‘gods’ indicates the self-
determined disclosure of the human being321.  
Each claim to human dignity asserts a particular image of who the human 
being is: potentiality and continuity are traits of the manifestation of human being-
ness in unborn life, while self-determination and the development of personality in the 
pregnant woman; unless the hope of regaining freedom in the future is maintained, 
and a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity is guaranteed for those 
sentenced to life imprisonment, these human beings find themselves ‘outside their 
essence’, that is, the very meaningfulness of their human being-ness is challenged; the                                                         
318 Human dignity and/as self-determination or autonomy are/is dominantly discussed in the legal 
literature in light of the Kantian interpretation. The present hermeneutic and literary approach explores 
the meta-dimension of the law of human dignity, namely what is presupposed by the concept’s 
application, rather than single substantive accounts of human dignity. See Hufen (2004) 313, 316  
319 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 539 [‘[…] the cultural criticism of law is part 
of the work – at once political and aesthetic – of choosing what kind of culture we hope to have and 
what kind of identities we hope to foster.’] 
320 For present purposes, the existence and the essence of human beings are considered two logically 
distinct, yet ontologically correlative moments of being (Seinsmomenten). The nexus between Dasein, 
‘[…] that something is existent and present […]’, and Sosein ‘[…] how it is; its being a certain way 
[…]’ requires clarification. While Heidegger, his contemporary, focused predominantly on Dasein, 
Nicolai Hartmann specifically inquired into the relation of Dasein to Sosein as ontic manifestations of 
being. Hartmann found two stances in ontological theory essentially inaccurate: first, the association of 
essence with the ideal and existence with the real, and, second, the complete separation of essence and 
existence. Hartmann’s insight that ‘Sosein cannot be identified with the ideal since every thing that is 
real is also a Sosein’ and ‘Dasein is not identical with the real, since every ideal is also a Dasein’ 
demonstrates the complexity of the relation and the arbitrariness of the two – thought of as mistaken – 
stances. Cicovacki presents Hartmann’s account of the issues therein: ‘Dasein and Sosein are the two 
moments of the same being. The two terms can be logically differentiated, but Dasein and Sosein 
cannot be ontologically separated. Despite being deeply interwoven, there is no direct and tautological 
identity between Dasein and Sosein, even in the same thing.’ Hartmann, New Ways of Ontology, 7-8 
321 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.633) [The linguistic-analytical account of human dignity infra shall 
demonstrate how the world is our world, and our actions are determined, at the very fundamental level 
of language, by the self, the ‘metaphysical subject’, the ‘philosophical I’]; Thurner, interpreting the role 
of language as means for responding in Heraclitus, notes, ‘Der Mensch bedarf der göttlichen 
Offenbarung nicht mehr, wenn er seine eigene Sprache als Orakelspruch zu hören vermag. Wird die 
inhaltlich bestimmte Aussage des Gottes durch das Phänomen der menschlichen Sprache also solcher 
ersetzt, erweist sich die Sprachlichkeit als eine für die Austauschbarkeit des göttlichen Orakels durch 
das menschliche Selbst konstitutive Voraussetzung. Wie die Untersuchung eines delphischen Spruches 
im genauen Hinhören auf die sprachliche Struktur dessen doppeldeutige Sinnmöglichkeiten erschließen 
kann, erkennt der Mensch sich selbst, indem er seine eigene Sprache auf die in ihr verbogenen 
Botschaften hin analysiert.’ And commenting further on fragment B101 shows how the human being is 
the authority over meaning: ‘Wenn Heraklits Denken darin seinen Ursprung hat, daß er sich selbst als 
ein Orakel vernimmt (Fragment B101), so konkretisiert sich dies in der Denkbewegung dadurch, daß er 
auf seine Sprache hört. Die Selbstsuche wird so zum Hören auf die eigene Sprache, weil der Mensch in 
dem Sinne seine Sprache ist, als er sich im Sprechen vollzieht und verwirklicht.’ Martin Thurner, Der 
Ursprung des Denkens bei Heraklit (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2001) 206 
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human being-ness of transsexuals consists in the institution of a human image that 
reflects their unified Physis and Psyche in life within the realm of law; the non-
objectification of innocent victims on board a hijacked aircraft stands for their human 
being-ness; finally, livelihood and the fulfillment of basic needs in accordance with 
human dignity of the most vulnerable in society guarantee their human being-ness. 
When do we first realize that ‘something is missing’? The proposition that 
human being-ness first comes forth in polemos applies analogically to the initiation of 
concrete images of human being-ness into law, specifically into the realm of 
fundamental rights, to wit, the recognition of human beings – individuals and groups 
– as bearers of a claim to respect and protection of human dignity.322 The moment of 
human beings’ coming-into-being within the realm of law, when, for instance, 
violations give rise to a constitutional claim to human dignity by individuals or groups 
as subjects of fundamental rights or activate the duty to protect on the part of the state, 
marks the beginning of perceiving them as present at the level of law, thus realizing 
that they were previously absent. Disclosure through polemos signals that ‘something 
missing’ once corresponded to a space within the realm of fundamental rights, namely 
the part reserved for those who have no part323. ‘Something missing’ as an inherent 
quality of human being-ness324 constitutes also an aspect of the meaning of practicing 
the law of human dignity. Human dignity as a legal concept guarantees ontologically 
significant space, that is, ‘something missing’, within the realm of law’s practice.325  
The humane practice of the law of human dignity, more than ensuring the 
availability of – figurative and/or literal – locus for new subjects of fundamental 
rights in law, entails the observance of a certain process, namely critical reflection. To 
the extent that ontological portrayals are symptomatic of the establishment of a status 
                                                        
322 Admittedly, distinguishing between the ontological and phenomenological character of this 
assertion when it comes to the recognition of human beings as subjects of fundamental rights is 
difficult. Be that as it may, emphasis on the ontological dimension of coming-into-being, far from 
implying a stance of disregard for phenomenological implications, sets the stage for the ontological 
account of ‘something missing’ as an integral aspect of human dignity. 
323 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 35 
324 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ 155, 181 [On the meaning of ‘human being’] 
325 Multiple and diverse concretizations of the abstract concept of human dignity are conceivable; be 
that as it may, in light of the presently advanced ontological account, the mediating, inventive and 
creative function of human dignity as a legal concept guaranteeing the availability of space for the 
establishment of new subjects within the realm of fundamental rights ensues from the concept’s 
meaning understood holistically. The philosophical insights offered here hint at the meaning, the ‘how’ 
and the ‘why’, underlying the features of abstraction and universality; McCrudden (2008) 655, 721 f. 
[‘Justifying the Creation of New, and the Extension of Existing, Rights’]; Habermas, ‘The Concept of 
Human Dignity’ (2010) Metaphilosophy 464, 467 f. [inventive function] 
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quo326 they could be misrepresenting this processual dimension of humane practice. 
That this account is substantively less elaborate a step towards the multilayered story 
of ‘something missing’ is due to the fact that ontological premises can merely serve as 
a prelude to relational philosophical grounds and cannot soundly portray the 
transcendental meaning of the law of human dignity. Be that as it may, the value of 
ontological insights put forward herein lies precisely in that they leave the question 
‘who the human being is’ deliberately open327, hence introduce an understanding of 
human beings qua beings that allows for overturning the status quo.  
Rancière perceives of politics and aesthetics ‘as forms of dissensus’328. A 
further link in the chain of hermeneutic syllogisms surfaces, namely the nexus 
between dissensus and the notion of polemos329. According to Rancière, 
[…] the disruption that they [politics and aesthetics] effect is not 
simply a reordering of the relations of power between existing 
groups; dissensus is not an institutional overturning. It is an activity 
that cuts across forms of cultural and identity belonging and 
hierarchies between discourses and genres, working to introduce 
new subjects and heterogenous objects into the field of 
perception.330 
Dissensus ‘consists in the demonstration of a certain impropriety which 
disrupts the identity […]’331. The transcendental entails a surplus, an impropriety. 
Consensus332, on the contrary, corresponds to ‘the proper’. But, again, the ‘proper’ 
implies the ‘improper’.333 How does dissensus as polemos show who the human being 
                                                        
326 Bowman & Stamp, ‘Introduction: A Critical Dissensus’, in Reading Rancière: Critical Dissensus 
(2011) xv [The authors comment on Rancière’s abstention from perceiving his work as an ontology 
Rancière’s ‘suspicion of insitutionalization and organization’ is the weakness of his  ‘insistence on the 
emancipatory presupposition of equality.’]  
327 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 [‘Who the human being is – for philosophy, the 
answer to this problem is not inscribed somewhere in heaven. Instead: […] 1. The determination of the 
essence of the human being is never an answer, but is essentially a question.’] 
328 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 1 [editor’s introduction] 
329 Hoerster identifies dissensus regarding the ‘morally legitimate’ [sittlich legitim] particularly in those 
realms of life where the legitimate limits of self-determination in freedom lie. Hoerster (1983) 93, 95  
330 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 2 [editor’s introduction]; The delineation of legal actors’, specifically 
judges’ ‘field of perception’ is extensively discussed infra, in the linguistic-analytical account of the 
law of human dignity. It suffices to note at this stage of the analysis that there are ontologically – and 
phenomenologically – significant ‘fields’, and to explain that the ‘field’ of interest to this inquiry is 
law, in particular fundamental rights. 
331 ibid 
332 ibid [‘The essence of consensus […] is the supposition of an identity between sense and sense, 
between a fact and its interpretation, between speech and its account, between a factual status and an 
assignation of rights, etc.’] 
333 ibid 
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is?334 Rancière poses a question, at the same time introducing another framing of the 
opening question: ‘Who is the subject of the rights of man?’335 Rancière observes, 
‘[…] politics gets equated with power and power itself gets increasingly construed as 
an overwhelming historico-ontological destiny from which only a God can save us 
[…]’336. In order to ‘escape this ontological trap’337 the subject of fundamental rights 
‘has to be re-worked’338. Rancière revisits the position of Hannah Arendt on the 
Rights of Man: 
[…] either the Rights of Man are the rights of those who have no 
rights or they are the rights of those who have rights. Either a void 
or a tautology, and, in either case, a deceptive trick, such is the lock 
that Arendt builds. This lock is solid, however, only if we pay the 
price of sweeping aside the third assumption that escapes the 
quandary. This assumption can be stated as follows: the Rights of 
Man are the rights of those who have not the rights that they have 
and have the rights that they have not. 339 
Rancière distinguishes between rights as inscriptions340, hence ‘as such […] 
not merely the predicates of a non-existing being […]’341, and ‘rights of those who 
                                                        
334 See Butler, Feminism and the question of postmodernism (1992) 3, 13 [‘[…] subjects are constituted 
through exclusion, that is, through the creation of a domain of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, 
figures of abjection, populations erased from view. […] Here it becomes quite urgent to ask, who 
qualifies as a ‘who,’ what systematic structures of disempowerment make it possible for certain injured 
parties to invoke the ‘I’ effectively within a court of law?’] 
335 Rancière (n 330) 62 




340 Geertz’s argument on texts can enhance our understanding of the textual form of rights as 
inscriptions and, more generally, of the implications of focusing on the practice of the law of human 
dignity as an inscription in texts of positive law and case law discussed infra. See Geertz, Local 
Knowledge (1983) 31 [‘The key to the transition from the text to text analogue, from writing as 
discourse to action as discourse, is, as Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, the concept of “inscription”: the 
fixation of meaning. When we speak, our utterances fly by as events like any other behavior; unless 
what we say is inscribed in writing (or some other established recording process), it is as evanescent as 
what we do. […] The great virtue of the extension of the notion of text beyond things written on paper 
or carved into stone is that it trains attention on precisely this phenomenon: on how the inscription of 
action is brought about, what its vehicles are and how they work, and on what the fixation of meaning 
from the flow of events – history from what happened, thought from thinking, culture from behavior – 
implies for sociological interpretation. To see social institutions, social customs, social changes as in 
some sense “readable” is to alter our whole sense of what such interpretation is and shift it toward 
modes of thought rather more familiar to the translator, the exegete, or the iconographer than to the test 
giver, the factor analyst, or the pollster.’]; 31 f. [methodologically significant point: ‘Philology, the 
text-centered study of language, as contrasted to linguistics, which is speech-centered, [….] [serves] 
the end of producing an annotated edition as readable as the philologist can make it. Meaning is fixed 
at a meta-level; essentially what a philologist, a kind of secondary author, does is reinscribe: interpret a 
text with a text.’] 
341 Rancière (n 330) 68 [‘Actual situations of rightlessness may gainsay them, but they are not merely 
an abstract ideal, situated far from the givens of the situation. Instead they are part the configuration of 
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make something of that inscription, deciding not only to “use” their rights but also to 
build cases to verify the power of the inscription.’342 The subject of fundamental 
rights on account of the above distinction ‘bridges the interval between the two forms 
of existence of those rights’343. Subjects ‘are not definite collectivities, but surplus 
names that set out a question or a dispute (litigant) about who is included in their 
count.’344 This insight reinforces the doctrinal clarification that the subjective 
protective scope of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG encompasses each and every individual, not just 
the dignity of human beings or the dignity of humanity345, thus law’s Menschenbild is 
not to be defined. The openness of predicates is manifested in the polemos, disputes 
‘about what they entail, whom they concern and in which cases’346.  
In light of these considerations, a thinly veiled analogy is discerned between 
MacKinnon’s question ‘Are women human?’, Rancière’s ‘Who is the subject of the 
rights of man?’347 and the presently crucial ontological question ‘Who is the human 
being?’ Ultimately, are human beings human?348 The subjective scope of the law of 
human dignity encompasses every human being349, and, it follows, all conceivable 
particulars350. Ontologically significant ‘surplus names’ remain open for subjects 
                                                                                                                                                              
the given, which does not only consist in a situation of inequality, but also contains the inscription that 
gives equality a form of visibility.’] 
342 ibid [‘At issue is not simply to check whether rights are confirmed or denied by reality, but to bring 
to light what their confirmation or denial mean.’] 
343 Rancière, ibid 67; See also Wittgenstein, Tractatus(6.43) 
344 ibid 68  
345 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 17 [‘Die Menschenwürde jedes Einzelnen ist geschützt, 
nicht (lediglich) die Würde “der” Menschen, also “der Menschheit”.’]; Fritz Münch, Die 
Menschenwürde als Grundforderung unserer Verfassung (Bocholt: Böckenhoff & Honsel in Komm., 
1952) 8 
346 Rancière (n 330) 68  
347 ibid 62 
348 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 3 [‘Legally, one is less than human when one’s violations 
do not violate the human rights that are recognized.’]; See also Margalit, The Decent Society, 89 
[‘There are various ways of treating human beings as nonhuman: (a) treating them as objects; (b) 
treating them as machines; (c) treating them as animals; (d) treating them as subhuman (which includes 
treating adults as children).’] 
349 Cf. Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 63 [‘Anderersetis kann die allgemeine 
Menschenwürdegarantie der Differenzierung zwischen Deutschen- und Menschenrechten […] nicht 
den Boden entziehen. Die “Privilegierung” der Staatsangehörigen verdankt sich nicht nur 
pragmatischen Erwägungen oder solchen der Tradition, sondern ist Ausdruck des fundamentalen 
Umstands nationalstaatlicher Garantie auch universeller Menschenrechte sowie des Zusammenhangs 
von privat-staatsabwehrender und politisch-demokratischer Grundrechtsausübung. […] Für das 
Grundgesetz bleibt des weiteren zu berücksichtigen, daß Nichtdeutsche nach herrschender Ansicht in 
weitem Umfang auf den sachlichen Gehalt der Deutschengrundrechte berufen können.’]; See recent 
FCC jurisprudence expanding the subjective scope of the fundamental right to a subsistence minimum 
in line with human dignity to non-citizens, BVerfGE 132, 134 (2012) [Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz] 
350 Reference to ‘particulars’ indicates, for instance, women or children in international law, and, more 
generally, all conceivable individuals and groups as qualitative subtotals of ‘every human being’.  
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coming-into-being through dissensus to avail themselves of in putting forward claims 
to human dignity.351 
Hitherto, the meaning of the question ‘who the human being is’ within the 
realm of law has been elucidated by connotations of the opening ontological-
metaphysical question and of certain illustrative phrasing and framing variations; by 
the insight that coming-into-being occurs in the polemos, namely the disjunction of 
gods and human beings, which allows the latter to practice self-determination, and 
involves tension between universals and particulars; and by reflections on when, 
besides how, the ontological presence of ‘something missing’ is first sensed, thanks to 
Rancière’s thoughts on the political and the aesthetic character of dissensus. In 
understanding the ontology of the human being that trails the practice of human 
dignity in law, the ontological trap of treating a single definition as a status quo is 
assiduously avoided; quite the contrary, this ontological account indicates that the law 
of human dignity has a dynamic meaning.  
Rather than seeking to ascribe certain content352, I further a hermeneutic 
argument about ‘something missing’ as an aspect of the meaning of law’s 
Menschenbild. ‘Something missing’ is an ontological quality of human being-ness 
that trails the ‘human’ in ‘human dignity’, most crucially, as a legal concept. At this 
point in the analysis, due to the generic character of ontological insights, the dual 
                                                        
351 Just as ‘freedom and equality are not predicates belonging to definite subjects’ [Rancière (n 330) 
68], so too – or, even more – the question of partaking in human being-ness is always left open. Then, 
one would wonder, why is the point of importance specifically with respect to the legal concept of 
human dignity? Two responses are necessary for the sake of clarity and intelligibility: First, the focus 
on human dignity constitutes an emphasis, a ‘zooming in’ aspiring to advance another understanding of 
the legal concept’s meaning as practiced by legal actors, particularly judges. Freedom and equality 
rights are not ignored; on the contrary, the figurative rendering of the dynamics of the three concepts as 
forming a triangle of fundamental rights is endorsed and presumed; See Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) 
University of Toronto Law Journal 417; Second, the linguistic and semantic proximity of human 
dignity to the human being spark an inquiry into ontological grounds enhancing the nexus.  
352 In FCC jurisprudence and, more broadly, in German legal doctrine, the content of law’s 
Menschenbild is not forced to conform to a particular philosophical or ideological strand. The only 
aspect of the Menschenbild defined is that it mirrors both the individual and the individual as a part of 
the community. This determination, however, can be read as denoting the processual rather than 
substantive meaning of the Menschenbild. See BVerfGE 4, 7 (15f.) [Investitionshilfe] [‘Das 
Menschenbild des Grundgesetzes ist nicht das eines isolierten souveränen Individuums; das 
Grundgesetz hat vielmehr die Spannung Individuum - Gemeinschaft im Sinne der 
Gemeinschaftsbezogenheit und Gemeinschaftsgebundenheit der Person entschieden, ohne dabei deren 
Eigenwert anzutasten. Das ergibt sich insbesondere aus einer Gesamtsicht der Art. 1, 2, 12, 14, 15, 19 
und 20 GG. Dies heißt aber: der Einzelne muß sich diejenigen Schranken seiner Handlungsfreiheit 
gefallen lassen, die der Gesetzgeber zur Pflege und Förderung des sozialen Zusammenlebens in den 
Grenzen des bei dem gegebenen Sachverhalt allgemein Zumutbaren zieht, vorausgesetzt, daß dabei die 
Eigenständigkeit der Person gewahrt bleibt.’] 
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sense of ‘something missing’ laid out, the Leerstelle simile and the meta-sense of 
emptiness designating ‘something always missing’, is not perceptible.  
The documentation of ‘something missing’ as an ontological feature of human 
nature or φύσις353 in philosophy goes back to Presocratic thought, specifically, for 
present purposes, to Heraclitus of Ephesus354. Kahn notes that the ‘real subject’ of 
Heraclitus ‘is not the physical world but the human condition [conditio humana355], 
the condition of mortality’356. Thurner affirms the thematic dominance of and 
recurrent reference to the human being [ἄνθρωπος, Pl. ἄνθρωποι] in Heraclitian 
fragments357. Opposing the classification of Heraclitus, as Aristotle, under natural 
philosophers seeking to establish the material origin of all things358, Kahn emphasizes 
the ‘radical shift in perspective’ marked by the aim of Heraclitus ‘not to improve the 
Milesian cosmology by altering a particular doctrine but to reinterpret its total 
meaning’359 focusing on the human being as such [nach sich selbst]360. Heidegger 
contends that the correspondence between being and φύσις361 is echoed in ‘the great 
beginning of Greek philosophy, the first beginning of Western philosophy […]’362, 
implying the Presocratics.  
And a much weaker, much harder-to-hear echo of the original φύσις 
that was projected as the being of beings, is still left for us when we 
speak of the ‘nature’ of things, the nature of the ‘state’, and the 
‘nature’ of the human being, by which we do not mean the natural 
                                                        
353 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics, B, I’, in ibid, 
Pathmarks (William McNeill ed, Thomas Sheehan tr, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
183, 183 [‘The Romans translated φύσις by the word natura. Natura comes from nasci, “to be born, to 
originate,” as in the Greek root γεν-. Natura means “that which lets something originate from itself.”’] 
354 The philosophy of Heraclitus of Ephesus, just as the cosmology of Thales, Anaximander, or 
Anaximenes of the Milesian school, belongs to Ionian Presocratic thought; Kahn (1979) ix [‘His 
reflections upon the order of nature and man’s place within it, upon the problems of language, meaning 
and communication still seem profound; and many of his insights will remain illuminating for the 
modern reader, not merely for the specialist in ancient thought.’] 
355 See discourse in Thurner (2001) 187 
356 Kahn (n 354) 23 
357 Thurner (n 355) 204 fn 62 
358 ibid 204-205 
359 Kahn (n 354) 
360 Thurner (n 355) 205 
361 Heidegger (n 353) 229 [‘But how should we think φύσις in the way it was originally thought? Are 
there still traces of its projection in the fragments of the original thinkers? In fact there are, and not just 
traces, for everything they said that we can still understand speaks only of φύσις, provided we have the 
right ear for it.’] 
362 Heidegger (n 353) 229 
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‘foundations’ (thought of as physical, chemical, or biological) but 
rather the pure and simple being and essence of those beings.363 
At the very core of the ontological account to human dignity stands the well-
known, yet obscure364 fragment 123 of Heraclitus of Ephesus: ‘φύσις κρύπτεσθαι 
φιλεῖ’365, which should not be read in isolation, but rather as part of the human-
centered thought of Heraclitus in its entirety.366 The fragment is, as ensues from 
Thurner’s interpretation, not only of ontological, but also of phenomenological 
relevance367. In the thought of Heraclitus φύσις is inextricably associated with 
λόγος368. This association enhances the disjunction of universals and particulars in the 
polemos; the universal λόγος369, far from denoting a particular moment of reality 
[Wirklichkeitsmoment], is the concealed attunement among all things370. The 
concealed λόγος is constantly present in all manifested particulars coming forth in the 
polemos.371 Φύσις etymologically derives from φύεσθαι in the sense of coming forth 
in life, growing and arising372. Since φύσις is linked to the universal λόγος concealed 
in all things as the root of all things beyond superficial appearances of particulars, 
φύσις also corresponds to the hidden.373 Whoever divides [zerlegt] the φύσις, causes it 
to come forth in the unhidden374.                                                         
363 Heidegger, ibid 183, 229 [Here Heidegger criticizes what he thinks of as non-essence, namely 
perceiving original Greek thinking, that is, Pre-Socratic thought, as ‘philosophy of nature’ in the sense 
of a ‘primitive’ ‘chemistry’.] Cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (2.024) [‘Substance is what exists 
independently of what is the case.’]; ibid (2.025) [‘It is form and content.’] 
364 Kahn (1979) 7 [‘Heraclitus is not merely a philosopher but a poet, and one who chose to speak in 
tones of prophecy.’] 
365 Heraclitus, fragment 123 [Nature loves to hide] in Kahn (1979) 
366 So proposes Thurner (n 355) 185 [‘Im Fälle Heraklits sieht sich der Interpret mit einer Aufgabe 
konfrontiert, die sich ihm sonst bei kaum einem anderen Denker stellt: Aufgrund der fragmentarischen 
Gestalt der Überlieferungen besteht die Interpretation bereits darin, die zerstreuten heraklitischen 
Gedanken in einen Zusammenhang zu fügen.’] 
367 Thurner, ibid 214 [‘Der Prozeß der Bewußtwerdung des λόγος ist zugleich der Ursprung des 
Denkens im Sinne von dessen Selbstunterscheidung vom vorphilosophischen Selbstvollzug des 
Menschen. Wenn dieser in der Entdeckung einer unscheinbaren Gegenwart besteht, in der der λόγος 
zur Sprache kommt, entsteht das Denken bei Heraklit als eine Phänomenologie des Nicht-
Erscheinenden.’]; An analogy can be drawn between the concealed in Heraclitus and the absolutely 
other in Levinas (see infra). 
368 Thurner (n 355) 217; ibid 209 fn 75 
369 The λόγος can be paralleled to the logical form in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(see infra, Part B). 
370 Heraclitus, fragment B54, ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων; Kahn (1979) [The hidden attunement 
is better than the obvious one] 
371 Thurner (n 355) 215 [‘Da der λόγος demnach nicht ein Wirklichkeitsmoment, sondern deren aller 
[…] unscheinbare Zusammenfügung […] ist, wird er in der alles Geschehen beherrschenden Kraft […] 
seiner ständigen Gegenwart zugunsten der Vordergründigkeit des sich einander Abwechselnden und so 
in den Vorschein Drängenden […] übersehen.’] 
372 See ibid 217 fn 91 
373 ibid 217 
374 ibid 218 
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The diaeretic process [dihairetisches Verfahren] adopted by 
Heraclitus aims ultimately at a synthesis of the different moments of 
human experiential reality [Erfahrungswirklichkeit].375 
Another grouping of fragment 123 together with fragments 18376, 22377, and 
35378 is proposed in Kahn’s commentary, ‘on the basis of their common imagery of 
searching, finding, being hard to find.’379 At once, this intimates the epistemological 
difficulty of understanding φύσις and affirms the importance of openness as a feature 
of critical reflection.  
As grouped here, these four quotations deal with the difficulty of 
cognition from the side of the object. [...] the prize of wisdom 
hunted by philosophical goldseekers, is not simply there for the 
taking. Even if the logos is common to all, so that the structure of 
reality is ‘given’ in everyday experience, recognition comes hard. It 
requires the right kind of openness on the part of the percipient […]. 
And it requires inquiry and reflection – digging up a lot of earth and 
judging it with discretion. The ‘gnosis’ which Heraclitus has in 
mind is rational knowledge, and it has to be gained by hard work; it 
is not the miraculous revelation of a moment of grace. 380 
Heidegger381, undoubtedly one of the most astute and controversial 
interpreters of Greek thought382, proffered a penetrative translation383 and an original 
hermeneutic approach384 to fragment 123: ‘being loves to hide itself’385.                                                         
375 ibid 217-18 
376 Heraclitus, fragment 18, ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηθαι ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορο; 
Kahn (1979) [He who does not expect will not find out the unexpected, for it is trackless and 
unexplored] 
377 Heraclitus, fragment 22, χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον; 
Kahn (1979) [Seekers of gold dig up much earth and find little] 
378 Heraclitus, fragment 35, χρὴ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι; Kahn (1979) [Men 
who love wisdom (philosopoi andres) must be good inquirers (histores) into many things indeed] 
379 Kahn (1979) 105 
380 ibid 
381 Heidegger’s approach to Greek thought is of both ontological and phenomenological significance. 
For present purposes the former reading is emphasized; Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, ‘Hinführung’ 
in Günther, Hans-Christian & Antonios Rengakos (eds), Heidegger und die Antike (München: Verlag 
C. H. Beck, 2006) 10 [phenomenology and fundamental ontology] 
382 von Hermann, ibid 7, 9 [‘In seinen Griechen-Interpretationen wetteifert Heidegger nicht mit anderen 
philosophischen, philosophiehistorischen und philologischen Untersuchungen. Jede dieser 
Zuwendungen zur griechischen Philosophie hat ihre eigene Legitimation und gelangt zu ihrer eigenen 
Wahrheit. Heideggers Griechen-Auslegungen verstehen sich nicht als Beiträge zur Forschungsliteratur. 
Sie halten sich vielmehr auf der Ebene eines eigenständigen systematischen Denkens, das innerhalb der 
Geschichte des Denkens eine eigene Grundstellung bezieht, zu deren thematischem Gegenstand die 
Geschichte der Philosophie im Ganzen und insbesondere das griechische Denken gehört. Hierhin zeigt 
sich eine Vergleichbarkeit mit dem Hegelschen Denken, das seine eigene Sache zugleich in einem 
Gespräch mit dem überlieferten Geschichte des Denkens denkt.’] 
383 George Steiner, ‘The Hermeneutic Motion’ in Lawrence Venuti (ed), The Translation Studies 
Reader (London, New York: Routledge, 2000) 186, 186 [‘All understanding, and the demonstrative 
statement of understanding which is translation, starts with an act of trust.’]; ibid 187 [‘The translator 
invades, extracts and brings home.’]; See also Friedrich Schroeder, ‘Sieglinge Pommer: 
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What does this mean? It has been suggested, and still is suggested, 
that this fragment means being is difficult to get at and requires 
great efforts to be brought out of its hiding place and, as it were, 
purged of its self-hiding. But what is needed is precisely the 
opposite. Self-hiding belongs to the pre-dilection [Vor-liebe] of 
being, i.e., it belongs to what wherein being has secured its essence. 
And the essence of being is to unconceal itself, to emerge, to come 
out into the unhidden – φύσις. Only what in its very essence 
unconceals itself and must unconceal itself, can love to conceal 
itself. Only what is unconcealing can be concealing. And therefore 
the κρύπτεσθαι of φύσις is not to be overcome, not to be stripped 
from φύσις. Rather, the task is the much more difficult one of 
allowing to φύσις, in all the purity of its essence, the κρύπτεσθαι 
that belongs to it. 386 
‘Something missing’ can be understood as a trace of being’s self-hiding or 
loving-to-conceal-oneself, discernible – paradoxically – in coming out into the 
unhidden; ‘something missing’ as an aspect of human being-ness aims at portraying 
‘the self-concealing revealing’ of being, ‘φύσις in the original sense’387, and as such 
self-determined, nature of human beings. The event of disclosure of what is 
concealed, ‘something missing’, can be conceptualized as crossing the limit388 
between a hiding place and the unhidden. That very limit at once delineates the being 
whose being-ness becomes present through unconcealment and, consequently, the 
corresponding human image, the Menschenbild. The limit as the demarcating line of a 
locus within which a subject grounds its being-ness on the sphere of fundamental 
rights is, besides obviously political, aesthetically substantiated. Resort to the 
figurative rendering of traversing a limit for communicating the event of disclosure 
                                                                                                                                                              
Rechtsübersetzung und Rechtsvergleichung. Translatologische Fragen zur Interdisziplinaritӓt’ (2008) 
63(4) JZ 191 
384 von Herrmann (n 381) [‘[…] Heideggers Griechen-Interpretationen […] erhalten sie zugleich eine 
Fülle von hermeneutischen Einsichten in die antiken Texte, die als textimmanente Erkenntnisse für 
jede andere interpretatorische Zuwendung zur griechischen Philosophie fruchtbar und fördernd sein 
können.’] 
385 Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics’ 183, 229; See also 
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics 121 ff.; 133 ff [on interpretations and misinterpretations of 
Heraclitus in the course of Western history]; Cf. other translations: Kahn (1979) 105 [‘Nature loves to 
hide’]; Miroslav Marcovich, Heraclitus – Greek text with a short commentary (2nd edn, Sankt 
Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2001) [‘The real constitution of each thing is accustomed to hide itself’]; 
Nicholas Rescher, Cosmos and Cognition – Studies in Greek Philosophy (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 
2005) 60 [‘Nature loves to hide’]; Marcel van Ackeren, Heraklit – Vielvalt und Einheit seiner 
Philosophie (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006) 57 [‘Das Wesen der Dinge versteckt sich gern.’]  
386 Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics’ 183, 229-30 
387 Heidegger, ibid 183, 230; Ivo De Gennaro, ‘Φύσις und Metaphysik’ in Günther, Hans-Christian & 
Antonios Rengakos (eds), Heidegger und die Antike (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006) 11, 15 
388 The limit is intimated in Heraclitus, fragment 108, ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς 
τοῦτο, ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον; Kahn (1979) [Of those whose accounts I 
have heard, none has gone so far as this: to recognize what is wise, set apart from all]. 
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affirms the indispensability of poetics389 for advancing an understanding of the 
process of coming-into-being; the limit can be perceived as a border that occasions 
ongoing critical reflection390 on who crosses it, namely on who the human being is; it 
is both the limit crossed, and the limit that delineates the realm corresponding to a 
given ‘surplus name’.  
Who the human being is – for philosophy, the answer to this 
problem is not inscribed somewhere in heaven.391 
If not in heaven, the answer to the question should be sought in the world. 
Human dignity, a distinctly abstract and multidimensional concept, opens up a wide 
realm of becoming (γίγνεσθαι) within which polemos can bring about the 
ontologically appreciated presence of human beings as subjects in legal, political or 
aesthetic terms. Rancière brings forth the famous argument of Olympe de Gouges, ‘if 
women were entitled to go to the scaffold, then they were also entitled to go to the 
assembly’392. In this example the limit separates, politically and, from the presently 
critical perspective, ontologically, the private from the public space. For women to 
establish their being-ness in the public space a limit need be traversed.  
Her point was that women, who were apparently born equal, were in 
fact not equal as citizens. They could neither vote nor stand for 
election. The proscription, as usual, was justified on the grounds 
that women did not fit the purity of political life, because they 
belonged to private, domestic life. The common good of the 
community had to be kept apart from the activities, feelings and 
interests of private life.393 
                                                        
389 See infra for the poetic dimension of the limit between ‘something missing’ and ‘something there’ 
in the epistemological considerations that emerge from the ontological account of human dignity.  
390 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 68 [‘Politics concerns that border, an activity which continually places it 
in question.’] 
391 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149; Cf. Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social 
Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) 74 [Referring to heaven apropos a Talmudic 
story: ‘For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee [Hebrew: 
felah, alternatively translated ‘it is not too hard for thee’]; neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that 
thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do 
it? […] (Deuteronomy 30:11-14)’, Walzer notes: ‘Moses indeed climbed the mountain, but no one need 
do that again. There is no longer any special role for mediators between the people and God. The law is 
not in heaven; it is a social possession.’] 
392 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 68 
393 ibid 
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However, as Rancière’s argument evolves, we come to another important 
realization: the limits drawn in the world – philosophical-ontological, legal, political, 
or aesthetic – and not in heaven, can be obscure and ambiguous.394 
Olympe de Gouge’s argument showed that it was not possible to 
draw the border separating bare life and political life so clearly. At 
least one point existed where ‘bare life’ proved to be ‘political’: 
when women were sentenced to death as enemies of the revolution. 
If they could lose their ‘bare life’ thanks to a politically motivated 
public judgment, this meant that even their bare life – their life from 
the standpoint of its being able to be put to death – was political. If 
they were as equal ‘as men’ under the guillotine, then they had the 
right to the whole of equality, including equal participation in 
political life.395 
 
The standpoint of one’s bare life, in other words of elemental human being-
ness, is evidently relevant to the practice of the law of human dignity. Rancière 
identifies a state of affairs in which the deduction proffered in the argument of 
Olympe de Gouge ‘could be enacted’396, in other words practiced, namely ‘in the 
process of a wrong, in the construction of a dissensus’397, an analogy of the polemos. 
A dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions or values; it is a 
division inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is given 
and about the frame within which we see something as given. 
Women, as political subjects, set out to make a two-fold statement. 
They demonstrated that they were deprived of the rights that they 
had thanks to the Declaration of Rights and that through their public 
action that they had the rights denied to them by the constitution, 
that they could enact those rights. They acted as subjects of the 
Rights of Man […]. They acted as subjects that did not have the 
rights that they had and that had the rights that they had not. This is 
what I call a dissensus: the putting of two worlds in one and the 
same world. […] A political subject is a capacity for staging scenes 
of dissensus.398 
                                                        
394 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 462 [‘[l]egal judgment […] polices the 
disputed boundaries between public and private […]’]; MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 4 f. 
[public – private distinction]; See also Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (original 
edition: Esquisse d’ une théorie de la pratique. Précédé de trois études d’ ethnologie kabyle, Geneva: 
Librairie Droz, 1972; Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977) 43 [‘intimate sphere of family life, i.e. in a woman’s conversation 
with her father […]’] 
395 Rancière (n 392) 68-69 




In crossing the limit the being asserts its presence within the realm of law as a 
subject of fundamental rights. The traversal of the limit signifies the movement from 
a state of concealment towards disclosure. The a posteriori identification of 
‘something missing’ once it becomes ‘something there’, hence ontologically present, 
presupposes dissensus. Can dissensus be understood as a mode of constant critical 
reflection? Limits that a priori cannot be traversed engender the experience of 
deadlock and essentially disallow the unfolding of human being-ness, hence impair 
human dignity. References to the potential that inheres in the practice of the law of 
human dignity to restore the rightful place of subjects and to initiate new subjects into 
law is not seldomly found in legal literature399. The shadow that corresponds to 
‘something missing’ becomes somehow tangible the moment these subjects positively 
partake in the order of fundamental rights. Dissensus then is a mode of constant 
critical reflection. 
If there is a positive content to this term [dissensus], it consists in 
the rejection of every difference that distinguishes between people 
who ‘live’ in different spheres of existence, the dismissal of 
categories of those who are or are not qualified for political life. 
[…] Political names are litigious names, whose extension and 
comprehension are uncertain, and which for that reason open up the 
space of a test or verification. Political subjects build cases of 
verification. They put the power of political names – that is their 
extension and comprehension – to the test. Not only do they bring 
the inscription of rights to bear against situations in which those 
rights are denied but they construct the world in which those rights 
are valid, together with the world in which they are not. They 
construct a relation of inclusion and a relation of exclusion.400  
[…] The strength of those rights lies in the back-and-forth 
movement between the initial inscription of the right and the 
dissensual stage on which it is put to the test. 401 
In exploring the meta-dimension of human dignity as a legal concept I center 
on the notion of the limit traversed in coming-into-being. Far from attempting to fill a 
void, rather I turn my sights to the line distinguishing ‘something missing’ from ‘what 
is there’. What is the precise meaning of the limit? How is it to be drawn? The limit 
has an ontologically significant bearing on the processual aspect of practicing the law 
of human dignity and the ensuing Menschenbild, respectively as the limit traversed in 
coming-into-being and as the demarcating line of the space guaranteed to legal                                                         
399 McCrudden (2008) 655, 721f.; Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity’ (2010) Metaphilosophy 
464, 467f. [inventive function]  
400 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 69 
401 ibid 71 
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subjects within the realm of fundamental rights. The further explication of this 
proposition rests on linguistic-analytical and phenomenological insights. 
This ontological account reinforces opposition to Leistungstheorien402, namely 
theories associating human dignity with Leistung, that is, performance or 
achievement. Starck sees a ‘sociological misunderstanding’ in this theoretical 
stance.403 Rebutting the conveyed dynamism of human dignity as construed in 
Leistungstheorien need not imply passivity. ‘Something missing’ as the trace of 
ontologically framed concealment is a vital aspect of who the human being is. 
Concealment and unconcealment mutually constitute each other’s condition and 
result, and signify phases in an ontologically dynamic process. 
B. A linguistic-analytical account of practicing the law of human dignity 
Linguistic-analytical philosophical insights contribute concepts and graphs for 
portraying and exploring the practice of human dignity language in legal texts, 
thereby prompting a more meaningful mobilization of the law of human dignity. As 
hermeneutic and literary analytical tools they permit original interpretations of human 
dignity meaning and another understanding of issues that feature prominently in 
relevant legal literature. The linguistic-analytical account of the law of human dignity 
intimates the possibility of transcendence of the limit; advances an understanding of 
law’s meta-dimension and Menschenbild apropos the dual sense of ‘something 
missing’; provides the hermeneutic and literary methodological approach with tools 
for tracing the human factor in legal language games; and permits the portrayal of 
how the boundaries of legal language games can change. Was not imagining the law 
of human dignity post World War II actually the imagining of a new form of life404? 
                                                        
402 See Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution: ein Beitrag zur politischen Soziologie (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1965) 53ff., 61 
403 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 24 
404 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 63f. [‘[…] a social practice creates and assumes a crucial distinction 
between interpreting the acts and thoughts of participants one by one […] and interpreting the practice 
itself, that is, interpreting what they do collectively. It assumes that distinction because the claims and 
arguments participants make, licensed and encouraged by the practice, are about what it means, not 
what they mean. [If participants in that process do not agree, then] [t]hey must, to be sure, agree about 
a great deal in order to share a social practice. They must share a vocabulary […]. They must 
understand the world in sufficiently similar ways and have interests and convictions sufficiently similar 
to recognize the sense in each other’s claims, to treat these as claims rather than just noises. That 
means not just using the same dictionary, but sharing what Wittgenstein called a form of life 
sufficiently concrete so that the one can recognize sense and purpose in what the other says and does 
[…]. They must all ‘speak the same langauge’ in both senses of that phrase. But this similarity of 
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Why is a linguistic-analytical account of the law of human dignity a crucial 
step towards cultivating an understanding of law’s meta-dimension? First, transition 
to ‘linguistic-analytical’ discourses from any other kind of discourse is generally 
meant to ‘secure clear and meaningful speech.’405 The transition to a ‘linguistic-
analytical’ discourse at any time is imperative406 when, while communicating, actors 
‘use the same expression with different meanings’407, in other words when the 
required ‘communality in the use of language’408 in discourse is not attained.409 As 
Alexy explains,410 ‘linguistic-analytical’ discourses are ‘concerned […] with the 
discovery of ambiguities, indeterminacies, emotive components of meaning, and 
absurdities’411. Second, language as the basis of communication and society412 is 
essentially the point of departure for a relational understanding of how the legal 
concept is practiced. The unraveling of an affirmative stance towards the dual sense 
of ‘something missing’ originating in linguistic-analytical insights413 incites revising 
predispositions towards ambiguity and controversy.  
Drawing on well-known propositions and themes in the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein serves to refine the delineation of the research question and to inspire 
                                                                                                                                                              
interests and convictions need hold only to a point: it must be sufficiently dense to permit genuine 
disagreement, but not so dense that disagreement cannot break out.’] 
405 Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 144-145; Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.116) 
[‘Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be said can be said 
clearly.’] 
406 Alexy ibid; ibid 206 [Alexy expressly formulates a transition rule in general practical discourse].  
407 See Alexy ibid 188 [One of the basic rules of general practical discourse is: ‘Different speakers may 
not use the same expression with different meanings.’] 
408 See also Perelman, Chaïm & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation, (original published La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l’ Argumentation in Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1958; John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trs, Notre Dame, London: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969) 15ff.  
409 Alexy (n 405) 190-191 [‘It is a matter of controversy how this communality is to be established and 
secured. Representatives of the Erlangen School stipulate that every expression should be subjected to 
the rules of an “ortho-language” to achieve communality. For this, ordinary language can only be used 
in a subordinate role. […] There is quite a lot to be said in favour of starting out from ordinary 
language and only making stipulations concerning word usage where obscurities and 
misunderstandings arise. Analysis of the expressions used is a presupposition of any such stipulation. 
[…].’] 
410 ibid 144-145 
411 ibid 
412 See Giese, Das Würde-Konzept (1975) 73f.; ibid 77; Arthur Kaufmann, ‘Gedanken zu einer 
ontologischen Grundlegung der juristischen Hermeneutik’ in ibid, Beiträge zur Juristischen 
Hermeneutik: sowie weitere rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen (first published in 1982; Köln: C. 
Heymann, 1984) 89, 96 ff. [relational conception]; Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ 
(1995) 104, 114 [‘Jedenfalls im Rechtsinne ist Würde demnach kein Substanz-, Qualitäts- oder 
Leistungs-, sonder ein Relations- oder Kommunikationsbegriff. Würde muß als eine Kategorie der 
Mitmenschlichkeit des Individuums begriffen werden.’] 
413 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.0031) [‘All philosophy is ‘Critique of language […].’] 
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and flesh out a linguistic-analytical model414. Driven by Wittgenstein’s celebrated 
thesis that problems framed as philosophical problems are, in fact, associated with 
misunderstandings of the logic of our language415, I seek linguistic-analytical tools to 
portray and interpret the practice of human dignity language in law focusing on the 
question of how the concept is empty. 
(4.112) […] Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.416 
Philosophy as activity is manifested in actual propositions; it is an organic 
aspect of linguistic acts. Thus, philosophizing the language of law is critical to 
understanding the practice of law, for instance by drawing parallels between patterns 
and ideas, the form and the content of philosophy as activity, and the mobilization of 
language by legal actors.417 The linguistic-analytical account of the law of human 
dignity is attuned to the premise that this analysis focuses on law as language.  
(4.003) Most propositions and questions, that have been written 
about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, 
therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their 
senselessness. […] 
(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is 
more or less identical than the Beautiful.) 
And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are 
really no problems. […]418 
Under proposition (6.421), Wittgenstein parenthetically notes, ‘Ethics and 
aesthetics are one’419. Reference to the relation between ethics and aesthetics, between 
the ‘Good’ and the ‘Beautiful’, occasions an important clarification. Both ethics and                                                         
414 Wittgenstein clarifies, in ibid (6.211): ‘In life it is never a mathematical proposition which we need, 
but we use mathematical propositions only in order to infer from propositions which do not belong to 
mathematics to others which equally do not belong to mathematics. (In philosophy the question ‘Why 
do we really use that word, that proposition?’ constantly leads to valuable results.)’ The closing 
parenthetical question indicates the value of transition to linguistic-analytical discourses.   
415 ibid (4.003) [‘Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do 
not understand the logic of our language.’]; ibid (4.112) [‘The object of philosophy is the logical 
clarification of thoughts. […] A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of 
philosophy is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions’, but to make propositions clear. Philosophy 
should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and 
blurred.’]; Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 17 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘[…] conclusions of our 
basic philosophical questions are to be found beyond metaphysics, in ethics.’] 
416 Wittgenstein, ibid (4.112) 
417 Cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.557) [‘The application of logic decides what elementary 
propositions there are. What lies in the application logic cannot anticipate. It is clear that logic may not 
collide with its application. But logic must have contact with its application. Therefore logic and its 
application may not overlap one another.’] 
418 ibid (4.003) 
419 ibid (6.421) 
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aesthetics are senseless420 apropos the world as delineated and described in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations.421 
Gadamer notes, ‘‘to have a horizon’ means not being limited to what is nearby but 
being able to see beyond it.’422 It is suggested that the following excerpt is read in that 
spirit. 
What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot 
speak thereof one must be silent. […]  
The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on 
the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.423 
(6.421) It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics are 
transcendental.424 
Ethics and aesthetics, the Good and the Beautiful, are ineffable as nonsensical 
and transcendental. What does this convey about the meaning of law’s Menschenbild 
and meta-dimension? The Good and the Beautiful, regardless of how diversely 
different legal orders and cultures define those425, are manifested in human dignity. 
The transcendental is thus practiced whenever the law of human dignity is mobilized 
in texts. 
                                                        
420 In the succeeding phenomenological analysis such senselessness is put into words, without being, 
for that reason, irreconcilable with Wittgensteinian logic. 
421 Transposing the rigid lines of Wittgenstein’s pure logic in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – 
which, in fact, Wittgenstein himself flexed in his later work Philosophical Investigations – to the 
practice of the law of human dignity is neither promising nor desirable an enterprise. Critical reflection 
is not served by the inflexible analytical style and tone of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Drawing 
analogies from linguistic-analytical concepts and graphs permits another understanding of how the law 
of human dignity is practiced. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus constitutes an intelligible, 
appropriate and sufficient source of insights for elaborating on the notion of the limit as a central theme 
in a story of ‘something missing’. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein adopts a 
different style: his thought presents greater versatility and appears to be more open to the complexity of 
language and the world. See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 3e-4e [Preface: ‘After several 
unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never 
succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts 
soon grew feeble if I tried to force them along a single track against their natural inclination. – And this 
was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For it compels us to travel criss-
cross in every direction over a wide field of thought. – […] So this book is really just an album.’]; ibid 
4e [Preface: ‘Four years ago, however, I had occasion to reread my first book (the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas. […] For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, 
sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book.’]; ibid 
15e [‘23. […] It is interesting to compare the diversity of the tools of language and of the ways they are 
used, the diversity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of 
language. (This includes the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)’]. 
422 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 301; ibid 302 [‘A person who has an horizon knows the 
relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small.’] 
423 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 23 [Preface] 
424 ibid (6.421) 
425 See Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights’ (1982) 76(2) The American Political Science Review 303 
 94
Wittgenstein metaphorically builds a ladder in his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus to lead us to sense the limit of the world, that is, our world.426 What 
cannot be expressed – hence nonsense if articulated – is so, using ‘our world’ 
perceived in terms of logic427 as the reference point. Human dignity stands on the 
borderline between what can be ‘said’ and what cannot be ‘said’, but only ‘shown’ or 
sensed, thus constitutes the paradigmatic legal concept for exploring the notion of the 
limit. The colloquially put ‘gut-feeling’, which cannot be adequately expressed with 
words, vividly denotes how aspects of human dignity meaning can only be ‘shown’, 
and not ‘said’. 
The notion of the limit is key to solving whatever riddles lie in the dual sense 
of ‘something missing’ associated with law’s meta-dimension and Menschenbild. 
Philosophical linguistic-analytical insights into the limit demonstrate how and why 
the practice of human dignity in law upholds law’s meta-dimension, hence law’s 
humanism, and manifests the pluralism that corresponds to the empty Menschenbild. 
On the side of this attempt, I confront other instances of ‘something missing’ by 
analogy with the Leerstelle and undertake to portray those by means of the introduced 
model. Setting up the introduced linguistic-analytical model constitutes per se a 
hermeneutic enterprise and, additionally, a tool for the hermeneutic and literary 
approach to instances of judicial practice of human dignity in Chapter Two.  
How is the law of human dignity empty? ‘ ‘Something always missing’ 
stands for the transcendental, what cannot be said. The conscious focus on the limit 
should not be misunderstood either as abstention from exploring the transcendental, 
or as aphoristic omission of themes and tensions in ‘our world’. With regards to the 
space outside ‘the world’ nothing can be ‘said’. All that can be ‘shown’, as Levinas 
implies (see infra), is our separation from the space beyond the limit, ‘something 
always missing’. The separation can be ‘shown’, in other words sensed or felt; 
Wittgenstein notes, ‘[t]he feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical 
feeling.’428 With regards to the area within the boundaries of our language, assessing 
the meaning of ‘something missing’ requires exploring the context of the Leerstelle.                                                         
426 Wittgenstein (n 423) (6.54) [the ladder metaphor] 
427 ibid (1.13) [‘The facts in logical space are the world.’]; This proposition intimates, for present 
purposes, first, how the world is conceived in philosophy of language and logic, that is, in purely 
linguistic-analytical terms; second, that the world of lived experience is larger than the world, if the 
latter is perceived as facts in logical space; and, ultimately, that the linguistic-analytical account alone 
does not suffice to portray the practice of the law of human dignity. 
428 ibid (6.45) 
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By analogy with the treatment of the Leerstelle, the ad hoc meaning of ‘something 
missing’ in practicing the law of human dignity can be deduced from linguistic 
context. How and why do I associate the notion of the limit with the meta-dimension 
of human dignity meaning and law’s Menschenbild? In this critical approach to the 
practice of the law of human dignity, the dual sense of ‘something missing’ can, for 
instance, shed new light on the Leerformel429 and the intuitionism and agnosticism it 
is charged with, or the empty box and black box figures. Let us first proceed with 
constructing the linguistic-analytical model to arrive at solid footing for substantiation 
of the limit.  
Legal actors consciously430 mobilize human dignity language in legal texts; in 
practicing such language, their competence and responsibility, as well as the 
responsibility to be competent to do so, are assumed.  This is a foundational premise 
of the introduced linguistic-analytical model, and, granted, of important legal-
sociological underpinnings. Legal actors – for present purposes reductively perceived 
as authors of legal texts – bear the determinant authority over human dignity 
meaning431, namely signification and significance432 or value433, admittedly under 
                                                        
429 Hoerster (1983) 93, 95 [discussion about the Leerformel]; Wolfram Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit 
der Menschenwürde – Annäherungen an einen schwierigen Verfassungsrechtssatz’ (1995) JuS 857, 
859 [‘[…] seinen prekären Funktion als Lehrformel oder Leerformel […]’ (trans. its precarious 
function as a teaching/didactic formula or an empty formula)]; ibid 859 ff.; See also, critically, Stöcker 
(1968) 685, 686 [‘Allein, die Freiheit, die den Menschen zur Autonomie befähigen könnte, ist bei Kant 
eine bloße Idee ohne jede emprische Realität, die ‘niemals begriffen oder nur eigesehen werden kann: 
eine Fiktion also, gegründet auf einer als Realität geleugneten Freiheit. Dementsprechend stehen im 
Auslegungsmittelpunkt des Art. 1 I GG weniger die Freiheit des Menschen als etwa seine 
‘Personhaftigkeit’: eine prätentiöse Leerformel, die in ihrer auf intuitive Erschauung angelegten 
Unbegreiflichkeit verdeutlicht, daß auch hier der metaphysische Aspekt, säkularisiert oder nicht, in 
Intuitionismus und Rechtsagnostizismus mündet. Das sind in jedem Fall unannehmbare Konsequenzen. 
Denn die Würde des Menschen kann nicht darin erfüllen, daß wir ihn seinen ‘Gefühlen’: Ahnungen, 
Vorurteilen, atavistischen Instinkten, überantworten. Und Rechtsagnostizismus – als Absage an die 
Vernunft, aus eigener Kraft wissen zu können, was Recht ist – macht die Jurisprudenz zu einer 
Farbenlehre für Blinde, womit der Gipfel, auf dem sich die menschliche Würde entfaltet, mit Sicherheit 
ebenfalls nicht erklommen wäre.’] 
430 Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 26; 209-211 [Rechtsbewusstsein] 
431 Practicing the law of human dignity can be ‘violent’ in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
‘symbolic violence’. This concept can inform our understaning of conceivable scenarios of exercising 
‘authority over meaning’. Pierre Bourdieu & Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, 
Society and Culture (2nd edn, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1977) 4 [‘Every power to exert symbolic 
violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by 
concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force 
to those power relations.’]; ibid 25 [‘[…] any action of symbolic violence which succeeds in imposing 
itself [...] objectively presupposes a delegation of authority. […] these symbolic actions can work only 
to the extent that they encounter and reinforce predispositions […]. There is no “intrinsic strength of 
the true idea”; nor do we see grounds for belief in the strength of the false idea, however often 
repeated. It is always power relations which define the limits within which the persuasive force of a 
symbolic power can act […].’] 
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certain constraints. Among those constraints, the authority of individual human beings 
involved in cases of human dignity violations over meaning vis-à-vis that of the 
constitutional judge or the democratic body politic and society as collectivities is 
emphasized in the portrayal of the legal texts under scrutiny in Chapter Two. The 
linguistic-analytical model assists us in tracking the human factor in the practice of 
the law of human dignity. That the human being is homo significans denotes that 
language mirrors meaning – the meaning directly produced by the legal actor as 
author, the meaning referred to, or the meaning assumed; this is a central premise of 
the present hermeneutic and literary enterprise.  
Linguistic-analytical insights afford a toolset for portraying the practice of 
human dignity meaning in law drawing on its, only partial, reflection in legal texts. 
The undertaking should not be misunderstood as an effort to detect – or, in actuality, 
assume – the intentions underlying the meaning produced, though the portrayal per se 
can spark critical reflection on what is signified as character in rhetoric, namely the 
ethical underpinnings of Aristotelian praxis. Language restrains meaning, while at the 
same time augments it434. The practice of human dignity by legal actors can be 
depicted as a legal language game435. Legal language games are sui generis language 
games436; they operate on their own terms and certainly involve more than descriptive 
and explanatory propositions.437 Games are rule-bound438 activities. Opting for the                                                                                                                                                               
432 The importance of bearing in mind this dual understanding of meaning becomes evident where 
human dignity is practiced by merely being employed as language in a legal text, in other words 
without being further analyzed. In that case the concept’s significance, that is, value, in law, despite the 
lack of explicit signification – ensuing from the relationship between signified and the signifier – in the 
text, corresponds to the rhetorical dimension of language in the spirit of Aristotle’s well-rounded 
approach to the art of rhetoric. In light of the ontological account (supra under Part A) even mere 
presence carries a meaning in the sense of signification, besides significance, namely the guarantee of 
being’s self-concealing revealing ontology. See also Lebech (2009) 21 [‘[…] human dignity can, does, 
and indeed is likely to play the role of a universal cultural ideal because it can, is and indeed is likely to 
be identified in experience by every human being as the importance of that experience, regardless of 
the individual’s tradition or culture.’] 
433 See de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1986) 110ff. 
434 Regarding in particular the relation of language to thought, i.e. thoughts being ‘the significant 
propositions’ in Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4); ibid (4.002) [‘Language disguises the thought; so that 
from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the 
external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be 
recognized.’] 
435 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 8e [‘I shall also call the whole, consisting of language 
and the activities into which it is woven, a ‘language game’.’]; ibid 15e [‘The word ‘language-game’ is 
used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life.’] 
436 Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 50 
437 ibid 50 [‘[…] the descriptive function of language is only one among several. The implication of 
this for ethics is that there is no need at all to be guided (either in a naturalistic or in an intuitionistic 
direction) by a paradigm of the descriptive or explanatory sciences. Both moral and legal discourse are 
language games sui generis.’] 
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term ‘language game’439 is an investment in the evocation of both the playfulness and 
rule-governed modus operandi of games. In portraying the practice, in particular the 
judicial practice, of the law of human dignity, I avail myself of both qualities. This 
portrayal invites engagement in further definitional projects.440 
Under proposition (5.6331) of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
Wittgenstein introduces the famous simile of the eye and the field of sight441. The 
introduced model is grounded on this graph.442 ‘What is there’, the totality of facts 
within our field of sight, all the same establishes ‘something always missing’.443 
Conceiving of either space presupposes a limit. 
(5.6331) For the field of sight has not a form like this [graph 1]444: 
                                                                                                                                                              
438 See also Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 153 [‘[...] interpretation is a 
convention-bound activity. Interpretation generally involves putting a text to use in some institutional 
context in a way that will be accepted by other participants as legitimate. […] writing is generally 
convention-bound as well. Authors produce texts for use in some institutional context.’] 
439 From the range of other possibilities consider the concept of a ‘speech act’, John Langshaw Austin, 
How to Do Things with Words How to Do Things with Words (J. O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds, 2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press, 1962) 20 
440 Alexy observes, ‘[t]he crucial factor for this [the definitional] mode of justification is that the 
presentation of the system of rules as defining a practice is considered the real motive for adopting that 
practice. This of course does not exclude the option of using other modes of justification as well.’ A 
definitional project consists in examining methodically a system of rules identified in a language game 
and proposing the ensued definition. Language games can be actual or hypothetical. The definitional 
mode of justification does not compromise the appropriateness of other modes of justification; this is 
an important advantage of that mode. In fact it cuts through other modes, is compatible to rules of 
justification set out in light of other modes, and can potentially enhance their usage. At the same time, 
it suffers from the weakness that it does not compel further justification of the system of rules thereby 
depicted. Definitional projects are meant to simply elucidate and present a system, hence enhance our 
understanding of practice. Although they rest ‘to some degree upon mere fiat or arbitrary will’, they are 
not ‘pointless’. Alexy notes, ‘It does make a difference whether one decides in favour of an explicitly 
formulated and comprehensively presented system of rules or whether one chooses something wholly 
lacking in conceptual and analytic endeavour. The definitional mode of justification can be 
advantageous in another way too. It allows the construction of completely new systems of rules.’ In 
Alexy (n 436) 184-185 
441 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 301 [‘Every finite present has its limitations. We 
define the concept of ‘situation’ by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of 
vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of ‘horizon’. The horizon is the range 
of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the 
thinking mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening 
up of new horizons, and so forth.’] 
442 The graph is related to the discussion of solipsism. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.62) [‘This remark 
provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. In fact what solipsism means, is quite 
correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact 
that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world.’]; 
ibid (5.621) [‘The world and life are one.’]; ibid (5.63) [‘I am my world. (The microcosm.) […].’] 
443 ibid (1.21) [‘For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the 
case.’] 
444 ibid (5.6331) 
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The finitude of our world as a portion of the world and our separation – 
irreconcilable in the case of the meta-dimension, and reconcilable in the paradigm of 
the Leerstelle – from ‘something missing’, the rest, or what escapes our perception in 
the two senses that have been named herein are understood apropos the notion of the 
limit, about which nothing can be ‘said’. Why is that so? In his famous introduction to 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Bernard Russell deduces from Wittgenstein’s 
fundamental thesis that any account of the world is necessarily reductive. His 
comment on the simile of the eye and the field of sight opens the present discussion. 
Wittgenstein uses, as an analogy, the field of vision. Our field of 
vision does not, for us, have a visual boundary, just because there is 
nothing outside it, and in like manner our logical world has no 
logical boundary because our logic knows of nothing outside it. 
These considerations lead him to a somewhat curious discussion on 
Solipsism. Logic, he says, fills the world. The boundaries of the 
world are also its boundaries. In logic, therefore, we cannot say, 
there is this and this is in the world, but not that, for to say so would 
apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this 
cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go 
beyond the boundaries of the world as if it could contemplate these 
boundaries from the other side also. What we cannot think we 
cannot think, therefore we also cannot say what we cannot think. 
[…] That the world is my world appears in the fact that the 
boundaries of language (the only language I understand) indicate 
the boundaries of my world. The metaphysical subject does not 
belong to the world but is a boundary of the world.445 
The eye in the graph under proposition (5.6331) represents the ‘metaphysical 
subject’, which, Wittgenstein notes, ‘does not belong to the world but, rather, is the 
limit of the world.’446 
                                                        
445 ibid 15-16 [Introduction] 
446 ibid (5.632) 
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(5.633) Where in the world is the metaphysical subject to be noted?  
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field 
of sight. But you do not really see the eye.  
And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is 
seen from an eye. 447 
Nothing can be said about the limit of the field of sight because the eye, the 
metaphysical subject, cannot see it. The totality of ‘what is there’, before the eye, 
cannot comprise the limit. Though it necessarily escapes the eye’s gaze, the limit is 
not tantamount to ‘something missing’; rather it is spatially identified with the 
metaphysical subject. 
Who is the metaphysical subject? The metaphysical subject is the 
‘philosophical I’448, which ‘is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of 
which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of the 
world.’449 Minding that Wittgensteinian logic and the analysis in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus in particular450 aim at the elucidation of meaning, 
distinguishing between the metaphysical subject and the cognitive account of the 
human being as human body and soul should not be misinterpreted451 as implying that 
the latter dimension of human being-ness is trivial. This definition simply clarifies the 
level at which Wittgenstein’s simile operates. Wittgenstein conceives of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus as a contribution to the distinction between propositions that 
are senseless and others that are not. The metaphysical subject is negatively 
delineated; the human body and soul are not defining features.  
                                                        
447 ibid (5.633) 
448 Resorting to how Wittgenstein conceives of the function of philosophy particularly on account of 
the notion of limit can enhance our understanding of the ‘philosophical’ in the Tractatus: Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus, (4.113) [‘Philosophy limits the disputable sphere of natural science.’]; ibid (4.114) [‘It 
should limit the thinkable and thereby the unthinkable. It should limit the unthinkable from within 
through the thinkable.’]; ibid (4.115) [‘It will mean the unspeakable by clearly displaying the 
speakable.’]; The ‘philosophical I’ and the metaphor of the eye and the field of sight indicate the 
phenomenological character and value of insights derived from these propositions. Under Chapter One, 
Part C, the introduced model is combined with aspects of Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenology. 
449 ibid (5.641) 
450 ibid (6.53) [‘The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, 
i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then 
always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had 
given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other – 
he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – but it would be the only strictly 
correct method.’]  
451 One is led to the conclusion that the human body and soul are simply irrelevant, ‘nonsense’, apropos 
the purposes of the particular argument, from other instances in the Tractatus. Cf. Wittgenstein, (n 448) 
(4.002) [‘[…] Colloquial language is a part of the human organism and is not less complicated than it. 
[…].’]  
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The Wittgensteinian conception of the ‘philosophical I’ serves the linguistic-
analytical ends of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, yet imposes no restrictions as 
to the drawing of analogies for a hermeneutic and literary approach to the law of 
human dignity. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is no less anthropocentric than 
the writings of philosophers who explicitly link metaphysics with humanism, from 
Plato to Heidegger (see supra) or conceive of humanistic first-person accounts of the 
world, as Levinas does. Where can we trace humanism in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus? Embarking on an inquiry into this matter presupposes a better 
understanding of the simile of the eye and the field of sight as the basis of the herein 
introduced model.  
(5.634) This [the graph of the eye and the field of sight] is 
connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a 
priori.  
Everything we see could also be otherwise. 
Everything we can describe at all could also be otherwise.  
There is no order of things a priori.  
(5.64) Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with 
pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point 
and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.  
(5.641) There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we 
can talk of a non-psychological I.  
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the ‘world is my 
world’.  […]452 
Metaphysical subjects are the same in that everything they see and describe 
could also be otherwise. The perspectives of all metaphysical subjects have the same 
validity. Proposition (6.4), ‘All propositions are of equal value […]’453, spells out this 
insight. Human beings, perceived as metaphysical subjects, are identified with the 
limit. Sameness with regards to where they are positioned vis-à-vis their world is, at 
once, the condition of difference and uniqueness.454 Reference to solipsism, 
characterized ‘somewhat curious’ in the introductory comment by Russell, sharpens 
                                                        
452 Wittgenstein, ibid (5.634), (5.64), (5.641) 
453 ibid, (6.4) 
454 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 468 [‘Perspectivism is not the same as 
relativism, which implies that multiple equally true claims can be made about the same object. 
Perspectives are not propositions or opinions about a reality that exists independent of them. Nietzsche 
insists that no particular point of view is epistemologically superior in the sense of affording those who 
occupy it a better picture of the world as it really is, but his position does not imply that all points of 
view are equally valuable.’]; Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche – Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) 3 [‘But I also think – and so, I believe and argue, does Nietzsche – that some 
interpretations are better than others and that we can even know sometimes that this is the case.’] 
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this point. We could only ‘say things about the world as a whole’455 from a viewpoint 
external to the world.456 The limits of the world can be perceived only from a point 
outside the world. God’s eye evokes the meta-dimension and should not be confused 
as referring to a specific God. Any account of the world is finite and reductive and 
does not encompass the limit separating it from what lies beyond it, namely 
‘something always missing’. What ensues is that human beings are same as 
essentially limited, yet cannot be encompassed and delimited.  
(5.556) There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of the elementary 
propositions. Only that which we ourselves construct can we 
foresee.457  
(5.5561) […] The hierarchies are and must be independent of 
reality. 
Foreseeable and controllable, as lying within our grasp or vision, is the 
meaning we ourselves produce.458 The fact that the world, a totality459, could cease to 
be for us the whole world intimates the dual sense of ‘something missing’ manifested 
in our essentially reductive perspective. That hierarchies ‘are and must be 
independent of reality’ corresponds to the transcendental nature of ethics and 
aesthetics and the metaphysical character of the subject in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus.  
Our world may be bounded for some superior being who can survey 
it from above, but for us, however finite it may be, it cannot have a 
boundary, since it has nothing outside it.460  
                                                        
455 Wittgenstein (n 448) (1) [‘The world is everything that is the case.’]; ibid (1.1) [‘The world is the 
totality of facts, not of things.’]; ibid (1.11) [‘The world is determined by the facts, and by these being 
all the facts.’]  
456 ibid, 15 [Introduction] [‘We here touch one instance of Wittgenstein’s fundamental thesis, that it is 
impossible to say anything about the world as a whole, and that whatever can be said has to be about 
bounded portions of the world. […] According to this view, we could only say things about the world 
as a whole if we could get outside the world, if that is to say, it ceased to be for us the whole world.’] 
457 ibid (5.556) 
458 It would not be farfetched, in the spirit of the hermeneutic and literary methodological approach I 
adopt, to draw a link between human beings as creators (‘[…] that which we ourselves construct […]’) 
and the instances in the course of human dignity in the history of ideas, where the human being has 
been honored as a creator and the dignity of the human being has been associated with the imago Dei 
doctrine. The e contrario argument derived from Wittgenstein’s proposition is that what we do not 
ourselves construct lies outside our grasp. The implications of the syllogism for biotechnology and 
bioethics issues that are framed as human dignity legal questions are plain to see.  
459 Cf. Wittgenstein (n 448) (2.063) [‘The total reality is the world.’]; ibid (4.001) [‘The totality of 
propositions is the language.’]; ibid (4.11) [‘The totality of true propositions is the total natural science 
(or the totality of the natural sciences).’]; ibid (5.5561) [‘Empirical reality is limited by the totality of 
objects. The boundary appears again in the totality of elementary propositions. […].’] 
460 ibid 15 [Introduction] 
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Transposing this perception of the meta-dimension apropos the notion of the 
limit to the practice of law triggers an interpretation of ‘God’ in the Preamble to the 
Basic Law as the external to our world perspective from which the limit can be seen. 
The notion of logos [λόγος], stemming from the same etymological source as logic, 
beyond being a philosophical term461 ever since the time of first philosophy, namely 
the Presocratics, features prominently also as a theological concept.462 Wittgenstein’s 
reference to logic synopsizes the various insights extracted from his analysis in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus so far, refines the conception of the meta-dimension 
in linguistic-analytical terms, and gives rise to epistemological considerations. That 
the logical form is ‘shown’ in the propositions of our language intimates how 
‘something always missing’ is practiced in the use of language and permits drawing 
parallels between logic, theology and metaphysics in philosophy. 
(5.552) The ‘experience’ which we need to understand logic is not 
that such and such is the case, but that something is; but that is no 
experience.  
Logic precedes every experience – that something is so. 
It is before the How, not before the What. 463 
(6.13) Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world. Logic is 
transcendental. 464 
Logic, the transcendental reflection of the world, precedes the ‘How’, not the 
‘What’; under propositions (6.432), (6.44), (6.45), and (6.522) Wittgenstein 
elaborates on the meaning of the ‘How’.  
(6.432) How the world is, is completely indifferent for what is 
higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.  
(6.44) Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is. 
(6.45) The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its 
contemplation as a limited whole.                                                         
461 Language in philosophy is intertwined with logos. Language is foundational to human relations 
because it enables communication. It is inextricably associated with logos. Heidegger, inquiring into 
the essence of word and saying as conceived by Greek philosophy, in particular Aristotle, critically 
notes: ‘Only when language has been debased to a means of commerce and organization, as is the case 
with us, does thought rooted in language appear to be a mere “philosophy of words,” no longer 
adequate to the “pressing realities of life.” This judgment is simply an admission that we ourselves no 
longer have the power to trust that the word is the essential foundation of all relations to beings as such. 
[…] when Aristotle appeals to λέγεσθαι he is not relying extraneously on some “linguistic usage” but is 
thinking out of the original and fundamental relation to beings.’ Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and 
Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle's Physics’ 183, 214  
462 In the first chapter of the Gospel of John (1:1) we find: ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and the Word was God.’ [‘Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ 
θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.’] 
463 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.552) 
464 ibid (6.13) 
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The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical 
feeling.465 
(6.522) There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the 
mystical.466 
The logical form is ‘shown’ in propositions as pictures of reality, or, more 
specifically, models of reality ‘as we think it is’467. In the spirit of proposition (5.556), 
according to which ‘only that which we ourselves construct can we foresee […]’468,  
(4.12) Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot 
represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be 
able to represent it – the logical form. 
To be able to represent the logical form, we should have to be able 
to put ourselves with the propositions outside logic, that is outside 
the world.469 
The logic of the world and the logical form of propositions are reflected in 
language. Propositions can represent reality, but cannot represent the logical form. 
That the logical form is rather ‘shown’ in language, intimates its unmediated 
perception. Linguistic-analytical insights afford a link to the notion of the concealed 
in the thought of Heraclitus and the emphasis on the meaning of practicing the law of 
human dignity in the present inquiry. The ineffable, the empty, ‘something missing’ 
or concealed as features of the sign, presently ‘human dignity’, are revealed and 
declared when the sign is applied, that is, in practicing human dignity language.470 
The latter remark furthermore elucidates the poetic sense in which something 
outside the world ‘mirrors itself’ in propositions of our language, that is, our world471. 
It moreover alludes to the link between non-mediation and what is ‘shown’ or the 
notion of the image, which features infra in the phenomenological account as the face 
of the other. Logic lies outside the world. The relation between the viewpoint outside                                                         
465 ibid (6.432), (6.44), (6.45) 
466 ibid (6.522) 
467 ibid (4.01) [‘The proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of reality as we think 
it is.’] 
468 ibid (5.556) 
469 ibid (4.12); See also ibid 8 [Introduction] [‘The essential business of language is to assert or deny 
facts. Given the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is determinate as soon as the meaning 
of the component words is known. In order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there 
must, however the language may be constructed, be something in common between the structure of the 
sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Mr Wittgenstein’s 
theory. That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, so he contends, be 
itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may 
say will still need to have the same structure.’]  
470 ibid (3.262) [‘What does not get expressed in the sign is shown by its application. What the signs 
conceal, their application declares.’] 
471 ibid (5.6) [‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.’] 
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our world and our viewpoint is essentially asymmetrical.472 This observation stems 
from the parallel reading of proposition (6.421) on ethics and aesthetics, which 
‘cannot be expressed’ as transcendental, and propositions (4.121) together with 
(4.1212). 
(4.121) Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors 
itself in the propositions.  
That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent.  
That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by 
language.  
The propositions show the logical form of reality.  
They exhibit it.473[…] 
(4.1212) What can be shown cannot be said.474 
The logical form ‘mirrors itself’ in the propositions, but propositions cannot 
represent the logical form. In the third sentence of proposition (4.121) Wittgenstein 
adds emphasis to the words ‘itself’ and ‘we’.475 Wittgenstein juxtaposes the puissance 
of ‘that which expresses itself in language’ with our ability to meaningfully express it. 
The metaphysical subject, the ‘philosophical I’, or for present purposes a specific 
rendering of human beings’ perspective, cannot express by language that which can – 
asymmetrically – express ‘itself’ in language. Language ‘shows’ but we cannot ‘say’ 
that which it ‘shows’. Finally, under proposition (4.1212) the asymmetry is only 
intensified through the added emphasis and juxtaposition of the verbs ‘can’ and 
‘cannot’. That which ‘can be shown’, simply ‘cannot be said’. Under proposition 
(6.41), Wittgenstein concludes, ‘the sense of the world must lie outside the world.’476  
(6.41) […] In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does 
happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no 
value. 
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening 
and being-so [So-Sein]. For all happening and being-so is 
accidental. 
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise 
this would again be accidental. 
It must lie outside the world.477 
                                                        
472 See infra the remarks on asymmetry in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas in Levinas, Totality and 
Infinity, 244 [‘God sees the invisible and sees without being seen.’]  
473 Wittgenstein (n 463) (4.121) 
474 ibid (4.1212) 
475 ibid (4.121) The German original reads: ‘Was s i c h in der Sprache ausdrückt, können w i r nicht 
durch sie ausdrücken.’ 
476 ibid (6.41) 
477 ibid 
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Wittgenstein notes, ‘there can be no ethical propositions’, because 
‘[p]ropositions cannot express anything higher.’478 Ethics and aesthetics cannot be 
expressed; can they be ‘shown’? The metaphysical subject being identified with the 
limit, the sense in which this linguistic-analytical account communicates humanism is 
three-pronged. First, since all metaphysical subjects are the limit of the world, to wit, 
their world, and all propositions are of equal value, all can claim ‘how the world is’, 
and their ‘being-so’ [So-Sein]. Second, since the mystical, ‘that [the world] is’, 
signifies ‘something always missing’ apropos our field of sight and implies God’s 
eye, our world is essentially limited. Reference to ‘God’ in the German Basic Law’s 
Preamble can be understood in light of this elucidation as a guarantee of humanism 
and a gesture of anthropocentrism; it does not purport to declare faith in God or define 
who God is. Rather, it is about setting limits to human beings in recognition of their 
sameness as metaphysical subjects, and, at the same time, identifying them with the 
limit479. Third, logic (6.13), ethics and aesthetics (6.421) are transcendental.  
The humanism that practicing the law of human dignity signifies can only be 
‘shown’. What then are we to make of what is ‘said’, namely of human dignity 
language and, more specifically, of the legal guarantee? Mindful of the danger of 
totalitarian, coercive systems ‘garnished with humanistic feathers’480, we must 
critically reflect on what is – to some extent improperly – ‘said’, and particularly on 
whether humanism is pursued in humane ways. Starck notes that only in respecting 
and protecting ‘on the way’ the concrete human being and his or her human dignity is 
the humane practice of the law – even the law of human dignity per se – 
guaranteed.481 Starck’s conclusion, ‘These are political limits’ [Das sind 
Politikgrenzen]482, brings to mind Rancière’s thesis on politics and aesthetics and 
affirms the pertinence of the notion of the limit to portrayals of practice. 
The introduced model is based on the graph of the eye and field of sight 
simile483 (graph 2):                                                          
478 ibid (6.42) 
479 Cf. Tatjana Geddert-Steinacher, Menschenwürde als Verfassungsbegriff – Aspekte der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu Art. 1 Abs. 1 Grundgesetz (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1990) 60 [‘Der Mensch ist sowohl dem Reich der Freiheit als auch dem Reich der Sinne 
verhaftet und muß deshalb stets hinter seiner Vernunftsbestimmung zurückbleiben. Er ist […] stets 
defizitär.’] 
480 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 10 
481 ibid 
482 ibid 
483 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.6331) 
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In judicial practice, the eye represents the judge484. The law, as a lens before 
the eye, establishes the critical perspective, forms the judge’s viewpoint485 and 
determines the judge’s latitude for reasoning486. To the extent that the law as the lens 
before the eye constitutes language practiced in a text487, the eye ‘reads’ this language 
and ‘is continuously altered throughout the reading experience.’488 This hermeneutic 
and literary approach aspires to depict the implications of entrusting authority over 
meaning to human beings representing institutions489. The perspective of the judge as                                                         
484 The term ‘judge’ is understood in the broad sense as referring to the person or group of persons that 
represent the institution of the Court. With respect to the FCC, save the instances of minority opinions, 
the ‘judge’ would correspond to the Court. In other constitutional courts, such as the South African or 
the Canadian, where the different opinions in the decision are attributed to the person/judge/author, the 
term can refer to a particular judge. The Vorverständnis of the judge as interpreter influences the 
production of meaning; ‘An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending […].’ Heidegger, 
Being and Time (1927, with a new Forward by Taylor Carman in 2008, John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson trs, New York: Harper & Row, 1962) 191 
485 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 390 [‘[…] one intends to understand the text itself. But 
this means that the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. In 
this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or 
enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that 
helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says. I have described this […] as a ‘fusion of 
horizons’. We can now see that this is what takes place in conversation, in which something is 
expressed that is not only mine or my author’s, but common.’] 
486 Constitutional law is formative of who the judge is and of how meaning is produced, for instance by 
provisions such as Art. 101 GG, Art. 103 GG, Art. 104 GG. See also Friedrich E. Schnapp, ‘Die 
Grundrechtsbindung der Staatsgewalt’ (1989) Heft 1 JuS 1, 8 
487 Practice in texts, indeed just an aspect of what practice entails, is perceived broadly, that is, should 
be understood as alluding also to the implicit presence of human dignity. Though a systematic inquiry 
into proof of implicitly present human dignity language in legal texts exceeds the objectives of my 
research question, it should be noted that legal scholarship has affirmed the implicit practice of the law 
of human dignity in documents such as the ECHR or the constitution of Canada. The point furthered 
here emphasizes the self as reader and the reflexive relationship between the reader and the text.  
488 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 137; See Wolfgang Iser, Der implizite Leser. 
Kommunikationsformen des Romans von Bunyan bis Beckett (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972) 
489 For instance Gadamer notes ‘the painful imperfection associated with applying one’s knowledge.’ 
Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 316; Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (John 
B. Thomson ed, Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trs, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991) 66 [‘[…] utterances are not only […] signs to be understood and deciphered […]; they are also 
[…] signs of authority to be believed and obeyed.’] 
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author of the decision coincides in certain respects with the law as the critical lens. 
The coincidence is sharply discernable in FCC jurisprudence. Literary criticism sheds 
another light on the institutional style of the FCC as author: the syntactical choice of 
passive voice framing; the imperative utterance of what is valid in accordance with 
constitutional law, often without explicit reference to the FCC as the author – 
syntactically, as the subject – assessing constitutionality; and – a more crude and plain 
to see point – the institutional representation of individual constitutional judges not by 
their own person, but rather by Senates of the FCC, save in minority opinions. Partial 
concealment, in stylistic terms, of the author causes (an illusion of) coincidence 
between the pouvoir constituant or the will of society and the will of the 
constitutional judge.  
Minding the linguistic-analytical insights presented so far, the eye of the judge 
looking through the lens of the law is not the sole viewpoint490 traced in judicial 
decisions. To portray the meaning of the law of human dignity ensuing from 
intersecting fields of sight I turn to the text of decisions as a limited yet essential and 
illustrative aspect of judicial practice and borrow the concept of the language game. 
Despite the fact that language games are highly diverse491 Wittgenstein talks about 
family resemblances492. The produced legal language game constitutes the material of 
the linguistic-analytical analysis. The legal language game intersects with a range of 
other language games most importantly those of human beings as legal subjects, as 
well as those of other legal actors across branches of state power, constitutional 
orders, and levels of constitutionalism. These are often integrated into the text of 
cases. Family resemblances, though discernible between legal and other language 
games in the texts discussed infra, are not spinal elements of this analysis. 
A further modification of the above graph reflects the sui generis character of 
legal language games493 and enhances the intelligibility of law as a totality. Imagine a 
narrower field that expands again from the eye within the eye’s field of sight, in other 
words a subtotal of the field of sight. The boundaries of this subtotal are the                                                         
490 See also Nehamas (1985) 1ff. [on Nietzsche’s perspectivism and aestheticism] 
491 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 15 para 23 [‘It is interesting to compare the diversity of 
the tools of language and of the ways they are used, the diversity of kinds of word and sentence, with 
what logicians have said about the structure of language. (This includes the author of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus).’]; Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 154 [‘[…] linguistic 
conventions have soft edges. Linguistic categories are defined by family resemblances rather than 
shared characteristics. These ‘resemblances’ are historically contingent and so change with use.’] 
492 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 35-36 paras 66f. 
493 Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 50 
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boundaries of the legal language game. These, unlike the limits of our language, 
which can only be seen from a point outside our world, belong to the eye’s field of 
sight. That said, defining the legal language game as a subtotal of the field of sight 
indicates a margin beyond its boundaries that allows for their expansion or 
contraction. The boundaries and the content of the legal language game are at the 
disposal of the legal actor, who – as a human being – is identified with the limit in the 
introduced linguistic-analytical model. Judges have both the field of sight and the 
legal language game at their disposal. If the good or bad willing of metaphysical 
subjects can change the limits of their language games, ad majorem a minus it can 
also change the limits of legal language games (graph 3): 
 
Other perspectives taken into account in producing the legal language game 
are subject – first in linguistic-analytical terms – to the authority of the judge as 
author of the legal text. Be that as it may, the doctrinal recognition of a claim to 
human dignity ensuing from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG could be understood as the granting of 
authority over meaning to another ‘eye’, that is, an alternative ‘perspective’ even 
against law per se. Each human being corresponds to an eye with its very own field of 
sight. The limit is an inviolable position, in other words an ‘unantastbar’ place; 
paternalism lurks in the appeal to the inviolability of this position, rather than the 
inviolability of the metaphysical subject identified with the limit494.  
A range of institutional and doctrinal mechanisms that feature in the practice 
of the law of human dignity, ranging from constitutional review and judicial restraint 
to the principle of proportionality, introduce certain language into the legal language 
game: ‘review’, ‘restraint’, ‘principle’, ‘proportionality’. Zooming in on the language 
494 v. Olshausen (1982) 2221 
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found in legal doctrine495 through a hermeneutic and literary methodological lens can 
be perceived as post-modern criticism.496 Having said that, the uniformity, 
impartiality, certainty, coherence and foreseeability of doctrine as standardized 
language render law graspable and, in democratic constitutional orders, define how 
judges should exercise their authority over meaning in interpreting the law and in 
constructing legal arguments, thus contribute to the soundness of justification.  
Bearing in mind that the legal language game is narrower than the field of 
sight that represents the eye’s perception of life497, hence its boundaries can afford to 
fluctuate, how does the breadth of this subtotal increase or decrease? The fluctuation 
of the boundaries of the legal language game can be associated, indicatively, with the 
interplay between internal and external justification of legal arguments composing 
legal syllogisms produced in practicing the law of human dignity, or the need to 
transcend disciplinary borders, questing after the context of a given Leerstelle, in 
order to extract insights and methodologies for assessing ad hoc its meaning (graph 
4):  
                                                         
495 Hendrik Zahle, ‘Legal Doctrine between Empirical and Rhetorical Truth. A Critical Analysis of Alf 
Ross’ Conception of Legal Doctrine’ (2003) 14(4) EJIL 801, 802 [legal doctrine is composed of 
propositions about legal norms]; 806 [verification or falsification of propositions of legal doctrine by 
inquiry into the reasoning of the courts ‘under specific conditions]; ibid 809 [‘The fact that statements 
about law are made in a social context implies that the statements themselves influence the law.’]; ibid 
812f. [‘We are involved in a rhetorical study of the impact of statements of legal science. The greater 
the authority of the scholar, the more adequate the presentation of the statement, the more fitting to the 
practical need for guidance the statement is framed, the higher is the chance that the statement is 
‘followed’ or rather – in the words of a verification procedure – will turn out to be ‘true’ in the sense 
that law is decided as stated.’]; ibid 815 [‘[According to Ross] […] legal doctrine somehow creates its 
own object and thereby contributes to its own truth. Consequently legal doctrine has a ‘magical’ 
element.’] 
496 Butler, Feminism and the question of postmodernism (1992) 15 [‘[T]o call into question and perhaps 
most importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that previously has 
not been authorized.’] 
497 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.621) [‘The world and life are one.’]  
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Two disparate, yet illustrative, examples of figuratively rendered fluctuation, 
as in the above graph, can be offered. In German legal scholarship it is argued that the 
legal guarantee of human dignity marks Tabugrenze [taboo limits]498, which exclude 
from the protective scope of human dignity instances of ‘exaggerated sensitivity’ and 
unreasonableness499, therefore setting – in light of the seriousness of the guarantee – 
limits to subjective estimations500 of what amounts to a violation of human dignity.501 
Another example of fluctuation of the breadth of legal language games indicates how 
drastically the boundaries are influenced by methodological choices. Comparative and 
multi-, inter- or transdisciplinary approaches to law reflect openness502, namely 
willingness to look at law from another perspective and to integrate other (legal) 
language games into the produced legal language game.  
(6.423) Of the will as the bearer of the ethical we cannot speak. And 
the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology. 
(6.43) If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change 
the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be 
expressed in language. 
In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so to 
speak wax or wane as a whole. 
The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.503  
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein states, ‘[…] to imagine a 
language means to imagine a form of life.’504 Can the limits of the world, of life and,                                                         
498 Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde’ (1995) 857, 860; Harro Otto, ‘Diskurs über 
Gerechtigkeit, Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte’ (2005) JZ 473, 480f. [on torture] 
499 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 23 
500 Binder and Weisberg propose looking at literature and law in approaches importing the former into 
the latter as ‘potential collaborators or competitors in the same enterprise […]’ and note that ‘the 
disciplines perform this dual function of disciplining both social investigators and the objects of social 
investigation, insofar as they are modes of apprehending subjectivity.’ The emphasis on subjectivity 
and the position that ‘legal decisions turn on diverse representations of the will of legal actors’ mark 
how the hermeneutic and literary methodological approach denotes an actor-oriented view on law in 
that it treats subjectivity, namely the result of the presence of the human factor in law’s practice. In 
Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 5 f.  
501 Kunig (n 499)  
502 White, Heracle’s Bow (1985) 124 [openness as ‘many-voicedness’] 
503 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.23), (4.3) 
504 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 11 para 19; Contrary to the ‘controversial feature of the 
Saussurian conception of the sign system as a discrete body of rules […] that […] gives the system a 
definite boundary […]’, in Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein argues ‘for the instability of sign 
systems, which he calls ‘language games’. Since meaning is use in his pragmatist scheme, 
understanding a sign means competence in using it in a discourse. Such discourses do not have hard 
boundaries – the range of moves that may be recognized as going on with a linguistic practice, as 
‘within the rules,’ cannot be exhaustively specified in advance and is contingent on the responses of 
other participants in the game. […] Wittgenstein concludes, ‘the extension of [any given] concept is 
not closed by a frontier.’’ [as translated in: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Gertrude E. M. Anscombe tr, New York: Macmillan, 1968) Part 1, 67 para 2e; This translation 
deviates from the revised 4th edition of the Philosophical Investigations used here: in the revised 4th 
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essentially, also of law change through the practice of the law of human dignity? A 
response to this question can only be given on occasion of linguistic-analytical 
analysis of ad hoc instances of practice (see infra in Chapter Two). The legal 
language game expanding from the eye is infused with the law of human dignity and 
fundamental rights. Law permeates the content and the boundaries of legal language 
games. Law as the critical lens through which the eye, the constitutional judge, looks 
forms the respective viewpoint. In light of Art. 1 sec. 3 GG, fundamental rights are, 
primarily and indispensably, lenses influencing the production of meaning by all three 
manifestations of state power (Art. 20 sec. 2 GG505, Art. 20 sec. 3GG).506 
Linguistic-analytical insights set the stage for the phenomenological account 
of ‘something missing’, and reinforce the ontological inquiry into the law of human 
dignity. The ‘human’ component of human dignity language denotes the metaphysical 
subject. The legal actor, the human within the institution, stands for the metaphysical 
subject. The linguistic-analytical insight that all propositions are of equal value and 
metaphysical subjects are the limit of the world as in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus elucidates the justification of self-determination and autonomy at the 
core of human dignity meaning. Pluralism is premised on the proposition that all 
human beings are as such the limit of their world: human beings are the same 
precisely and leastwise in that they are diverse and unique.  
The responsibility of the judge to develop an understanding of the world of 
human beings as metaphysical – prior to and besides legal – subjects becomes all the 
more compelling in view of the appreciation that man-made507 law is limited. Despite 
the spatial coincidence of the eye of the judge with the law as the decisive lens in the 
introduced model, the human factor within the institution508, namely the metaphysical 
subject at the limit of the (legal) language game, should not escape our attention. The 
humane practice of law presupposes entrusting law’s grasp to human beings; whether 
this possibility effectuates depends on the process of practicing the law of human 
dignity and the ethics and aesthetics applied in the propositions produced among other 
factors.  
                                                                                                                                                              
edition ‘frontier’ is substituted with ‘boundary’).] See also Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of 
Law (2000) 122 f [on the quality of the boundaries drawn]. 
505 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
506 ibid 1 
507 Gender alert! Man-made stands for ‘human’-made. 
508 Baer, ‘Thematisierungen – Körper, Sprache und Bild im Prozeß’ (2003) 109, 117 
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What can be ‘said’, and what can only be ‘shown’ and not ‘said’ in the 
practice of the law of human dignity? The question itself is an oxymoron: how can I 
discuss something that cannot be ‘said’ but only ‘shown’? The philosophy of 
Wittgenstein is an invaluable source of philosophical insights for addressing such 
epistemological challenges to eventually render the discussion about ‘something 
always missing’, namely something that can only be ‘shown’ and not ‘said’, a sound 
analytical endeavor. Pre-ethics, a meticulous account of what is only ‘shown’ and not 
‘said’, are discussed in the succeeding part of the analysis, even if spelling them out 
only builds another ladder, which should, once ascended, be discarded.509  
C. A phenomenological account of practicing the law of human dignity 
The neutral and impartial510 relational portrayal of the practice of human 
dignity language in law ensuing from concepts such as the ‘philosophical I’, or the 
‘metaphysical subject’ in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus sets the stage for 
processing, hermeneutically and literary, phenomenological insights derived from the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas, particularly Totality and Infinity – An Essay on 
Exteriority511, to further enhance the introduced model. Levinas depicts the 
experience of human being-ness in its metaphysical etherealness; still, at the same 
time, in its concreteness. Hospitality512, generosity, responsibility, desire for a face-to-
face encounter with the absolutely other and the Other are examples of the language 
employed in Totality and Infinity. Levinas’ phenomenology is apt for the cultivation 
of another understanding of how the law of human dignity is practiced and the 
enrichment of the analysis of FCC jurisprudence in Chapter Two. Totality and Infinity 
introduces an original phenomenology that deviates from hermeneutic philosophy of                                                         
509 Wittgenstein, Tractatus (6.54) 
510 See critical stance towards neutrality and impartiality in Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 12 
[Introduction by John Wild]  
511 In Totality and Infinity Levinas reflects and builds on former scholars such as Husserl and 
Heidegger. Levinas, ibid 43 [‘In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with Being 
the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics. To be sure, the freedom 
involved in the essence of truth is not for Heidegger a principle of free will. Freedom comes from an 
obedience to Being: it is not man who possesses freedom; it is freedom that possesses man. But the 
dialectic which thus reconciles freedom and obedience in the concept of truth presupposes the primacy 
of the same, which marks the direction of and defines the whole of Western philosophy.’]; 305 [‘To 
posit being as Desire is to decline at the same time the ontology of isolated subjectivity and the 
ontology of impersonal reason realizing itself in history.’] 
512 ‘Has anyone noticed? Although the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized within it, 
Totality and Infinity bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality.’ Jacques Derrida, Adieu to 
Emmanuel Levinas (Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas trs, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999) 21 
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Being and transcendental idealism513, showing ‘the inexhaustible richness of our lived 
experience and the fruitfulness of reflecting on its forms and patterns.’514  
In the Preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas reacts to the cryptic reference 
to the polemos in the thought of Heraclitus and states that war establishes a totality 
order that precludes exteriority and is experienced as deadlock.  
We do not need obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being 
reveals itself as war to philosophical thought, that war does not only 
affect it as the most patent fact, but as the very patency, or the truth, 
of the real. […] The ontological event that takes form in this black 
light is a casting into movement of beings hitherto anchored in their 
identity, a mobilization of absolutes, by an objective order from 
which there is no escape. The trial by force is the test of the real. 
[…] [War] establishes an order from which no one can keep his 
distance; nothing henceforth is exterior.515 
Dissensus, by analogy with the polemos, as a mode of critical reflection 
presupposes the totality of ‘an objective order from which there is no escape’.516  
War does not manifest exteriority and the other as other; it destroys 
the identity of the same.  
The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept 
of totality, which dominates Western philosophy. Individuals are 
reduced to being bearers of forces that command them unbeknown 
to themselves.517 
Totality absorbs the multiplicity of beings, which peace implies. 
Only beings capable of war can rise to peace. War like peace 
presupposes beings structured otherwise than as parts of a 
totality.518 
                                                        
513 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 12 [Introduction by John Wild]  
514 ibid  
515 ibid 21 
516 See an original interpretation of escape in Levinas, On Escape/De L’ Evasion, 52 [‘This term 
escape, which we borrow from the language of contemporary literary criticism, is not only a word à la 
mode; it is word-weariness, the disorder of our time [mal du siècle]. It is not easy to draw up a list of 
all the situations in modern life in which it shows itself. […] What is caught up in the 
incomprehensible mechanism of the universal order is no longer the individual who does not yet 
belong to himself, but an autonomous person who, on the solid terrain he has conquered, feels liable to 
be mobilized – in every sense of the term. […] Temporal existence takes on the inexpressible flavor of 
the absolute. The elementary truth that there is being – a being that has value and weight – is revealed 
at a depth that measures its brutality and its seriousness. […] It is not that the sufferings with which life 
threatens us render it displeasing; rather it is because the ground of suffering consists of the 
impossibility of interrupting it, and of an acute feeling of being held fast [rivé]. The impossibility of 
getting out of the game and of giving back to things their toy-like uselessness heralds the precise 
instant at which infancy comes to an end, and defines the very notion of seriousness. What counts, 
then, in all this experience of being, is the discovery not of a new characteristic of our existence, but of 
its very fact, of the permanent quality [l’ inamovibilité] itself of our presence […].’] 
517 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21  
518 ibid 222 
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The notion of totality is reintroduced in a most vibrant fashion. The preclusion 
of escape brings about the human experience of deadlock, which manifests 
recurrently in the portrayal of human dignity violations in courts’ jurisprudence. The 
above excerpt acquaints us with a particular experience of deadlock operating chiefly 
at the level of language as the basis of society, communication and meaning, namely 
the state of being subject to the authority of forces unbeknown to oneself in spite of 
oneself. An important facet of this experience is ignorance emboldened by 
elusiveness, ambiguity, controversy, or lack of transparency re meaning and the 
‘forces’ that produce it. Failing to clearly identify who speaks and to communicate as 
transparently as possible the meaning produced to those at the receiving end are 
tantamount to the subsumption of human beings subject to such authority under a 
totality from which there is no escape. 
The world is one of ‘alien things and elements which are other than, but not 
negations’519 of the self. The appropriation of the field of sight simile in the 
introduced model indicates who has authority over meaning, hence inevitably over 
other subjects with their own worldviews; the phenomenological insights herein 
elucidate what precedes such authority and, at once, decides whether it is exercised 
humanely. The totality structure of the legal language game produced by the judge is 
the crucial subtotal of the field of sight for present purposes, in view of the material 
attended to in Chapter Two (graph 5):  
 
Far from resembling the neutral, impartial, system520 of the eye and the field 
of sight simile, Levinas notes, ‘the world as I originally experience it is not a logical 
                                                        
519 ibid 12 [Introduction by John Wild]  
520 ibid 
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system of this kind, in which no term takes precedence over the rest.’521 Levinas’ 
remark points to the necessity of complementing the model with language that affords 
tools for portraying the richness of lived experience unveiled in practicing the law of 
human dignity and filling ‘something missing’ with concrete content.  
 ‘Language is exceptional in that it attends its own manifestation.’522 The legal 
language game523 entails both the action of producing meaning and the meaning 
produced, ‘signifiance’, ‘the saying that is correlated with something said’524. Legal 
language games can be portrayed as totalities. The linguistic-analytical account 
indicates how the practice of the law of human dignity – at least those aspects of 
practice evidenced in legal texts – corresponds essentially to a subtotal of legal actors’ 
actual vision. Law ubiquitously permeates the viewpoint emanating from the 
metaphysical subject at the limit of the world, the boundaries, and the content of legal 
language games. There are, indeed, good reasons why law should be partly instituted 
as a totality. Totality structures afford, for instance, certainty, coherence and 
consistency. This holds true for the practice of human dignity not only in positive law, 
but also in case law, where it manifests most potently in the advantages of employing 
elaborate legal doctrine on the legal concept in German constitutional law.525                                                          
521 ibid 
522 ibid 98 
523 Cf. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1962) [speech acts] 
524 John Llewelyn, ‘Levinas and Language’ in Simon Critchley & Robert Bernasconi (eds), The 
Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 119, 132; 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 14 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘There is no difference between the 
active expression and what is expressed. The two coincide. The other is not an object that must be 
interpreted and illuminated by my alien light. He shines forth with his own light, and speaks for 
himself.’]  
525 Critically, offering historical insights, Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 40-42 [‘It has not 
escaped the observation of the lawgivers of different nations, that owing to the different interpretation, 
put upon the same laws, much vexation and trouble arise. In fact, the “uncertainty of the law,” which 
originates in a great measure from the different interpretation to which one and the same law may be 
subject, has become proverbial. It has been, therefore, the anxious desire of several well-disposed 
legislators, to avoid interpretation and consequent commentaries, by framing codes of law which 
should be so complete and exact as to render interpretation superfluous. To diminish litigation, and to 
make lawyers comparatively useless, was one of the objects of the Prussian code, promulgated by 
Frederick the Great. […] Napoleon said […] that be once entertained the idea, that all principles of law 
might be reduced to a few concise forms, which ought to be combined accordingly to fixed rules, 
similar to those of mathematics; and that thus simplicity and certainty of law might be established. He 
soon, however, gave up the idea […]. In Bavaria, commentaries on the penal code are actually 
prohibited. With true wisdom did the government of that country officially publish the motives, 
explanations, &c., which were given in the course of the discussions in the king’s privy council, for 
adopting the various laws. They have been drawn up and reduced to a systematic whole […]. But it 
was not equally wise to prohibit commentaries; for those who advised the king so to do, forgot, that as 
they felt bound to explain the various provisions of the code, so would their own explanations again 
carry along with them the necessity of interpretation, simply because drawn up in human language, 
though we willingly allow, not in the same degree with the briefer code. No code can possibly provide 
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Be that as it may, the practice, namely mobilization, of human dignity 
language in law effectuates, I argue due to the immediacy of the concept’s linguistic 
and semantic relatedness to human being-ness, a crack in law’s totality. This crack, 
the ‘breach of totality’526, is like a vent or a window that enables law’s openness 
towards infinity, to wit, allows for the practice of law’s meta-dimension and activates 
the metaphysical quality of law’s Menschenbild. Perceiving of the ‘breach of totality’ 
as an aspect of human dignity meaning profoundly refines constitutional claims to 
respect and protection of human dignity. The transcendental meaning of the law of 
human dignity is practiced when, first and foremost, definitional – here, also, 
figurative – provision for the Other beyond is made; only then can transcendence as 
transascendance in encountering the other face-to-face make sense. The crack in the 
totality guarantees the humane practice of law in general, on account of the prominent 
position of the human dignity clause in the Basic Law, the encapsulation of the self-
understanding of the German state in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, and the doctrinally postulated 
Ausstrahlungswirkung (radiation impact) of human dignity on other fundamental 
rights.  
How does Levinas define totality and infinity? The ‘panoramic sense of 
vision’527 is associated with a totalizing understanding of the other human being and 
the world. ‘Synoptic thought’ inevitably totalizes.528 ‘Vision is an adequation of the 
idea with the thing, a comprehension that encompasses’,529 thus diametrically 
opposed to the transcendent, namely ‘what can not be encompassed’530. Affirmation 
of or opposition to a condition ‘while remaining attached to its horizons’531, the ‘yes’ 
and the ‘no’, positivity and negativity, take place within the boundaries of totality. 
Human history recurrently documents ‘outwardly directed but self-centered totalistic 
thinking.’532 Totalizers ‘are satisfied with themselves and with the systems they can 
                                                                                                                                                              
for all specific cases, which most frequently consist of a combination of simple elements; nearly every 
case in reality is a complex one; and because the various relations of men are forever changing.’] 
526 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 40 
527 ibid 16 [Introduction by John Wild] 
528 ibid 40 
529 ibid 34; ibid 295 [‘For vision is essentially an adequation of exteriority with interiority: in it 
exteriority is reabsorbed in the contemplative soul and, as an adequate idea, revealed to be a priori, the 
result of a Sinngebung.’] 
530 ibid 293 [‘This is an essential precision of the notion of transcendence, utilizing no theological 
notion.’] 
531 ibid 41 
532 ibid 17 [Introduction by John Wild]  
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organize around themselves as they already are […]’.533 They ‘seek power and 
control’534, ‘order and system’.535 Totalities are associated with objectivity and with 
valuing objective thinking536 and neutrality. Questions regarding the Being are treated 
‘in terms of a context, a system.’537 
The acts of sensing, thinking, existing, as they are lived through, are 
discounted as subjective. […] To be free is to sacrifice the arbitrary 
inner self and to fit into a rationally grounded system. Inner feelings 
and thoughts cannot be observed. They are private and unstable. So 
men are judged by what they do, their works that are visible and 
remain. Since they endure, they can be judged by the group which 
also remains. They are what they are judged to be by the ongoing 
course of history. Since this is the inclusive system, with nothing 
beyond, there is no appeal from this judgment. It is final. As Hegel 
said, Die Weltgeschichte ist die [sic] Weltgericht. History itself is 
the final judge of history.538 
Common sense and philosophy ‘from Plato to Heidegger’, contends Levinas, 
have deemed ‘panoramic existence and its disclosure’ equivalent to ‘the very 
production of being’.539 Levinas considers Heidegger’s thesis ‘that every human 
attitude consists in ‘bringing to light’ […]’ to be a manifestation of the ‘primacy of 
the panoramic.’540 The breach of totality is elemental to the actual existence of being, 
rather than merely expressive of disobedience against totality structures; it concerns 
the essential core meaning of ‘human’ in human dignity language. 
The break-up of totality, the denunciation of the panoramic 
structure of being, concerns the very existing of being and not the 
collocation or configuration of entities refractory to system.541 
Notwithstanding this evidently critical stance towards totality structures, 
Levinas grants they are an indispensible feature of lived experience, since ‘a great 
part of our speaking and thinking is systematic and bound by logic of some kind.’542 
The realization of justice through law, this sui generis facet of lived experience, 
                                                        
533 ibid  
534 ibid  
535 ibid  
536 ibid 17-18 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘A priority is […] placed on objective thinking, and the 
objective.’]  
537 ibid  
538 ibid 
539 ibid 294 
540 ibid 
541 ibid 
542 ibid 14; ibid 18 [‘Systematic thinking, no doubt, has its place.’] [Introduction by John Wild]  
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undoubtedly requires totality structures. Uniformity543, certainty, coherence, 
foreseeability of outcomes, and determinacy re the standards guiding law’s practice 
are only conceivable within totality frameworks. Having said that, rigid boundaries 
that signify a ‘partial and biased doctrine’544 impair the transcendental meaning of the 
law of human dignity. Far from thoroughly rejecting the value and necessity of 
totality systems in the practice of human dignity and fundamental rights it suffices at 
this point of the analysis to view totality structures and traits as just one side of the 
story. 
In the work of Levinas, infinity, the other side of the story, is identified with 
emptiness, ‘the void that breaks the totality’545, an ‘apparently wholly empty 
notion’546 analogous to the presently introduced conception of ‘something always 
missing’. The breach of totality relies, instead of vision547, on language, ‘where there 
is always room for the diversity of dialogue, and for further growth through the 
dynamics of question and answer.’548 The precedence of language over vision in the 
phenomenology of Levinas directly opposes the ‘primacy of the panoramic’549 
implied, for instance, in Heiddegger’s interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment 123 (see 
supra, Part A), and conveys the abandonment of the position ‘that disclosure, which 
implies the solitude of vision, is the first work of truth.’550 Expression is never 
neutral551; on the contrary, it breaches ‘all the envelopings and generalities of Being’ 
to display ‘its “form” the totality of its “content”, finally abolishing the distinction 
between form and content.’552 Content and form merge in that they are both signified                                                         
543 See MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 51 
544 Levinas (n 526) 18 [Introduction by John Wild]  
545 ibid 40 
546 ibid 50 
547 Reference to ‘vision’ brings to mind the linguistic-analytical metaphor of the eye and the field of 
sight.  
548 Levinas (n 526) 16 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘This other-regarding way of thought rejects the 
traditional assumption that reason has no plural, and asks why we should not recognize what our lived 
experience shows us, that reason has many centers, and approaches the truth in many different ways. 
Instead of building great systems in which the singular diversities of things and persons are passed over 
and diluted, this way of thinking prefers to start with the careful analysis of the peculiar features of 
each being in its otherness, and only then to clarify its relations with other things in the light of its 
peculiar and distinctive features.’]  
549 ibid 294; ibid 15 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘Totalitarian thinking accepts vision rather than 
language as its model. It aims to gain an all-inclusive, panoramic view of all things, including the 
other, in a neutral, impersonal light like the Hegelian Geist (Spirit), or the Heideggerian Being. It sees 
the dangers of an uncontrolled, individual freedom, and puts itself forth as the only rational answer to 
anarchy.’]  
550 ibid 99 
551 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 52f.  
552 Levinas (n 526) 51 
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as the distance between the self and the other and Other, which ‘unlike all distances, 
enters into the way of existing of the exterior being’.553 
Infinitizers, ‘who are dissatisfied, and who strive for what is other than 
themselves’554 pursue ‘a higher quality of life’555, ‘freedom and creative advance’556. 
Levinas’ proposal for approaching infinity shuns both ‘subjective anarchism’557 and 
‘the holistic thinking of traditional philosophy’558 in that it opts for language. 
Language capacitates diversity in conversation. Seeing that ‘judgment is crude and 
subjective, varying with the otherness of those who judge differently from place to 
place and from time to time […]’559 should lead us to never consider it final; ‘history 
itself is not the final judge of history.’560 
Levinas draws a link between the idea of the perfect and infinity. Perfection 
transcends the limit of ‘the common plane of the yes and the no’561 and the idea of 
infinity ‘designates a height and a nobility, a transascendence.’562 Analogously to the 
‘Cartesian primacy of the idea of the perfect over the idea of the imperfect’563, argues 
Levinas, the idea of infinity cannot be reduced to ‘the negation of the imperfect’564, 
because ‘negativity is incapable of transcendence’565. In language neither the ‘yes’ 
nor the ‘no’ are ‘the first word’.566 Polarization, negativity and positivity, falsification 
and verification, as well as subsumption under categories are conceivable only in 
totality structures. Locating the infinite outside ‘the common plane of the yes and the 
no’ amounts to a genuinely affirmative stance towards ‘something always missing’. 
An exceptional quality of the idea of infinity is ‘that its ideatum surpasses the 
idea’567. Just like the transcendent, what cannot be encompassed, infinity overflows 
the idea of infinity and sets in motion the process of critical reflection and self-
                                                        
553 ibid 35 [‘Its formal characteristic, to be other, makes up its content. Thus the metaphysician and the 
other cannot be totalized. The metaphysician is absolutely separated.’] 
554 ibid 17 [Introduction by John Wild]  
555 ibid 
556 ibid 
557 ibid 15 [Introduction by John Wild]  
558 ibid 15-16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
559 ibid 18 [Introduction by John Wild]  
560 ibid 19 [Introduction by John Wild]  
561 ibid 41 
562 ibid; ibid 35 [Transcendence ‘is necessarily a transascendence.’] 
563 ibid 41 
564 ibid  
565 ibid 
566 ibid 42 
567 ibid 49; ibid 289 [‘[…]the social relation, the idea of infinity, the presence in a container of a 
content exceeding its capacity, was described in this book as the logical plot of being.’] 
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reflection on the ‘spontaneous freedom within us’.568 Are there limits to the inner 
spontaneous freedom? The question relates to the understanding of ‘God’ in the 
Preamble to the Basic Law as ‘something always missing’ apropos to the notion of 
the limit, and to the justification of the limited character of positive law. Since the law 
of human dignity encapsulates the infinite, an assertion that becomes more intelligible 
upon focus of the ‘human’ component of ‘human dignity’, this surpassing among 
different levels of meaning is an inherent quality of that law and determinant of 
practice. The notion of human dignity surpasses the law of human dignity itself569, 
and the ideatum of human dignity surpasses the idea of human dignity. The distance 
between ideatum and idea at the same time means that critical reflection, a process 
requiring distance, is intrinsic to the practice of human dignity in law. Levinas 
observes,  
[…] we could conceivably have accounted for all the ideas, other 
than that of Infinity, by ourselves. […] The distance that separates 
ideatum and idea here constitutes the content of the ideatum itself. 
[…] The transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can only be 
an idea in us; it is infinitely removed from its idea, that is, exterior, 
because it is infinite.570 
Infinitizers perceive totality as violence originating ‘in the permanent tyranny 
of power systems which free men should resist’571. Levinas asserts that violence does 
not eventuate predominantly in ‘injuring and annihilating’572 human beings, but rather 
‘in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer 
recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own 
substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy every possibility of 
action.’573 Margalit offers an apt, quite extraordinary, yet historically accurate 
example of Jews in concentration camps digging holes just to fill them up again. The 
humiliation corresponds to both aforementioned senses of violence. It is more than 
just tantamount to a deviation from the categorical imperative never to treat human 
beings only as means, but also as ends; it rather involves treating them not even as 
                                                        
568 ibid 51 
569 Starck, Präambel, GG Kommentar (2010) para 36ff.; Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) 
para 14; ibid 10 
570 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 49 
571 ibid 18 [Introduction by John Wild]  
572 ibid 21 
573 ibid  
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means.574 Still, Levinas notes, ‘[v]iolence bears upon only a being both graspable and 
escaping every hold.’575 Infinity is not the negation of totality; the two terms are 
logically mutually dependent. 
It is critical, for present purposes, to adumbrate a phenomenological account 
of three patterns of relation, essentially from the first-person point of view: the self as 
self and as other to the self, the self and the other as Other576, and the self and the 
world.577 The three patterns are laid out to aid the portrayal of these relations as they 
surface in instances of FCC jurisprudence (Chapter Two) in line with the insight that 
‘law […] [is] an arena for the performance and contestation of representations of self 
and […] an influence on the roles and identities available to groups and individuals in 
portraying themselves.’578 Finally, the world as alterity, ‘the bread I eat, the land in 
which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate, […] sometimes, myself for myself 
[…]’579 is sharply distinguished from the metaphysically desired other as Other580. 
‘Their alterity is […] reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor.’ 581 
At once this remark explains how the self relates to the world, and how the self relates 
to the self. In self-reflection, the alterity encountered is reabsorbed into the identity of 
the self; the self evolves in circularly rendering the own otherness same and one’s 
own. Where certainty and foreseeability foreclose significantly the possibility of 
encountering the alterity that disrupts the identity in the process of self-reflection, 
tools and mechanisms should be invented and applied for setting in motion that 
process.582                                                         
574 Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 103f. [treating human beings as subhumans] 
575 Levinas (n 570) 223 
576 The ‘other’ and the ‘Other’ are used interchangeably by Levinas due to their coincidence in the 
face-to-face relation, presented infra. 
577 The phenomenological account of the relation of the self to the world can be enhanced by 
ontological and linguistic-analytical insights. The world, according to the linguistic-analytical model 
based on the eye and the field of sight simile in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, is defined by the 
limits of our language; Thurner (2001) 206 [Thurner’s interpretation of Fragment B101 of Heraclitus 
notes how self-knowledge [Selbsterkenntnis] can only be attained through reflection on language, 
namely the world: ‘Da die Sprache die Weise ist, in der der Mensch sich in seinem konkreten 
Lebensvollzug immer schon erschlossen ist, kann die Selbsterkenntnis nur als Reflexion über die 
Sprache Gestalt gewinnen.’] 
578 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 463 
579 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 33 
580 ibid 
581 ibid 
582 Constitutional review and the principle of the separation of powers can be understood as a 
mechanism of self-reflection of the constitutional state; also, comparative insights and inter- and 
transdisciplinary approaches in practicing the law are active ways of seeking to encounter the other in 
order to inform the same. Finally, doctrinal tools such as the Objektformel materialize, at the level of 
language and meaning, what is ‘other than’ human, and ‘other than’ the language and meaning of 
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The ‘relation with exteriority’, metaphysics, is a relation between the finite, 
that is, the limited, and the infinite, which transcends any and all limits. The dynamics 
resulting from reference to ‘God’ in the Preamble to the German Basic Law can be 
perceived in light of the insight that ‘the relation between the finite and the infinite 
does not consist in the finite being absorbed in what faces him583, but in remaining in 
his own being, maintaining himself there, acting here below.’584 This insight evokes 
the disjunction of gods and human beings and the inviolability signified by the limit 
as discussed respectively in the ontological and linguistic-analytical accounts supra. 
Infinity is characteristic of a transcendent being as transcendent; the 
infinite is the absolutely other.585 
Absoluteness features dominantly in the legal literature on human dignity and 
in the judicial practice of the legal concept. The twist on the relation between the self 
and the other in Levinas’ phenomenology is the coincidence of the other and the 
Other on the human face on account of the transcendent quality of human being-ness, 
in other words the partaking of his or her being-ness to infinity. The self’s face-to-
face encounter with the metaphysical other ‘is not formal, is not the simple reverse of 
identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every 
initiative, to all imperialism of the same.’586 As Natalia Petrillo notes, shedding light 
on the distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive meaning of human dignity 
in legal discourse, or the fact and the law of human dignity as I put it, the fact 
underlying human rights according to Levinas is the ethical relationship of the face-
to-face.587 
Encountering the other does not fulfill a need, does not seek ‘to fill a negation 
or lack in the subject’588; rather it is sparked by a desire, argues Levinas, ‘for that 
which transcends me and my self-centered categories’589. This desire ‘seems                                                                                                                                                               
human dignity in the Basic Law, hence disrupting a sterilized concept by assuming a darker, yet real, 
possibility of violations and degrading objectification. Treating instances of contended objectification 
in the practice of the law of human dignity amounts to an absorption of the other into the same, the 
latter being defined in light of the absolute guarantee of human dignity in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.  
583 Gender alert! 
584 Levinas (n 579) 292 
585 ibid 49 
586 ibid 38-39 
587 Natalia Petrillo, ‘Phӓnomenologische Ansӓtze zur Menschenwürde’ in Jan C. Joerden & Eric 
Hilgendorf & Felix Thiele eds, Menschenwürde und Medizin – Ein interdisziplinӓres Hanbuch (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2013) 135, 140 
588 Levinas (n 579) 19 [Introduction by John Wild]  
589 ibid 16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
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insatiable’590 and ‘feeds on itself’591. Desire is the undercurrent of the mutual 
dependence between law’s humanism and pragmatism. The schematic parallelization 
of humanism and pragmatism to the literary and the legal as performed in the infra 
excerpt aim to enhance the comprehension of the relation between desire and 
language. The story of interpretation in American legal thought frames the context of 
the following remarks:  
Before the development of a modern conception of subjectivity as 
desire, legal discourse and literary discourse were subsumed within 
an undifferentiated activity of literate reflection. Law had 
institutional embodimens, but because of its customary source of 
legitimacy, it transcended those embodiments; and literature did not 
yet exist as a separate category of letters. Interpretation played an 
uninteresting role in premodernist legal thought. Identifying and 
applying the law were commonly experienced as processes of 
customary judgment, not as the interpretation of sovereign will. 
Accordingly legal judgment was not seen as remote from, or in a 
semiotic relation to, virtue.  
The separation of law and literature became possible with a new 
conception of language as the representation of desire: law was 
reconceived as an instrumental discourse, in which language 
functioned as a means to realize desire; literature was bounded off 
as intrinsically worthy discourse, the production of language for 
consumption. Yet the experience literature offered for consumption 
was an aesthetic contemplation of desire, or its sublimation. As law 
was conceived in positivist terms, literature was conceived in 
Romantic terms. Law and literature were each understood as 
representations of desire, but they represented desire by means of 
different tropes, the tropes of realization and sublimation 
respectively.592 
Desire ‘is positively attracted by something other not yet possessed or needed, 
is worked out in very original ways and grounded on a rich array of 
phenomenological evidence.’593 The Other is absolutely other; the self’s relation to 
the other does not necessarily effectuate dependence. The other ‘can absolve 
himself594 from this relation with his integrity intact.’595 Levinas calls the relation in 
                                                        
590 ibid 16 [Introduction by John Wild]; ibid 34 [‘The metaphysical desire […] is a desire that can not 
be satisfied. For we speak lightly of desires satisfied, or of sexual needs, or even of moral and religious 
needs. Love itself is thus taken to be the satisfaction of a sublime hunger. If this language is possible it 
is because most of our desires and love too are not pure.’] 
591 ibid 16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
592 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 109 f.  
593 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 19 [Introduction by John Wild]  
594 Gender alert! 
595 Levinas (n 593) 16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
 124
that sense absolving or absolute.596 ‘My way of existing is my final answer.’597 The 
association of the other with the Other is not an abstract relation. It manifests in the 
face-to-face encounter, ‘a final and irreducible relation which no concept could cover 
without the thinker who thinks that concept finding himself forthwith before a new 
interlocutor […].’598 
The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. 
The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural of the 
‘I.’ I, you – these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither 
possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts link 
me to the Stranger [l’ Etranger], the Stranger who disturbs the being 
at home with oneself [le chez soi]. But Stranger also means the free 
one. Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an 
essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not 
wholly in my site. But I, who have no concept in common with the 
Stranger, am, like him, without genus. We are the same and the 
other.599 
Pluralism presupposes absolute otherness. The absolutely other can never be 
subsumed under the totalities established on a mediating concept. Legal actors should 
be cautious not to destroy the distance between the self and the other in employing the 
‘human being’ and ‘human dignity’ as mediating concepts. The self and the other are 
‘without genus’. While recognizing the validity of biological sameness among human 
beings600, Levinas insists on the conception of human community as a relation 
‘instituted by language’, which does not rest on ‘the unity of a genus.’601 Fraternity 
and solidarity602 among human beings is not premised on their resemblance or on ‘a 
                                                        
596 ibid; ibid 17 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘And [Levinas] finds many other relations of this kind, 
for example, that of truth. In so far as I am related to another entity and share in its being, it must be 
really changed. But as classical metaphysics pointed out, in so far as I discover the truth about 
something, it is absolved from this relation and remains unchanged. The same is true of the idea of 
absolute perfection which is clearly radically other than what I am. But I can strive for such an other 
without changing it, or losing my own integrity, just as I can respond to another person and engage in 
dialogue without jeopardizing his or my own being. Levinas suggests that this may be the reason for 
Plato’s well-known statement at Republic 509 that the good lies beyond being, and relates it to his own 
view that the conclusions of our basic philosophical questions are to be found beyond metaphysics in 
ethics.’] 
597 ibid 17 [Introduction by John Wild]  
598 ibid 290 
599 ibid 39 
600 ibid 213 [‘There does indeed exist a human race as a biological genus, and the common function 
men may exercise in the world as a totality permits the applying to them of a common concept.’] 
601 ibid 213f. 
602 Hufen (2004) 313, 317 [‘Als anthropologisches Leitbild der Verfassung gilt vielmehr, was das 
BVerfGE schon früh mit dem Stichwort “Menschenbild des Grundgesetzes” als ein 
eigenverantwortliches, aber auch sozial gebundenes Individuum umschrieben hat. Solidarität und 
Mitmenschlichkeit sind also durchaus Inhalte der Menschenwürde. Deren Unantastbarkeit schließt 
 125
common cause of which they would be the effect.’603 Mysterious participation604 in 
such causality connotes the imposition of totalities on human beings. Levinas’ 
skepticism towards ‘mysterious participation’ in a common causality as the basis of 
fraternity and solidarity can be viewed as resistance to the association of the 
transcendental meaning of human dignity with an epiphany originating in natural law 
doctrine, which is also pinpointed in German legal scholarship as a danger lurking in 
metaphysical interpretations.605 What does the conjunction ‘and’, connecting the 
‘same’ and the ‘other’, mean? Levinas argues, neither addition, nor authority of one 
term over the other; rather, it indicates their relation, namely language.606  
The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, is 
primordially enacted as conversation, where the same, gathered up 
in its ipseity as an ‘I’, as a particular existent unique and 
autochthonous, leaves itself.607 
The I ‘in its ipseity’, the self, signifies having ‘identity as one’s content’608 and 
‘existing [as] […] identifying [oneself] [as] […] recovering [one’s] […] identity’609 
throughout all that one endures. The I is asserted in the process of ongoing 
identification of oneself, rather than in the event of static sameness (graph 6):  
                                                                                                                                                              
Konflikte und notwendige Abwägung der “Würde des Einen gegen die Würde des Anderen” nicht 
vornherein aus.’] 
603 Levinas (n 593) 
604 Levinas (n 593); The mysterious quality of the law of human dignity is intimated by Stöcker (1968) 
685, 685 [‘Kein Wunder also, daß so view Gewicht in einem einzigen Satz von sechs Wörtern dem 
Interpreten ein ehrfürchtiges Staunen entlockt, das ihn veranlassen wird, sich dem Erhabenen nur in 
angepaßter Form zu nähern: mit jener zeremoniösen Feierlichkeit nähmlich, in welche die deutsche 
Zunge gern verfällt, wird sie unvermittelt dem Mysterium konfrontiert.’]; ibid 685 fn 3 [Another line of 
aesthetically termed criticism as regards the phraseology associated with the mysterious quality of 
human dignity is found in Stöcker, who ponders over whether the category of kitsch would serve the 
function of fertile critique in legal philosophy and legal science.] 
605 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 19 
606 Levinas (593) 39 [‘For language accomplishes a relation such that […] the other, despite the 
relationship with the same, remains transcendent to the same.’]   
607 ibid 




The identity of the individual does not imply being like to oneself and being 
identified as such from a finger pointing to the self ‘from the outside’.610 The 
identification of the self as same eventuates from within.611 Even when the self 
appears other to the self, the I remains identical in a self-reflective sense, in other 
words through absorbing these alterations.  
The I that thinks hearkens to itself thinking or takes fright before its 
depths and is to itself an other. It thus discovers the famous naïvité 
of its thought, which thinks ‘straight on’ as one ‘follows one’s 
nose.’ It hearkens to itself thinking and surprises itself being 
dogmatic, foreign to itself. But faced with this alterity the I is the 
same, merges with itself, is incapable of apostasy with regard to this 
surprising ‘self’. […] The alterity of the I that takes itself for 
another may strike the imagination of the poet precisely because it 
is but the play of the same: the negation of the I by the self is 
precisely one of the modes of identification of the I.612  
Real conversation between the self and the other can never be foreseeable or 
exhaustively planned. The ‘room for reinterpretation’613 and the ‘spontaneity’614 on 
the side of both the self and the other propel uncertainty, indeterminacy, 
unforeseeability, ambiguity and controversy re the evolution and outcome of the 
conversation.615 Levinas associates this ‘intersubjective space’ with the infinite, with 
the exteriority of the Other (graph 7): 
                                                        
610 ibid 289 
611 ibid 289; ibid 245 [‘The morality called inward and subjective exercises a function which universal 
and objective law cannot exercise, but which it calls for. […] The judgment of God that judges me at 
the same time confirms me. But it confirms me precisely in my interiority, whose justice is more severe 
than the judgment of history.’] 
612 ibid 37 
613 ibid 13 [Introduction by John Wild]  
614 ibid  
615 ibid 13 [Introduction by John Wild]  
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The introduction of the Other into the conversation between the self and the 
other unveils the dimension of height, which is critical to conceiving how respect 
towards the dignity of human beings is guaranteed and why the Preamble to the Basic 
Law pairs responsibility towards human beings with responsibility before God. This 
‘curvature of intersubjective space’616 becomes the overloaded locus where 
‘perhaps’617 God as ‘something always missing’618 is sensed as a presence.  
This curvature of the intersubjective space inflects distance into 
elevation; it does not falsify being, but makes its truth first possible. 
[…] This ‘curvature of space’ expresses the relation between human 
beings. That the Other is placed higher than me would be a pure and 
simple error if the welcome I make him consisted in ‘perceiving’ a 
nature. Sociology, psychology, physiology are thus deaf to 
exteriority. Man as Other comes to us from the outside, a separated 
– or holy – face. His exteriority, that is, his appeal to me, is his 
truth. My response is not added as an accident to a ‘nucleus’ of his 
objectivity, but first produces his truth (which his ‘point of view’ 
upon me can not nullify). This surplus of truth over being and over 
its idea, which we suggest by the metaphor of the ‘curvature of 
intersubjective space,’ signifies the divine intention of all truth. This 
‘curvature of space’ is, perhaps, the very presence of God.619 
In real conversation, self-determinacy and autonomy are preserved not 
dogmatically but rather critically, in a coexistence grounded in language, since real 
conversation with someone genuinely other essentially triggers and feeds on critical 
                                                        
616 ibid 290; Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 390 [‘[…] one intends to understand the 
text itself. […] the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, […] more as an opinion and a possibility that 
one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says. I 
have described this […] as a ‘fusion of horizons’. We can now see that this is what takes place in 
conversation, in which something is expressed that is not only mine or my author’s, but common.’] 
617 Levinas, ibid  
618 ibid  
619 ibid 
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reflection.620 This relation is conceived as conversation in radical separation. The 
distance between the self and the Other enables transcendence, namely the movement 
that effectuates a crack in totality. Transcendence, at once transascendence621, implies 
that the distance between the self and the other is measured in height622 and depth, 
vertically; it is the distance ‘of conversation, of goodness, of Desire’623, which is 
‘irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding establishes 
between the diverse terms, other with respect to one another, that lend themselves to 
its synoptic operation.’624 This insight into the dimension of height enhances the 
distinction and relation between ‘something missing’ interpreted by analogy with a 
Leerstelle that can be filled in by means of synthetic activity, and ‘something always 
missing’ as the meta-dimension of human dignity language practiced in law.  
Language preserves the immediacy of the face-to-face, namely the unmediated 
encounter of ‘existents’625. Contrary to the ontological inference that ‘the existent is 
disclosed only in the openness of Being’ 626, which means that ‘we are never directly 
with the existent as such […]’627, the infinity of language in the phenomenology of 
Levinas is premised on non-mediation.  
The immediate is the interpellation and, if we may speak thus, the 
imperative of language. […] Contact is already a thematization and 
a reference to a horizon. The immediate is the face to face.628 
The crack in law’s totality eventuates through ongoing struggle against and 
critical reflection upon the ‘neutralization of the other’, rendering him or her ‘theme 
or object’ that is disclosed and reduced to the same.629 In light of the introduced                                                         
620 ibid 13 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘My autonomy remains intact. In fact, in so far as I have any, it 
is stimulated to further intensity by searching questions from a point of view that is not merely opposite 
and therefore correlative to mine, but genuinely other. I can always say what I wish and even begin 
once again de novo. The same is true of the other. He does not merely present me with lifeless signs 
into which I am free to read meanings of my own. His expressions bear his meanings, and he is himself 
present to bring them out and defend them.’] 
621 ibid 35; ibid 41 
622 ibid 35 [‘That this height is no longer the heavens but the Invisible is the very elevation of height 
and its nobility.’] 
623 ibid 39 
624 ibid 
625 ibid 52 
626 ibid  
627 ibid  
628 ibid 
629 ibid 43-44 [‘To know ontologically is to surprise in the existent confronted that by which it is not 
this existent, this stranger, that by which it is somehow betrayed, surrenders, is given in the horizon in 
which it loses itself and appears, lays itself open to grasp, becomes a concept. To know amounts to 
grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing, removing from it its alterity. This result is 
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model, the objectification of the other translates into his or her subsumption under a 
hermetically and rigidly closed totality, that is, a legal language game that does not 
comprise any words that could breach it630; a doctrine that comprehends all 
conceivable variations of violation; a theory operating on the basis of dogmatism. Not 
permitting the self’s alienation by the other is symptomatic of dogmatism631. Levinas 
opposes dogmatism632, arguing for an understanding of theory as ‘respect for 
exteriority’633 concerned with critique that causes ruptures of history and reacts to the 
ignorance of the absolutely Other as the transcendent other, usually paired with 
integration within the impersonal. 
[…] we propose to describe, within the unfolding of terrestrial 
existence, of economic existence […], a relationship with the other 
that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not a 
totalization of history but the idea of infinity. Such a relationship is 
metaphysics itself. History would not be the privileged plane where 
Being disengaged from the particularism of points of view (within 
which reflection would still be affected) is manifested. If it claims 
to integrate myself and the other within an impersonal spirit this 
alleged integration is cruelty and injustice, that is, ignores the Other. 
History as a relationship between men ignores a position of the I 
before the other in which the other remains transcendent with 
respect to me. Though of myself I am not exterior to history, I do 
find in the Other a point that is absolute with regard to history – not 
by amalgamating with the Other, but in speaking with him. History 
is worked over by the ruptures of history, in which a judgment is 
                                                                                                                                                              
obtained from the moment of the first ray of light. To illuminate is to remove from being its resistance, 
because light opens a horizon and empties space – delivers being out of nothingness.’] 
630 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 46 [‘[…] those who occupy what is called the objective 
standpoint socially, who also engage in the practice from that standpoint called objectification – the 
practice of making people into things to make them knowable – their standpoint and this practice are an 
expression of the social position of dominance that is occupied by men.’] 
631 While within Totality and Infinity the totalizing implications of theory make sense, and lived 
experience is not silenced or neglected, in certain strands of literature, particularly those with a 
sociological pedigree, thus seeking particulars and calling for concreteness, such as feminism, the 
precise meaning of references to totality in postmodern scholarship is challenged. See Mary Joe Frug, 
‘A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft)’ (1991-1992) 105 Harvard Law 
Review 1045, 1046 [‘I am in favor of localized disruptions. I am against totalizing theory.’]; Cf. 
MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 50 [‘As to “totality” – a bloated, overfed, but also oddly 
empty term – what is one against when one is “against totalizing theory”? Why doesn’t anyone say 
what is meant by the term? Why aren’t there footnotes to the charge?’ Of course, her criticism of 
unattended to assertions is at once a defense of feminism; ‘It is apparently a synonym for “universal,” 
but, just to begin with, no analysis that is predicated on a gender division can be a universal one in the 
usual sense.’] 
632 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43 [This kind of theory ‘[…] discovers the dogmatism and naïve 
arbitrariness of its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology; it then 
seeks to exercise this freedom in such a way as to turn back at every moment to the origin of the 
arbitrary dogmatism of its free existence. This would lead to an infinite regression if this return itself 
remained an ontological movement, an exercise of freedom, a theory.’] 
633 ibid 
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borne upon it. When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted 
from history. 634 
Critique, unlike theory and ontology, ‘does not reduce the other to the 
same’635 through the employment of a mediating third term636. Levinas does not 
utterly oppose mediation. Mediation can be meaningful, still, he argues, ‘only if it is 
not limited to reducing distances.’637 Critique amounts to challenging and reflecting 
on the exercise of the same.638 Levinas draws an analogy from the nexus of critique 
and dogmatism, and thereby establishes the famous thesis on pre-ethics, that is, 
metaphysics precedes ontology.  
A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the 
egoist spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other. We 
name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of 
the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to 
the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished 
as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, 
transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other 
by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the 
same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical 
essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, 
metaphysics precedes ontology.639  
The relation between the self and the other is irreversible, because the self 
transcends the distance between the two entities of the face-to-face encounter.                                                         
634 ibid 52 
635 ibid 43 
636 ibid 43-45 [Levinas notes, ‘Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the 
other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of 
being.’ In the rest of Part 4, titled ‘Metaphysics Precedes Ontology’, Levinas confronts the 
characteristic mediation employed to reduce the distance between the self and the other in Western 
philosophy. ‘The ideal of the Socratic truth’ leads Levinas to the conclusion that this strand of 
philosophy ‘is an egology’. Husserl’s phenomenology, grounded on ‘the promotion of the idea of 
horizon, which for it plays a role equivalent to that of the concept in classical idealism’, results in the 
loss of the face; ‘[a]pproached from Being, from the luminous horizon where it has a silhouette, but has 
lost its face, an existent is the very appeal that is addressed to comprehension.’ Heidegger’s Being and 
Time establishes yet another impersonal mediating term, namely Being. ‘To affirm the priority of Being 
over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with 
someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, 
impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), 
subordinates justice to freedom.’]; See also the intimation of the pattern of mediation in Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus, (6.2323) [‘The equation characterizes only the standpoint [den Standpunkt] from which I 
consider the two expressions [von welchem ich die beide Ausdrücke betrachte], that is to say the 
standpoint of their equality of meaning.’] 
637 Levinas (n 632) 44 
638 ibid 43 
639 ibid; ibid 48 [‘The ‘saying to the Other’ – this relationship with the Other as an interlocutor, this 
relation with an existent – precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology 
presupposes metaphysics.’]; ibid 304 [‘The ethical, beyond vision and certitude, delineates the 
structure of exteriority as such. Morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy.’] 
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‘Alterity is possible only starting from me.’640 The original experience of the other 
human being is absolute separation from the other, who is no alter ego of the self in 
the face-to-face encounter641 but rather strange, and, to a certain extent, concealed642, 
though ‘present in the flesh’, distanced, casting a ‘questioning glance’ towards the 
self.643  
The self’s primary experience is ‘definitely biased and egocentric’644. Levinas 
discerns this ‘primordial experience of enjoyment (jouissance)’645 in individuals and 
groups as the egocentric attitude to interpret other individuals ‘either as extensions of 
the self, or as alien objects to be manipulated for the advantage of the individual or 
social self.’646 Conversation cannot ‘renounce the egoism’647 of the self’s existence, 
but grants the Other ‘a right over this egoism’648 that justifies649, for present purposes, 
the production of law’s meaning by the self as actor and interlocutor. Critical 
reflection constitutes the process of practicing responsibility or, according to Levinas, 
of responding to the other. Circularly, by responding to the other the self becomes 
aware of ‘arbitrary views and attitudes’650 springing from ‘uncriticized freedom’651                                                         
640 ibid 40 
641 ibid 13 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘The other person as he comes before me in a face to face 
encounter is not an alter ego, another self with different properties and accidents but in all essential 
respects like me. This may be an expression of an optimistic hope from a self-centered point of view 
which is often verified. The other may, indeed, turn out to be, on the surface at least, merely an 
analogue of myself. But not necessarily! I may find him to be inhabiting a world that is basically other 
than mine and to be essentially different from me.’] 
642 The theme of concealment in the ontological account under Part A and the linguistic-analytical 
account under Part B is now further explicated. Concealment is seen here as a manifestation of the 
other’s strangeness – this amounts to a relational and phenomenological account of concealment. Cf. 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (3.262) [‘[…] What the signs conceal, their application declares.’] 
643 Levinas (n 632) 13 [Introduction by John Wild]  
644 ibid 12 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘I take precedence over the various objects I found around me, 
and in so far as my experience is normal, I learn to manipulate and control them to my advantage, 
either as a member of a group with which I identify with myself or simply as myself alone. In general, 




647 ibid 40; See also Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) 40 [egoism of ‘private, particular 
interests’ metamorphose into ‘disinterested, collective, publicly avowable, legitimate interests.’]; 
Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 476 [‘Official authority […] marks a formal 
boundary within a culture, a sphere of power relatively autonomous from other spheres. Because there 
exist such relatively autonomous spheres, governed by mechanisms capable of imposing their necessity 
on agents, those who are in a position to command these mechanisms are able to dispense with 
strategies aimed expressly and directly at domination. Strategies like law, aimed at formally regulating 
a field of practice, ‘transmute “egoistic” […] interests […] into disinterested […] interests.’ [citing 
Bourdieu]] 
648 Levinas (n 632) 40 
649 ibid  
650 ibid 15 [Introduction by John Wild]  
651 ibid  
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and cultivates responsibility, namely becomes able to respond in a justifiable manner 
to the other. 652 
The questioning glance of the other is seeking for a meaningful 
response. […] if communication and community is to be achieved, a 
real response, a responsible answer must be given. That means that I 
must be ready to put my world into words, and to offer it to the 
other.653 
The scope of the responsibility of legal actors, for instance judges authoring 
judicial decisions, comprises the exercise of critical reflection – also, self-reflection. 
Responsibility as the ability to respond to the other translates into the responsibility to 
acquire the competence to perform reflection and to soundly justify decisions 
grounded on the outcome of such critical process. Language as practice and as 
justice654 means ‘less interest in conceptual constructions and a greater readiness to 
listen and learn from experience.’655  
[…] prior to these systems, which are required to meet many needs, 
and presupposed by them is the existing individual and his ethical 
choice to welcome the stranger and to share his world by speaking 
to him. In other words, we do not become social by first being 
systematic. We become systematic and orderly in our thinking by 
first freely making a choice for generosity and communication, i.e., 
for the social. […] according to Levinas, speaking becomes serious 
only when we pay attention to the other and take account of him and 
the strange world he inhabits.656 
Responsibility is premised on generosity, articulating one’s world and 
‘offering it to the other’657, because ‘[t]here can be no free interchange without 
something to give.’ Generosity does not cause the disappearance of the distance 
separating the self from the other, nor does it bring them together. 
Metaphysics, or the relation with the other, is accomplished as 
service and as hospitality.658                                                          
652 ibid [‘It is only then that I see the need of justifying my egocentric attitudes, and of doing justice to 
the other in my thought and in my action.’] 
653 ibid 14 [Introduction by John Wild]; In interpreting the trail of thought [Gedankengang] of 
Heraclitus in its entirety, Thurner distinguishes between the self, language and thought; language 
corresponds to ‘the means to responding’ [Weg zur Beantwortung]. As noted supra, the demarcating 
line between the ontological and the phenomenological in the thought of the philosophers resorted to 
presently cannot always be clearly drawn. Common threads among the philosophically grounded 
accounts are illustrative of their mutual relevance. In Thurner (2001) 185 
654 Levinas (n 632) 213 
655 ibid 16 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘The basic difference is between a mode of thought which tries 
to gather all things around the mind, or self, of the thinker, and an externally oriented mode which 
attempts to penetrate into what is radically other than the mind that is thinking it.’] 
656 ibid 14-15 [Introduction by John Wild]  
657 ibid 14 [Introduction by John Wild]  
658 ibid 300; See Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999) 
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To posit being as Desire and as goodness is not to first isolate an I 
which would then tend toward a beyond. […] it is to affirm that the 
becoming-conscious is already language, that the essence of 
language is goodness, or again, that the essence of language is 
friendship and hospitality. The other is not the negation of the same, 
as Hegel would like to say. The fundamental fact of the ontological 
scission into same and other is a non-allergic relation of the same 
with the other. 659 
‘Something always missing’ in the story presently told corresponds to the 
‘invisible’660 in Levinas’ thought, which informs and elevates the meaning of 
responsibility661. The absolute distance between the self and the other is premised on 
asymmetry662 or non-reversibility. Reversibility would result in the overlapping of the 
self with the other, and would form a totality comprising both, and ‘visible from the 
outside.’663  
The intended transcendence would be thus reabsorbed into the unity 
of the system, destroying the radical alterity of the other. […] the 
radical separation between the same and the other means precisely 
that it is impossible to place oneself outside of the correlation 
between the same and the other so as to record the correspondence 
or the non-correspondence of this going with this return. Otherwise 
the same and the other would be reunited under one gaze, and the 
absolute distance that separates them filled in. 664 
Approaching ‘something missing’ as a Leerstelle through insights ensuing 
from Totality and Infinity conforms more to the task of a totalizer. The proposition 
that ‘expression precedes’665 the ‘coordinating effects’666 of seeking to comprehend 
the meaning of ‘something missing’ by means of broadening our horizons and 
scrutinizing context should not be understood as a polemic stance towards totality; 
rather, the primacy of expression signals the precedence of the ethical.                                                          
659 Levinas (n 632) 305 
660 ibid 
661 ibid 35 [‘Demented pretension to the invisible, when the acute experience of the human in the 
twentieth century teaches that the thoughts of men are borne by needs which explain society and 
history, that hunger and fear can prevail over every human resistance and every freedom! There is no 
question doubting this human misery, this dominion of the things and the wicked exercise over man, 
this animality. But to be a man is to know that this is so. Freedom consists in knowing that freedom is 
in peril. But to know or to be conscious is to have time to avoid and forestall the instant of inhumanity. 
It is this perpetual postponing of the hour of treason – infinitesimal difference between man and non-
man – that implies the disinterestedness of goodness, the desire of the absolutely other or nobility, the 
dimension of metaphysics.’] 
662 ibid 244 [‘God sees the invisible and sees without being seen.’] 
663 ibid 35-36 
664 ibid 
665 ibid 201 
666 ibid 
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Expression is not produced as the manifestation of an intelligible 
form that would connect terms to one another so as to establish, 
across distance, the assemblage of parts in a totality, in which the 
terms joined up already derive their meaning from the situation 
created by their community, which, in its turn, owes its meaning to 
the terms combined. This ‘circle of understanding’ is not the 
primordial event of the logic of being. Expression precedes these 
coordinating effects visible to a third party. 667 
The conversation between the self and the other enriches law’s Menschenbild 
in the spirit of the law of human dignity and initiates an elaborate relational account 
of human being-ness. ‘Something is missing’ because the absolutely other is strange. 
Figuratively rendered particular characteristics are not identified. The expression of 
the face, in all its diversity and uniqueness, manifests the human-beingness of the 
other as a particular existent, not an abstract Being.668  
Being is exteriority: the very existence of its being consists in 
exteriority, and no thought could better obey being than by allowing 
itself to be dominated by this exteriority. […] The face to face is 
established starting with a point separated from exteriority so 
radically that it maintains itself of itself, is me; every other relation 
that would not part from this separated and therefore arbitrary point 
[…], would miss the – necessarily subjective field of truth. The true 
essence of man is presented in his face […].669 
The Menschenbild is an icon, an ‘image of being’670, the ‘the idea of its 
nature’671 and not its truth.672 Rather, explains Levinas, the ‘truth of being673 […] is 
the being situated in a subjective field which deforms vision, but precisely thus allows 
exteriority to state itself, entirely command and authority: entirely superiority.’674                                                          
667 ibid; In line with Levinas’ assertion that neither the yes nor the no are the first word in language, 
and that the primordial event of the logic of being is not found in the ‘circle of understanding’, that is, 
through a reflexive process, see Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 425 [on incarnation and how 
it implies that the inner mental word is not deduced from a reflective act]; See also Palmer (1969) 204 
[‘To see language and words as the tools of human reflection and subjectivity is to allow the tail to wag 
the dog. […] In the case of language, its saying power, not its form, is the central and decisive fact. 
[…] The unity of language and thought itself, the nonreflexivity of the formation of words, both refute 
the idea of language as sign. Language is an encompassing phenomenon, like understanding itself. It 
can never be grasped as “fact” or fully objectified; like understanding language encompasses 
everything that can become object for us. The early Greeks, Gadamer notes, had no word or concept 
for language itself; like being and understanding, language is medium, not tool.’] 
668 Levinas (n 632) 213 [‘Like a shunt every social relation leads back to the presentation of the other to 
the same without the intermediary of any image or sign, solely by the expression of the face. When 
taken to be like a genus that unites like individuals the essence of society is lost sight of.’]  







Within the realm of fundamental rights, human dignity is not practiced in 
isolation; rather, it constitutes just one of the three core fundamental rights concepts, 
the other two being liberty and equality. Levinas considers freedom ‘an abstraction 
that reveals itself to be self-contradictory when one supposes it to have a 
limitation’675, namely to be finite, and thus not apt to portray the relation of beings in 
war, namely a relation that presupposes yet ‘does not constitute a totality.’676 Due to 
its arbitrariness, freedom always needs to be tempered with justice677. 
The irrational in freedom is not due to its limits, but to the infinity 
of its arbitrariness. Freedom must justify itself; reduced to itself it is 
accomplished not in sovereignty but in arbitrariness. […] Freedom 
is not justified by freedom. To account for being or to be in truth is 
not to comprehend nor to take hold of …, but rather to encounter 
the Other without allergy, that is, in justice. 678 
The freedom of the I is subordinated679 ‘in welcoming the Other’680. In 
Totality and Infinity equality is founded on the ‘welcoming of the face’681 towards 
whom one is already responsible. This face ‘approaches me from a dimension of 
height and dominates me.’682 
Equality is produced where the other commands the same and 
reveals himself to the same in responsibility; otherwise it is but an 
                                                        
675 ibid 223 
676 ibid 224 
677 See Otto (2005) 473, 474ff. [distinction between Unrecht (illegality), which refers to the violation 
of legal obligations, and Ungerechtigkeit (injustice), which constitutes a principle and standard by 
which legal norms can be measured]; ibid 478f. [Exploring the link between human dignity and justice, 
Otto explicitly frames a relational account of human dignity apropos the other [der Andere]. The idea 
of community within society and essentially also the notion of equality are indispensable aspects of the 
meaning of justice in light of human dignity. Otto notes: ‘Die ungleiche Behandlung Einzelner in 
Normen und Entscheidungen kann daher ein Unrecht sein, ungerecht muss sie nicht sein. Erst dann, 
wenn der Rechtsstatus des in der Würde Gleichen betroffen ist, wird eine Norm oder eine Entscheidung 
ungerecht. Differenzierungen des Einzelnen aufgrund seines Soseins als Mensch, Beschränkungen 
seiner Autonomie und der Möglichkeit der Gestaltung seiner Lebensverhältnisse in dem Maße, dass 
kein eigener wesentlicher Gestaltungsfreiraum verbleibt, und die Nutzung des Menschen als Objekt der 
Wohlfahrt der Anderen kennzeichnen ungerechte soziale Verhältnisse, weil sie die der Menschenwürde 
angemessene Achtung verletzen.’] 
678 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 303 
679 ibid 300 [‘In welcoming the Other I welcome the On High to which my freedom is subordinated. 
But this subordination is not an absence: it is brought about in all the personal work of my moral 
initiative (without which the truth of judgment cannot be produced), in the attention to the Other as 
unicity and face (which the visibleness of the political leaves invisible), which can be produced in the 
work of truth, and not as an egoism refusing the system which offends it.’] 
680 ibid 
681 ibid 214 
682 ibid 
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abstract idea and a word. It cannot be detached from the welcoming 
of the face, of which it is a moment.683 
Are there traces of human dignity meaning in Totality and Infinity? The 
analogies between the notion of morality in the phenomenology of Levinas and the 
law of human dignity are plain to see. Insights into morality, in particular vis-à-vis 
freedom and equality, elucidate the meaning of practicing human dignity language in 
law.  
The accomplishing of the I qua I and morality constitute one sole 
and same process in being: morality comes to birth not in equality, 
but in the fact that infinite exigencies, that of serving the poor, the 
stranger, the widow, and the orphan, converge at one point of the 
universe. Thus through morality alone are I and the others produced 
in the universe. 684  
The concept of morality as in Totality and Infinity affords the introduced 
model an account of the transcendental, pre-ethics, in practicing the law of human 
dignity and a response to the question how that law appears empty. ‘The poor, the 
stranger, the widow, and the orphan’ signify – bearing in mind the historical social 
context of Levinas and Totality and Infinity – the vulnerable or less fortunate, those 
deprived of something, those lacking means, locus or protectors. The famous thesis 
‘metaphysics precedes ontology’, which translates also into ‘ethics precedes 
ontology’, grounds the meaning of fraternity and solidarity as aspects of human 
dignity meaning on solid footing. 
The human I is posited in fraternity: that all men are brothers is not 
added to man as a moral conquest, but constitutes his ipseity. 
Because my position as an I is effectuated already in fraternity the 
face can present itself to me as a face.685 
Another, more comprehensive approach to ‘the very status of the human’ 
draws connections between fraternity, the idea of the human race, individuality, 
biological resemblance, integrity in the sense of being self-referential, and 
responsibility, while hinting at infinity, that is, the meta-dimension of human dignity 
meaning. 
The very status of the human implies fraternity and the idea of the 
human race. Fraternity is radically opposed to the conception of a                                                         
683 ibid 
684 ibid 245 
685 ibid 280 
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humanity united by resemblance […]. Human fraternity has then 
two aspects: it involves individualities whose logical status is not 
reducible to the status of ultimate differences in a genus, for their 
singularity consists in each referring to itself. (An individual having 
a common genus with another individual would not be removed 
enough from it.) On the other hand, […] Monotheism signifies this 
human kinship, this idea of a human race that refers back to the 
approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of height, in 
responsibility for oneself and for the Other.686 
Apropos the juxtaposition of totality and infinity and the – indeed 
sophisticatedly refined – account of metaphysics in Levinas’ phenomenology, the 
meaning of human dignity as the respect accorded to every human being by virtue of 
being human is related to transcendence as transascendance and to the transcendent 
human being. Attuned to the inviolable position of the limit in light of linguistic-
analytical insights from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the transcendent being in 
the phenomenology of Levinas escapes any ontologically termed grasp, receives no 
content or form, no ‘what is’, but rather commands respect for the limit as such, to wit 
the human being qua being. 
Knowledge687 would be the suppression of the other by the grasp, 
by the hold, or by the vision that grasps before the grasp. In this 
work metaphysics has an entirely different meaning. If its 
movement leads to the transcendent as such, transcendence means 
not appropriation of what is, but its respect. 688 
The neutral and the impersonal imperil law’s humanism. The active and the 
personal emphasize the face of the human being. Tracing the active and personal in 
law as part of life, while appreciating the value of the neutral and impersonal for 
attaining justice through law, focuses on the meaning produced by actors as authors. 
The portrayal of how actors practice the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as an 
aspect of practicing human dignity language in law sets the stage for critical reflection 
and further theoretical and empirical approaches. Contentions regarding the misuse of 
the legal concept at the level of actors’ praxis should be premised on a systematic 
portrayal of human dignity practice. In his Introduction to Totality and Infinity, John 
Wild notes:  
                                                        
686 ibid 214 
687 See also MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 46 [‘[…] objectification – the practice of making 
people into things to make them knowable […].’] 
688 Levinas (n 678) 302 
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Slavery is the dominance of the neutral and impersonal over the 
active and personal. In a living dialogue and even in a written 
monologue of many volumes it is more important to find out who is 
speaking and why, than merely to know what is said. We do not 
need to know the other person (or thing) as he is in himself, and we 
shall never know him apart from acting with him. But unless we 
desire this, and go on trying, we shall never escape from the 
subjectivism of our systems and the objects they bring before us to 
categorize and manipulate. We do not get rid of our thoughts and 
feelings by ignoring them or by any other means. But we may seek 
to transcend them, first as individuals and only later, perhaps, as a 
group. The individual person becomes free and responsible not by 
fitting into a system but rather by fighting against it and by acting 
on his own.689 
Wild recapitulates spinal themes in the supra analysis. This excerpt underlines 
the importance of safeguarding the possibility of escape by interpreting, 
understanding and practicing concepts that can effectuate a crack in the totality of 
systems, ultimately preserving and advancing law’s humanism; reinforces the 
justification of employing the term ‘practice’; associates objectification with 
obstructing escape from systems that allow for grasping, classifying and manipulating 
what lies within their scope; orients legal actors and the legal order as a whole 
towards transcendence; and serves as a transition to important epistemological 
insights, synoptically, to the responsibility to engage in critical reflection on 
established systems implied by human dignity language.  
D. Concluding observations and an epistemological remark 
The ontological foundations of ‘something missing’ as a qualitative aspect of 
human beings qua beings places law’s Menschenbild and the meta-dimension of the 
law of human dignity in a new light. ‘Something missing’ is an ontological inherent 
quality of human being-ness, and trails the ‘human’ component of the legal concept 
on the basis of a linguistic and semantic overlapping. If human dignity is an ‘empty’ 
concept, then how is it empty? What is the role of the law of human dignity in an 
anthropocentric legal order? Human dignity guarantees an ultimum refugium for 
human beings’ human being-ness from forced and, a minore ad maius, from forceful                                                         
689 ibid 18 [Introduction by John Wild]; ibid 222 [‘War therefore is to be distinguished from the logical 
opposition of the one and the other by which both are defined within a totality open to a panoramic 
view, to which they would owe their very opposition. In war beings refuse to belong to a totality, 
refuse community, refuse law; no frontier stops one being by another, nor defines them. They affirm 
themselves as transcending the totality, each identifying itself not by its place in the whole, but by its 
self.’] 
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interference – for instance, humiliation – with the irruptive happening of coming into 
Being. This refugium within the realm of law’s practice, is at the same time, indeed 
paradoxically, a refugium from law, and from the legal concept of human dignity690. 
Law can transform perspective into being both formally and substantively691 or, more 
broadly put, law has power over meaning. Understanding the law of human dignity as 
a surplus term within the realm of law on account of the ‘human’ component of 
‘human dignity’ is required for the humane practice of law – even of the law of 
human dignity per se. How human dignity transcends the realm of law while 
remaining attached to its boundaries is inquired into in the linguistic-analytical and 
phenomenological accounts. 
The void of the limit reflected in the tautological proposition communicating 
the meaning of human dignity, as the worth of human beings by virtue of being 
human, is associated, in the linguistic-analytical account, with the transcendental 
dimension of the law of human digntiy. By analogy with the metaphysical subject 
each human being is located at an inviolable limit. The limit is a genuinely inviolable 
position; that each human being has a unique viewpoint on the world, thus produces 
meaning in self-determination at the elemental level of language. The limit constitutes 
at once the content and the form of the meaning of human dignity. Setting the human 
being at the limit precludes the very possibility of objectification, namely of 
subsumption under a totality, for present purposes under the totality of legal language 
games produced in judicial practice of the law of human dignity.  
The phenomenology of Levinas in Totality and Infinity spells out pre-ethics. 
Does he ‘say’ what can only be ‘shown’, therefore contravene the foundations of the 
linguistic-analytical account of the law of human dignity? Or does Levinas utter the 
preconditions of critical reflection as the process of humane practice of the law of 
human dignity, that is, of the discarding of the ladder used to ascend to understanding, 
to transcend? The second interpretation is adopted for present purposes. To those 
resisting indulging in the richness of phenomenological insights deduced from 
Totality and Infinity, consisting of reflections on the transcendental masterly attached 
to facets of lived experience, maintaining the ladder metaphor as part of the                                                         
690 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 14 [‘[…] es ist denkbar, dass nicht erst die Anwendung 
eines Gesetzes, sondern bereits das Gesetz selbst einen Verstoß gegen die Menschenwürde darstellt. 
Das angeführte Zitat darf auch nicht in der Weise verstanden werden, dass Menschenwürde nur in 
böser Absicht verletzt werden könne. Gerade die ‘gute Absicht’ ist gefährlich, wenn sie den Menschen 
als Person mit seiner metaphysischen Dimension aus dem Auge verliert.’] 
691 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
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introduced model allows for critically reflecting on the pre-ethics put forward 
borrowing concepts from the thought of Levinas. The pre-ethics of hospitality, 
generosity, goodness, and desire for the radically other as Other capture and embody 
prerequisites to the very possibility of pluralistic human community and 
communication.  
Fragment 123 of Heraclitus, ‘nature loves to hide itself’692, as interpreted by 
Rescher, affords valuable epistemological insights that assist us in perceiving how 
doctrinal concepts employed recurrently in the practice of the law of human dignity 
can be understood as tools of thought experimentation and critical reflection. Being a 
‘devoted practitioner of thought experimentation’693, Heraclitus employed ‘fact-
contravening hypotheses’694 in pursuit of ‘far-reaching conclusions’695 and resorted to 
‘projecting assumptions about what is not’696 to better understand ‘what is’697. This 
pattern of thought experimentation intimates the reasoning of negative determinations 
of human dignity meaning in legal doctrine, which, however, deviates from thought 
experimentation in that ‘what is not’ is not artificially constructed, but rather an image 
corresponding to – harsh, in most cases – reality. Thought experimentation is more 
apt to understanding anew the meaning introduced into legal language games 
produced through the lens of the law of human dignity through the practice of the 
language of the Objektformel doctrine. Objectification, save in borderline cases such 
as the Aviation Security Act, where the other is – in actuality – objectified by a self, is 
an artifact, a thought experiment serving to evoke, from a hermeneutic and literary 




                                                         
692 Rescher (2005) 60 
693 ibid 59; 60 [‘Though their [Presocratics] interest was in reality, their deliberations about it placed 
extensive reliance on the use of problematic hypotheses in thought experimentation. […] Someone 
might perhaps be tempted to think that the success which the Greek nature-philosophers had with 
thought experimentation exerted a dampening influence on their development in real experimentation. 
But this would be both unjust and inappropriate. […] the development of thought experimentation is in 
fact an essential preliminary to the development of real experimentation as such.’] 






STORIES OF ‘SOMETHING MISSING’:  
THE LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE  
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF GERMANY 
 
 In Chapter Two, I employ the model set up in Chapter One for 
hermeneutically and literary portraying how the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as 
an aspect of the meaning of the law of human dignity is practiced. The model is used 
as a lens through which to look at the text of five Federal Constitutional Court cases, 
undeniably bracketed seminal instances of human dignity jurisprudence in German 
and Anglo-American legal scholarship.698 As background to these five stories of 
‘something missing’, a brief overview of relevant practice of human dignity language 
in law ‘on the books’ post 1945 is deemed necessary. At the same time, looking at 
positive law manifestations through the constructed lens aims at making readers 
conversant with the application of this hermeneutic and literary tool.  
A. Reflections on the law of human dignity ‘on the books’ post 1945 
 
Human dignity language appears in most all documents composing the 
International Bill of Human Rights699, while in EU law, the legal character of the                                                         
698 The length of the analysis and the, at times, unavoidable repetition of excerpts of the text of the five 
cases are incidental to the enterprise of a hermeneutic and literary approach to text as an aspect of law’s 
practice.  
699 The International Bill of Human Rights comprises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) [Preamble, Art. 1, 22, 23]; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,  
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [Preamble, Art. 13 sec. 1]; 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) [Preamble, Art. 10 sec. 1] 
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,  
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; the Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR (1966) G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 23, 1976; and the Second Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR (1990) G.A. res. 44/128, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 
(1989), entered into force July 11, 1991 [declaring the abolition of death penalty]. Human dignity 
language is explicitly present in all documents but the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Other 
international human rights instruments within which human dignity language is found are the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) 660 
U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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concept is boldly affirmed in the text of the 2000 European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU Charter)700, which formed part of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(Reform Treaty) in 2009. Numerous constitutions practice the law of human dignity. 
A hermeneutic and literary approach, while acknowledging the distinct significance of 
mobilization in legally binding vis-à-vis non-binding texts, is not anchored to 
mainstream determinations of ‘legal’ character701; rather, this approach looks at 
positive law to provide background to the succeeding analysis of judicial practice, to 
denote comparative relevance, and opportunistically tease out and highlight themes 
identified supra in Chapter One. Ultimately – and in that it deviates from the 
mainstream – the present, hermeneutic and literary, methodological approach seeks to 
elucidate the cultural and/as literary dimension of law. 702 While mainstream, 
positivist approaches might seek to verify or falsify the subsumption of language and 
meaning under axiomatically defined ‘normativity’ and ‘legal’ character, this 
approach interprets texts to induce another understanding of the presence of human 
dignity language within, or even despite, the ‘legal’ shell.  
Albeit different, both the mainstream and the present viewpoint contribute to 
delivering upon the commitment expressed in the legal guarantee of human dignity 
and to fostering law’s humanism. Mainstream, positivist accounts point out the lack 
of legally binding provisions and enforceability where these would be beneficial to 
the fulfillment of fundamental rights703. The hermeneutic and literary lens on selected                                                                                                                                                               
Discrimination against Women (1979) G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. 
Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (1984) G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 
197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987; the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1989) G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 
entered into force Sept. 2, 1990; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force July 1, 2003; and the 
International Convention on th Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(2008) G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 
(2006), entered into force May 3, 2008 
700 [2000] O.J. C 364/1 [ECFR] 
701 As shown supra (Chapter One, ontological account) there is a sense beyond enforceability in which 
legal actors always practice ‘something missing’ in employing human dignity language. This analysis 
concentrates on themes (identified supra in Chapter One) that reflect aspects of human dignity practice 
irrespective of the concept’s actual normative status and legal effects. This clarification does not 
amount to a polemic stance towards mainstream and positivist interpretations of international law 
human dignity clauses. In fact, this study only adopts a different angle and operates at another, pre-
legal and pre-ethical, level, tracing in texts as aspects of the practice of law the meta-dimension of 
human dignity.  
702 Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 17 
703 See, for instance, how Kelsen’s positivist account of rights reflects the pursuit of law’s humanism. 
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 41-42 [‘Besides, the view that all human beings are endowed 
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instances of the law of human dignity ‘on the books’ at the international, regional and 
constitutional level can sensitize about and provoke reflection on whether the practice 
of that law is humane. To those ends, I draw on sources among the abundance of 
overviews of human dignity in positive law in German and Anglo-American legal 
scholarship. Primarily, I seek to assert the value of the methodological approach; 
secondarily, references to positive law manifestations of human dignity language 
serve as background to the analysis of FCC jurisprudence infra. 
Human dignity language is practiced in positive law across levels of 
constitutionalism704: at the international, regional, and constitutional level705. The 
human dignity panegyric has endured remarkably in positive law since 1945.706 
Indeed, ‘it is an interesting fact that it was only after the Second World War that the 
philosophical concept of human dignity, which had already existed in antiquity and 
acquired its current canonical expression in Kant, found its way into texts of 
international law and recent national constitutions.’707  
While bearing in mind the explicitly stated and widely affirmed interpretation 
of post-1945 practice of human dignity language in positive law as an expression of 
                                                                                                                                                              
with reason and conscience is, in view of the differences which exist with respect to the degree in 
which human beings are endowed with reason and conscience, meaningless. The statement that all 
human beings are born free and equal, is a specific natural-law doctrine, and this doctrine is far from 
being generally accepted. […] from the point of view of a bill of rights, it is not the question how 
human beings are born, but the question how human beings shall be treated by the law, regardless of 
how they actually are born, and regardless of the great differences which actually exist between them. 
It is not very fortunate that the Declaration of Human Rights starts with a problematic statement and 
thus places the whole document under the sway of highly disputed doctrine.’] 
704 See Pernice (2004) 
705 See Vicki C. Jackson, ‘Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational 
Constitutional Discourse’ (2004) 65 Montana Law Review 15 [practice of human dignity language in 
constitutional law at the state level in the US] 
706 Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity’ (2010) Metaphilosophy 464, 465 f. [‘Why does talk of 
“human rights” feature so much earlier in the law than talk of “human dignity”? Certainly the founding 
documents of United Nations, which drew an explicit connection between human rights and human 
dignity, were clearly a response to the mass crimes committed under the Nazi regime and to the 
massacres of the Second World War. […] Is it only against the historical background of the Holocaust 
that the idea of human rights becomes, as it were, retrospectively morally charged – and possibly 
overcharged – with the concept of human dignity? The recent career of the concept of ‘human dignity’ 
in constitutional and international legal discussions tends to support this idea. […] there is a striking 
temporal dislocation between the history of human rights dating back to the seventeenth century and 
the relatively recent currency of the concept of human dignity in codifications of national and 
international law, and in the administration of justice, over the past half century.’] 
707 ibid 465 [‘Only during the past few decades has it also played a central role in international 
jurisdiction. By contrast, the notion of human dignity featured as a legal concept neither in the classical 
human rights declarations of the eighteenth century nor in the codifications of the nineteenth century 
[…].’] 
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global reaction to the atrocities of World War II708, another reason why the post 
United Nations Charter (UN Charter) era is emphasized is its role in the gradual 
coming-into-being of a multilevel constitutionalism reality. Although exploring and 
comprehensively demonstrating the subtleties of the interplay between levels of 
constitutionalism with respect to the subject matter exceeds the scope of my research 
questions, it is important to take cognizance of this reality of underpinning 
interconnectedness and plant a seed in the consciousness of the reader: to have an eye 
for similarities and differences re the practice of human dignity language and the 
meaning it conveys. 
Manifestations of human dignity ‘on the books’ of interest to a hermeneutic 
and literary enterprise need not necessarily surface as the most attractive examples for 
mainstream doctrinal accounts. For instance, from a mainstream perspective, 
preambular references could be swept aside on the basis of their aspirational, political, 
symbolic709, or merely rhetorical character; they could, however, be highly relevant to 
a hermeneutic and literary approach to the law of human dignity. Likewise, although 
declarations, principles, guidelines, standard rules and recommendations have no 
binding legal effect710 unless recognized as customary international law as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), such international human rights 
instruments offer valuable practical guidance to States Parties as to the rights that 
yield respect and protection and often develop significant political, moral and 
rhetorical force.                                                          
708 An alternative basis is proposed by Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A human dignitas?’ (2011) 32, 56 [‘[…] 
current legal conceptualizations and usages of the principle are seen erroneously as derivations of post-
World War II dignity; rather, they descend from the old dignitas, essentially status-based more than 
humanist. Such a distinction is crucial: the human dignity principle is not all about human rights.’]; See 
also Panagiotis Kondylis, ‘Art. “Würde” – Abs. II-VIII’ in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart 
Kosselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Bd. 7, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlagsgemeinschaft, 
1992) 645, 657 [French Declaration (1789), ‘dignités’] 
709 See Herald Kindermann, ‘Symbolische Gesetzgebung’ (1988) 13 Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtstheorie 222 [distinction between instrumental and symbolic lawmaking]; Thomas Raiser, 
Grundlagen der Rechtssoziologie: Das lebende Recht (5th edn, Stuttgart: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) 243ff. 
[symbolic impact and validity]; There is law that develops only a symbolic impact. One could consider 
symbolic law ineffective on the grounds that it does not state the expectation or the regulation of 
certain conduct, or impose sanctions; See also Erhard Blankenburg, ‘Rechtssoziologie und 
Rechtswirksamkeitsforschung – Warum es so schwierig ist die Wirksamkeit von Gesetzen zu 
erforschen’ in Konstanze Plett & Klaus A. Ziegert, Empirische Rechtsforschung zwischen Wissenschaft 
und Politik: zur Problemlage rechtssoziologischer Auftragsforschung (Max-Planck-Institut für 
Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht, Tübingen: Mohr, 1984) 45; See also Jens Newig, 
Symbolische Umweltgesetzgebung: Rechtssoziologische Untersuchungen am Beispiel des 
Ozongesetzes, des Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetzes sowie der 
Großfeuerungsanlagenverordnung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003) [impact of symbols on the 
practice of the law]  
710 Covenants, conventions, protocols and statutes on the other hand are legally binding. 
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The expansion of human dignity and human rights through symbolic and 
rhetorical mobilization can be portrayed as a diffusion-spiral, a process of dispersing, 
spreading and diffusing law and essentially also the language of law.711 The diffusion-
spiral is set in motion through implementation, adaptation and consciousness-
raising712, pursued by means of argumentation, dialogue and persuasion, that is, 
rhetorical processes.713 The introduction of human dignity and rights language into 
law ‘on the books’ marks their internalization as part of the legal order and their 
institutionalization. 714 A boomerang effect of this spiral process cannot be foreclosed; 
critique, resistance, or opposition to the new language and law can cause such 
initiatives to return to ‘the thrower’. The rhetorical mobilization of law is 
indispensable to political action and to the traversal of limits separating the realms of 
social reality715 and law; still it does not amount to actual enforcement. The symbolic 
and rhetorical impact asserted by voices in the literature calls for empirical 
verification. 716 
The absence of human dignity language in the European Convention on 
Human Rights of the Council of Europe717 may be understood simply as lack of 
explicit reference, as the Preamble to the Convention expressly embraces the UDHR, 
underlining the importance of a ‘common understanding and observance of the human 
rights […]’. Omissions of human dignity language in positive law, as in the case of 
the ECHR or the Canadian constitutional text, are also of interest insofar as the 
narratives about them in legal scholarship convey portrayals of the self, the other and 
the world corresponding to the context that generated them.718 Commenting more                                                         
711 See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds), 
The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 1 [diffusion]; Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 223 
712 Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works – A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 33 [reciprocity, retaliation, reputation as parameters of 
compliance]; Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 102, 117ff. [reputation]; Baer (n 711)  
713 Baer ibid 
714 ibid 
715 ibid 222 
716 ibid 223 
717 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Eur.T.S. 5 [ECHR] 
718 See Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417, 445 ff. [‘If my […] suggestion 
is correct and constitutions address that which is endangered and do not necessarily make explicit those 
matters on which there is a consensus ‘behind the curtain,’ then there is a plausible explanation for this; 
again, text is not all there is to constitutional law, and a triangle may be lurking in the shadows. In 
Canada, respect for human beings was so foundational to constitutional law that an explicit formula 
seemed redundant.’] 
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generally on omissions in the UDHR, MacKinnon notes they ‘are not merely 
semantic.’719 This observation indicates the complexity of the phenomenon of 
omissions: they are not merely linguistic, but also semantic; they are not merely 
semantic, but also real, in the sense that they correspond to ‘something missing’ at the 
level of social reality.  
Being a woman is ‘not yet a name for a way of being human,’ not 
even in this most visionary of human rights documents. If we 
measure the reality of women’s situation in all its variety against the 
guarantees of the Universal Declaration, not only do women not 
have the rights it guarantees – most of the world’s men don’t either 
– but it is hard to see, in its vision of humanity, a woman’s face.  
Women need full human status in social reality. For this, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights must see the ways women 
distinctively are deprived of human rights as a deprivation of 
humanity. […] 
When will women be human? When?720 
The word ‘human’ cuts through the argument: ‘being human’, ‘humanity’, 
‘human status’, and ‘human rights’. This excerpt, besides demonstrating another facet 
of the phenomenon of omissions in law, affirms, first, that ‘human’ designates the 
broadest possible ‘surplus name’721; second, states that the text of the UDHR under 
scrutiny in MacKinnon’s critique mirrors a vision of humanity; third, notes that the 
face, ‘a woman’s face’, is the locus where humanity is concretized; fourth, demands 
that the human status of this ‘face’ be recognized in law and in ‘social reality’; and, 
finally, states that the UDHR ‘must see’, that is, encounter face-to-face women and 
how they are deprived of humanity.  
In EU law, the legal character of the concept is boldly affirmed in the text of 
the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) (2000), which 
formed part of the Lisbon treaty (2009). Art. 1, on ‘human dignity’, under Chapter I, 
titled ‘Dignity’, reads: 
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.                                                          
719 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 42 
720 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 43; ibid 48 [‘By including what violates women under 
civil and human rights law, the meaning of ‘citizen’ and ‘human’ begins to have a woman’s face. As 
women’s actual conditions are recognized as inhuman, those conditions are being changed by requiring 
that they meet a standard of citizenship and humanity that previously did not apply because they were 
women. In other words, women both change the standard as we come under it and change the reality it 
governs by having it applied to us.’] 
721 As noted in the introductory delineation, animals are not attended to in the presently furthered 
argument.  
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Chapter One encompasses, apart from ‘human dignity’, a series of other guarantees 
framed as rights, namely the ‘right to life’ (Art. 2), the ‘right to the integrity of the 
person’ (Art. 3)722, or as prohibitions, the ‘prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ (Art. 4), and the ‘prohibition of slavery and 
forced labour’ (Art. 5). Solely the coexistence of human dignity language with other 
rights within this legal language game and the systemic constellation of the law of 
human dignity apropos other fundamental guarantees indicate how language such as 
‘life’, ‘integrity’, ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ are indispensable 
to the production of human dignity meaning.   
 At the regional level, human dignity language is practiced in instruments such 
as the American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica’ (1969) 
or the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986), where it is 
mentioned in the same breath as ‘freedom, equality, justice’ in the Preamble, and is 
understood considerably as the dignity for which the peoples of Africa are striving. 
Perceiving each such instance of practice as a legal language game conveys the 
richness of diverse particulars of meaning once the universal concept confronts the 
world of lived experience in each of these regions.  
At the constitutional level, inviolability [Unantastbarkeit] is a famous topos in 
the order of the Basic Law [Grundgesetz] of the Federal Republic of Germany that 
presents interpretive complexity as regards its concretization723. Inviolability evokes 
the transcendental, understood presently apropos the notion of the limit and 
‘something always missing’. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG reads:  
(1) Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu 
schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.  
(2) Das Deutsche Volk bekennt sich darum zu unverletzlichen und 
unveräußerlichen Menscehnerechten als Grundlage jeder 
menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens und der Gerechtigketi in 
der Welt.                                                         
722 See Catherine Dupré, ‘What does dignity mean in a legal context? The UK can learn from Europe 
by enshrining dignity as a fundamental part of – rather than adjunct to – our human rights’ (Guardian, 
24 March 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/mar/24/dignity-uk-
europe-human-rights> accessed 1 March 2014 [‘These provisions offer a wide-ranging and inclusive 
definition of human dignity. For instance, the protection of “physical and mental integrity” is certain to 
cover a much wider range of situations than the extreme – and fortunately less frequent – instances of 
inhuman and degrading treatment and torture under article 3 ECHR […]. Similarly, the obligation to 
protect dignity at work resulting from the combined articles 5 and 31 (“Every worker has the right to 
working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity”) extends much further than the 
extremely rare instances of forced labour or slavery and anti-harassment legislation.’] 
723 See Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde’ (1995) 857  
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(3) Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, 
vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes 
Recht. 
Translated: 
(1) Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty 
of all state authority. 
(2) The German People therefore acknowledge inviolable and 
inalienable human rights as the basis of every human community, of 
peace, and of justice in the world. 
(3) The following basic rights are binding on legislature, executive, 
and judiciary as directly valid law. 
Human dignity, the highest value of the legal order, is inviolable 
(unanatastbar). The state, that is, all three branches of state power, as Art. 1 sec. 3 
GG provides724, and all state and private actors must not only respect human dignity, 
but also protect it under Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG.725 Art. 1 sec. 2 GG declares the 
commitment of the German people to fundamental rights.726 The word ‘darum’ in Art. 
1 sec. 2 GG effectively bridges the constitutional guarantee with the 
acknowledgement of the fundamental rights of all and, consequently, alludes to the 
universal minimum and justifies – perhaps even encourages – recourse to 
international and comparative law.727 The commitment exceeds state borders: if Art. 1 
sec. 1 sent. 2 GG suggests the responsibility to oppose any reality or regime that 
infringes on fundamental rights, not having delivered upon728 human rights in the 
world effectuates the broadening of the scope of responsibility.   
During the travaux préparatoires procedures for the Basic Law, the framers 
deliberated intensely on the legal framework of the protection of human dignity.729 
Expressing opposition to National Socialist ideology730 and determined to reverse the 
                                                        
724 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 7; Denninger (1998) JZ 1129, 1129 [international human 
rights instruments post-UDHR and the guarantee under Art. 1 GG in German constitutional 
jurisprudence] 
725 Kunig, ibid para 1  
726 ibid 
727 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 3 
728 Baer, ‘Triangle’ 417 at 425, fn 11; Kunig (n 724) para 7 [‘Dieser ist nicht nu rein Versprechen an 
die Völkergemeinschaft für die Rechtsentwicklung im Innern, zu dem zur Zeit der Verfassungsgebung 
aller Anlass bestand, sondern von brennender Aktualität, solange die Menschenrechte noch nicht global 
verwirklicht sind; […].’] 
729 See Kunig (n 724) para 6 
730 Cf. Whitman, ‘On Nazi “Honor” and the New European “Dignity”’ 243, 243 [threads of continuity 
connect the fascist era with the era of dignity]; ibid [‘The many, various and disturbing instances in 
which we discover Nazi origins of modern practices of “human dignity” have something in common: 
they are, for the most part, cases in which Nazi law aimed to vindicate claims of “honour”, of Ehre. 
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national-socialist dogma of granting priority to the people, the Volk, over the 
individual, they incorporated into the constitutional text the negation of totalitarian 
conceptions of the state, which result in the devaluation of the individual human 
being. Devaluation need not be the manifest goal of totalitarian regimes; it suffices to 
ascertain that it constitutes an integral aspect of experiences prompted by them.731 
Examples of other famous instances of constitutional practice of the law of 
human dignity, as the discourse in German and Anglo-American legal scholarship 
conveys, are the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)732, the 
Constitution of India (1950), in the text of which human dignity language appears 
under the Directive Principles of State Policy, the Basic Law of Israel (1992), in 
which human dignity and liberty are spelled out at the very first Article, stating that 
their protection is the purpose of that law, or the Constitution of Hungary (2011)733, 
which has been a point of controversy in Hungary and beyond, and could offer 
insights in the reflection of the transition from communism on the meaning of the law 
of human dignity. Though absent from the United States Constitution, human dignity 
is practiced as language in constitutional court jurisprudence and is considered by 
some American scholars a value underlying constitutional rights.734 
B. Stories of ‘something missing’: practicing the law of human dignity in the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
 
Human dignity is undoubtedly the norm most closely entwined with the life of 
citizens in a constitutional democratic state735. Consequently, it is practiced in a wide                                                                                                                                                               
[…] modern ‘dignity’, as we see it in continental legal cultures, is in fact often best understood, from 
the sociological point of view, as a generalisation of old norms of social honour.’] 
731 Kunig (n 724) 
732 Approved by the Constitutional Court in 1996 and took effect in1997. 
733 See Catherine Dupré, Importing the Law in Post-Communist Transitions – The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003); See 
also Frankenberg, ‘Constitution-Building In Times Of Transition’ (2001) 103 [Identifies three areas of 
challenges to constitutional theory: the relationship between transnational regimes and government 
institutions and how transnational norms can be ‘constitutionalized’, the existence of transnational 
regimes sui generis, such as the EU, and the expansion of the EU.] 
734 Michael M. Meyer, The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values (William A. 
Parent ed, 1st edn, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 
735Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity’ (2010) Metaphilosophy 464, 469 [‘’Human dignity’ 
performs the function of a seismograph that registers what is constitutive for a democratic legal order, 
namely, just those rights that the citizens of a political community must grant themselves if they are to 
be able to respect one another as members of a voluntary association of free and equal persons. […] 
The idea of human dignity is the conceptual hinge that connects the morality of equal respect for 
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range of contexts.736 A serious shortcoming of the high degree of adaptability to 
diverse contexts is the danger of inflation of human dignity argumentation737. Thus, 
critical reflection is deemed necessary to avoid rendering the legal concept ‘kleine 
Münze’738 [small change]. The advantages of the presence of human dignity outweigh, 
I argue, however this and other conceivable shortcomings of practicing an 
indeterminate and highly adaptable to meanings legal concept; most significantly the 
practice of human dignity in law reiterates the recognition of the subject-status of 
citizens by the state, an event of ontological and phenomenological significance. 
Provided processes of critical reflection are actuated in mobilizing the law of human 
dignity, practicing this language can guarantee the humanism of law. A hermeneutic 
and literary approach is most apt to setting up and demonstrating this interpretation of 
the legal concept.  
The self-determined human being is the bearer of the dignity belonging to 
human beings qua beings. The FCC sees in the human being the individual within the 
community. The law of human dignity is practiced cumulatively with other legal 
values, such as the right to life, the general right to personality [allgemeine 
Persönlichkeitsrecht] and the principle of the social state. The five cases analyzed in 
the pages that follow are seminal instances of practice of the law of human dignity in 
FCC jurisprudence, as can be additionally deduced from German legal doctrine and 
Anglo-American legal scholarship. The ontological, linguistic-analytical and 
phenomenological analyses are preceded each time by an outline of the decision, 
significant doctrinal context, and the presentation of some key points in the respective 
areas of discussion, enhanced with comparative insights from positive or case law 
manifestations where deemed of elucidatory value.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
everyne with positive law and democratic lawmaking in such a way that their interplay could give rise 
to a political order founded upon human rights.’]; 470 [‘Because the moral promise of equal respect for 
everybody is supposed to be cashed out in legal currency, human rights exhibit a Janus face turned 
simultaneously to morality and to law […]. […] They are designed to be spelled out in concrete terms 
through democratic legislation […].’] 
736 Kunig (n 724) para 8 
737 Giese, Das Würde-Konzept (1975) 14ff.; Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 15ff. fn 16  
738 Günter Dürig, ‘Der Grundrechtssatz der Menschenwürde – Entwurf eines praktikablen Wertsystems 
der Grundrechte aus Art. 1 Abs. I in Verbindung mit Art. 19 Abs. II des Grundgesetzes’ (1956) 81 AöR 
117, 203 [‘eiserne Ration’] 
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I. The Abortion I Case (1975)739 
 
In the Abortion I Case in 1975, a landmark FCC judgment that 
chronologically succeeded the 1973 United States Supreme Court Roe v. Wade740 
decision, the German constitutional judge pronounced the constitutionality of the 
criminalization of abortion, save, exceptionally, in indicated cases. 
 
1. Decision (and dissenting opinion) 
In the Abortion I Case the First Senate of the FCC judged the constitutionality 
of § 218a StGB after the 1974 reform of abortion law [Fifth Statute to Reform the 
Penal Law], which provided that abortions performed by a licensed physician with 
the consent of the pregnant woman within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy would 
not be punishable. The Abortion I Case should be read in context, namely in the 
historical, political and social context of abortion cases and public debate on this topic 
in the 1960s (United States) and the 1970s (Germany).   
Reform advocates planned to reconfigure the effective punitive law, 
which allowed for abortion only in cases of strict medical 
indication, when the pregnancy endangered the life of the mother 
(United States) or the life and physical health of the mother 
(Germany). The debate polarized both societies like almost no other 
topic of domestic policy because the issue of abortion touched upon 
sensitive questions regarding the beginning of human life, self-
emancipation, and attitudes towards gender roles, family values, and 
religious beliefs. Radical women’s rights groups advocated a broad 
liberalization, arguing that all penal restrictions should fall, while 
the Catholic Church backed the existing laws. Between these two 
extremes, some supported the decriminalization in cases of ethical, 
eugenic, and social indication, while others favored an abortion law 
that allowed abortion, at least for a certain time period. In the 
United States, the first pro-choice and pro-life groups were born.741 
The federal government, ‘the newly elected center-left coalition of the Social-
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Liberal Party (FDP)’742, supported the ‘new, 
liberalized’ Act. Pregnant women were legally required to consult a physician or a                                                         
739 BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975), First Senate of the FCC 
740 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
741 Felix Lange, ‘American Liberalism and Germany’s Rejection of the National Socialist Past – The 
1973 Roe v. Wade Decision and the 1975 German Abortion I Case in Historical Perspective’ (2011) 
12(11) German Law Journal 2033, 2036 
742ibid; ibid 2036-37 [‘After an extensive debate, the coalition adopted a reform law in 1973 – against 
the vote of the center-conservative opposition of the Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union 
(CDU/CSU) – that decriminalized abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.’] 
 152
counseling agency prior to deciding whether they would undergo abortion. With the 
exception of abortions for medical, eugenic, or ethical reasons, for instance in case of 
rape or incest, criminal penalties would still apply for abortions performed after the 
twelfth week of pregnancy.743 
Two thematic threads run parallel in the Court’s legal syllogism: the 
penalization of abortion and the human dignity v. human dignity conflict. The FCC 
found the contested provision inconsistent with Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG in conjunction 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG ‘to the extent that it excepts interruption of pregnancy from 
punishability if no reasons are present which […] have standing under the ordering of 
values [Wertordnung] of the Basic Law.’744. In linguistic-analytical terms, the Court 
identified the incompatibility of the statutory provision with the law of human dignity 
and the ordering of values in the constitution. Law and ethics can be portrayed as 
lenses before the eye of the judge. The specifics of this portrayal are explored infra.  
The FCC found that the statute conflicted the constitutional duty to protect 
prenatal life. The decision was grounded on the fundamental right to life under Art. 2 
sec. 2 GG in light of the state duty to respect and protect human dignity. The 
criminalization of abortion was held constitutional, although it was clearly expressed 
that prevention is preferable to punishment by means of penal measures. In 
accordance with the Basic Law, abortion is prohibited, save in cases demanding the 
interruption of pregnancy for reasons such as averting a danger to the life or to serious 
impairment of the health of the pregnant woman. Such and other indicated 
extraordinary burdens were excluded from penalization. In cases of social need, 
counseling and moral and practical assistance should be resorted to with the objective 
to encourage the pregnant woman to continue the pregnancy. 
The petitions of one hundred and ninety three (193) members of the 
Bundestag and five (5) state governments, namely Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein initiated the abstract judicial 
review proceeding before the FCC. The majority of petitioners were Christian 
Democrats. The question was whether the so-called regulation of terms of the Fifth 
Statute to Reform the Penal Law is consistent with the Basic Law. The petitioners 
claimed that the Act violated a range of Basic Law provisions, in particular the human                                                         
743 See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(2nd edn, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997) 336 
744 BVerfGE 39, 1 (68) 
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dignity and right to life clauses. The FCC concluded that the protection of unborn life 
takes precedence as a matter of principle over the right of the pregnant woman to self-
determination, rejecting the term solution alternative. The old law was reinstated, and, 
consequently, criminal penalties were imposed for abortions at any stage of 
pregnancy, with the exceptions indicated in the statute.745  
The FCC called attention to the historical evolution of the legal treatment of 
abortion, noting the diachronically intense discussion on the matter in the public 
sphere and observing its multidimensionality on account of its proximity to the most 
fundamental questions of human existence. A remarkable range of arguments flesh 
out the syllogism that leads to the Court’s decision. Examples of the range of 
concepts, issues, methodologies and sources of knowledge and experience drawn 
upon are the treatment of unborn life by the National Socialist Regime746; the 
biological-physiological beginning of the historical existence of human life, stressing 
the development of the fetus as a continuing process without clearly demarcated 
phases, and rendering the protection of the ‘completed’ human being an arbitrary, 
unavailing requirement; the legislative history of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG; 
consciousness as the basis of self-determination, limited though by the rights of 
others, the constitutional order and the moral law; continuity and potentiality as 
qualities of the human being; the disputed issue of whether the unborn is a bearer of 
the fundamental right ensuing from Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG as 
addressed in jurisprudence and scientific literature; the ‘objective value order’ 
[objektive Wertordnung] underlying the objective legal content of fundamental legal 
norms; and the social dimension of the interruption of pregnancy, which necessitates 
treating it as a concern exceeding the private sphere, despite the intimate character of 
the natural union between the pregnant woman and the child en ventre sa mere, thus 
requiring state regulation, investigation of and comparative perspectives on the 
tendency towards liberalization and modernization of measures against abortion in 
other democracies of the Western World. The Court deemed the latter, however, less 
critical a factor than the legal standards of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
In the Abortion I Case, the majority of the Court characterized abortion ‘an act 
of killing’. Law, the Court maintained, has to manifestly and clearly label the 
interruption of pregnancy an unjust act. The legislature can distinguish between                                                         
745 See Kommers (1997) 336 
746 Hufen (2004) 313, 313 
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unborn and born life in determining the required and expedient protective penal 
measures. The disproportionate sacrifice of the pregnant woman in favor of unborn 
life should be presumed not only in cases of danger for her life or health, but also in 
cases of general emergency, particularly social conflict. The didactic stance towards 
the pregnant woman and society as a whole is evident in the majority opinion, 
particularly in the argumentation on the sociological implications of penal norms for 
the guarantee of respect for the value of life: the pregnant woman should be reminded 
of her fundamental duty to respect the right to life of the unborn, and, moreover, a 
decision to undergo abortion, when neither material distress, nor emotional conflict 
are experienced, is ‘arbitrary’. The passionate discourse on abortion, observed the 
Court, could be a sign that unborn life is no longer fully respected in a considerable 
segment of the population. Legal consequences are instructive and formative, in the 
Court’s view, of how society understands ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Purely theoretical 
announcements do not suffice for expressing the legal order’s socio-ethical 
disapproval of abortion. In line with this position, the FCC engaged in a pragmatic 
assessment of the social phenomenon of abortion, for instance of the various motives 
leading pregnant women to interrupt pregnancy and of the actual effectiveness of state 
regulation.  
The dissenting opinion of Justice Rupp-von Brünneck747 and Justice Simon748 
raised predominantly constitutional review and separation of powers considerations as                                                         
747 Donald P. Kommers, ‘Wiltraut Rupp-von Brünneck’ in Rebecca Mae Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek 
(eds), Women in Law: A Bio-Bibliographical Sourcebook (Greenwood 1996) 277, 277-79  [‘Justice 
Wiltraut Rupp-von Brünneck was an associate justice of West Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court 
from 1963 to 1977. She was the only woman among the Court’s 16 members during her 14 years on 
the German Federal Republic’s highest court of constitutional review. Elected to fill the seat on the 
First Senate vacated by Justice Erna Scheffler, the only other woman to have been appointed to the 
Court in the first 26 years of its existence, she distinguished herself as an independent-minded judge of 
enormous talent and sensitivity. [She] […] was also a controversial judge and the author of some of the 
Court’s most notable dissenting opinions during her tenure of office. […] Her commitment to the 
defense of women’s interests appeared early. At Berlin and Heidelberg, she helped organize a group of 
women law students dedicated to defending women academicians and lawyers against the National 
Socialist effort to keep them out of the professions. […] Wiltraut von Brünneck was present at the 
creation of the West German Federal Republic. As Georg-August Zinn’s personal assistant in his 
capacity as chairman of the Parliamentary Council’s Constitutional Court Committee and member of 
its Committee on Basic Rights, she was among the ‘insiders’ behind the scenes who had the rare 
privilege of witnessing and contributing to the Council’s work as the Basic Law was being debated and 
drafted. […] She was an active member of the Evangelical Church in Hesse and Nassau, and a member 
of the executive committee of Germany’s Federation of Women Lawyers […]. She was also active in 
the German-French Women Lawyer’s [sic] Association. […] Von Brünneck was the SPD’s unanimous 
choice to fill the open seat on the First Senate.’] 
748 Justice Helmut Simon served as constitutional judge from 1970 to 1987 and was the President of the 
German Evangelical Church Assembly (1977-1989) and the Zentralstelle für Recht und Schutz der 
Kriegsdienstverweigerer aus Gewissengründen (1993-2000). 
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regards the majority opinion. The authority to annul decisions of the legislator should 
be exercised with restraint in order to avoid imbalance between state powers within 
the constitutional state. Referring to judicial self-restraint749 as the ‘elixir of life’ 
[‘Lebenselexier’]750 of FCC jurisprudence, the dissenters maintained that such a 
decision falls within the scope of legislative responsibility and that a duty of the state 
to punish abortion in every stage of pregnancy could not be derived from the 
constitution. The legislator is entrusted with decisions re the regulation of terms or 
indications solutions and the provision for counseling and moral or practical 
assistance to the pregnant woman.  
The dissenting Justices furthermore reacted to the imposition of penal 
measures, in other words the strongest conceivable encroachment into the freedom of 
the citizen, while noting the oxymoron of protecting fundamental rights by employing 
norms that, in fact, infringe on those. Moreover, they revisited the implications of the 
relationship between the pregnant woman and the child en ventre sa mere and the 
analogy between abortion and the killing of independently existing life. Finally, they 
pragmatically evaluated a range of dangers associated with illegal interruptions of 
pregnancy. In a nutshell, the dissenting Justices maintained that the Basic Law did not 
prevent the legislature from dispensing with penal measures in dealing with abortion. 
The dissenters opted for socially adequate means, which they considered more 
compatible with the spirit of the constitution.  
In the 1993 Abortion II Case751 the Second Senate of the FCC maintained the 
essential core of Abortion I, while tailoring protection to the circumstances and needs 
of post-unification Germany.752 The main point of divergence between the Abortion II 
Case and the Abortion I Case was that non-indicated abortions performed during the 
first trimester, while unjustified and illegal, remained unpunished. Kunig appreciates 
that the shift of the Court’s position in the Abortion II Case led to the fortification of 
the protection of developing life, without resolving the controversy in favor of either 
one of the legal-political competing models.753  
 
                                                         
749 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
750 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69)  
751 BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993), Second Senate of the FCC 
752 See Kommers (1997) 349; Denninger (1998) JZ 1129, 1129f.  
753 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 14 
 156
2. Discussion 
The Court’s decision demonstrates the conflict between two legal values: the 
life developing itself in the womb of the mother and the self-determination of the 
pregnant woman. The duty to protect unborn life deduced from Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 
GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG, in the Court’s view, should be understood both 
negatively and positively. The state should not only refrain from infringements on 
life, but also foster and protect it against illegal attacks by others, even against the 
mother. Measures directed towards guaranteeing the actual protection of unborn life 
should prove commensurate to the importance of the legal value enjeu. In extreme 
cases of non-compliance the legislator can resort to the threat of punishment, although 
criminal law measures were clearly understood by the FCC as the ultimate means to 
dealing with abortion.   
The law of human dignity and violations of human dignity are not identical to 
the right to life and violations of human life.754 The subjective scope, that is, the 
bearers, and the objective scope, namely the protected interests, of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 
GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG are not indistinguishable.755 Not all human dignity violations 
cause or aim at the death of human beings affected and, conversely, not all instances 
of depriving another human being of life amount to an affront on human dignity under 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.756 According to some voices in German legal scholarship, the 
guarantee of human dignity and the protection of life should be decoupled.757 
Disengaging the two legal norms does not mean that depriving a human being of his 
or her life cannot be at the same time a violation of human dignity; the purpose of 
dissociation is, rather, to disallow an automatic deduction of the occurrence of a 
human dignity violation from the event of a violation of human life.758                                                          
754 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 67; Kunig, ibid para 14 
755 Dreier, ibid  
756 ibid 
757 This is the dominant opinion in the discourse: Dreier, ibid para 67; Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene 
Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 125; Dreier, ‘Menschenwürdegarantie und Schwangerschaftsabbruch’ 
(1995) DÖV 1036, 1037; Udo Fink, ‘Der Schutz des menschlichen Lebens im Grundgesetz – zugleich 
ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis des Lebensrechts zur Menschenwürdegarantie‘ (2000) Jura 210, 211; ibid 
216; Michael Anderheiden, ‘“Leben” im Grundgesetz’ (2001) 84 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 353, 354; ibid 380; Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, ‘Systematische 
Bedingungen der Garantie unbedingten Schutzes der Menschenwürde in Art. 1 GG – unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Probleme am Anfang des Lebens’ (2001) DÖV 925, 926ff; ibid fn 13; Opposite 
opinion: Michael Kloepfer, ‘Leben und Würde des Menschen’ in Peter Badura & Horst Dreier (eds), 
FS 50 Jahre BVerfGE (Bd. 2, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2001) 77, 78ff. [pairs up human dignity 
and life] 
758 Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde’ (1995) 857, 859 [circumstances under which 
the deduction of a violation of human dignity from the infringement on life is valid] 
 157
Strack understands frequent efforts to decouple the protection of human 
dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG from the protection of life under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 
GG and to ‘award’ [zusprechen]759 the fertilized egg only the protection of life to be 
led by an intention to bypass the unlimited guarantee of human dignity in order to 
ground a statute that permits interventions in life in Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 3 GG. Even 
then, notes Starck, the legislature would recognize, in applying the constitutional 
protection of life, that the fertilized egg is human life. Interference with the life of a 
human being is only justified when the life of another human being is threatened and 
the danger can only be averted by means of depriving the former of life. The fertilized 
egg, observes Strack, does not threaten anyone, save in the case of the medical 
indication, in which the life of the mother is in danger.760 
Ambiguity and controversy about the meaning of human being-ness and 
human dignity becomes all the more manifest and persistent in abortion 
jurisprudence761. Who is the human being? The human being is the being begotten by 
a human being762. What does human dignity mean? Responding to these questions 
within the realm of law presents distinct complexity for a number of reasons. The 
wide discretion as to the kind of statutory means763 materializing the duty to protect 
that ensues from the law of human dignity can lead to indeterminacy.764 Starck claims 
that, due to the high status of the legal interest of protecting unborn life, 
administrative law measures are insufficient; rather, criminal law provisions are 
required.765 Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG, not Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, dictates ‘[w]hether and 
under which standards’ abortion should be punished766, argues Kunig, despite the 
recognition of the status of the bearer of fundamental rights to unborn life under the 
latter provision. Benda demonstrates how the debate on abortion triggers                                                         
759 Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 119 [‘[…] was die Menschen einander 
zusprechen, sich als Rechtsgenossen versprechen.’] 
760 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 20 
761 Ernst Benda, ‘Verständigungsversuche über die Würde des Menschen’ (2001) NJW 2147, 2147f.; 
ibid 2150 
762 Kunig (n 753) para 12 
763 Whether the protection of human dignity under the auspices of civil law instead of criminal law 
would prove sufficient and appropriate a regulation is extensively discussed in constitutional doctrine. 
Kunig, ibid para 32; Starck (n 760) para 42 [Ehrenschutz] 
764 See Kunig ibid 
765 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47); BVerfGE 88, 203 (258); See also on the nexus between constitutional and 
criminal law measures, BVerfGE 6, 389 (433 f.) (1957) [homosexuals]; BVerfGE 57, 250 (270) (1981) 
[V-Mann]; BVerfGE 73, 206 (253) (1986) [Sitzblockaden I]; Starck (n 760) para 94 
766 Kunig (n 753) para 32; See also Starck (n 760) para 42 [protection of human life as the existential 
foundation of human dignity and the necessity of criminal law means for the protection of human life]; 
ibid para 94 [fundamental rights considerations (human dignity, human life) in the abortion discourse] 
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constitutional review and is problematized as a separation of powers discussion, and 
concludes that decision-making in this area of discourse falls under the responsibility 
of the parliament.767 Art. 1 sec. 1 GG guarantees the human dignity ‘des Menschen’, 
namely of the human being, rather than the dignity of human life.  
What can be inferred from the course of human dignity in the history of ideas 
and its constitutional genesis is that it concerns born persons768. Human beings are not 
to be treated as animals or ‘non-human’ beings. The protection of unborn life is not 
contemplated on in the philosophical background of human dignity.769 Equally, 
resorting to theoretical grounds does not promise the determination of the subjective 
protective scope of the norm. Looking at the protection of unborn life through the lens 
of different theoretical accounts of human dignity permits an appreciation of possible 
theoretical responses to the question of who the bearer of human dignity is. 770  
The Leistungstheorie calls for the assessment of human performance, of which 
an embryo is not capable by nature [naturgemäß].771 The Kommunikationstheorie 
anchors the idea of human dignity to inter-human solidarity and concrete community 
of – mutual – recognition. As a result, everyone, regardless of his or her actual 
capabilities, is a bearer of human dignity, except the embryo before implantation.772 
Arguably, grounding an understanding of human dignity entirely on communicative 
interaction and on the embedding of human beings in a community united in 
solidarity and founded on mutual respect773 ‘must stand at a distance from a claim to 
human dignity on the part of the embryo’774. Nevertheless, alternative courses of 
determination such as considering the moment of birth the decisive point in the 
development of human life, drawing demarcating lines between stages of 
development accordingly, and protecting the unborn child differently from the 
newborn are also marked by ambiguity, as noted by the dissenters in the Abortion I 
Case.  
The human dignity of the embryo at the early stages of pregnancy could 
alternatively be understood in light of ‘a broadly understood Mitgifttheorie [dowry                                                         
767 Benda (2001) NJW 2147, 2150 
768 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 82 
769 ibid 
770 ibid para 84 
771 ibid 
772 ibid para 84; Erhard Denninger, ‘Embryo und Grundgesetz. Schutz des Lebens und der 
Menschenwürde vor Nidation und Geburt’ (2003) 86 KritV 191, 206f. 
773 See Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104 
774 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 66f. 
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theory]’775: the embryo is invested with the capabilities that belong uniquely to the 
species of human beings [Menschen als Gattungswesen].776 In accordance with 
Mitgifttheorien, the idealistic variant offered in the thought of Kant, who centers on 
the concept of the person, has to be rejected as inappropriate, because drawing an 
analogy between this perception of the human being and unborn life would probably, 
Dreier notes777, bring about misunderstanding.778 Turning to the imago-Dei-
conception and its interpretations in Catholic or Protestant doctrine requires careful 
contextualization in light of the historical background of the dogmas.779 Such 
inferences should remain attuned to the secular and ideologically neutral state of the 
Basic Law, within which religious beliefs cannot dominate the interpretation of the 
prominent norm of the guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.780 
The crucial question in the context of abortion concerns the standards for 
interpreting and applying the duty of the state to protect developing life.781 Factors 
influencing the standards of protection of the human dignity of prenatal life have been 
identified in FCC jurisprudence782. The majority of the Court in the Abortion I Case 
established the human dignity of the embryo on the potentiality of capabilities 
associated with human existence [menschlichen Sein].783 The process of formulation 
of the identity of an individual human being, the continuity of maturation, the 
distinction between artificially induced and natural development in view of the 
advance of biotechnological methods, for instance in vitro fertilization or the creation 
of an embryo through cloning, and the balancing of the original development 
perspective with consideration of parental will to permit it as in the case of 
supernumerary embryos [‘überzähliger’ Embryonen]784 are illustrative examples of 
considerations associated with the protection of prenatal life in scholarly discourse.  
                                                        
775 Herdegen, ibid para 32 
776 ibid para 62 [‘Totipotenz ist nicht schlicht mit Würdehaftigkeit gleichzusetzen.’] 
777 Dreier (n 768) 
778 Dreier ibid; See also Kurt Seelmann, ‘Menschenwürde und die zweite und dritte Formel des 
Kategorischen Imperativs. Kantischer Befund und aktuelle Funktion’ in Gerd Brudermüller & Kurt 
Seelmann (eds), Menschenwürde – Begründung, Konturen, Geschichte (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2008) 67  
779 Dreier ibid 
780 ibid 
781 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 14 
782 Herdegen (n 774) para 64 [‘[…] aber noch nicht hinreichende Komponenten des pränatalen 
Würdeschutzes […]’] 
783 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41); Herdegen, ibid para 63 
784 ibid para 64 
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The majority opinion in the Abortion I Case sets the beginning of life and, 
consequently, the recognition of human dignity785 and the protection of fundamental 
rights on the 14th day after conception786; before that day multiple pregnancy is still 
possible. Life before the 14th day is human in kind, but not individualized human life, 
not an Individuum but rather a Dividuum, or indeed human life but not a human being. 
Fundamental rights and the guarantee of human dignity are, however, individual- 
related [individualbezogen].787  ‘Of the human being’ [des Menschen] in Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG and ‘everyone’ [jeder] in Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG denote the individual rather 
than human life in general. 788 Dreier explains that if we understand those rights as a 
type of bridge-construction that supports and affirms proactively – or, ‘better’, 
retroactively – the effects [gestützte Vorwirkung] of the guarantee of human dignity at 
the stage before birth, then the effectiveness of this guarantee cannot extend further 
than the point of implantation, namely the stage of individuation of unborn life.789 
Implantation790 has been upheld as the critical point for ascertaining the ‘genetic 
identity and along with it the uniqueness [Einmaligkeit] and distinctiveness 
[Unverwechselbarkeit] of an already established and no longer divisible life’791 that 
develops as – rather than into – a human being. The FCC has, however, not 
recognized the status of a legal subject to the unborn human being to present.792 What 
is more, the protection of human dignity before birth has not been contoured thus far 
in FCC jurisprudence. In line with FCC jurisprudence and the dominant opinion in the 
                                                        
785 See Wolfram Höfling, ‘Wer definiert des Menschen Leben und Würde?’ (2007) FS Isensee 525, 
530f.  
786 Majority opinion, BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) [‘Leben im Sinne der geschichtlichen Existenz eines 
menschlichen Individuums besteht nach gesicherter biologisch-physiologischer Erkenntnis jedenfalls 
vom 14. Tage nach der Empfängnis (Nidation, Individuation) an […].’]; Dissenting opinion, BVerfGE 
39, 1 (80) [‘Die biologische Kontinuität der Gesamtentwicklung bis zur Geburt […] - deren Beginn bei 
konsequenter Anwendung der Mehrheitsauffassung nicht erst bei der Einnistung, sondern bei der 
Empfängnis anzusetzen wäre - ändert nichts daran, daß den verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen des 
Embryos eine Veränderung in der Einstellung der Schwangeren im Sinne einer wachsenden 
mütterlichen Bindung entspricht.’] 
787 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 83 
788 ibid para 66 
789 ibid 
790 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41); BVerfGE 88, 203 (251 ff.) [with cautious notice regarding the period before 
implantation]; For the doctrinal discourse, see Herdegen (n 774) para 65 fn 5; ibid para 111 [measures 
preventing the implantation foreclose the chances of the beginning and development of life] 
791 BVerfGE 88, 203 (251 f.) 
792 The Abortion I Case left the question whether the embryo is a legal subject, namely a subject of 
fundamental rights, open. Establishing the legal status of the embryo was also resisted to in the 
Abortion II Case. Herdegen (n 774) para 63 [‘Es ist schwer verständlich, dass sich das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht […] bislang nicht zur ausdrücklichen Anerkennung der Rechtssubjektivität 
des Ungeborenen durchzuringen vermochte.’] 
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literature the unborn [nasciturus] is a bearer of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG.793  
The FCC declared in the Abortion I Case, ‘where human life exists, human 
dignity is present to it’794, and the Abortion II Case fundamentally affirmed this 
proposition, yet in an even darker [dunkler]795, as Dreier puts it, statement: ‘This 
dignity of being human lies also for unborn life in its existence for its own sake.’796 
This view has been deemed ambiguous on the grounds that it is insufficiently 
justified; the position puts forward a categorical formulation lacking normatively 
evaluative reasoning [normativ wertenden Begründung] and, instead, rests on 
biological-naturalistic fallacies797. As Dreier notes, the understanding of human life 
that originates in biology or the natural sciences does not automatically bring about 
the status of the bearer of human dignity798; his point is of obvious pertinence to the 
ontological, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological accounts of human dignity 
presently construed. If such propositions carry prescriptive meaning, then the 
tautology implied in the phrasing ‘for its own sake’, ambiguous and dark as it may be, 
can be understood as the linguistic substantiation of the guarantee of human dignity. 
Resting solely on biological and scientific facts could be perceived as a stance 
of abstention from drawing distinctions between evaluative viewpoints in human 
dignity theories. The charge of fallacy cannot be challenged on the grounds that there 
are other temporal demarcation lines that can be drawn without resorting to 
biological-scientific facts. The decisive factor is, rather, the realization that solely the 
reference to such facts cannot be the substantive content of the status of the bearer of 
human dignity within the realm of law; normative reasons and justifications are also 
called for. These are required even if we resist regarding vague references to 
potentiality as the critical feature of human being-ness and, consequently, of human 
dignity in law.799                                                         
793 For positions in the discourse, see Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 66 
794 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41) [‘Wo menschliches Leben existiert, kommt ihm Menschenwürde zu […].’]; 
This proposition, however, does not necessarily facilitate the determination of the protection of human 
dignity of prenatal life. Herdegen (n 774) para 66f.; 
795 Dreier (n 793) 
796 BVerfGE 88, 203 (252) [‘Diese Würde des Menschseins liegt auch für das ungeborene Leben im 
Dasein um seiner selbst willen.’] 
797 Dreier (n 793); Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 114 [Hofmann’s thesis 
departs from an understanding of human dignity as a ‘Seinsgegebenheit’, a quality or characteristic of 
the individual] 
798 Dreier ibid 
799 Dreier ibid 
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As far as the human dignity of prenatal life is concerned, uncertainty about the 
subjective scope of protection calls for the amplification of justificatory standards for 
ascertaining human dignity violations in particular forms of treatment.800 FCC 
jurisprudence established the non-penalization of abortion in the Abortion II Case801, 
presuming necessarily that the protection of human dignity is contingent on the stages 
of development of life. Interestingly, the language of ‘Unentdecktheit’ [the state of 
not being discovered or being concealed] appears in the Abortion II Case legal 
language game to portray the relation between the pregnant woman and the child.802 
The duty to respect the dignity of the human being relates typically 
to the subject of interhuman relations. In a stage of human 
development, in which it is difficult to render such relations 
concretely tangible [konkret schwer erlebbar sind], the assumption 
of human dignity violations demands great cautiousness.803 
The balanced overall appreciation [der bilanzierenden Gesamtbetrachtung] of 
stages of development804 is another proposed method of ascertainment of the 
constitutional protection of unborn life. The standards of respect deduced therefrom 
are not subject to further balancing, just as in the case of life after birth.805 The 
concrete standard for the guaranteed protection of the embryo in FCC jurisprudence is 
in fact not derived from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG but rather from Art. 2 sec. 2 GG (Abortion II 
Case806). The normative basis for the protection of unborn life from abortion by the 
state is derived apodictically [apodiktisch] from Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG; the due 
standard of protection is however determined, again apodictically [ebenfalls                                                         
800 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 70 
801 BVerfGE 83, 203 (251) 
802 BVerfGE 83, 203 (266) [‘Sie allein und nur von ihr selbst ins Vertrauen Gezogene wissen in diesem 
Stadium der Schwangerschaft um das neue Leben, das noch ganz der Mutter zugehört und von ihr in 
allem abhängig ist. Diese Unentdecktheit, Hilflosigkeit und Abhängigkeit des auf einzigartige Weise 
mit der Mutter verbundenen Ungeborenen lassen die Einschätzung berechtigt erscheinen, daß der Staat 
eine bessere Chance zu seinem Schutz hat, wenn er mit der Mutter zusammenwirkt’]; See also 
Herdegen (n 800) para 69; ibid para 60 fn 5; Ralf Müller-Terpitz, Der Schutz des pränatalen Lebens – 
Eine verfassungs-, völker- und gemeinschaftsrechtliche Statusbetrachtung an der Schwelle zum 
biomedizinischen Zeitalter (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007) 349ff. [critical]; Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, 
‘Systematische Bedingungen der Garantie unbedingten Schutzes der Menschenwürde in Art. 1 GG – 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Probleme am Anfang des Lebens’ (2001) DÖV 925 at 930 
[resisting the tailoring of protection to the stages of development of unborn life leaves us helpless 
before the question of determination of the beginning of human dignity in human life] 
803Herdegen (n 800); See also Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104 [relational, 
communication-based understanding of human dignity] 
804 Matthias Herdegen, ‘Der Würdeanspruch des Embryo in vitro – zur bilanzierenden 
Gesamtbetrachtung bei Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG’ in Söllner, Gitter, Waltermann, Giesen & Ricken (eds), 
Gedächtnissschrift für Meinhard Heinze (2005) 357, 363f. 
805 Herdegen (n 800) para 60 
806 BVerfGE 83, 203 (251) 
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apodiktisch], by Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG.807 It is argued that such jurisprudential 
deductions sacrifice the consistency of fundamental rights doctrine ‘at the altar of 
outcome-oriented malleability [Geschmeidigkeit]’808, probably in pursuit of consensus 
within the FCC809. 
According to certain voices in German legal scholarship, it still remains 
unclear why abortion should be framed from a constitutional law perspective as a 
human dignity violation,810 since identifying the infringement on this area of 
protection with a violation of human dignity811 is of limited heuristic value. On the 
other hand, interference with life as the vital basis of human dignity812 does not as 
such suffice as a justification for human dignity violations, since, as noted previously, 
not every act causing final death [Tötung] need infringe on human dignity. Be that as 
it may, it is claimed that, as far as physical existence is concerned, the protection of 
human dignity is tantamount to the protection of life as advanced in the Abortion I 
Case and the Abortion II Case813, since human life is the vital basis of human 
dignity814 and as such a value of the highest rank [Höchstwert]815. With respect to the 
embryo, the protection of human dignity is exhausted in protecting life.816  
In the Abortion I Case the FCC held that the existence of unborn life has 
priority over the free development of the personality of the mother817, for whom the 
child could be, in the worst case, only a burden.818 Precisely because what is at issue 
is the guarantee of human dignity, the fundamental rights of the mother do not go so 
far as to permit the interruption of pregnancy during the first months in general.819 
Since abortion always leads to the termination of unborn life, an actual balance 
between two colliding rights does not come into question.820 The permission of 
                                                        
807 Herdegen (n 800) para 112; ibid para 112 fn 3; Rolf Stürner, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und 
das frühe menschliche Leben – Schadensdogmatik als Ausformung humaner Rechtskultur?’ (1998) JZ 
317, 319 
808 Herdegen (n 800) para 112; Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 70  
809 Herdegen, ibid para 112 
810 ibid 
811 ibid para 73 
812 Life (also past [auch vergangenes]) is conditio sine qua non, but not conditio per quam of Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG. Dreier (n 808) para 67 
813 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41); BVerfGE 88, 203 (252) 
814 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 17; ibid para 92 
815 ibid para 92 
816 ibid para 17 
817 See BVerfGE 88, 203 (267)  




abortion during the first three months and the protection thereafter does not amount to 
a balancing from the perspective of individual unborn life for which constitutional 
protection is valid.821 Attention is thus focused on the – soundly – assumed viewpoint 
of the unborn. 
The Abortion I Case constitutes an example of the possibility of restrictions on 
human dignity in favor of life as its vital basis.822 To the extent that human dignity is 
violated, the proper standard for respect and protection is Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, also in 
view of the third-party effect of the inviolability of human dignity guaranteed 
thereby823 and of Art. 1 sec. 2 GG [Drittwirkung]824. The direct third-party 
[unmittelbare, unmediated] effect of Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 1 GG825 can be deduced from 
the remark that the framers of the constitution did not bracket Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 1 and 
sent. 2 GG under one and the same proposition, for instance: ‘All state authority 
respects and protects human dignity’.826 Safeguarding human dignity from 
interference by others827, in other words protecting it against all possible attackers828, 
is delivered upon on the part of the state first through the legal order and the 
enforcement of the law, but also, preventively, through enlightenment and 
information, the guarantee of education [des Schulwesens] and ultimately through 
state action in its entirety.829  
Respect for the human dignity of the individual can be in conflict with the 
duty to protect under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. Should the state be kept from dissuading the 
individual from conduct that interferes with the guarantee of human dignity 
[würdelosem] or from prohibiting actions threatening human dignity? Can the state 
protect the individual from his or her own conduct? Priority is regularly granted to the 
claim to autonomy rooted in the demand to respect human dignity830. The basis of                                                         
821 BVerfGE 88, 203 (255 f.); Starck, ibid 
822 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42); Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 73 fn 4 
823 Herdegen, ibid para 112 
824 Herdegen, ibid para 74; See BVerfGE 24, 119 (144) [‘Eine Verfassung, welche die Würde des 
Menschen in den Mittelpunkt ihres Wertsystems stellt, kann bei der Ordnung zwischenmenschlicher 
Beziehungen grundsätzlich niemandem Rechte an der Person eines anderen einräumen, die nicht 
zugleich pflichtgebunden sind und die Menschenwürde des anderen respektieren’.]; Kunig, Art. 1, GG 
Kommentar (2012) para 27; Klaus Stern, ‘Menschenwürde als Wurzel der Menschen- und 
Grundrechte’ (1983) FS Scupin 627, 635f.  
825 The direct third-party effect also applies to Art. 9 sec. 3 sent. 1 GG. 
826 Kunig (n 824) 
827 BVerfGE 1, 97 (104) (1951) [Hinterbliebenenrente] [‘Wenn Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG sagt: ‘Die Würde des 
Menschen ist unantastbar’, so will er sie nur negativ gegen Angriffe abschirmen.’]; Kunig ibid para 31 
828 Dürig, Art. 1 Abs. 1, Grundgesetz: Kommentar (1958) para 3 
829 Kunig (n 824) 
830 ibid  para 34 
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authorization of state intervention in such cases could be the protection of public 
safety, that is, the interest of third parties.831  
According to some voices in legal literature, the refusal of pregnancy alone 
does not amount to a violation of human dignity.832 Rather, an affront to the human 
dignity of the embryo is found, for instance, when an interruption of pregnancy is 
motivated by a selection on grounds of gender or criteria of ‘positive’ eugenic, or in 
order to use the aborted fetus for research purposes.833 Medical liability for 
interruptions of pregnancy in the case of physical or mental disability of the unborn 
child, framed as the problem of the ‘child as damage’ [Kind als Schaden]834, merits 
separate attention. This issue was a point of disagreement among the Senates of the 
FCC. The conferring of a claim against the doctor to undertake the maintenance of the 
child is perceived in the relevant criticism as an improper commercialization of 
human existence [Daseins].835 The Second Senate of the FCC opposed in an obiter 
dictum the legal qualification of the existence of a child as source of damage836, 
considering this perception of human life a violation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.837 Those in 
favor of the opinion of the First Senate clarified that the legal sense of the damage 
contention refers solely to the maintenance expenses related to the birth of a child, not 
to the existence of a human being; thus, it violates neither the child’s claim to respect, 
nor the undertaking of responsibility by the parents.838 A claim to compensation for 
damages on the part of the child that endures an undesired, ‘wrongful life’, against the 
doctor who treated the pregnant mother839, as in many cases of serious disability, has 
                                                        
831 ibid para 27 
832 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 112; Cf. Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, 
GG Kommentar (2010) para 94 
833 Herdegen, ibid  
834 Herdegen, ibid 119; Stürner (1998) 317 [on the controversy in FCC jurisprudence re the ‘Kind als 
Schaden’ and comparative insights]; ibid 330 [‘Die Einordnung planwirdiger und vor allem behinderter 
Geburt ins Schadensersatzrecht ist gesellschaftspolitisch das falsche Signal […].’] The ‘false signal’ 
brings to mind the association of the legal condemnation of abortion with the cultivation of individual 
and collective legal consciousness. Stürner links the ‘false signal’ to the responsibility of the FCC in 
concretizing constitutional provisions to further a legal culture in line with humanism; Hufen (2004) 
313, 313f.; Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 160 
835 Dreier, ibid; Stürner (n 834) 324 ff.; ibid 325 [emphasis on the future impact of the claim against the 
doctor to undertake the maintenance of the self-consciousness and self-understanding of the child] 
836 BVerfGE 96, 409 (411 ff.) (1997) [Plenarvorlagen] [Contrary to the opinion of the First Senate on 
the issue, the Second Senate used as legal basis the duty of the state to respect ‘all human beings in 
their existence for their own sake’ [jeden Menschen in seinem Dasein um seiner selbst willen zu 
achten; BVerfGE 88, 203 (296)] in deciding the case before it.] 
837 Dreier (n 834); See BVerfGE 88, 203 (296); BVerfGE 96, 409 (409, 413) 
838 Dreier, ibid para 160 fn 548 
839 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 123 
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been declined840  in German jurisprudence. Solidarity and fraternity extend, beyond 
the relation to fellow human beings, to the responsibility towards future generations. 
Strack argues that the guarantee of human dignity requires consideration of future 
generations, ‘because human beings live in generational communities due to their 
reproductive ability.’841 
Turning our sights to language games produced at a political level, under 
paragraph 8.25 under the section ‘Women’s health and safe motherhood’ of the 
Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) in Cairo it is stressed that ‘in no case should abortion be 
promoted as a method of family planning.’ At the same time governments and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are ‘urged to strengthen their 
commitment to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion’ 
and ‘reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved family-planning 
services.’ 842 
Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always be given the 
highest priority and every attempt should be made to eliminate the 
need for abortion.  Women who have unwanted pregnancies should 
have ready access to reliable information and compassionate 
counselling.  Any measures or changes related to abortion within 
the health system can only be determined at the national or local 
level according to the national legislative process.  In circumstances 
where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe. 
In all cases, women should have access to quality services for the 
management of complications arising from abortion.  Post-abortion 
counselling, education and family-planning services should be 
offered promptly, which will also help to avoid repeated 
abortions.843 
Considering the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States 
following Roe v. Wade (1973)844 which held that government may not prohibit 
abortions prior to viability and that the regulation of abortions had to meet strict 
scrutiny, the Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey (1992)845 repudiated the trimester framework but upheld the central holding of 
Roe v. Wade as regards viability. The state has a substantial interest throughout the                                                         
840 Dreier (n 834); ibid para 161; Stürner (1998) 317, 318 
841 Starck (n 839) para 11 
842 A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1  
843 ibid  
844 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
845 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
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pregnancy. What is at stake is the right of the pregnant woman to make the ultimate 
decision, not the right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Before viability the 
state cannot ban abortion, since that would mean granting priority to the fetus over the 
woman; still, the state can express its interest in potential life so long as no substantial 
obstacle is imposed on the freedom of the woman to exercise her right.  
After the point in time when viability is established, the state can ban abortion 
altogether but has to make an exception where necessary to protect the life and health 
of the mother. What kind of right is being protected? Drawing the line at viability 
suggests that it is the right of the mother not to have her body conscripted to bring the 
child into the world that should be addressed, and that the decisions of the mother 
about her life, more broadly understood, are protected. Since Casey, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on abortion has concentrated on restrictions on partial birth abortion846 
and exceptions for the protection of the health of the mother847. 
Under Art. 54 sec. 1, the Hungarian Constitution provides that ‘everyone has 
the inherent right to life and to human dignity’ and ‘no one shall be arbitrarily denied 
of these rights.’ The Hungarian Constitutional Court affirmed the centrality of 
individuality, identified potentiality as a quality of human life and associated the right 
to self-determination of the mother with human dignity and privacy.848 The language 
employed in the decision brings to mind the themes encountered in the Abortion I 
Case. The Hungarian constitutional judge indeed explicitly resorted to FCC 
jurisprudence, the Abortion II Case, and drew on the thereby established individual 
right to life of the fetus.849                                                         
846 See Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914 (2000) [The Court declared a state law that prohibited the 
‘dilation and extraction’ ‘partial birth abortion’ procedure, defined as an abortion procedure in which 
the person performing the abortion partially delivers into the vagina a living unborn child before killing 
the unborn child and completing the delivery (as opposed to ‘dilation and evacuation’ procedure where 
fetus is killed and dismembered inside womb and then extracted), unconstitutional.] 
847 See Gonzales v. Carhart 505 U.S. 124 (2007)  
848 Decision 48/1998 (XI. 23.) AB [‘Individuality is the key word even if, for the sake of 
circumspection, one were to talk of ‘potential human life’. As regards abortion, one should not deny 
the existence of an individual and wilful act actually performed – impersonalisation may only be taken 
to the extreme in the legal qualification of abortion [by the legislature’s not acknowledging the 
personal status of the foetus […]]. This is why the mother's right to self-determination may be 
weighted against foetal life; however, during such an assessment, one must constantly keep in mind the 
weight of the values constitutionally protected by the State’s objective yet not absolute duty to protect 
life.’] 
849 Grounding his dissent on the constitutional provision of human dignity in Decision 48/1998 (XI. 
23.) AB, Judge Tamás Lábady essentially dealt with the range of issues raised in the Abortion I Case. 
[‘I am convinced that the legislature has no constitutional empowerment to qualify, in legal terms, 
foetal life differently from human life, as the foetus – regardless of being inside the mother’s body or in 




Looking through the newly carved lens, I identify themes found in the three 
philosophically grounded accounts of the law of human dignity in the text of the 
Abortion I Case and show how this reading advances another understanding of the 
meaning of practicing the law of human dignity in a well-know and much-discussed 
FCC case.  
a. Ontological  
The ontological account of the law of human dignity permits the contouring of 
life and law as distinct realms and of the variations of the human image evidenced in 
the text of the Abortion I Case. 
i. Inconsistency between life and law 
The relationship of the child en ventre sa mere [das Verhältnis der 
Leibesfrucht zur Mutter] in life and in law surfaces in the text of the Abortion I Case. 
In law, the life developing itself in the womb of the mother is an independent legal 
value under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG850. 
Notwithstanding the natural union between the unborn child and the mother, the 
unborn child is perceived as ontologically autonomous in legal life, that is, not merely 
as ‘a part of the maternal organism’851. The pregnant woman is of course too the 
                                                                                                                                                              
a subject of law, a person with legal capacity, and consequently, the foetus has a right to life against the 
mother as well. According to Art. 54 sec. 1 of the Constitution in the Republic of Hungary every 
human being has the inherent right to life and to human dignity of which no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived. In thex interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the right to life and human dignity is an 
absolute subjective right, i.e. it cannot be restricted and reduced, since it is a fundamental right, which 
must be left intact by the law. Since in a biological sense, the foetus is a human, i.e. a genetically fully 
developed individual human being, and since the term ‘inherent right to life’ means – even in the 
terminology of international treaties (“droit inhérent à la vie”, “angeborenes Recht auf Leben”) – a 
right not gained through birth, but one “formed” together with the man, i.e. a right that originates in the 
existence, the humanity of the man, the lack of human dignity and having no right to life cannot be 
justified by the Constitution in case of a foetus not yet born. Therefore, in my opinion, the foetus as a 
new human life is a person, who is inviolable by the law and whose absolute right to life cannot be 
constitutionally restricted by the legislature with reference to the pregnant woman’s right to self-
determination or any other fundamental right. The foetus’ right to life may only collide with the 
mother’s right to life.’] 
850 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
851 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
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bearer of the fundamental right to life and bodily integrity under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 
GG.852  
The ontological portrayal of the child en ventre sa mere in life is inconsistent 
with the ontological appreciation of the relationship in law. Law as a lens forms – and 
transforms – the representation of natural and social phenomena in texts as planes of 
practice. The FCC admitted the inconsistency between the relationship of the child en 
ventre sa mere with the mother and the ontology of that relation from the vantage 
point of the fundamental right to life and the law of human dignity. It also noticed the 
disparity between the ontological uniqueness of the relationship on the one hand, and 
the recognition of the intrinsic legal value of the child on the other. Practicing the 
fundamental right to life and the law of human dignity in the Abortion I Case853 is 
premised on the legal fiction that unborn life exists separately from the mother. The – 
conceptual – separation in law contrasts with the firmness of the union in life. 
Even if the child is recognized as an intrinsic legal value, the child 
en ventre sa mere is united with the body and the life of the mother 
in the most intimate manner conceivable. Nature has already placed 
the protection in the direct care of the mother.854  
[…] Without doubt, the natural connection of unborn life with that 
of the mother establishes an especially unique relationship, for 
which there is no parallel in other circumstances of life. 855 
[…] developing life itself is entrusted by nature in the first place to 
the protection of the mother.856 
Pregnancy is a manifestation of human being-ness; despite the universality of 
the image of the state of being pregnant, the condition of pregnancy is uniquely 
experienced. This assertion points to the relevance of the tension between universals 
and particulars to all matters of close pertinence to human existence. Abortion is a 
strikingly multidimensional phenomenon of social life that ‘raises manifold problems 
of biological, especially human-genetic, anthropological, medical, psychological, 
social, social-political, and not least of ethical and moral-theological nature, which                                                         
852 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25); ibid (42) [‘Pregnancy belongs to the sphere of intimacy of the woman, the 
protection of which is constitutionally guaranteed through Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG.’] 
853 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) [‘The statutory regulation in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law which 
was decided upon after extraordinarily comprehensive preparatory work can be examined by the 
Constitutional Court only from the view-point of whether it is compatible with the Basic Law, which is 
the highest valid law in the Federal Republic. [...] what is involved here is the protection of human life, 
one of the central values of every legal order.’] 
854 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
855 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
856 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
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touch upon the fundamental questions of human existence.’857 The legislature, argued 
the Court, has to confront the multidimensionality of abortion and evaluate the 
plethora of arguments so as to, ultimately, reach a decision that reconciles law with 
life, in other words ‘to arrive at a decision as to the manner in which the legal order 
should respond to this social process.’858 
ii. The concrete imprint of unborn life on the Menschenbild: potentiality, 
continuity and the traversal of limits 
Human dignity is an integral aspect of human existence, regardless of whether 
one is conscious of it and autarkic in maintaining it. Potentiality is an inherent quality 
of human being-ness that trails the ‘human’ in ‘human dignity’. 
The potential faculties present in the human being from the 
beginning suffice to establish human dignity.859 
Human life represents, within the order of the Basic Law, an 
ultimate value, the particulars of which need not be established; it is 
the vital basis of human dignity and the prerequisite for all other 
fundamental rights. 860 
Human life constitutes the ‘vital basis’ of human dignity and enables the 
practice of all other fundamental rights. The Court resisted setting out the particulars 
of the value of human life; non-determination is attuned to the unspecified content 
and form of law’s Menschenbild. The textual hook in Art. 2 sec. 2 sec. 1, ‘Everyone 
has a right to life […]’, directed the Court to set the beginning of life ‘in the sense of 
historical existence of a human individual’861 on the 14th day after conception 
(nidation, individualization). The exercise of authority over meaning manifested in 
the definition of the beginning of life by the Court – based, granted, indeed on valid                                                         
857 BVerfGE 39, 1 (35f.); ibid (42f.) [‘Were the embryo to be considered only as a part of the maternal 
organism the interruption of pregnancy would remain in the area of the private structuring of one's life, 
where the legislature is forbidden to encroach [cited cases omitted]. Since, however, the one about to 
be born is an independent human being who stands under the protection of the constitution, there is a 
social dimension to the interruption of pregnancy which makes it amenable to and in need of regulation 
by the state. The right of the woman to the free development of her personality, which has as its 
content the freedom of behavior in a comprehensive sense and accordingly embraces the self 
responsibility of the woman to decide against parenthood and the responsibilities flowing from it, can 
also, it is true, likewise demand recognition and protection.’] 
858 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36); ibid (66) In line with Rancière’s observation that dissensus, through its 
impropriety, introduces new subjects and heterogenous objects into the field of perception, the Court 
noted, ‘The passionate discussion of the abortion fabric of problems [Abtreibungsproblematik] may 
provide occasion for the fear that in a segment of the population the value of unborn life is no longer 
fully recognized.’ It added, however, that this possibility gives the legislature no right to resignation.  
859 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41) 
860 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41) 
861 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
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sources of external justification – indicates how the ontology of human being-ness is 
proclaimed independently in legal life. Thus, stating the limits of human being-ness in 
legal texts asserts the integrity of legal life as a distinct sphere of events.  
The right to life is guaranteed to everyone who ‘lives’; no 
distinction can be made here between various stages of the life 
developing itself before birth, or between unborn and born life. 
‘Everyone’ in the sense of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG is ‘everyone 
living’; in other words: every life possessing human individuality; 
‘everyone’ also includes the yet unborn human being.862 
Coming-into-being evokes the notions of potentiality and continuity. 
Potentiality and continuity constitute key ontological qualities of the human being-
ness of developing life as portrayed in the text of the Abortion I Case; accordingly, 
this portrayal leaves its imprint on law’s Menschenbild. Potentiality and continuity 
assume ‘something missing’, namely a perpetual state of incompleteness on which the 
process of the unfolding of one’s essence in coming-into-being feeds. The traversal of 
limits as a figurative rendering of the happening of the irruption of Being is the modus 
operandi of that process. The practice of the law of human dignity in the Abortion I 
Case is a prime example reinforcing the insight that limits crossed are not clearly 
sketched and spaces of verification opened up in coming-into-being not sharply 
demarcated. For instance, in coming-into-being the human being crosses the limits 
that delineate the various stages of – physical, mental and psychical – development. 
Consciousness as the essential trait of human personality and, according to some 
voices in the literature, the prerequisite for establishing human dignity, appears ‘a 
rather long time after birth.’863 In light of those observations the Court argued,  
In opposition to the objection that ‘everyone’ commonly denotes, 
both in everyday language as well as in legal language, a 
‘completed’ person and that a clear grammatical interpretation                                                         
862 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37); Still, the Court effectively differentiated between unborn and born life, stating 
that ‘[t]he legislature is not obligated, as a matter of principle, to employ the same penal measures for 
the protection of the unborn life as it considers required and expedient for born life.’ The Court’s 
position is understood as an insinuation of the difference in ontological signification and significance 
between unborn and born life, though the FCC explicitly referred only to legal history, noting that ‘this 
was never the case in the application of penal sanctions […].’ BVerfGE 39, 1 (45f.) 
863 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37); ibid [‘The process of development which has begun at that point is a 
continuing process which exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a precise division of the 
various steps of development of the human life. The process does not end even with birth; the 
phenomena of consciousness, which are specific to the human personality, for example, appear for the 
first time a rather long time after birth. Therefore, the protection of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG cannot be 
limited either to the ‘completed’ human being after birth or to the child about to be born which is 
independently capable of living.’] 
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speaks therefore against the inclusion of the unborn life within the 
scope of effectiveness of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG, it should be 
emphasized that, in any case, the sense and purpose of this 
provision of the Basic Law require that the protection of life should 
also be extended to the life developing itself. The security of human 
existence against encroachments by the state would be incomplete if 
it did not also embrace the prior step of ‘completed life,’ unborn 
life.864 
Only by deeming unborn life to be encompassed in ‘everyone’ can the security 
of human existence against state encroachments be guaranteed. The FCC opposed a 
grammatical interpretation that denies unborn life ontologically conceived space 
within the scope of constitutional protection on grounds of its incompleteness. The 
fundamental right to life protects developing unborn life. Potentiality and continuity 
mirror the uninterrupted coming-into-being of human beings and, from an ontological 
perspective, it is plain to see that the forceful interruption of this movement would be 
inhumane.  What requires closer scrutiny is the syllogism that led the Court to hold 
unconstitutional the failure to guarantee unborn life the uninterrupted unfolding of its 
essence.  What calls for astute consideration is how the inhumane features in the text 
of the Abortion I Case and how it relates to the unconstitutional. The ontological 
account of human dignity permits another, hermeneutic and literary, reading of the 
Court’s argument.  
The practice of the law of human dignity and the fundamental right to life in 
the Abortion I Case is premised on the recognition of the potential residing in human 
existence to reveal its essence. The human being comes forth and gradually discloses 
its essence even during the pregnancy.865 The lines that mark the different stages 
traversed in coming-into-being are indistinct and indeterminate in life; the FCC 
argued for embracing this insight as a decisive factor in the production of the meaning 
of human being-ness in law and, consequently, of the practice of the law of human 
dignity. The obscurity of limits is an exceptional feature of life developing itself not 
only prior to but also after birth. For that reason, this encroachment on human 
existence by the state or third parties cannot be justified on the basis of strictly 
specified time frames; any attempt to determine precise time frames in law would be 
arbitrary. In response to the question raised supra re the relation between the 
                                                        
864 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
865 The trimester solution reflects the gradual evolution of the human being in the womb of the mother.  
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inhumane and the unconstitutional, a first association can be based on the nexus 
between the arbitrary and the inhumane.  
How does the arbitrary relate to the unconstitutional? While the ontological 
analysis only intimates their relation, themes in the phenomenological account of 
human dignity can help elucidate this connection. Arbitrariness implies that a single 
perspective or viewpoint, and the vision emanating therefrom, retains authority over 
meaning and totalizes meaning, leaving no room for critical reflection, namely for the 
process commanded by the constitutional guarantee of human dignity and premised 
on the infinity of language. A constitutional order founded of human dignity does not 
tolerate the arbitrary, because the experience of arbitrariness is tantamount to the 
experience of mysterious participation866 to an imposed causality.  
Coming-into-being while in the womb of the mother is not a self-determined 
movement. The FCC called attention to the widely disputed question ‘whether the one 
about to be born himself is a bearer of the fundamental right, or on account of a lesser 
capacity to possess legal and fundamental rights, is ‘only’ protected in his right to life 
by the objective norms of the constitution […]’867; while noting the importance of that 
question, the Court abstained from deciding on the issue. The question hints at a 
fundamental difference between the ontological signification and significance of 
unborn life in the Abortion I Case and the ontological rendering of all other 
manifestations of human being-ness exhibited in the ontological analyses. State 
interference in all other cases amounts to a forced polemos that causes the irruptive 
disclosure of human beings, hence the impairment of the self-determined unfolding. It 
is the forced and – a minore ad maius – forceful nature of interventions in their 
unfolding that leaves human beings ultimately outside their own essence.  
The forceful signifies the irruptive disclosure of Being that results in the 
revelation of the essence of human being-ness ex negativo, to wit precisely by 
displaying its negation, by portraying the inhumane, namely the distorted image of a 
human being outside its essence. The forced, as used here, connotes the externally 
determined happening of the irruption of Being868. The Court stressed that abortion is 
devastating in an all-exceptional way for unborn life; ontologically termed, it strikes 
human existence and irreversibly distorts the concealing-revealing process of φύσις.                                                         
866 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213 
867 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41) 
868 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 
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In the Court’s reasoning, the forceful is associated with abortion as an interruption of 
the unfolding of unborn life and the forced with state intervention in the sphere of 
self-determined decision-making of the mother.  
The duty of the state to protect every human life may therefore be 
directly deduced from Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG. In addition to that, 
the duty also results from the explicit provision of Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 
2 GG since developing life participates in the protection which Art. 
1 sec. 1 GG guarantees to human dignity.869 
The duty of the state is comprehensive; it ‘forbids not only self-evidently 
direct state attacks on the life developing itself but also requires the state to take a 
position protecting and promoting this life, that is to say, it must, above all, preserve it 
even against illegal attacks by others.’870 The statement declares law’s humanism, 
namely ‘caring’ and ‘meditating’ to the fullest extent possible that the human being is 
human and not inhuman.871 The Court granted that delivering upon the duty to protect 
is pragmatically limited due to the ineffectiveness of penal sanctions when the mother 
is unwilling to carry the child to term. The threat to the life and health of the pregnant 
woman872 posed by quackery or illegal interruptions of pregnancy873, that is, measures 
to which the unwilling mother might resort, introduces into the equation the interests 
of another human being and at once points to the complexity of the relation and 
heightens the illustration of ineffectiveness. ‘The duty to protect, therefore, cannot 
establish for the state a thoroughgoing duty to punish.’874 
iii. Humanism, pragmatism, and paternalism 
Amidst the tension between life and law, this ontological analysis seeks the 
meaning of law’s humanism, how it coordinates with law’s pragmatism, and how it 
could, or indeed sometimes does, metamorphose into paternalism in the text of the 
Abortion I Case.  
The fundamental right to life is expressly incorporated into the Basic Law – in 
contrast to the Weimar Constitution. Explicit constitutional protection is understood 
as ‘a reaction to the “destruction of life unworthy of life,” to the “final solution” and 
“liquidations,” which were carried out by the National Socialist Regime as state                                                         
869 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41) 
870 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
871 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
872 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
873 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
874 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
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measures.’875 Likewise, the ‘legal condemnation of the interruption of pregnancy […] 
must clearly appear in the legal order existing under the constitution.’876 The utterance 
of condemnation stresses ‘the duty incumbent upon the legislature to protect life’877 
and facilitates the advancement of the claim of those who have no part878 to the part 
reserved for them within the realm of fundamental rights in light of the law of human 
dignity. Legal condemnation of abortion need not be communicated by means of the 
threat of punishment; the only requirement ensuing from the law of human dignity 
and the fundamental right to life is that the chosen means clearly mirror legal 
condemnation and prove effective in preventing interruptions of pregnancy.879 
Emphasis on communicating certain meaning affirms the importance of the rhetorical 
substantiation of condemnation. 
Punishment, however, can never be an end in itself […]. The penal 
norm represents, to a certain extent, the ‘ultimate ratio’ in the 
armory of the legislature.880 
With respect to the legal protection they occasion, socio-legal or civil law 
means are ‘not fundamentally different than the enactment of a penal norm […]’881; 
the difference lies in their intensity. In an anthropocentric legal order, ‘meditating and 
caring’882 that the law practiced does not force human beings outside their essence 
calls for both an understanding of what the pursued humanism stands for and a 
pragmatic approach. The proportional intensity of state interference reconciles the two 
impetuses underlying law’s practice. Humanism manifests in the guiding principle of                                                         
875 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36); Hufen (2004) 313, 313; See also Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Europe’s 
Dark Legacy – Reclaiming Nationalism and Patriotism’ in Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh 
Ghaleigh (eds), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe – The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism 
over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003) 389, 391 
[‘To explore and actively remember – the two are inextricably linked – is thus, not only, as Habermas 
teaches, about understanding who we are – creatures of an ‘… historical milieu that made us what and 
who we are today.’ It is constitutive of who we are. It helps make us who we want to be.’] 
876 BVerfGE 39, 1 (53) 
877 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65); ibid [‘That interruptions of pregnancy are neither legally condemned nor 
subject to punishment is not compatible with the duty incumbent upon the legislature to protect life, if 
the interruptions are the result of reasons which are not recognized in the value order of the Basic 
Law.’] 
878 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 35 
879 BVerfGE 39, 1 (51) [‘If the legislature wants to abstain (even in this case) from penal law 
punishment, this would be compatible with the requirement to protect of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG only 
on the condition that another equally effective legal sanction stands at its command which would 
clearly bring out the unjust character of the act (the disapproval by the legal order) and likewise 
prevent the interruptions of pregnancy as effectively as a penal provision.’]  
880 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46f.) 
881 BVerfGE 39. 1 (47) 
882 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
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the precedence of prevention over repression ensuing from parliamentary discussions 
and affirmed in the Court’s jurisprudence883. Pragmatism is evidenced, for instance, in 
the following empirically verified observation: 
It is generally recognized that the previous § 218 StGB, precisely 
because it threatened punishment without distinction for nearly all 
cases of the interruption of pregnancy, has, as a result, only 
insufficiently protected developing life. The insight that there are 
cases in which the penal sanction is not appropriate has finally led 
to the point that cases actually deserving of punishment are no 
longer prosecuted with the necessary vigor.884 
The Court noted that preventive measures, such as the assistance and 
counseling offered to the pregnant woman in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal 
Law, could not adequately ‘replace the individual protection of life which a penal 
norm fundamentally provides […]’885. Be that as it may, no general duty of the state 
to punish can be derived from the Basic Law, the opposing fundamental rights of the 
pregnant woman and the unborn child, or constitutional value decisions.886 
It would be fair to argue that a very fine line distinguishes the advancement of 
humanism from state paternalism in the practice of law. Paternalism signifies an 
infringement on the self-determination of the individual human being. In the Abortion 
I Case, paternalism is evinced in the claim that a particular portrayal of the 
relationship of the child en ventre sa mere accords with the meaning of law’s 
humanism deduced from the objective value order of the Basic Law. A further remark 
elucidates why this instance of transformation of perspective into being887 – which 
holds true for the practice of law in general – can amount to paternalism. The Court’s 
instructions to the pregnant woman in the Abortion I Case indicate that the effective 
transformation of perspective into being through law requires the alignment of 
perspective of the constitutional order on the ontology of the relationship with the 
child en ventre sa mere with the perspective of an individual human being and of 
                                                        
883 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) [‘In this connection the guiding principle of the precedence of prevention over 
repression is also valid particularly for the protection of unborn life [cited cases omitted]. It is therefore 
the task of the state to employ, primarily, social, political, and welfare means for securing developing 
life.’] 
884 BVerfGE 39, 1 (52) 
885 BVerfGE 39, 1(65) 
886 BVerfGE 39, 1(24f.) 
887 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
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society as a whole888. If in ad hoc cases these perspectives cannot be harmonized, that 
of the law prevails over that of the individual889. How harmonization is conducted is 
also decisive in ascertaining paternalism. 
Paternalism is evident in the Court’s statement that ‘the primary concern is to 
strengthen readiness of the expectant mother to accept the pregnancy as her own 
responsibility and to bring the child en ventre sa mere to full life […]’890, and that the 
principal goal of the undertaking to protect life by the state is ‘to reawaken and, if 
required, to strengthen the maternal duty to protect, where it is lost […].’891 
Counseling as a preventive measure that aims at strengthening the personal 
responsibility of the woman compromises the integrity and ability to self-
determination of the pregnant woman. The punishability of abortion ‘creates a 
threshold [Schwelle] which many recoil from crossing’892; the didactic motivation 
underlying punishment is plain to see. An ontological observation can be directly 
inferred from reference to a threshold, namely that law ‘creates’ certain limits and 
prohibits their traversal in coming-into being and unfolding one’s essence.  
State paternalism corresponds to the assertion of an objective meaning of Art. 
1 sec. 1 GG, which should be protected even against the legal subject and the 
authority of his or her subjective perspective over meaning.893 Reactions to this 
impairment of self-determination center on the danger of restrictions on liberty in 
view of human dignity considerations894. However, despite the soundness of 
perceiving state paternalism as a phenomenon that originates in the human dignity v. 
liberty conflict, which is, indeed, elucidated and tempered by means of systemic 
constructs such as the triangle of fundamental rights895, a further understanding can 
spring from the co-occurrence of totality and infinity in the practice of the law of 
human dignity. At this stage, the analysis calls for the employment of 
phenomenological insights.                                                         
888 Minding that law’s practice is essentially interpretive practice, critical reflection is called for as 
regards differences in treating individual and collective interpretations. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(1986) 62ff. [Analogies can be drawn from the discussion about the interpretation of a social practice 
from the various viewpoints of individuals as members of a community on the one hand, and the 
interpretation of the social practice per se on the other.] 
889 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
890 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) 
891 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
892 BVerfGE 39, 1 (57) 
893 See comments on BVerwGE 64, 274 (1981) [Sittenwidrigkeit von Peep-Shows] in Dreier, Art. 1 
Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 152 
894 Enders (1997) 369 
895 Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417 
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Asserting an objective meaning of human dignity in line with the 
constitutional order can result in totalizing the other896, namely the self-determined897 
human being or, more generally, the bearer of human dignity, and in disregarding 
infinity as an essential aspect of human being-ness. State paternalism is, then, the 
consequence of an intra-conceptual inadequacy. This alternative understanding of the 
roots of paternalism alarms actors to critically reflect on whether, besides vision898, 
language has shaped the produced human dignity meaning. Identifying the cause of 
the problem within the concept points, at the same time, to the plane where 
opportunities to resolve it could be lying. Telling a human dignity story that 
comprises totality and infinity, in other words adopting an affirmative stance towards 
the dual sense of ‘something missing’, sets the stage for addressing such intra-
conceptual inadequacy.  
iv. The portrayal of the human dignity v. human dignity conflict 
Facing the human dignity v. human dignity conflict in the Abortion I Case, the 
FCC adopted a clear stance in favor of the continuation of pregnancy,899 unless 
‘another interest equally worthy of protection, from the standpoint of the constitution, 
asserts its validity with such urgency that the state’s legal order cannot require that the 
pregnant woman must, under all circumstances, concede precedence to the right of the 
unborn.’900. An ontological portrayal ensuing from the Court’s backbone argument 
shows that the balancing involves on the one hand the forceful destruction of human 
existence and the consequential interruption of its potentiality and continuity and, on 
the other hand, the forced, that is, the externally determined happening of the 
irruption of Being that contravenes the φύσις and causes one to be outside one’s 
essence, featuring in the interference of the state with the self-determination of the 
pregnant woman in non-indicated cases of abortion. 
                                                        
896 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 152; Günter Frankenberg, ‘Die Würde des Klons 
und die Krise des Rechts’ (2000) 33 KritJ 325 at 332 [The human being turns from a self-determined 
subject to an object of ‘educational-solicitous measures in the name of prevailing notions of behavior 
in line with dignity.’] 
897 Self-determination concerns first and foremost the individual authority over the production of the 
meaning of human dignity. Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 89 fn 49; See also Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene 
Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 112 [individual human dignity emphasized over the dignity of humanity] 
898 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 16 [Introduction by John Wild] 
899 See for instance, BVerfGE 39, 1 (27) [‘That the counseling must be directed to the continuation of 
the pregnancy is clear.’] 
900 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
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Interestingly, as the reasoning in the dissenting opinion shows, definitions of 
the forceful and the forced are relative; the depiction of the forced ensuing from the 
majority opinion corresponds apparently to what is rendered as forceful from the 
viewpoint of the dissenters. The Abortion I Case, including the dissenting opinion, 
presents a prime example of how varying definitions of the forced and the forceful, 
understood in an a minore ad maius relation, reflect differences in the degree of 
sensitization of the Court, of a particular Justice or of society to the concrete lived 
experience of the other.  
A compromise which guarantees the protection of the life of the one 
about to be born and permits the pregnant woman the freedom of 
abortion is not possible since the interruption of pregnancy always 
means the annihilation of the unborn life. […]901 
The irrevocable destruction of an existing human life led the FCC to label 
abortion ‘an act of killing.’902 The Court juxtaposed the phrasing of the respective 
section in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law, ‘Felonies and Misdemeanors 
against Life’, and the language in the previous penal law, ‘Killing of the Child en 
ventre sa mere’903, and further noticed that the common description ‘interruption of 
pregnancy’ cannot camouflage the fact that abortion is an act of killing.  
No legal regulation can pass over the fact that this act offends 
against the fundamental inviolability and indisposability of human 
life protected by Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG. […] Therefore, it follows 
that the law cannot dispense with clearly labeling this procedure as 
‘unjust.’ 904 
The application of the measures that stipulated the legal condemnation of 
abortion will often unavoidably ‘touch upon the areas of freedom of other bearers of 
fundamental rights.’905 The Court admitted that the right to life of the unborn ‘can 
lead to a burdening of the woman which essentially goes beyond that normally 
associated with pregnancy.’906 Due to the uniqueness of the situation of pregnancy, 
penal measures could prove particularly problematic. Beyond illustrating the 
difference between forced and forceful interference, the ontological lens cannot 
convey more as regards the portrayal of abortion as an act of killing; this project is                                                         
901 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43) 
902 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
903 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
904 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
905 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
906 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
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undertaken in the linguistic-analytical analysis of the practice of the law of human 
dignity in the Abortion I Case, infra. 
v. The ‘how’ of the protection guaranteed by the law of human dignity: forced 
or, also, forceful? (Dissenting opinion) 
The dissenters argued, ‘the constitutional duty to protect [the life of each 
individual human being] also includes its preliminary stages before birth […]’ 907, and 
moved on to clarify that discussions in Parliament and before the FCC ‘dealt not with 
the whether but rather with the how of this protection.’908 The role of the FCC as 
understood by the dissenters is to defend the subject of fundamental rights from 
‘excessive infringement by the state power.’909 
On the scale of possible infringements by the state, penal provisions 
are positioned at the top: they demand of a citizen a definite 
behavior and subdue him in the case of a violation with sensitive 
restrictions of freedom or with financial burdens. [...] 
In the present constitutional dispute, the inverse question is 
presented for the first time for examination, namely whether the 
state must punish, whether the abolition of punishment for the 
interruption of pregnancy in the first three months of pregnancy is 
compatible with fundamental rights. It is obvious, however, that the 
disregard of punishment is the opposite of state encroachment.910  
Penal sanctions amount to the gravest state infringement on fundamental 
rights. The dissenters stressed that the partial withdrawal of penal provisions was not 
motivated by a stance of approval of abortion; rather, in line with law’s pragmatism, 
the legislature sought to react to the experience of ineffectiveness of previous stricter 
penal measures. For those reasons, argued the dissenters, the abolition of punishment 
for abortions in the first three months does not amount to an attack on the unborn life 
by the state or, in ontological terms, does not seek to impede unfolding towards 
humanism. This point could be perceived as an indication of critical reflection on the 
– hermeneutic and literary – association of refraining from punishing and endorsing 
an infringement on the legal value of life. In essence, the dissenters’ argument hints at 
the argumentative leap in the substantiation of that link.  
                                                        
907 BVerfGE 39, 1 (68) 
908 BVerfGE 39, 1 (68f.) 
909 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
910 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70f.) 
 181
The dissenters criticized reliance on the ‘more extensive meaning of 
fundamental rights as objective value decisions’911 in the majority opinion. Setting the 
objective value order as the vantage point for the ontological appreciation of human 
being-ness and the law of human dignity in the Abortion I Case can lead to static 
portrayals. Recourse to tools that enable critical reflection on the dogmatism lurking 
in the prospect of a status quo established by objective value decisions is undertaken 
infra. The imposition of a status quo alludes to the forced nature of the polemos that 
causes the unfolding of the essence of human beings thus interferes with their self-
determination; penal measures, however, evoke the forceful on top of the forced. The 
dissenters were fundamentally concerned about the position that ‘an objective value 
decision should function as a duty of the legislature to enact penal norms, therefore to 
postulate the strongest conceivable encroachment on the sphere of freedom of the 
citizen’.912 The measures that purport to further humanism, according to the 
dissenters, threaten as such the guarantee that ‘human beings be human and not 
inhumane’.913 
If the objective value decision contained in a fundamental legal 
norm to protect a certain legal value should suffice to derive 
therefrom the duty to punish, the fundamental rights could 
underhandedly, on the pretext of securing freedom, become the 
basis for an abundance of regimentations which restrict freedom. 
What is valid for the protection of life can also be claimed for other 
legal values of high rank – for example, bodily integrity 
[körperliche Unversehrtheit], freedom, marriage, and family.914 
Interestingly, in similar fashion to the Life Imprisonment Case discussed infra, 
freedom considerations are associated with inviolability as the foundational aspect of 
the meaning of human dignity. This observation brings to mind the theorizing of the 
relation of human dignity to other fundamental rights. The law of human dignity is 
widely practiced together with other fundamental rights, rather than independently. 
The ontological account presently introduced does not offer language and concepts 
for treating other legal concepts, such as equality or liberty, featuring alongside the 
law of human dignity. The linguistic-analytical and phenomenological accounts 
                                                        
911 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71) 
912 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73); ibid (86f.) [‘If […] judicial self-restraint has validity, the Constitutional Court 
a fortiori should not compel the legislature to employ the power of punishment […]. This certainly 
does not correspond to the function of penal law in a liberal social state.’] 
913 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
914 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
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afford hermeneutic and literary tools for approaching the interplay between the 
different legal concepts and their mutually restrictive, reflective and enriching 
practice. 
vi. Dissensus: an alternative portrayal (Dissenting opinion) 
The portrayal of the state of being pregnant as a manifestation of human 
being-ness, and, consequently, of the uniqueness of the interruption of pregnancy vis-
à-vis other cases of interference with human life in the dissenting opinion essentially 
deviates from the understanding of pregnancy and the appreciation of abortion in the 
majority opinion. The dissenting opinion relocated the point of dissensus.  
Involved here is not the academic question of whether it is proper to 
employ the power of the state to protect against murderers and 
killers, who can be deterred in no other way. […]915 
[…] Where the defense against state encroachments is involved, a 
distinction cannot, of course, be made between prenatal and 
postnatal stages of development; the embryo is, insofar as it is a 
potential bearer of fundamental rights, to be protected without 
exception in the same way as each born human life. This equal 
treatment under the law has only limited applicability to the injury 
to unborn life by a third party against the will of the pregnant 
woman, in no way however can it be applied to the refusal of the 
woman to allow the child en ventre sa mere to become a human 
being.916 
According to the dissenters, ‘in the person of the pregnant woman there is a 
unique unity of ‘actor’ and ‘victim’ [that] is of legal significance […]’917. The 
dissenters opposed leveling the mother undergoing abortion and third parties killing 
unborn life apropos the legal treatment accorded with their action. Significantly, this 
argument was premised on the dissenters’ appreciation of the unique nature of 
pregnancy. Emphasizing the natural and unique bond between unborn life and the 
pregnant woman, the dissenting opinion shifted the conception of the ontology of the 
relationship, ergo also of the ‘how’ of the legal treatment of abortion. 
Otherwise than in the case of homicide mentioned, the legislature 
can and must proceed, furthermore, from the idea that the object of 
protection – the child en ventre sa mere – is most effectively 
protected by the mother herself and that her willingness to carry the 
child en ventre sa mere to term can be strengthened through 
measures of the most varied kinds. [...] the question arises whether a                                                         
915 BVerfGE 39, 1 (78) 
916 BVerfGE 39, 1 (79) 
917 BVerfGE 39, 1 (79) 
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disturbance of this relationship, as is evident in the case of 
interruptions of pregnancy, can be obviated directly through a penal 
sanction in an appropriate manner. In any case the legislature may, 
because of the special circumstances mentioned, react differently 
here than to the killing of human life by a third party.918 
Moreover, the dissenters clarified that the beginning of life is to be set at 
conception rather than implantation, and contended that the demarcating lines 
separating and delineating distinct stages in the development of human life are less 
obscure than the majority of the FCC claimed. Setting conception as the beginning of 
life is, according to the dissenters, attuned to focusing on the prospect of development 
in the case of natural fertilization of an embryo, regardless of the probability of 
realization of this evolution.919 The extension of identification of human being-ness at 
the embryonic stage conveys a particular self-understanding of the human being from 
the origins of the own ‘I’920. Empowering the embryo, from the moment of 
conception, with a categorical claim to human dignity spares the dubious question 
about the demarcating lines between stages of development and their decisiveness on 
whether human dignity should be protected.921 According to some voices in the legal 
literature, the guarantee of the human dignity of the unborn child implies recognition 
of the status of a legal subject922; FCC jurisprudence has, however, not affirmed to 
date this interpretation.  
The disparity between the majority opinion and the dissent on this matter, 
considering that, in both instances, definitions are grounded on scientific facts, 
highlights how, in the practice of law, being is formed – and transformed923 – by 
perspective and initiated anew as being into the realm of law. In the dissenting 
opinion, the development of unborn life is documented apropos the lived experience 
of the pregnant woman, in line with the proposition that the ‘growing maternal 
relationship corresponds to the different embryonic stages of development.’924. This 
determination of indicative stages of pregnancy is a sign of a holistic approach to the 
ontology of the relationship of the child en ventre sa mere in the dissenting opinion.                                                         
918 BVerfGE 39, 1 (80) 
919 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 65  
920 Spaemann, ‘Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde’, Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde (1987) 
295, 303 
921 Herdegen (n 919)  
922 Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 66ff. 
923 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
924 BVerfGE 39, 1 (80); ibid (94) [‘For the constitutional decision it matters only whether the penal 
provision is imperatively required to secure an effective protection of developing life, having taken into 
consideration the interests of the woman which are deserving of protection.’] 
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The fact that an independently existing living being separable from 
the maternal organism first exists after a lengthy process of 
development rather suggests or at least permits with regard to legal 
judgment consideration of lines of demarcation based on time, 
which correspond to this development. The biological continuity of 
the entire development until birth – the beginning of which is to be 
set, not at implantation, but rather at conception, if the majority 
view is consistently applied – does not alter the fact that a change in 
the attitude of the pregnant woman, in the sense of a growing 
maternal relationship, corresponds to the different embryonic stages 
of development.925 
The dissenters juxtaposed the legal consciousness of the pregnant woman and 
general legal consciousness with the majority opinion. For the former, the dissenters 
noted, ‘there is a difference between an interruption of pregnancy which takes place 
in the first stage of pregnancy and one which takes place in a later phase.’926 The 
introduction of the two extra-legal perspectives opens up a field of dissensus fostering 
critical reflection on the authority of law over meaning, which can be understood as 
the transformation of perspective into being. The dissenters referred to the Roe v. 
Wade decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and the opting for ‘a 
different penal assessment, tied to such stages which are based on time […]’927. There 
is not only one ontology of human being-ness and, consequently, not only one 
meaning of the practice of the law of human dignity. The confrontation of variant 
ontological portrayals sets up a stage of dissensus. As noted in the ontological account 
of human dignity in Chapter One, dissensus is ‘a dispute over what is given and about 
the frame within which we see something as given […] the putting of two worlds in 
one and the same world.’928 The law of human dignity as the vantage point of 
confrontations introduces into the practice of law versatile language that stretches 
across the levels – law and life – to which ontological portrayals correspond. The 
building of bridges renders the ontologically significant traversal of limits possible.  
It was especially significant for the legislature in deciding how best 
to reform these situations that the decision for an abortion generally 
grows out of a conflict situation based on varied motivations which 
are strongly imprinted with the circumstances of the individual 
case.929 
                                                        
925 BVerfGE 39, 1 (94) 
926 BVerfGE 39, 1 (81) 
927 BVerfGE 39, 1 (81)  
928 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 69  
929 BVerfGE 39, 1 (83) 
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In line with the proposition that the answer to the question ‘Who is the human 
being?’ should be sought in the world rather than in heaven930, the dissenters raised 
indicative pragmatic concerns like those expressed in the majority opinion re the 
consequences of illegality, such as the unavailability of modern equipment, 
professional assistance, and follow-up treatment.931 At the same time, they stressed 
the importance of assessing ‘the circumstances of the individual case’, in other words 
of seeking and addressing the particulars of lived experience.  
b. Linguistic-analytical 
The linguistic-analytical portrayal of the Abortion I Case shows how 
incompatibility with the constitution can be figuratively rendered as non-subsumption 
under the legal language game, the value of surveyance for grounding the soundness 
of legal argumentation and the consideration of the viewpoints of other metaphysical 
subjects within the legal language game. It also looks at references to lenses other 
than law in the text of the decision. ‘Something always missing’ surfaces first in the 
linguistic-analytical portrayal of the Abortion I Case. The didactic function of legal 
condemnation is depicted in light of the introduced model; authority over the 
production of meaning is key in ascertaining whether the linguistic-analytically 
perceived law of human dignity has been complied with. The principle of 
proportionality is parallelized to the logical form, and the concept of the ordering of 
values is viewed as a tool of critical reflection. The dissenting opinion can be 
perceived as a self-reflective look at the legal language game of the majority opinion.  
 
i. Incompatibility with the constitution as non-subsumption under a legal 
language game 
The FCC found that the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law did not afford 
unborn life the protection required by the Basic Law. The Court established the 
incompatibility of the statute with the law of human dignity932 or, linguistic-
analytically portrayed, its non-subsumption under the legal language game emanating                                                         
930 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 
931 BVerfGE 39, 1 (83) 
932 In fact the law of human dignity is cumulatively practiced along with the right to life. See BVerfGE 
39, 1 (51) [‘If the challenged regulation of terms of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law is 
examined according to these standards, the result is that the statute does not do justice, to the extent 
required, to the obligation to protect developing life effectively which is derived from Art. 2 sec. 2 
sent. 1 GG, in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.’] 
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from a viewpoint significantly defined by constitutional law. The question that 
prompted the proceeding was whether the regulation of terms introduced by the Fifth 
Statute to Reform the Penal Law, which left the termination of pregnancy during the 
first twelve weeks after conception under certain conditions unpunished, was 
consistent with the constitution. The regulation of terms signified a new approach to 
the legal treatment of interruptions of pregnancy in the German legal order; prior to 
the reform, law considered ‘the killing of a child in the womb of its mother’ generally 
a punishable act933.  
The protection of the individual life may not be abandoned for the 
reason that a goal of saving other lives, in itself worthy of respect, is 
pursued. Every human life – the life first developing itself as well – 
is as such equally valuable and can not therefore be subjected to a 
discriminatory evaluation, no matter how shaded, or indeed to a 
balancing on the basis of statistics.934 
The Court turned to the draft of the Fifth Statute to the Reform the Penal Law, 
which ‘adhered to the fundamental punishability of the interruption of pregnancy’935. 
In the draft, the Federal Government had stressed that ‘human life even before birth is 
a legal value which is worthy of protection and requires protection’936; that the Basic 
Law furthers a specific value decision for life in Art. 1 GG and Art. 2 sec. 2 GG, 
namely ‘the principle of the legal inviolability of developing life’; and that, at the 
same time, a balance must be struck ‘between the right of the unborn child and the 
human dignity of the pregnant woman as well as her right to the free development of 
her personality’937. According to the argumentation of the Federal Government as it 
appears in the Court’s legal language game ‘an absolute precedence cannot be granted 
to the one right or to the other’938 and in conflict situations the solutions should ‘take 
into account the value judgment of the constitution.’939  
 
ii. Surveyance as the basis of soundness: ‘total consideration’ and portrayal of 
other viewpoints within the legal language game 
 Faced with the difficulties of surveying and deciding on the highly controversial                                                         
933 BVerfGE 39, 1 (6) 
934 BVerfGE 39, 1 (59) 
935 BVerfGE 39, 1 (12) 
936 BVerfGE 39, 1 (12) 
937 BVerfGE 39, 1 (12) 
938 BVerfGE 39, 1 (12) 
939 BVerfGE 39, 1 (13) 
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matters in the Abortion I Case, namely the constitutionality of penalization and the 
human dignity v. human dignity conflict, the Court outlined the prongs of a ‘total 
consideration’940 of the issue: ‘the worth of the injured legal value and the extent of the 
social harm of the injurious act – in comparison with other acts which socio-ethically are 
perhaps similarly assessed and which are subject to punishment’941; ‘the traditional legal 
regulation of this area of life as well as the development of concepts of the role of the 
penal law in modern society’942; and ‘the practical effectiveness of penal sanctions and 
the possibility of their replacement through other legal sanctions.’943  In other words, the 
crucial considerations are first, the rank of the injured legal value in a hierarchy of values 
along with the relative social harm brought about, second, the history of legal regulation 
of this area of life, and third, the practical effectiveness of the selected measures. The 
first can be paralleled to the notion of hierarchy in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus944, the second is telling of the content of the legal language game, and the 
third intimates the conciliation of law’s humanism and pragmatism.  
 The FCC sought to incorporate diverse and opposing approaches into the legal 
language game, that is, to demonstrate surveyance of the range of arguments, in other 
words a broad field of sight945, and to fortify the argumentative soundness of 
propositions employed in the legal language game of the Abortion I Case through 
reference to pragmatic considerations sparked by empirical insights. For that, the Court                                                         
940 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
941 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
942 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
943 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
944 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5.556) 
945 For instance, the legal language game encompasses the analysis of pragmatic considerations 
offering grounds against penal sanctions and for the regulation of terms: BVerfGE 39, 1 (56f.) [‘The 
objection against this is that women not subject to influence understand best from experience how to 
avoid punishment so that the penal sanction is often ineffective. Furthermore, the legislature is 
confronted with the dilemma that preventive counseling and repressive threat of punishment in their 
life protecting effect are necessarily partially exclusive: the penal sanction of the indication solution 
would, in truth, through its deterrent effect prevent unmotivated interruptions of pregnancy to an extent 
not exactly ascertainable. At the same time, according to this objection, the threat of punishment, by 
discouraging counseling of women susceptible of influence, impedes saving life in other cases because 
it is precisely women in whose cases the prerequisites of an indication are absent and, beyond that, also 
those who do not trust the result of a procedure to determine an indication who will, in the face of the 
penal threat, carefully keep the pregnancy secret and who to a large extent withdraw themselves from 
helpful influence available through counseling centers and surroundings. On the basis of such an 
analysis, there could not be a defense of unborn life, which was free of gaps. The legislature, so this 
objection continues, would have no other choice than to weigh off life against life, namely the life 
which through a definite regulation of the abortion question could probably be saved against the life 
which would probably be sacrificed on account of the same regulation, since the penal sanction would 
not only protect but at the same time destroy unborn life. Thus, since no solution would unequivocally 
better serve the protection of the individual life, the legislature would not have transgressed its 
constitutionally drawn boundaries with the regulation of terms.’] 
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turned to and reflected on the viewpoint of other eyes. The representation of various and, 
often, conflicting viewpoints in the text of the decision reinforces the soundness of the 
Court’s argument in at least two ways.  
 The first is processual: the confrontation and interplay between (legal) language 
games within the legal language game of the Abortion I Case substantiates that they are 
subsumed under the field of sight of the Court as the critical eye. It can hence be 
logically assumed that the Court’s field of sight emanates from a viewpoint outside the 
represented viewpoints; elementally, namely from a linguistic-analytical perspective, 
therein lies the ultimate authority of the constitutional judge over the meaning produced. 
At the same time, viewpoints represented within the legal language game of the 
constitutional judge are to a considerable extent premised on assumptions. Circularly, 
critical reflection sets off from the question whether portrayals of the unborn child and 
the pregnant woman are based on sound assumptions.  
The second way is substantive: opening up an area of dissensus within the 
legal language game and welcoming other viewpoints into affirms of the analogy 
between the metaphysical subject and the human factor wherever it is traced, that is, 
not only on the face of individual human beings but also within institutions. The 
demonstration of dissensus strengthens the argumentative soundness of the decision 
and, what is more, conveys commitment to openness. 
The acknowledgment of inconsistency and tension, the openness to 
ambiguity and uncertainty […] define the individual mind as aware 
of its limits and in need of instruction, from the past and from 
others, and as tentative in its own claims to assurance and to vision. 
It makes the speaker doubt the adequacy of any language, and seek 
to be aware of the limits of her own forms of thought and 
understanding. In committing to an acknowledgment of the various 
ways in which […] claims [can be] made, and values characterized, 
it commits her to what can be called ‘many-voicedness’: it is 
profoundly against monotonal thought and speech, against the 
single voice, the single aspect of the self or culture dominating the 
rest. In forcing us to the limits of expression and of our minds, it is a 
commitment to openness, to the recognition of mystery, to the value 
of what no one has yet found the words to say or to do. 946 
The concretization of law’s Menschenbild in the Abortion I Case portrays the 
one about to be born as ‘an independent human being [selbständiges menschliches 
Wesen] who stands under the protection of the constitution’947. On those grounds, the                                                         
946 White, Heracle’s Bow (1985) 124  
947 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
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FCC identified ‘a social dimension to the interruption of pregnancy, which makes it 
amenable to and in need of regulation by the state.’948. The state has the duty to 
individually protect each single concrete life949. In linguistic-analytical terms, each 
individual constitutes a metaphysical subject; hence, the protection afforded to 
individuals as human beings should take into account their unique viewpoint on the 
world as their world. Recognition and protection of the rights of the pregnant woman 
as a concretization of law’s Menschenbild can also be linguistic-analytically 
represented by the incorporation of her – assumed – viewpoint into the Court’s legal 
language game. The Court expressed the commitment to treat the viewpoints of 
human beings involved separately in line with the principle developed in FCC 
jurisprudence ‘that the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision, which in its 
structure and actual effect prejudices a definite circle of persons, may not be refuted 
with the showing that this provision or other regulations of the statute favor another 
circle of persons.’950 The Court furthermore noted that this principle holds particularly 
‘for the highest personal legal value, “life”.’951 
 Experience – as documented by the Government – shows that the percentage of 
interruptions of pregnancy during the first twelve weeks is exceptionally high, thus 
causing the statutory provision to effectively recede into the background.952 The 
viewpoint of the pregnant woman is assumed953: ‘[a] – formal – statutory disapproval of 
the interruption of pregnancy would […] not suffice because a woman determined upon 
abortion would disregard it.’954 The FCC reacted to the counseling system proposed in 
the new statute, noting that complete repeal of punishability occasions a gap in the 
protection of unborn life, thus interferes with its security ‘in a not insignificant number 
of cases’ because it ‘[hands] this life over to the completely unrestricted power of 
disposition of the woman.’ In line with law’s pragmatism, the FCC added, ‘[t]here are                                                         
948 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
949 BVerfGE 39, 1 (58) 
950 BVerfGE 39, 1 (58f.) 
951 BVerfGE 39, 1 (59) 
952 BVerfGE 39, 1 (53) 
953 The central question in critically reflecting on assumed viewpoints is whether they are soundly 
assumed. On assumed viewpoints and their validity see MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 57 
[‘When something happens to women, it happens in social reality. The perspective from women’s point 
of view does not mean that women’s reality can only be seen from there, hence is inaccessible to 
anyone else and can’t be talked about and does not exist. Rather, what can be seen from the point of 
view of the subordination of women has been there all along – too long. We wish it didn’t exist, but it 
can’t be wished out of existence. Anyone can see it. It can be found. It can be ascertained. It can even 
be measured sometimes. It can be discussed. Before us, it has been missed, overlooked, made 
invisible.’]  
954 BVerfGE 39, 1 (55) 
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many women who have previously decided upon an interruption of pregnancy without 
having a reason which is worthy of esteem within the value order of the constitution and 
who do not have access to a counseling such as § 218c sec. 1 StGB proposes.’955 It 
noticed that ‘a sufficient basis is lacking for the conclusion that the number of 
interruptions of pregnancy in the future will be significantly less than with the previous 
statutory regulation.’956 
iii. Lenses other than law and the Basic Law  
The Court constructively enriched the sources of material and, consequently, 
the language imported into the legal language game. The sources of material surveyed 
in the Court’s legal language game do not submit to disciplinary dividing lines. The 
history of the origin of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG conveys clearly ‘that one need not 
proceed to the defense of unborn life with compulsory and uniform penalization’957. A 
literary approach to the word ‘compulsory’ intimates the forced and the forceful as 
traits of penal measures and recalls the concept of polemos discussed in the 
ontological account of human dignity. Uniformity implies the establishment of a 
totality as thoroughly examined in the phenomenological analysis (infra); from a 
linguistic-analytical perspective it suffices to trace the presence of such language in 
the legal language game. The FCC engaged in sociological observations re ‘the large 
number of interruptions of pregnancy not performed by physicians’ which renders the 
‘protection of the life and the health of pregnant women’958 urgent, and the 
insufficient protection of developing life resulting from instituting the threat of 
punishment ‘without distinction for nearly all cases of the interruption of 
pregnancy’.959                                                         
955 BVerfGE 39, 1 (55f.); ibid (53f.) On the de facto ineffectiveness of the penal sanction the Court 
noted: ‘[…] women not subject to influence understand best from experience how to avoid punishment 
so that the penal sanction is often ineffective.’  
956 BVerfGE 39, 1 (59) 
957 BVerfGE 39, 1 (24) 
958 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
959 BVerfGE 39, 1 (52); ibid [‘The insight that there are cases in which the penal sanction is not 
appropriate has finally led to the point that cases actually deserving of punishment are no longer 
prosecuted with the necessary vigor. In addition, with respect to this offense, there is, in the nature of 
the case, the frequently difficult clarification of the factual situation. Certainly, the statistics on the 
incidence of illegal abortion (Dunkelziffer: unreported cases) differ greatly and it may hardly be 
possible to ascertain reliable data on this point through empirical investigations. In any case, the 
number of the illegal interruptions of pregnancy in the Federal Republic was high. The existence of a 
general penal norm may have contributed to that, since the state had neglected to employ other 
adequate measures for the protection of developing life.’] 
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The text of the Abortion I Case conveys the Court’s interest in comparative 
insights. Comparative relevance enhances the soundness of justification of the 
language used and the meaning produced in the Court’s legal language game. Those 
defending the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law argue, noted the Court, ‘that in 
other democratic countries of the Western World in recent times the penal provisions 
regulating the interruption of pregnancy have been “liberalized” or “modernized” in a 
similar or an even more extensive fashion […].’960 Still, the FCC clarified, the 
correspondence of the new regulation to the ‘general development of theories 
[Anschauungen] in this area’ and to ‘fundamental socio-ethical and legal principles 
[…]’961 was not critical in deciding on the Abortion I Case.  
Disregarding the fact that all of these foreign laws in their 
respective countries are sharply controverted, the legal standards 
which are applicable there for the acts of the legislature are 
essentially different from those of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.962 
Looking at the percentage of abortions in Germany, Dreier notes that 
worldwide the percentage number is even higher963 and discerns two possibilities: 
either the unconstitutionality of the valid law on the interruption of pregnancy or the 
strict statutory regulations through constitutional law and the human dignity norm are 
not necessarily required.964 Dreier notes the exceptional character of the constitutional 
treatment of abortion in Germany apropos international legal documents and the 
legislation in other democratic constitutional states and argues that this comparative 
insight, rather than precipitating demand for change, urges an understanding of such 
regulations less as constitutionally commanded implications of the human dignity 
clause, and more as decisions of the lawmaker in light of democratic principles. 965   
The historical context of the Basic Law accounts for the structural principles 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. The ‘historical experience’ of National 
Socialism966, and the ‘spiritual-moral confrontation’ with that system formatively 
influence the signification and significance of the Basic Law as the lens through 
                                                        
960 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
961 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
962 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
963 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 86 
964 ibid 
965 ibid 
966 Hufen (2004) 313, 313 
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which legal actors within the German constitutional order produce meaning967. At the 
same time, resort to historical experience indicates that insights derived from looking 
at the world through another lens inform the viewpoint of the judge and constitute 
aspects of the produced meaning. 
In opposition to the omnipotence of the totalitarian state which 
claimed for itself limitless dominion over all areas of social life and 
which, in the prosecution of its goals of state, consideration for the 
life of the individual fundamentally meant nothing, the Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany has erected an order bound 
together by values which places the individual human being and his 
dignity at the focal point of all of its ordinances. At its basis lies the 
concept, as the Federal Constitutional Court previously pronounced 
[cited decisions omitted], that human beings possess an inherent 
worth as individuals in the order of creation which 
uncompromisingly demands unconditional respect for the life of 
every individual human being, even for the apparently socially 
‘worthless,’ and which therefore excludes the destruction of such 
life without legally justifiable grounds.968 
The supra excerpt associates the legal concept of human dignity with the right 
to life. Human dignity, ‘the inherent worth’ of human beings as individuals, 
‘demands’ the unconditional guarantee of human life. Nevertheless, life can be 
infringed on when ‘legally justifiable grounds’ exist; the right to life is not absolute. 
In practicing the fundamental right to life, evaluations formative of concrete 
manifestations of the Menschenbild, for instance of the image of the ‘apparently 
socially “worthless”’ human being, only leave an imprint on law’s Menschenbild.  
The FCC as the decisive eye is ‘charged by the constitution with surveying the 
observance of its fundamental principles by all organs of the state and, if necessary, 
with giving them effect […]’. The judge as a human being and a representative of the 
respective institution is expected to orient decisions ‘only on those principles to the 
development of which this Court has decisively contributed its judicial utterances.’969. 
Judicial practice generates a doctrinal legacy that should be respected, surveyed and 
taken into account in the construction of the legal language game. The Court 
contextualized the signification and significance of the pouvoir constituant, noting 
that the ethics manifested in constitutional propositions and jurisprudence are 
contingent on ‘experiences with a system of injustice’970, historical development,                                                         
967 BVerfGE 39, 1 (67); Schnapp (1989) 1, 1 
968 BVerfGE 39, 1 (67) 
969 BVerfGE 39, 1 (67) 
970 BVerfGE 39, 1 (67) 
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‘political conditions and fundamental views of the philosophy of state’971 and, hence, 
need not appear as manifestations of law’s meta-dimension in other legal orders.   
The National Socialist Regime resulted in an omnipotent totalitarian state; its 
viewpoint dominated limitlessly all other viewpoints, in other words imposed the 
world portrayed through the lens of National Socialism on metaphysical subjects 
denying them their unique viewpoint and the world ensuing from it, their world972. 
The life of the individual ‘fundamentally meant nothing’. Reaction to totalitarian state 
structures is inherent to ‘an order bound together by values’, specifically values 
encapsulating humanism, precisely because commitment to practicing the ethical 
within and through law elementally enables practicing law’s meta-dimension. The 
values of the constitutional order allude to the meta-dimension of law on account of 
the parallel that can be drawn between the notion of value and the transcendental 
character of ethics in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.973 This order centers on 
human beings and their dignity in sharp contrast to the limitless totalitarian state; the 
order of the Basic Law is not limitless. This is how the preambular reference to ‘God’ 
in the Basic Law is interpreted in the present analysis.  
iv. ‘Something always missing’ and the law of human dignity  
Why and how is ‘something always missing’ the meaning of law’s meta-
dimension? Affirmation of law’s ethical dimension or meta-dimension, regardless of 
whether particular ethics are identified and uttered, that is, ‘said’ rather than just 
‘shown’, amounts to the portrayal of the democratic constitutional state as a limited 
entity by analogy with metaphysical subjects. What can limit must stand outside and 
beyond what it limits. The preambular reference to ‘God’, the transcendental as an 
aspect of the law of human dignity and the doctrinal appreciation of the Menschenbild 
of the Basic Law are topoi of manifestation of the meta-dimension of law conceived 
as ‘something always missing’. The notion of the limit marks our separation from 
‘God’, understood as ‘something always missing’, which at once indicates the 
humanism of all human beings existing at the limit, and so thus limited in the same 
way. On the grounds of this understanding, this analysis takes on a limit-related 
approach to the meta-dimension. 
                                                        
971 BVerfGE 39, 1 (67f.) 
972 Hufen (2004) 313, 313 
973 Wittgenstein, Tractatus (6.42) 
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The constitutional decision to guarantee human dignity and life is the critical 
structural element of the meaning of the entire legal order. All expressions of state 
power are bound by this constitutional decision, and other socio-political and 
pragmatic considerations ‘cannot override this constitutional limitation’. With respect 
to the issue of abortion, ‘[e]ven a general change of the viewpoints dominant in the 
population on this subject if such change could be established at all would change 
nothing.’ This position reaffirms the rigidness of the boundaries of legal language 
games emanating from an eye that looks through the lens of an absolute law and 
portrays the interplay between the broader field of sight and the legal language game 
in the Abortion I Case. Absolute law as the critical lens for perceiving the world and 
producing meaning at first glance deauthorizes the viewpoints of metaphysical 
subjects wherever they appear in the portrayed legal language game – the viewpoints 
of the judge at the limit by analogy with the eye and of the human beings involved in 
any given case. However, upon closer examination, if we understand the dual sense of 
‘something missing’ to be a crucial aspect of the meaning of the absolute law of 
human dignity the diverse perspectives of metaphysical subjects are, conversely, 
accommodated within law.  
What are the implications of the constitutional character of the limitation? 
Does the constitutional shell of the limitation interfere with the practice of law’s 
meta-dimension in the sense that what can only be ‘shown’ and not ‘said’ is ‘said’? 
The propositions that communicate the meaning of these values are according to 
linguistic-analytical insights nonsensical. The ethical basis of ‘constitutional 
limitation’ denotes law’s meta-dimension. This proposition could either be an 
oxymoron or, by analogy with Wittgenstein’s ladder metaphor, the utterance of what 
can only be ‘shown’ in order to elucidated its senselessness after we have ‘climbed 
out through […], on […], over […]’974 it.  
 
v. Penalization of abortion: implications of the didactic function of legal 
condemnation  
The issue of the constitutionality of penalizing abortion arises early on in the 
course of the Court’s argument.  
                                                        
974 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.54) 
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The guarantee of constitutional value decisions through penal 
sanctions is not required in every instance in which such a decision 
is present. A thoroughgoing parallel of the ordering of values in 
constitutional and penal law cannot be created; the two realms are 
not identical.975 
 Law as the lens before the eye determines the eye’s viewpoint. The discussion 
about the penalization of abortion intimates how the different fields of law correspond to 
different curves carved on the lens before the eye and, consequently, prompt the 
production of varying understandings of the world and of human beings as metaphysical 
subjects within it. Of course, metaphysical subjects within the totality of the legal 
language game are in principle, descriptively and prescriptively, identified with the limit. 
This presents a paradox: how can the limit be subsumed under the totality of ‘what is 
there’, before the eye? The limit is an inviolable, an ‘unantastbar’ place; paternalism 
lurks in the appeal to the inviolability of a position, the limit as the locus where 
metaphysical subjects are found, rather than the inviolability of the human being, namely 
the metaphysical subject identified with the limit, as in the Dwarf-throwing Case976. The 
linguistic-analytical model brings to our attention the portrayal of the subsumption of 
human beings as metaphysical subjects under the legal language game corresponding to 
the text of the Abortion I Case. How is the inviolability respected and protected at the 
level of language, minding that metaphysical subjects become part of the world 
extending before the eye of legal actors? Phenomenological insights, such as absolute 
separation and non-mediation977 or mediation that does not destroy the distance between 
the eye and the metaphysical subject or the self and the other, are called for to enhance 
the linguistic analytical account. 
 The Court explicitly defined the lens before the judge’s eye in deciding on the 
Abortion I Case.  
[…] The statutory regulation in the Fifth Statute to Reform the 
Penal Law which was decided upon after extraordinarily 
comprehensive preparatory work can be examined by the 
Constitutional Court only from the viewpoint of whether it is 
compatible with the Basic Law, which is the highest valid law in the 
Federal Republic.978 
 The criterion for determining the appropriateness of measures employed is, as                                                         
975 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
976 UN Human Rights Committee Communication No. 854/1999 
977 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 52 
978 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36)  
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the Court noted, the effectiveness of protection of the fetus. What can be inferred from 
the constitution, specifically from Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG, is the duty of the general 
legal order [allgemeinen Rechtsordnung] to guarantee ‘appropriate and effective 
protection of unborn life […]’979, and of the legislature in particular to be mindful of ‘the 
guiding principles and impulses emanating from a constitutionally fundamental 
decision.’980 Resorting to the authority of legislative history the Court noticed the lack of 
evidence therein ‘for answering the question whether unborn life must be protected by 
the penal law.’981 
 The question whether the duty of the state to protect unborn life requires the 
employment of penal law measures, considering that penal law is ‘the sharpest weapon’ 
at the disposal of the state, ‘cannot be answered by the simplified posing of the question 
whether the state must punish certain acts.’982 Penal law protects, according to the Court, 
‘the elementary values of community life’983. The life of the human being is ‘among the 
most important legal values’984. Abortion ‘irrevocably destroys an existing human life’, 
hence amounts to ‘an act of killing’985. The FCC criticized the post-reform language of 
the section comprising the contested penal sanction.  
[…] this is most clearly shown by the fact that the relevant penal 
sanction – even in the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law – is 
contained in the section ‘Felonies and Misdemeanors against Life’ 
and, in the previous penal law, was designated the ‘Killing of the 
Child en ventre sa mere.’ The description now common, 
‘interruption of pregnancy,’ cannot camouflage this fact. 986  
 The FCC implied the influence that varying phrasings of the statute under 
scrutiny exert on meaning – understood here primarily as significance – and warned 
about such rhetorical implications. More neutral and less bold language might 
camouflage the fact that ‘abortion is an act of killing’. In support of the assertion that 
abortion is an act of killing, which has the justificatory force of a fact in the Court’s legal 
argumentation, the judge resorted to the language practiced in other legal language 
games, specifically in positive law. The main concern was the branding of abortion in 
law as an unjust act; law ‘cannot dispense with clearly labeling this procedure as                                                         
979 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
980 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
981 BVerfGE 39, 1 (40) 
982 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
983 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
984 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
985 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
986 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
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“unjust”’ 987.  
[...] the employment of penal law for the punishment of ‘acts of 
abortion’ is to be seen as legitimate without a doubt; it is valid law 
in most cultural states under prerequisites of various kinds – and 
especially corresponds to the German legal tradition. 988 
 The legal condemnation of abortion is constitutionally required and must, 
additionally, clearly appear ‘in the legal order existing under the constitution’989; from a 
linguistic-analytical perspective, legal language games extending from an eye looking 
through the lens of constitutional law and occupied with the subject matter should 
contain propositions expressing the disapproval of abortion. Such disapproval was not 
expressed in the provisions of the statute under scrutiny, argued the FCC, since it was 
left unclear ‘whether an interruption of pregnancy which is not “indicated” is legal or 
illegal after the repeal of the criminal penalty through § 218a StGB990. The Court 
deferred to another viewpoint, namely that of ‘the unbiased reader of the statute’991, in 
support of its argument. Penalization constitutes the clearest possible declaration of legal 
condemnation. An unbiased reader would have the impression, in the Court’s view, that 
§ 218a StGB ‘completely removes, through the absolute repeal of punishability, the legal 
condemnation – without consideration of the reasons – and legally allows the 
interruption of pregnancy under the prerequisites listed therein.’ 992 What does the text 
‘say’, in line with the Gadamerian hermeneutic strand presently drawn upon, the reader? 
The picture that results is of a nearly complete decriminalization of 
the interruption of pregnancy […].993 
 Emphasis on the picture of ‘nearly complete decriminalization’ ensuing from 
the statutory reform, besides affirming the necessity of methodological insistence on 
portrayals and offering impetus to refine our tools to those ends in view of the apparent 
significance of the pictures and images reproduced in practicing the law, suggests the 
Court’s concern re the impact of pictorial rendering on the shaping of legal 
                                                        
987 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
988 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
989 BVerfGE 39, 1 (53) 
990 BVerfGE 39, 1 (53) 
991 BVerfGE 39, 1 (53) 
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consciousness994. The Court acknowledges the force of pictures, irrespective of whether 
they reflect actual facts, to influence the legal consciousness of human beings involved 
in this case, but also of society as a whole. The existence of an order of values is as 
important as ‘the observable reaction in an individual case’, because it enhances ‘the 
long-range effect of a penal norm which in its principal normative content (“abortion is 
punishable”) has existed for a very long time.’995 On the other side of the coin, concerns 
about the receptivity of the meaning produced by the Court in the Abortion I Case imply 
a didactic stance and could constitute a prelude to paternalism.  
No doubt, the mere existence of such a penal sanction has influence 
on the conceptions of value and the manner of behavior of the 
populace (cf. the report of the Special Committee for the Penal Law 
Reform, Federal Parliamentary Press, 7/1981 new p. 10). The 
consciousness of legal consequences which follows from its 
transgression creates a threshold which many recoil from crossing. 
An opposite effect will result if, through a general repeal of 
punishability, even doubtlessly punishable behavior is declared to 
be legally free from objection. This must confuse the concepts of 
‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ dominant in the populace. The purely 
theoretical announcement that the interruption of pregnancy is 
‘tolerated,’ but not ‘approved,’ must remain without effect as long 
as no legal sanction is recognizable which clearly segregates the 
justified cases of abortion from the reprehensible. If the threat of 
punishment disappears in its entirety, the impression will arise of 
necessity in the consciousness of the citizens of the state that in all 
cases the interruption of pregnancy is legally allowed and, therefore, 
even from a socio-ethical point of view, is no longer to be 
disapproved. The ‘dangerous inference of moral permissibility from 
a legal absence of sanction’ (Engisch, In the Quest for Justice, M 
1971, p. 104) is too near not to be drawn by a large number of those 
subject to the law.996 
 The FCC, the eye in Wittgenstein’s simile, is occupied with subsuming other 
viewpoints under the produced legal language game, to ensure that these are in accord 
with ‘the conceptions of value’, ‘the concepts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’’, more generally,                                                         
994See ‘Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness’, International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences (New York: Elsevier, Pergamon Press, 2001); online www.iesbs.com 8623ff. [‘[…] legal 
consciousness usually refers to micro level social action, specifically the ways in which individuals 
interpret and mobilize legal meanings and signs. […] If research on legal culture focuses attention on 
the myriad ways in which law exists within society generally, the study of legal consciousness traces 
the ways in which law is experienced and interpreted by specific individuals as they engage, avoid, or 
resist the law and legal meanings.’]; Stürner, who, in discussing the ‘Kind als Schaden’ problem notes 
how this conception is socio-politically the false signal and states: ‘Gesteigerte Fürsorge für solche 
Menschen darf nicht entscheidend vom Mißglücken ihrer Verhinderung abhängen. 
Verfassungskonkretisierung in diesem Bereich ist eine hohe rechtskulturelle Aufgabe des BVerfG.’ In 
Stürner (1998) 317, 330 
995 BVerfGE 39, 1 (57) 
996 BVerfGE 39, 1 (57f.) 
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with what is morally permissible ‘from a socio-ethical point of view’997. Penal sanctions, 
due to the gravity of their legal consequences, create, as the Court put it, a threshold 
‘which many recoil from crossing’, in other words, cause the boundaries of the legal 
language game to be exceptionally rigid and stiff. This threshold can be attributed to the 
indirect molding of legal consciousness, rather than an act of direct state force. The 
citizens of the state are led, in ontological terms, to refrain from traversing the limit set 
by law in view of the resultant strict legal consequences or, in linguistic-analytical terms, 
to produce meaning from a viewpoint decisively and profoundly attuned to a viewpoint 
formed by the dominant moral law as the lens attached to the eye of the responsible state 
actors.  
 Penal sanctions have compelling rhetorical force; they prohibit the inference of 
moral permissibility. The alleged danger of presumption of moral permissibility in the 
absence of legal sanctions is reported in legal scholarship as ensues from the reference in 
the supra excerpt. In drawing on legal literature to support the justificatory basis of its 
argument the Court demonstrated surveyance of the scholarly discourse. Relying on the 
report of the Special Committee for the Penal Law Reform, the FCC asserted the impact 
of merely the fact of penalization on the legal consciousness of the populace. Important 
linguistic-analytical remarks spring from the above arguments. Penal sanctions are 
understood as a means to the shaping of certain ethics among the populace. The legal 
consequences of penal sanctions reduce the likelihood of confusion about ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’, and about the distinction between ‘justified’ and ‘reprehensible’ actions. This 
polarization indicates the rigidity of the boundaries of legal language games ensuing 
from an outlook on the field of sight through the lens of penal provisions. The Court’s 
didactic stance is plain to see. The conceptions of value and the manner of behavior of 
citizens should adhere to the moral law.  
 The practice of penal sanctions consists elementally in the expression of the 
moral condemnation of abortion in linguistic propositions. Citizens become conscious of 
the fact of penalization and, mindful of its legal consequences, shape their viewpoint and                                                         
997 Moral permissibility in accordance with the values dominant among the populace is not critical in 
view of self-determination of the individual human being as guaranteed by the law of human dignity. 
Rather, what is at stake in the Abortion I Case is that a third party, that is, the unborn child is affected 
by the interruption of pregnancy decided and performed in free will by the pregnant woman. See 
Köhne (2004) 285, 287 [‘Dem Versuch, (angeblich) anerkannte Wertvorstellungen der Gesellschaft 
über das freie Individuum zu stellen, steht der Grundgedanke des GG, dass der einzelne Mensch in 
seiner Bedeutung über allem steht, entgegen. Eine ‘abstrakte Menschenwürde’, die das freiwillige – 
keinen Dritten schädigende – Verhalten von Menschen einschränkt, ist mit dem Menschenbild des GG 
nicht in Einklang zu bringen und deswegen abzulehnen.’]  
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actions accordingly. This new insight is of utmost importance; it leads to an 
advancement of the ontological observation that perspective transforms being998. 
Circularly, being originates in a particular perspective declares its presence in the world, 
hence can be surveyed. Reflexively, being influences the formation of perspective. 
Minding that the ethical presents itself at the limit of the world, that is, precisely where 
the metaphysical subject is located in the linguistic-analytical model, the assumption of 
certain dominant ethics among the general populace and the identification, by means of 
penal sanctions, of the morally permissible compose the portrayal of the didactic stance 
of the Court in the Abortion I Case, ensuing from the reflexive coexistence of the lens of 
moral law representing the ethical in a given order and viewpoints of metaphysical 
subjects linguistic-analytically subsumed under the field of sight. The assumption of 
dominant ethics shared by the general populace begs for sound justificatory grounds.  
 Another instantiation of the Court’s didactic stance surfaces in the discussion 
about the role of counseling centers. The FCC noted that the statutory instruction about 
available public or private assistance ‘could be interpreted to mean that the counseling 
centers should only inform, without exerting influence directed to the motivational 
process.’999. The Court argued – portraying at once the assumed viewpoint of physicians 
entrusted with instruction about assistance to pregnant women, mothers, and children – 
that ‘[s]ocial law and social reality are […] very difficult for the technically trained 
person to comprehend […]’1000, and that, according to documented experiences in 
England, ‘an influence by the physician on the pregnant woman for the continuation of 
the pregnancy is highly improbable.’1001 
The passionate discussion of the abortion fabric of problems 
[Problematik] may provide occasion for the fear that in a segment 
of the population the value of unborn life is no longer fully 
recognized. This, however, does not give the legislature a right to 
resignation. It rather must make a sincere effort through a 
differentiation of the penal sanction to achieve a more effective 
protection of life and formulate a regulation which will be 
supported by the general legal consciousness. 1002 
 The supra excerpt is illustrative of the interplay between the practice of law, 
portrayed as a legal language game, and life. The FCC expressed concern, specifically                                                         
998 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
999 BVerfGE 39, 1 (61) 
1000 BVerfGE 39, 1 (62) 
1001 BVerfGE 39, 1 (62) 
1002 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
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‘fear’, about the actuality of the full recognition of the value of unborn life in a segment 
of the population, and insisted on the reworking of the penal sanction by the legislature 
towards the more effective protection of life and the correspondence, to the highest 
degree possible, between the regulation and general legal consciousness. The reflexive 
process1003 of the influence of perception, the eye’s viewpoint, on being and, vice versa, 
of being on perception is discernible in the above portrayal.    
 Penal law protects the elementary values of community life. ‘Punishment, 
however, can never be an end in itself.’1004 In other words, penal law constitutes just 
means to ends other than its own practice. The law of human dignity guarantees, in light 
of its Kantian philosophical foundations, respect for and protection of human beings as 
ends in themselves. The telos of practicing law is the human being and his or her worth, 
and this ensures that law be humane and not inhumane. The legislature, in the Court’s 
view, in deciding on the employment of penal law, has the latitude to express ‘the legal 
condemnation of abortion required by the Basic Law in ways other than the threat of 
punishment.’1005 From a linguistic-analytical perspective, a parenthetical, yet interesting, 
observation is that the FCC as an eye looking through the lens of constitutional law 
engages in defining and delimiting another legal actor’s legal language game, that is, 
another eye’s viewpoint and field of sight1006.  
vi. The principle of proportionality and the logical form  
 Humanism meets pragmatism in the ad hoc decision on measures that 
effectively secure the actual protection of unborn life and reflect the importance of the 
legal value enjeu. The constitutionality of practicing penal law depends on compliance 
with the principle of proportionality, another concept that embodies the meta-dimension 
of law. As a principle of the rule of law, ‘which prevails for the whole of the public law, 
including constitutional law’1007, the principle of proportionality compels the legislature 
‘to use this [penal law] means only cautiously and with restraint.’1008 The principle of 
proportionality, precisely on account of its relation to the rule of law, expresses the 
                                                        
1003 Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 12; See also Susanne Baer, ‘Verfassungsvergleichung und reflexive 
Methode: Interkulturelle and intersubjektive Kompetenz’ (2004) 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Max-Planck-Institut) 735 
1004 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
1005 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
1006 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
1007 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
1008 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
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logical form ‘shown’ in the world as postulated by Wittgenstein1009. Precisely because 
the logical form can be ‘shown’ and cannot be ‘said’1010, the language and meaning of 
the principle of proportionality presents a certain impropriety, constitutes a ladder-term, 
a surplus-concept that articulates the ineffable as nonsensical. At the same time, the 
normative character of the principle of proportionality demands that the logical form be 
‘shown’ in propositions delivering the produced meaning in legal language games.1011 
On the other hand, the objection that a state duty to punish can 
never be deduced from a norm of the Basic Law which guarantees 
freedom is not decisive. If the state is obligated by a fundamental 
norm which determines value to protect an especially important 
legal value effectively even against the attacks of third parties, 
measures will often be unavoidable which touch upon the areas of 
freedom of other bearers of fundamental rights. In this respect, the 
legal situation in the employment of social-legal or civil law means 
is not fundamentally different than the enactment of a penal norm. 
Differences exist, perhaps, with respect to the intensity of the 
required interference. In any case, the legislature must resolve the 
conflict arising from this situation through a balancing of both of 
the fundamental values or areas of freedom in opposition to each 
other according to the standard of the ordering of values in the 
Basic Law and in consideration of the constitutional principle of 
proportionality. If one were to generally deny that there was any 
duty to employ the means of the penal law, the protection of life, 
which is to be guaranteed, would be essentially restricted. The 
seriousness of the sanction instituted for the annihilation is to 
correspond to the worth of the legal value threatened with 
destruction. The elementary value of human life requires criminal 
law punishment against the annihilation of life.1012 
 The FCC emphasized the importance of the legal value enjeu and, in view of the 
gravity of the violation effectuated through abortion, acknowledged that the 
consequences of the political duty to punish on the fundamental values and the freedom 
of other bearers of fundamental rights cannot be foreclosed. The ‘intensity’ of the 
required interference was signified as an indicator of difference between socio-legal or 
civil law means and penal norms, yet was not elaborated on. The dissenting opinion on 
the contrary points to the ‘intensity’ of penal law measures as the decisive parameter in 
appreciating the meaning thereby produced from the vantage point of the law of human 
dignity and fundamental rights. Ultimately, the Court defined the standards that the                                                         
1009 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.121)  
1010 ibid (4.1212) 
1011 See another excerpt that intimates the logical form in the Abortion I Case, BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
[‘[…] in enacting penal norms, it should be considered that limits should be set to the penal law from 
the precept of sensible and moderate punishment.’] 
1012 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
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legislature should apply in resolving this conflict of fundamental values, namely the 
value order of the Basic Law and the principle of proportionality, both conceptual 
embodiments of law’s meta-dimension, and deferred to the legislature on the statutory 
regulation of abortion. Law’s humanism and pragmatism intersect: to effectively ensure 
humanism, concretized as the duty to protect unborn life in the Abortion I Case, the 
legislature cannot be denied the option of employing penal law measures. The gravity of 
the sanction corresponds to the worth of the legal value threatened.  
vii. The portrayal of abortion as a ‘phenomenon of social life’ within the legal 
language game 
 Controversy and discord over the question of the legal treatment of abortion are 
mirrored in the Court’s legal language game. How should law react to the phenomenon 
of the interruption of pregnancy? ‘Various points of view’1013 compose the setting of 
public discussion. Abortion is an exceptionally multidimensional ‘phenomenon of social 
life’ raising ‘manifold problems of a biological, especially human-genetic, 
anthropological, medical, psychological, social, social-political, and not least of an 
ethical and moral-theological nature, which touch upon the fundamental questions of 
human existence.’1014  The FCC hints not only at the various facets of human being-ness 
manifested in the Abortion I Case, but also at the content of the field of sight 
corresponding to the abortion language game. In the legal language game, as a subtotal 
of a language game, the Court demonstrated awareness of the diverse sources of insights 
into the subject matter.  
 Identification of controversy and discord over the legal treatment of the 
interruption of pregnancy1015 and reference to the multidimensionality of the problem set 
the stage for the decision of the Court on the legal treatment of abortion in line with the 
Basic Law, particularly the law of human dignity. In view of the slipperiness of the case 
                                                        
1013 BVerfGE 39, 1 (35) 
1014 BVerfGE 39, 1 (35f.) 
1015 For instance, the FCC looked into the legislative history of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG in support of 
the principle [Grundsatz] that in doubtful cases an interpretation that furthers to the highest possible 
degree the judicial effectiveness of the fundamental norm should be preferred [See BVerfGE 39, 1 
(37f.)]. The Court presented different arguments that arose in the debate between Representatives in the 
Parliamentary Council on issues such as how compulsory sterilization and abortion should be treated in 
light of the right to life [BVerfGE 39, 1 (38f.)]. The Court overviewed the debate and did not exclude 
from the legal language game opposition to the dominant position on the matter, BVerfGE 39, 1 (39) 
[‘However Parliamentary Representative Dr. Greve (SPD) declared: “I must explicitly say here, for the 
record, that at the least as far as I am concerned, I do not understand the right of germinating life to be 
within the right to life.”’] 
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before the Court this foreground serves a rhetorically significant function: it underlines 
the difficulty of constructing arguments on the subject matter that are universally 
persuasive. Consequently, the Court sought to establish the relevance of the decision, 
which could well be understood as a contribution to the argumentation on abortion, to 
the state of the discourse. In light of the linguistic-analytical model, the constant state of 
flux of the boundaries delineating the legal language game represents the 
multidimensionality of the matter as exemplified in the Abortion I Case. 
The conflict in the Abortion I Case is synopsized in the infra excerpt: 
The right of the woman to the free development of her personality, 
which has as its content the freedom of behavior in a comprehensive 
sense1016 and accordingly embraces the self responsibility of the 
woman to decide against parenthood and the responsibilities 
flowing from it, can also, it is true, likewise demand recognition and 
protection. This right, however, is not guaranteed without limits – 
the rights of others, the constitutional order, and the moral law limit 
it. A priori, this right can never include the authorization to intrude 
upon the protected sphere of right of another without justifying 
reason or much less to destroy that sphere along with the life itself; 
this is even less so, if, according to the nature of the case, a special 
responsibility exists precisely for this life. 1017 
 The Court justifies the limits set to the freedom of the pregnant woman to the 
development of her personality by recourse to the rights of others, thus directly invoking 
a relational account of fundamental rights meaning, the constitutional order, namely the 
critical lens of constitutional law and the totality structure it generates, and, finally, the 
moral law. Parallels can be fluently drawn between the text and the definition of freedom 
in Totality and Infinity. Freedom ‘must justify itself’ 1018 and freedom is not ‘justified by 
freedom’1019. Limits can and need to be set to its arbitrariness1020, and it must be 
tempered with justice. 
 Constitutional law appears plainly as the critical lens forming the viewpoint of 
the judge’s eye and permeates comprehensively the legal language game in framing the 
meaning of abortion, understood primarily as significance, in the following statement: 
[…] the fundamental attitude of the legal order which is required by 
the constitution with regard to the interruption of pregnancy 
becomes clear: the legal order may not make the woman’s right to                                                         
1016 See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 223 [freedom] 
1017 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43) 




self-determination the sole guideline of its regulations. The state 
must proceed, as a matter of principle, from a duty to carry the 
pregnancy to term and therefore to view, as a matter of principle, its 
interruption as an injustice. The disapproval of abortion must be 
clearly expressed in the legal order. The false impression must be 
avoided that the interruption of pregnancy is the same social process 
as, for example, approaching a physician for healing an illness or 
indeed a legally irrelevant alternative for the prevention of 
conception. The state may not abdicate its responsibility even 
through the recognition of a ‘legally free area,’ [rechtsfreien 
Raumes] by which the state abstains from the evaluation and 
abandons this judgment to the decision of the individual to be made 
on the basis of his own sense of responsibility. 1021 
 The interval of a hypothetical, ‘approaching a physician for healing an illness’, 
serves to explain what could amount to a false impression. The dramatization by means 
of creating a plot, a scenario, is tantamount to a vivid incarnation of the event of false 
impression. In terms of enhancement of the rationality of the point furthered, this 
dramatization is not significant. What purpose does it serve? Responding to that question 
could require the traversal of disciplinary boundaries so as to plunge into poetics or 
literary criticism. For the purposes of this critical reflection on the text, it suffices to note 
that, from a mainstream perspective, the dramatization identified in the text, does not 
necessarily ameliorate the argument. It intensely, however, triggers the visualization of 
the scenario of a false impression, it arms the argument with poetic and rhetorical force 
and it penetrates our feelers, aiming probably at sensitizing and influencing those at the 
receiving end of the produced meaning at the level of legal consciousness.1022 
viii. Law’s meta-dimension and the value order [Wertordnung] as a tool of 
critical reflection 
 Reference to the ethical and moral-theological aspects of abortion ‘which touch 
upon the fundamental aspects of human existence […]’1023 resonates law’s meta-
dimension, which is practiced, as argued, exceptionally in human dignity legal language 
games. The doctrine of the objective ordering of values constitutes a foundational aspect 
of argumentation in the Abortion I Case, while the language it introduces into the legal 
language game witnesses the practice of law’s meta-dimension. On closer look, in 
uttering nonsense – what can only be ‘shown’ – the concept of the objective ordering of                                                         
1021 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) 
1022 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 477 [Practicing law, that is, exercising power 
over the production of meaning ‘depend[s] upon an aesthetic and dramaturgic activity […].’] 
1023 BVerfGE 39, 1 (35) 
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values triggers critical reflection on how, or whether, law’s meta-dimension finds 
practice in the Court’s legal language game.  
According to the constant jurisprudence of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the fundamental legal norms contain not only 
subjective rights of defense of the individual against the state but 
embody, at the same time, an objective ordering of values, which is 
valid as a constitutionally fundamental decision for all areas of the 
law and which provides direction and impetus for legislation, 
administration, and judicial opinions [cited cases omitted]. Whether 
and, if so, to what extent the state is obligated by the constitution to 
legal protection of developing life can therefore be concluded from 
the objective-legal [objektiv-rechtlichen] content of the fundamental 
legal norms.1024 
 The profound authority of the objective ordering of values, ‘as a constitutionally 
fundamental decision for all areas of the law’, over the meaning produced in legal 
language games is particularly problematic from a linguistic-analytical perspective. The 
decisive impact of the objective ordering of values on the viewpoint of legal actors is 
portrayed as ‘direction’ and ‘impetus’ for all branches of state power to adhere to those 
values in producing meaning from their respective viewpoints. Each field of the legal 
order ‘according to its special function’1025 adheres to the objective ordering of values. 
Ethics direct and drive law’s practice. The objective ordering of values as ‘the objective-
legal content of the fundamental legal norms’ compels the legal protection of developing 
life, in other words defines ‘whether’ and ‘to what extent’ there is a constitutional duty 
to protect developing life. This duty ‘is comprehensive’, namely entails ‘not only self-
evidently direct state attacks on the life developing itself’ but also the protection and 
promotion of this life, ‘that is to say, it [the state] must, above all, preserve it even 
against illegal attacks by others.’1026  
 The doctrinally introduced concept of the objective ordering of values 
communicates that values are determinants of meaning in legal language games. It 
should be highlighted that the Court in the Abortion I Case did not identify specific 
values, but rather affirmed that an objective ordering of values exists and has controlling 
influence on the production of meaning. Values allude to ethics, hence law’s meta-
dimension, whereas the words ‘objective’ and ‘ordering’ suggest the totality that serves 
as the doctrinal vessel of those values within the legal language game. The ‘fundamental                                                         
1024 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41f.) 
1025 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
1026 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
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legal norms’ that ‘embody’ an objective ordering of values imply a totality structure. 
Concentrating presently on the linguistic-analytical understanding, it would be fair to 
assume, at least at first glance, that the concept of the objective ordering of values 
attempts, partly, to put into words the ineffable. Is the objective value order doctrine an 
appropriation of law’s meta-dimension to legal language games? Does law’s meta-
dimension survive this appropriation? Does subsumption under the sui generis totality 
structure of legal language games alone suffice to ensure the humane practice of legal 
values? Is the ‘objective ordering of values’ symptomatic of an oxymoron in view of 
linguistic-analytical and phenomenological insights? Does it force the transcendental, 
what can only be ‘shown’, not ‘said’, into propositions composing the legal language 
game?  
 Are there other conceivable understandings of the objective ordering of values 
doctrine in light of the linguistic-analytical insights at our disposal? The objective value 
order could be serving the purpose of stating the ethics ‘shown’ in the propositions of 
fundamental legal norms. Analogously, then, to Wittgenstein’s considerations re the 
logical form and the transcendental, ethics and aesthetics, which are only ‘shown’ 
respectively in – and not expressed through – propositions and at the limit of the world, 
and as such must be exterior to the space defined by the limits of our language, what is 
the significance of the embodiment of ethics in law, and, what is more, what does the 
subjection of the transcendental to the construct of an ‘objective ordering’ mean? 
Another possible understanding springs from reflection on the conceivable hermeneutic 
purpose of this construct by analogy with the ladder metaphor; naming precisely what 
Wittgenstein contends can only be ‘shown’ and not ‘said’ functions as a ladder that 
assists us in ascending to understanding. The ladder then, Wittgenstein advices, should 
be discarded. Expressing that which amounts to nonsense if ‘said’ enhances the 
hermeneutic process. Unless this action is understood as a stage in a circle of critical 
reflection1027 it can have the adverse effects of indeed rendering the witnessing of ethics                                                         
1027 Palmer (1969) 25 [‘For the interpreter to “perform” the text, he must “understand” it: he must 
perunderstand the subject and the situation before he can enter the horizon of its meaning. Only when 
he can step into the magic circle of its horizon can the interpreter understand its meaning. This is that 
mysterious “hermeneutical circle” without which the meaning of the text cannot emerge. But there is a 
contradiction here. How can a text be understood, when the condition for its understanding is already to 
have understood what it is about? The answer is that somehow, by a dialectical process, a partial 
understanding is used to understand still further, like using pieces of a puzzle to figure out what is 
missing. A literary work furnishes a context for its own understanding; a fundamental problem in 
hermeneutics is that of how an individual’s horizon can be accommodated to that of the work. A 
certain preunderstanding of the subject is necessary or no communicton will happen, yet that 
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in law an oxymoron and of compromising the emptiness by establishing a status quo, 
that is, not throwing away the ladder after having climbed on it1028. A further question 
would investigate what necessitates putting into words law’s meta-dimension in the first 
place, that is, stating and doctrinally framing the ineffable in the practice of law, and 
why the language chosen, the values conveyed and the values silenced or – ostensibly – 
ignored differ among legal orders and cultures; this enterprise however begs for the 
introduction of sociologically and historically derived insights into a transdisciplinary 
project, thus exceeds present purposes.  
The degree of seriousness with which the state must take its duty to 
protect increases as the rank of the legal value [Rechtsgut] in 
question increases in importance within the order of values of the 
Basic Law. 1029 
 The hierarchy of legal values within the value order of the Basic Law is most 
relevant to the inquiry into law’s meta-dimension in light of the law of human dignity. 
‘Rechtsgut’, the term used in the original text and translated into legal value at present, 
comprises the word ‘Gut’, which is found also under proposition (4.003) in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus as ‘das Gute’, translated into ‘the Good’ in relation to ‘das 
Schöne’, translated into ‘the Beautiful’. Clearly ‘the Good’ suggests ethics, while ‘the 
Beautiful’ aesthetics. The term ‘Rechtsgut’ denotes ethics and, as the supra excerpt 
indicates, Rechtsgüter accorded a particular rank in the order of values of the Basic Law. 
The gravity of the duty of the state to protect is analogous to the rank of the legal value 
enjeu. At a later stage in the Court’s legal syllogism, ‘life’ is identified as the ‘highest 
personal legal value’1030. 
 How does Wittgenstein conceive of hierarchies in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and how can linguistic-analytical insights refine our understanding of 
law’s meta-dimension as it manifests in legal values? Hierarchies, according to                                                                                                                                                               
understanding must be altered in the act of understanding. The function of explanatory interpretation in 
literary interpretation may be seen, in this context, as an effort to lay the foundations in 
“preunderstanding” for an understanding of the text.’]; Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law 
(2000) 124 [‘Modern hermeneutics describes interpretation as a conversation between text and reader, 
in which the meaning of the text is its transformative impact on a reader. Hermeneutic theorists tend to 
portray interpretation as a ‘circular’ movement of dialogue between a reader and a text, since the reader 
must find what in the text is meaningful to her concerns, while being open to persuasion and learning 
from the text. In this way, hermeneutics suggests an ethic and epistemology of openness to persuasion 
by other points of view, and an aesthetic of openness to experience, or spontaneity.’]; See, for 
theoretical grounds, Hoy, The Critical Circle (1982) 
1028 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.54) 
1029 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
1030 BVerfGE 39, 1 (59) 
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Wittgenstein ‘are and must be independent of reality’1031. To the extent that legal values 
are perceived as components of a hierarchical structure, they are, in the sterilized and 
rigid tone of Wittgenstein’s propositions in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
independent of reality. Drawing this analogy enhances the portrayal ensuing from the 
above excerpt in that it intimates where legal values are to be located in the introduced 
model. The transcendental, namely the ‘value’ aspect of ‘legal values’, and the implied 
hierarchical structure in its entirety are ‘independent of’ or irrelevant to reality. What 
happens to the ‘legal’ aspect of ‘legal values’? This is the meaning ‘we ourselves 
construct’, that is, produce, and, thus, ‘can foresee’.1032 This point evidently alludes to 
the notions of totality and infinity in the phenomenological account of the law of human 
dignity. The foreseeable and controllable, what lies within our grasp, corresponds to the 
totality quality of law, while the independence of hierarchy from reality evokes 
‘something always missing’ as infinity. The inherently paradoxical Janus face of the 
notion of ‘legal values’, ‘turned simultaneously to morality and to law’ 1033, surfaces in 
this portrayal.  
ix. Equation apropos human dignity 
 The FCC noted the irreconcilability of the human dignity v. human dignity 
conflict, since ‘[a] compromise which guarantees the protection of the life of the one 
about to be born’ while permitting the pregnant woman to undergo abortion freely is 
impossible on account of the fact that ‘the interruption of pregnancy always means the 
annihilation of the unborn life.’1034. The conflicting constitutional values are to be 
viewed, in line with established doctrine in FCC jurisprudence, ‘in their relationship to 
human dignity, the center of the value system of the constitution [cited cases 
omitted].’1035  
A decision oriented to Art. 1 sec. 1 GG must come down in favor of 
the precedence of the protection of life for the child en ventre sa 
mere over the right of the pregnant woman to self-determination.                                                         
1031 ibid (5.5561) 
1032 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (5. 556) 
1033 Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ (2010) 
41(4) Metaphilosophy 464 at 470; See Georg Lohmann, ‘‘Menschenrechte zwischen Moral und Recht’ 
in Stefan Gosepath & Georg Lohmann, ed. Philosophie der Menschenrechte (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1998) 62–95 
1034 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43) 
1035 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43); BVerfGE 35, 202 (225) (1973) [Lebach Case] [‘Hierbei sind beide 
Verfassungswerte in ihrer Beziehung zur Menschenwürde als dem Mittelpunkt des Wertsystems der 
Verfassung zu sehen.’] 
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Regarding many opportunities for development of personality, she 
can be adversely affected through pregnancy, birth and the 
education of her children. On the other hand, the unborn life is 
destroyed through the interruption of pregnancy. According to the 
principle of the balance which preserves most of competing 
constitutionally protected positions in view of the fundamental idea 
of Art. 19 sec. 2 GG precedence must be given to the protection of 
the life of the child about to be born. This precedence is valid as a 
matter of principle for the entire duration of pregnancy and may not 
be placed in question for any particular period of time. 1036 
 This excerpt portrays concisely the conflict in the Abortion I Case. Proposition 
(6.2323) of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus1037 reads, ‘The equation characterizes 
only the standpoint [den Standpunkt] from which I consider the two expressions [von 
welchem ich die beide Ausdrücke betrachte], that is to say the standpoint of their 
equality of meaning [...]’. Equation does not serve ‘to show that both expressions, which 
are connected by the sign of equality, have the same meaning: for this can be perceived 
from the two expressions themselves.’1038 For present purposes it suffices to observe that 
human dignity operates as the standpoint apropos which the propositions in support of 
the protection of unborn life and those treating the right of the pregnant woman to self-
determination are balanced in the above excerpt. Another factor influencing the equation 
is Art. 19 sec. 2 GG, which rules out interference with the essence [Wesensgehalt] of 
fundamental rights1039. 
 Bearing in mind that linguistic-analytical insights deduced from the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus serve as sources of analogies and impetus for critical reflection on 
the practice of the law of human dignity, the mathematical remark that ‘equations 
express the substitutability of two expressions’ certainly cannot accurately portray the 
modus operandi of balancing. Be that as it may, it intimates how the process of 
balancing operates in a human dignity v. human dignity conflict. The equation traced 
here is later elaborated on in the phenomenological portrayal of the Abortion I Case in 
view of Levinas’ reflections on mediation. 
                                                        
1036 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43) 
1037 Wittgenstein (n 1032) (6.2323) 
1038 ibid (6.232) 
1039 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 34 [‘Zunächst darf die Unantastbarkeit (i.S. der 
Uneinschränkbarkeit) der Menschenwürde begrifflich nicht mit der Wesensgehaltgarantie vermischt 
werden. Art. 19 Abs. 2 garantiert im Zusammenhang mit der Eischränkbarkeit der Grundrechte (Art. 19 
Ans. 1 S. 1) die Unantastbarkeit ihres Wesengehalts.’] 
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x. Another self-reflective look: the majority opinion as a subtotal of the legal 
language game emanating from the eye of the dissenters (Dissenting 
opinion) 
 Naturally, the language practiced in the majority opinion features as the point of 
reference in the dissenting opinion. The dissenters noted that the majority had neglected 
to treat the uniqueness of the relationship between the child en ventre sa mere and the 
mother and moved on to distinguish abortion from other risks to life. Moreover, the 
majority’s appreciation of the ‘social fabric of problems [Problematik] previously found 
by the legislature’1040, namely of surveyance of pragmatic considerations in the field of 
sight, was deemed insufficient by the dissenters. The legal language game of the 
majority opinion failed, according to the dissenters, to demonstrate comprehension of the 
‘aims of urgent reform’1041. The dissenters argued that ‘each solution remains patchwork 
[Stückwerk]’1042 and, therefore, from the viewpoint of the legislature and in line with 
comparative insights from ‘other western civilized states’1043, the preference of social-
political measures instead of ‘largely ineffective penal sanctions’1044 is not 
‘constitutionally objectionable.’1045 
The constitution nowhere requires a legal ‘disapproval’ of behavior 
not morally respectable without consideration of its actual 
protective effect.1046 
 The dissenters defined the ‘classical function’ of the FCC as defense ‘against 
injuries to this sphere of freedom from excessive infringement by the state power’1047 
and located penal provisions at the top of the hierarchy of possible infringements by the 
state, noting that ‘they demand of a citizen a definite behavior and subdue him in the 
case of a violation with sensitive restrictions of freedom or with financial burdens.’1048  
Judicial control of the constitutionality of such provisions therefore 
means a determination whether the encroachment resulting either 
from the enactment or application of penal provisions into protected 
                                                        
1040 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1041 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1042 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1043 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1044 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1045 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1046 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1047 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1048 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
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spheres of freedom is allowable; whether, therefore, the state, 
generally or to the extent provided, may punish.1049 
The dissenters essentially agreed with the majority of the FCC re the 
constitutional permissibility of the term solution. Demonstrating surveyance of 
comparative insights and referring to the establishment, at the same period of time, of 
the third term solution in the seminal Roe v. Wade decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, the dissenters noted, ‘[t]his would, according to German 
constitutional law, go too far indeed.’1050 However, they stressed, the meaning of 
fundamental rights is not to promote penal measures, but rather to draw the 
boundaries of this manifestation of state authority.  
According to the liberal character of our constitution, however, the 
legislature needs a constitutional justification to punish, not to 
disregard punishment, because, according to its view, a threat of 
punishment promises no success or appears for other reasons to be 
an improper reaction [cited decisions omitted]. 1051 
Application of the linguistic-analytical model to portray this position captures 
the distinct quality of the law of human dignity and fundamental rights; they are 
practiced as law, and at the same time set limits to law’s practice. In linguistic-
analytical terms, the priority of the law of human dignity and fundamental rights as 
lenses through which meaning is produced apropos all other legal means is associated 
with the linguistic and semantic overlapping of the human being, that is, the 
metaphysical subject at the limit of the world, and human dignity. 
xi. Distinguishing between viewpoints (Dissenting opinion) 
The differing meaning corresponding to viewpoints represented in the legal 
language game is transparently portrayed and commented on in the dissenting 
opinion. The dissenters drew a distinction between the viewpoint of the pregnant 
woman undergoing abortion or a third party performing the interruption of pregnancy 
with her consent and the viewpoint of the state. They stressed, ‘the constitutional 
assessment of the killing of a child en ventre sa mere […] is less pertinent than 
drawing conclusions from such a killing by the state, as, for example, by the Nazi 
                                                        
1049 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1050 BVerfGE 39, 1 (74) 
1051 BVerfGE 39, 1 (74) 
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regime which had taken up a rigorous position corresponding to its biologically 
oriented ideology towards population.’ 1052  
The text of judicial decisions is just an aspect of the practice of law. The 
distinction among viewpoints portrayed in the legal language game of the dissenting 
opinion exemplifies this proposition, and conveys how facets of law’s practice – 
especially those manifested on the face of individual human beings or related to the 
human factor within institutions – escape our grasp1053. State action as production of 
meaning is more extensively documented, hence accessible, than the meaning of the 
world of individual human beings as metaphysical subjects. In the case of the former, 
the probability that it is contained in the field of sight of legal actors is high. As 
regards the latter, the portrayal of their viewpoint and field of sight relies to a 
considerable extend on assumption or even – at times – bias; for that, the 
demonstration of an effort to soundly ground assumptions is imperative. In the 
Abortion I Case, the difficulty of constitutional assessment is intensified on account 
of the particularity of the relationship between the pregnant woman and the child en 
ventre sa mere.  
xii. The employment of examples (Dissenting opinion) 
The dissenters laid out a thorough presentation of the sociological 
phenomenon apropos the effectiveness of the legal condemnation of abortion by 
means of penal law. The pragmatic considerations raised in the dissenting opinion are 
analyzed to ultimately inform the viewpoint of the legislature, which, as the 
constitutional judge directs, ‘cannot be indifferent to the fact that illegal interruptions 
of pregnancy lead even today to injuries of health […]’1054 
[…] this is true not only in the case of abortions by ‘quacks’ and 
‘angel-makers,’ but also, to a greater extent, in the case of 
procedures undertaken by physicians because illegality discourages 
the full use of modern equipment and assistance of the required 
personnel or hinders the necessary follow-up treatment. Further, the 
commercial exploitation of women inclined to an abortion in 
Germany and in foreign countries and the social inequality                                                         
1052 BVerfGE 39, 1 (76) 
1053 A parallel can be drawn between what is referred to presently as ‘the human factor’ and ‘human 
will’; the parallel elucidates the mutually reflexive relationship between the eye and the law as lens. 
See Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 462 [‘The fundamental operation of law is to 
identify legal persons, entitlements, and preferences; when law has identified all of these, it has fully 
represented society. On this view of law, authority is vested solely in human will, and it is the 
essentially mimetic task of law to reflect and enforce that will.’] 
1054 BVerfGE 39, 1 (83) 
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connected with it -appears as a drawback; better situated women 
can, especially by traveling to neighboring foreign countries, much 
more easily obtain an abortion by a physician than poorer or less 
clever ones. Finally, the resulting possibility of subsequent 
criminality must be added to this; thus extortion with the knowledge 
of an illegal abortion stands in third place among the types of 
extortion. 1055 
The language initiated into the legal language game is certainly telling of the 
grassroots origin of the information; the inclusion of up-to-date language deduced 
apparently from a reality-check renders the practice of law relevant to life and 
broadens the boundaries of the legal language game. The unique viewpoints of 
metaphysical subjects and, consequently, of the (legal) language games emanating 
therefrom can be depicted in light of the concept of family resemblances as 
introduced in the Philosophical Investigations. The poetic and dramaturgic manner1056 
of attending to the human condition in practicing law evinced in the above excerpt 
and the fluency with which images are evoked in association with human dignity 
indicate how the term invites the institution of common language and meaning at least 
at the aesthetic, if not at the political and legal/doctrinal level. The advantage1057 of 
pausing at this non-mainstream level of production of meaning for a moment is that 
we discover a niche in the practice of that law in texts, where the pluralism of unique 
viewpoints and, at the same time, lived experience, is celebrated as another field of 
critical reflection performed with an affirmative attitude towards alterity, rather than 
polemicized. 
c. Phenomenological 
The phenomenological portrayal of the practice of the law of human dignity in 
the Abortion I Case looks at points of controversy in the text through a lens grounded 
in insights and language derived from Levinas’ Totality and Infinity. Who is 
conceived as the self and who is the other? What amounts to a responsible response 
and can we identify the face-to-face encounter in the majority or dissenting opinion? 
                                                        
1055 BVerfGE 39, 1 (83) 
1056 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 477 [‘[…] the display of literacy, aesthetic 
refinement, and rhetorical skill are all means of staking a claim to […] symbolic capital.1056 The 
“literary” use of language therefore has a practical, power-enhancing dimension. […] conserving 




i. Self-reflection, responsibility as ability to respond, and the portrayal of the 
human dignity v. human dignity conflict 
Where in the text can the self’s response to the other be traced? What amounts 
to a responsible answer to the other, in other words what are the standards that 
determine whether a response in fact reflects ability to respond? How do totality and 
infinity feature in the language employed? The phenomenological approach to the 
Abortion I Case revolves around such considerations. The FCC actively assumes its 
role in the self-reflection of the state as self and seeks to identify the pillars of the 
identity of that self.1058 
The life developing itself in the womb of the mother is recognized as an 
independent legal value enjoying constitutional protection in accordance with Art. 2 
sec. 2 sent. 1 GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. The duty of the state to protect developing life 
is manifested negatively and positively. The Basic Law forbids direct state attacks 
against unborn life and requires the protection and fostering of this life. This duty of 
the state develops its effects even against the mother. The intervention of the state in 
the conflict between the human dignity of unborn life and the human dignity of the 
pregnant woman should, according to the Court, reflect the precedence of the 
protection of the child en ventre sa mere for the entire duration of the pregnancy over 
the pregnant woman’s right to self-determination. In responding to the pregnant 
woman, the Court as self decided that an interruption of the pregnancy is 
constitutional, if necessary to avert a danger to her life or health. The Court added that 
the legislature, another manifested form of the state as self, has the latitude to identify 
further extraordinary burdens that justify leaving abortion unpunished.  
The legislative reform should be compatible with the principle of inviolability 
of unborn life and, furthermore, ensue from the balancing of conflicting fundamental 
rights considerations apropos unborn life and the pregnant woman. The value 
judgment incarnated in the Basic Law should guide state actors in dealing with 
difficult conflicts.                                                         
1058 BVerfGE 39, 1 (67) [‘The Federal Constitutional Court, which is charged by the constitution with 
surveying the observance of its fundamental principles by all organs of the state and, if necessary, with 
giving them effect, can orient its decisions only on those principles to the development of which this 
Court has decisively contributed in its judicial utterances. Therefore, no adverse judgment is being 
passed about other legal orders “which have not had these experiences with a system of injustice and 
which, on the basis of an historical development which has taken a different course and other political 
conditions and fundamental views of the philosophy of state, have not made such a decision for 
themselves” [cited cases omitted].’] 
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A reform of the penal law which is oriented to the basic legal order 
must so structure the regulations governing abortion that the 
protection of developing life is guaranteed at the first opportunity 
under the circumstances. […] Therefore, an absolute precedence 
cannot be granted either to the one right or to the other. In 
especially difficult conflict situations, it is of importance to find 
solutions, which take into account the value judgment of the 
constitution […].1059 
The regulation of terms was considered incompatible with the hierarchy of 
values in the constitution, because it creates the impression that every abortion within 
the first three months of pregnancy has the approval of the law.1060 Emphasis on the 
impression created and the care about its implications hints directly at the interest in 
the quality of the relation to the other at the receiving end of the message conveyed, 
namely, at present, not just the human beings involved in the case, but also the legal 
subjects within the constitutional order of the Basic Law and – it could be argued – 
beyond, namely within a multilevel constitutionalism setting.  
The speaking self and author in the Abortion I Case being the FCC, it is vital 
to first present how the Court understands its own role as the self who produces 
meaning. Constitutional review and the principle of the separation of powers 
manifested in the text as an aspect of judicial practice can be viewed as self-reflection 
mechanisms1061. The order of the Basic Law sets the terms of self-reflection as a 
totality structure. The Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law is a statutory regulation 
‘which was decided upon after extraordinary comprehensive preparatory work’. The 
role of the constitutional judge is to examine the work of the legislator ‘only from the 
viewpoint of whether it is compatible with the Basic Law, which is the highest valid 
law of the Federal Republic.’ 1062 
The constitutional requirement to protect developing life is directed 
in the first instance to the legislature. The duty is incumbent on the 
Federal Constitutional Court, however, to determine, in the exercise 
of the function allotted to it by the Basic Law, whether the 
legislature has fulfilled this requirement. Indeed, the Court must 
carefully observe the discretion [Spielraum] of the legislature which 
belongs to it in evaluating the factual conditions which lie at the 
basis of the formation of norms by it, of the required prognosis and 
the choice of means. The court may not put itself in the place of the 
legislature; it is, however, its task to examine carefully whether the                                                         
1059 BVerfGE 39, 1 (12f.) 
1060 BVerfGE 39, 1 (12) 
1061 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
1062 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
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legislature, in the framework of the possibilities standing at its 
disposal, has done what is necessary to avert dangers from the legal 
value to be protected. This is also fundamentally true for the 
question whether the legislature is obligated to utilize its sharpest 
means, the penal law, in which case the examination can extend 
beyond the individual modalities of punishment.1063 
Addressing the social phenomenon of abortion necessarily involves 
responding to the other, namely the human beings portrayed in the text of the 
Abortion I Case. Doing ‘what is necessary to avert dangers’ constitutes a responsible 
answer to the other in the context of the Abortion I Case. A responsible answer is also 
contingent on the measures adopted to regulate abortion. Do penal law measures, the 
sharpest means of punishment, amount to a responsible answer? The purpose of this 
study being the portrayal of practice and the identification of questions that may 
trigger further reflection and inquiry across disciplines, I do not engage in affirming 
or negating the exercise of responsibility, that is, ability to respond, on the part of the 
FCC. Rather, I point to instances in the Court’s reasoning that raise questions on 
judicial responsibility. In practicing the Basic Law, the FCC as the self and author of 
decisions sometimes demands that other selves act or refrain from acting. The 
following conditional presents an example of how the FCC orients society, another 
self, towards an understanding of the other and the world in accordance with the value 
order of the Basic Law.  
If society recognizes developing life as a legal value worthy of 
protection and of comparably high rank, it could not make the 
destruction of this legal value dependant upon the untrammeled 
pleasure1064 of the individual without coming into conflict with this 
premise […].1065 
For this mechanism of self-reflection to effectuate, the FCC incorporated in 
the text of the Abortion I Case the meaning produced by other manifested forms of 
the state as self, first and foremost by the legislature.1066 The legislature concluded 
after surveying different viewpoints composing the discourse on abortion on ‘the 
manner in which the legal order should respond to this social process’ 1067. The                                                         
1063 BVerfGE 39, 1 (51) 
1064 See infra for the comment on the phrase ‘untrammeled pleasure of the individual’ in light of 
insights from Totality and Infinity. 
1065 BVerfGE 39, 1 (13) 
1066 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 [‘Die Grundrechtsbindung der Legislative ist institutionell durch die 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit gesichert.’] 
1067 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
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various viewpoints evoke the notion of vision and suggest how discourses are made 
up of intersecting totalities. An intersubjective space eventuates in the intersection of 
the totality of language games – including, of course, the legal language game of the 
Court. Totality and infinity thus coexist in the judicial practice of law.  
It is the task of the legislature to evaluate the many sided and often 
opposing arguments which develop from these various ways of 
viewing the question, to supplement them through considerations 
which are specifically legal and political as well as through the 
practical experiences of the life of the law, and, on this basis, to 
arrive at a decision as to the manner in which the legal order should 
respond to this social process. 1068 
The statutory indications in the presence of which an interruption of 
pregnancy performed by a physician with the consent of the pregnant woman should 
not be punishable (§ 218 StGB) can be perceived as responses to the other on the part 
of the legislature as self. The medical, ethical or criminological, and social or 
emergency indications are responses to the pregnant woman1069; the eugenic 
indication or indication from the condition of the child as laid out in the text of the 
Abortion I Case can be viewed as a response to the pregnant woman and the unborn 
child. 
(b) if, according to the judgment of medical science, compelling 
reasons require the assumption that the child, as a consequence of a 
hereditary disposition or the consequence of harmful influences 
before birth, will suffer damage to its condition of health which 
cannot be alleviated and which condition is so serious that the 
continuation of the pregnancy cannot be demanded from the 
pregnant woman, provided that not more than 20 weeks have 
elapsed since the beginning of the pregnancy (§ 219b Eugenic or 
Indication from the Condition of the Child). 1070 
                                                        
1068 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
1069 BVerfGE 39, 1 (13f.) [‘(a) if the interruption of the pregnancy was indicated in the judgment of 
medical science in order to avert from the pregnant woman the danger for her life or the danger of a 
serious impairment of the state of her health insofar as the danger could not be averted in any other 
way which was exactable for her (§219 Medical Indication); (c) when an illegal act has been 
committed against the pregnant woman pursuant to §176 (the sexual abuse of children), §177 (rape) or 
§179, Par. i (the sexual abuse of those incapable of resistance) and compelling reasons require the 
assumption that the pregnancy resulted from the act, provided that no more than twelve weeks have 
elapsed since the beginning of the pregnancy (§219c Ethical or Criminological Indication); (d) if the 
interruption of the pregnancy is indicated in order to avert from the pregnant woman the danger of a 
grave calamity, provided that the danger cannot be averted in another way that is exactable from her 
and if not more than twelve weeks have elapsed since the beginning of the pregnancy (§219d Social or 
Emergency Indication).’] 
1070 BVerfGE 39, 1 (13) 
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The serious condition of the child justifies not demanding the continuation of 
pregnancy from the pregnant woman. This indication constitutes a response to an 
extreme case1071 of harm to developing life and, at the same time, mirrors the 
particularity of the relation between the pregnant woman and the unborn child, the 
two manifestations of the other in the Abortion I Case and a crosscutting theme in the 
Court’s syllogism. How does the Court depict pregnancy as a manifestation of human 
being-ness? The phenomenological substantiation of human being-ness sets off from 
the first-person viewpoint, ‘who is speaking and why’1072 and, in that respect, differs 
from an ontological treatment of the question.  
The Court admitted that punishment ‘can never be an end in itself’ 1073. Rather, 
penal norms constitute the ‘ultima ratio’1074 in the arsenal of the legislature. Only as 
the ultimate response to the other are penal measures proportional. The principle of 
proportionality is ‘a principle of the rule of law, which prevails for the whole of the 
public law, including constitutional law’ 1075. The meta-dimension of the principle of 
proportionality can be paralleled, in linguistic-analytical terms, to the logical form 
and, in phenomenological terms, to the curvature of an intersubjective space. The duty 
to punish by means of penal sanctions is no ‘absolute’ but rather ‘relative’ in that it 
‘grows out of the insight into the inadequacy of all other means.’ 1076  
Resisting the legal condemnation or punishment of interruptions of pregnancy 
is incompatible with the duty of the legislature to protect life ‘if the interruptions are 
the result of reasons which are not recognized in the value order of the Basic Law 
[…]’ 1077, argued the FCC. That only reasons recognized in the value order of the 
Basic Law matter, denotes the sharp distinction between the sphere of law and the 
sphere of self-determination and self-responsibility of the pregnant woman. At the 
same time, the distinction indicates that the motives and circumstances leading the 
pregnant woman to abortion are ethically appreciated from the vantage point of the 
ordering of values of the Basic Law. How are specific reasons deduced and 
identified? Is the totality representing the vision of the self, looking at life through the 
lens of law, determinant of the reasons compatible with the value order of the Basic                                                         
1071 See Baer, ‘Triangle’ 417 at 459 f. [extremism tendency] 
1072 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 18 [Introduction by John Wild] 
1073 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46) 
1074 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
1075 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
1076 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
1077 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65) 
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Law? Are these reasons contingent on ‘the inexhaustible richness of our lived 
experience’1078?  
Indeed, the limiting of punishability would not be constitutionally 
objectionable if it were combined with other measures, which 
would be able to compensate, at least in their effect, for the 
disappearance of penal protection. That is however – as shown – 
obviously not the case. The parliamentary discussions about the 
reform of the abortion law have indeed deepened the insight that it 
is the principal task of the state to prevent the killing of unborn life 
through enlightenment about the prevention of pregnancy on the 
one hand as well as through effective promotional measures in 
society and through a general alteration of social concepts on the 
other. Neither the assistance of the kind presently offered and 
guaranteed nor the counseling provided in the Fifth Statute to 
Reform the Penal Law are, however, able to replace the individual 
protection of life which a penal norm fundamentally provides even 
today in those cases in which no reason for the interruption of 
pregnancy exists which is worthy of consideration according to the 
value order of the Basic Law. 1079 
Legal actors must explicitly demonstrate ‘less interest in conceptual 
constructions and a greater readiness to listen and learn from experience.’1080 
Totalities are only one, indeed necessary, stage of a critical reflection process in view 
of the infinite unique manifestations of human being-ness in lived experience. 
Encountering the other in responsibility, hospitality and generosity, that is, 
understanding language as practice and justice1081, requires articulation of the criteria, 
processes, sources of knowledge and methodologies on which the self grounded the 
assessment of unreasonableness apropos the value order of the Basic Law in ad hoc 
instances; otherwise, the soundness of the subsumption of reasons under the totality of 
the value order is impaired.  
Effectiveness is the critical standard for assessing responsibility as the ability 
to respond. The limiting of punishability would be constitutional were it combined 
with other measures; this ‘is however – as shown – obviously not the case.’ Is 
ineffectiveness as prevalent as the Court contented, hence a sound justificatory basis 
for rejecting the statutory reform so unequivocally? Does the speaking self 
responsibly articulate and offer to the other the meaning produced? The dissenting 
opinion in the Abortion I Case, as discussed infra, raises an opportunity for                                                         
1078 Levinas (n 1072) 12 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1079 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65) 
1080 Levinas (n 1072) 16 [Introduction by John Wild] 
1081 ibid 213 
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juxtaposition of responses. The Court resorted to parliamentary discussions on the 
reform of the abortion law. The separation of powers appears in texts as aspects of 
judicial practice and sets forth a self-reflection mechanism1082. This mechanism 
enhances the progression of the argumentation by incorporating insights into the 
subject matter, which the speaking self, here the Court, is neither competent nor 
responsible to draw alone. The FCC noticed how parliamentary discussions had 
deepened the insight that abortion should be counteracted ‘through enlightenment 
about the prevention of pregnancy’, namely through the exertion of influence on the 
viewpoint of the other, yet conveys a significantly different tone than ‘reminding’ that 
strongly evokes state paternalism. Other means for the prevention of abortion would 
be ‘effective promotional measures in society’ and ‘a general alteration of social 
concepts’.1083 In linguistic-analytical terms, the alteration of social concepts signifies 
the change of the limits of the world, which would ‘thereby become quite another’1084.  
The Court shed light on what constitutes a responsible answer to the other, 
mindful of the value order of the Basic Law, in other words the totality of ethics 
within the constitutional order or the totalizing of the transcendental. The Court, 
based on a reality-check of the actual effectiveness of measures deemed most 
appropriate to prevent abortion in view of insights deduced from the parliamentary 
discussions, argued that neither the assistance presently offered nor the counseling 
provided in the statutory reform could replace the individual protection of life ensured 
fundamentally by penal norms. In other words, the FCC upheld the employment of 
penal measures as a responsible, namely effective, answer to unborn life. The only 
reservation concerned cases where reasons for abortion exist which are ‘worthy of 
consideration according to the value order of the Basic Law’1085. If the legislature 
considers the undifferentiated threat of punishment ‘a questionable means for the 
protection of life’1086, it can opt for differentiated penal regulation. Be that as it may, 
the legislature ‘is not thereby released from the duty to undertake the attempt to 
achieve a better protection of life’1087 and to introduce penal measures for those cases 
of interruption of pregnancy condemned on constitutional grounds.  
                                                        
1082 See Schnapp (1989) 1, 1 
1083 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65) 
1084 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.43) 
1085 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65) 
1086 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65) 
1087 BVerfGE 39, 1 (65) 
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The phenomenological account of humanism consists in responding to the 
other in responsibility, generosity and hospitality. The definition of what amounts to a 
responsible answer to the other in ad hoc instances of practicing the law of human 
dignity determines in concreto the meaning of humanism. The effectiveness of penal 
measures panegyrized in the majority opinion of the Abortion I Case lies significantly 
in their didactic function. Penal norms have the power to shape individual and 
collective legal awareness. There are still standards that need to be met for penal 
measures to qualify as a responsible answer. Cases demanding penal regulation 
should be clearly distinguished from those in which the continuation of pregnancy is 
an unreasonable expectation on the part of the state. Clarity ‘will strengthen the power 
of the penal norm to develop legal awareness’ [wird die rechtsbewußtseinsbildende 
Kraft der Strafnorm verstärken]1088, in other words will enhance its effectiveness. The 
Court identified the shaping of legal awareness as the telos of punishment. The 
cultivation of legal awareness is imperative for abortion to be effectively averted. Are 
penal measures, still, a responsible answer?  
One who generally recognizes the precedence of the protection of 
life over the claim of the woman for an unrestricted structuring of 
her life will not be able to dispute the unjust nature of the act in 
those cases not covered by a particular indication. 1089 
The FCC sought to harmonize the viewpoint of the – individual and collective 
– other with the viewpoint formed by the law as a lens before the eye of the self, 
namely, in the present instance, of the constitutional judge. Despite the recognition of 
the latitude of the legislature to identify further indications rendering the prohibition 
of abortion by penal measures unreasonable, the enumeration of particular indications 
as such implies a totality structure imposed on the experience of the other and 
rendering it graspable. Critical reflection should focus on whether categories of 
indications conceptually foreclose the infinity of case-specific, unique reasons – 
circumstances and motivations – for undergoing an abortion. The dual sense of 
‘something missing’ as the defining aspect of law’s Menschenbild and the non-
subsumption or subsumption of each case under an indication are two different 
stories.  
                                                        
1088 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
1089 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
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The assertion that one who values and recognizes the precedence of the 
protection of life over the claim of the woman to exercise her freedom without 
restrictions ‘will not be able to dispute the unjust nature of the act’ where it is not 
covered by indications begs critical reflection. Is it an assumption? An 
oversimplification? A generalization? Or does neutrality and logical consistency 
evident in the argument that ‘one who generally recognizes the precedence of the 
protection of life’ cannot concede to an act that necessarily destroys life suffice as 
grounds for the soundness of the syllogism? From a phenomenological perspective, 
the Court’s approach to the development of legal awareness destroys the essential 
distance between the self and the other.  
If the state not only declares that these cases are punishable but also 
prosecutes and punishes them in legal practice, this will be 
perceived in the legal consciousness of the community neither as 
unjust nor as anti-social. 1090 
The rhetorical and didactic significance of punishment is plain to see. The 
declaration of punishability and the actual prosecution and punishment of abortion in 
legal practice reinforce the statement made by the constitutional order re the value of 
life. The perception of the penalization of abortion as being neither unjust nor anti-
social, however, does not necessarily mean that an affirmative proposition, namely 
that penalization is just and social, holds true. For the latter proposition to stand, 
separate elaboration on its grounds is required, for instance by means of putting 
forward concrete arguments in support of the just and social character of penalization 
or bringing forth empirical evidence of how the members of the community perceive 
of penalization. Critical reflection on the negative articulation is therefore called for to 
examine whether this suffices to soundly establish positively delineated grounds for 
upholding the penalization of abortion in the legal consciousness of the community. 
The Court concluded on the nullity of the provision ‘[w]ithin this framework’ 
[‘[in] diesem Umfang’]1091. Nullity [‘Nichtigkeit’]1092, from a phenomenological 
perspective, constitutes the response of the FCC to the legislature’s non-response or 
irresponsible response to the other. § 218a StGB as in the Fifth Statute to Reform the 
Penal Law was found incompatible with Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG in conjunction with 
Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 1 GG for excluding from penalization even those cases of abortion                                                         
1090 BVerfGE 39, 1 (66) 
1091 BVerfGE 39, 1(68) 
1092 BVerfGE 39, 1(68) 
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for which no reasons, recognized within the value order of the Basic Law, exist. 
Incompatibility with the value order can be construed to suggest an irresponsible 
response to the other. However, in the hermeneutic and literary analysis of the text of 
the Abortion I Case, effectiveness has surfaced as the key language in the production 
of meaning. Apropos the standard of effectiveness as the indicator of responsibility 
the nullity of the provision is a reaction to the legislature’s non-response to the social 
phenomenon of abortion; an ineffective response is equivalent to non-response.  
The FCC enjoined the legislature to practice the principle of proportionality 
‘only cautiously and with restraint.’1093. Constitutional review and the principle of the 
separation of powers are mirrored in texts as aspects of judicial practice and are 
presently portrayed as a self-reflection mechanism. The legislature, held the Court, is 
not prohibited from expressing the constitutionally required legal condemnation of 
abortion required by the Basic Law in ways other than the threat of punishment, in 
other words has the latitude to choose how to respond. 
The decisive factor is whether the totality of the measures serving 
the protection of the unborn life, whether they be in civil law or in 
public law, especially of a social-legal or of a penal nature, 
guarantees an actual protection corresponding to the importance of 
the legal value to be secured. In the extreme case, namely, if the 
protection required by the constitution can be achieved in no other 
way, the legislature can be obligated to employ the means of the 
penal law for the protection of developing life. 1094 
‘Actual protection’ is the standard for judging whether the response to 
developing life, ‘the legal value to be secured’, is responsible and commensurate to its 
importance. The humanism of law, expressed in the protection of legal values, is 
contingent on the pragmatism implied by the requirement of actual protection through 
the practice of law. The ‘final means’ of punishment ‘must also be employed, if an 
effective protection of life cannot be achieved in other ways’1095. A responsible 
answer to the other, here to developing life, is a response that develops effects. The 
‘worth and significance’1096 of the legal value enjeu require an effects-oriented 
approach to the practice of state responsibility in line with the Basic Law.  
Delivering upon the duty to protect developing life against the mother by 
means of penal law ‘may give rise to special problems, which result from the unique                                                         
1093 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1094 BVerfGE 39, 1 (46f.) 
1095 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
1096 BVerfGE 39, 1 (47) 
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situation of the pregnant woman.’1097 The pregnant woman as the other is understood 
in the Abortion I Case as a human being in a unique physical and emotional condition 
that is ‘immediately evident and need not be set forth in greater detail.’ 1098 What can 
be derived from this description for the purposes of the present portrayal is the 
uniqueness of the state of being pregnant as a concrete image of human being-ness, 
and the intimation of the multidimensionality of human being-ness through emphasis 
on both the physical and emotional condition of the pregnant woman. Whether this 
portrayal is telling of a relation with the other instituted in language and 
substantiating, in consequence, the ability of the speaking self to respond, remains 
open to critical reflection and requires closer scrutiny. Justification in legal 
argumentation, in light of phenomenological insights, amounts to the articulation of 
the world as an offering to the other, that is, in responsibility and generosity. The 
‘immediately evident’, in rendering further explications redundant, could justify 
overlooking the importance of demonstrating how the self came to a particular 
appreciation and portrayal of the other, and the value of putting forward illustrative 
concrete examples.  
Decisions involving moral judgments are inherently ambiguous and 
controversial, because, as the linguistic-analytical portrayal of the law of human 
dignity shows, metaphysical subjects, the bearers of ethics and aesthetics, are ‘a 
boundary of the world’1099, hence same in that everything they see and describe could 
also be otherwise. The phenomenological enhancement of the introduced model with 
Levinas’ insights into the radical separation between the self and the other allows for 
another understanding of the self-restraint required on the part of the legislature, 
namely, ultimately, the responsible state actor for deciding whether the conduct of the 
pregnant woman deserves punishment or not, and whether an interruption of 
pregnancy is constitutionally accepted upon balancing the conflicting interests. 
Unreasonableness is the standard for evaluating whether the self demonstrated 
the ability to respond to the other in the Abortion I Case. The FCC engaged in the 
determination of the content of this standard. It first excluded circumstances ‘which 
do not seriously burden the party under duty, since they represent the normal situation 
                                                        
1097 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1098 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1099 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 15-16 [Introduction] 
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with which everyone must cope.’1100 Critical reflection on the words ‘seriously’ and 
‘normal’ poses the question: Do they arbitrarily totalize the portrayal of human beings 
involved and of their lived experience? The Court further explained that only 
circumstances ‘of considerable weight’, which ‘render the fulfillment of the duty of 
the one affected extraordinarily more difficult, so that fulfillment cannot be expected 
from him [or her] in fairness [reasonably]’ [die dem Betroffenen die Erfüllung seiner 
Pflicht außergewöhnlich erschweren, so dass sie von ihm billigerweise nicht erwartet 
werden kann]1101, can ground the assessment of unreasonableness of the burden on the 
pregnant woman.  
Inner conflicts experienced by the pregnant woman qualify as unreasonable 
burdening; responding to such circumstances with criminal penalties ‘does not appear 
in general to be appropriate’ [angemessen]1102, namely does not amount to a 
responsible answer to the pregnant woman on the part of the state. The Court 
explained that the employment of criminal penalties in such cases ‘applies external 
compulsion where respect for the sphere of personality of the human being demands 
full inner freedom of decision.’1103 External compulsion alludes to the forced traversal 
of limits in the ontological account of the practice of the law of human dignity, and 
can be phenomenologically depicted as subsumption of the personal sphere of the 
human being under a totality that effectively denies the other the very possibility of 
producing own meaning. External compulsion, in other words, destroys the possibility 
of conversation. Conversation, explains Levinas, cannot ‘renounce the egoism’1104 of 
the self; in conversation the other as Other is granted ‘a right over this egoism’1105. 
The standard of unreasonableness mediates the self’s response to the other. 
The FCC applied the standard of unreasonableness to the indications introduced by 
the statutory reform under scrutiny. The Court agreed that the interruption of 
pregnancy is reasonable ‘when it is proven that [it] […] is required ‘to avert’ from the 
pregnant woman ‘a danger for her life or the danger of a grave impairment of her 
condition of health’ (§ 218b, No. 1 […]).’1106 Sacrificing1107 the right to life and                                                         
1100 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1101 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1102 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1103 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1104 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 40 
1105 ibid 
1106 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1107 The notion of sacrifice appears in the analysis of the Aviation Security Act Case, where it is 
extensively discussed. 
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bodily inviolability under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG ‘cannot be expected of her for the 
unborn life’1108. Similarly to the medical indication, the legislature is free to leave the 
interruption of pregnancy unpunished in the case of burdens for the pregnant woman, 
which are as weighty ‘from the point of view of unreasonableness’1109. Such are the 
extraordinary burdens associated with eugenic, ethical-criminological, and social or 
emergency indications1110 for abortion. 
ii. The evolving self  
The practice of human dignity language within the German constitutional 
order takes on a distinct meaning in view of the historical background of National 
Socialism1111. The state, understood as an evolving self, consciously opposed the 
totalitarian state of National Socialist Regime. The ipseity of the evolving self who 
speaks at the present time demands awareness of who the self was and aims at 
becoming. Perceiving the Basic Law as a reaction to the National Socialist Regime, 
and declaring consciousness of the responsibility before God and human beings in the 
Preamble and recognition on the part of the German people of ‘inviolable and 
inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in 
the world’, in Art. 1 sec. 2 GG, indicate the present, past and future of the state as an 
evolving self. 
The Basic Law is the critical lens before the eye of state actors and as such 
formative of their viewpoint. The contrast between the incorporation of ‘the self-
evident right to life’ into the Basic Law and the Weimar Constitution, noted the 
Court, ‘may be explained principally as a reaction to the ‘destruction of life unworthy 
of life’, to the ‘final solution’ and ‘liquidations,’ which were carried out by the 
National Socialist Regime as measures of state.’1112 The right to life guaranteed under 
Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG along with the abolition of death penalty in Art. 102 GG 
declare the fundamental worth of human life and convey a constitutional order that is 
the antithesis of the totalitarian, limitless state of the National Socialist Regime for 
which ‘individual life meant little’1113 and was, just as death, at the disposal of 
detrimental state practices. Historical context exerts influence on the meaning,                                                         
1108 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1109 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1110 The social indication implies the identification of the social dimension of law’s Menschenbild.  
1111 Hufen (2004) 313, 313 
1112 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
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signification and significance, of the other human being, of human being-ness and of 
human dignity. 
iii. Tracing totality and infinity: the value order and the law of human dignity 
The draft under scrutiny rejected the regulation of terms solution as 
irreconcilable with the value order of the Basic Law1114, despite relevant lively 
discussions in the Weimar Republic and at the time of the Abortion I Case in favor of 
such regulation, and opted for the validity of ‘exceptions from the fundamental 
prohibition of the interruption of pregnancy’ only on the basis of statutory 
indications.1115 The hierarchy of values in the Basic Law permeates the Court’s 
reasoning in the Abortion I Case, particularly in the construction of the major premise 
of the legal syllogism.  
The gravity and the seriousness of the constitutional question posed 
becomes clear, if it is considered that what is involved here is the 
protection of human life, one of the central values of every legal 
order. The decision regarding the standards and limits of legislative 
freedom of decision demands a total view of the constitutional 
norms and the value order contained therein. 1116 
The phrase ‘one of the central values of every legal order’ [eines zentralen 
Wertes jeder rechtlichen Ordnung] alludes to the notions of infinity and totality as in 
the phenomenological account of the law of human dignity. Are values – directly 
evocative of ethics – to be subsumed under the totality of the legal order? The FCC 
delineated the latitude of the legislature to respond to the interruption of pregnancy 
and set requirements for the attainment of the ability to respond. Reaching a decision 
‘demands a total view of the constitutional norms and the value order contained 
therein’ [eine Gesamtschau des verfassungsrechtlichen Normenbestandes und der in 
ihm beschlossenen Wertordnung.]1117. The requisite of a ‘total view’, namely of 
exhaustive surveyance, in order to justify a decision re the standards and limits of 
legislative freedom of decision, presupposes that constitutional norms and the value                                                         
1114 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43f.) [‘[…] The opinion expressed in the Federal Parliament during the third 
deliberation on the Statute to Reform the Penal Law, the effect of which is to propose the precedence 
for a particular time ‘of the right to self-determination of the woman which flows from human dignity 
vis-à-vis all others, including the child’s right to life’ (German Federal Parliament, Seventh Election 
Period, 96th Session, Stenographic Reports, p. 6492), is not reconcilable with the value order 
[Wertordnung] of the Basic Law.’] 
1115 BVerfGE 39, 1 (13) 
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order contained therein can be surveyed. It becomes clear that the value order is 
rendered graspable through constitutional norms and, what is more – a heuristic 
remark – their textual form and doctrinal character; the therein-comprised ethics are 
subject to the totalizing vision of the Court as self. This points to the purpose served 
by subsuming ethics under totality structures, such as constitutional norms, in the 
practice of law.  
The value order of the Basic Law, the ethics underlying the structuring of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, ‘may be understood only in light of the historical 
experience and the spiritual-moral confrontation with the previous system of National 
Socialism.’ 1118. The motif of the evolving self evidenced in this observation appears 
in all cases explored in Chapter Two. According to the majority opinion, ‘something 
missing’ as a Leerstelle in the practice of the law of human dignity is to be imbued 
with meaning drawing on the historical context of the Basic Law. 
[…] the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany has erected 
an order bound together by values which places the individual 
human being and [his or her] dignity at the focal point of all of its 
ordinances. At its basis lies the concept, as the Federal 
Constitutional Court previously pronounced […], that human beings 
possess an inherent worth as individuals in the order of creation 
which uncompromisingly demands unconditional respect for the life 
of every individual human being, even for the apparently socially 
‘worthless,’ and which therefore excludes the destruction of such 
life without legally justifiable grounds. This fundamental 
constitutional decision determines the structure and the 
interpretation of the entire legal order. Even the legislature is bound 
by it; considerations of socio-political expediency, even necessities 
of state, cannot overcome this constitutional limitation […]. Even a 
general change of the viewpoints dominant in the population on this 
subject if such a change could be established at all would change 
nothing. 1119 
Limitless dominion over all areas of social life as the distinctive trait of the 
omnipotent totalitarian National Socialist state brings forward the arbitrariness of 
freedom and the authority of the totality of vision over meaning as in Totality and 
Infinity. The totalitarian state functions as a rigid system that ignores the essential 
precedence of the social: ‘prior to these systems, which are required to meet many 
needs, and presupposed by them is the existing individual and his ethical choice to 
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welcome the stranger and to share his world by speaking to him.’1120 The social 
precedes the systematic. The systematic presupposes ‘first freely making a choice for 
generosity and communication, i.e., for the social.’1121 A hermeneutic and literary 
reading of the perception of the German Basic Law as a response to the historical 
background of the National Socialist state, which stripped human life of meaning, 
prompts the appreciation of the dramatic verb ‘erected’ [hat […] aufgerichtet]1122, 
which emphasizes the stimulating willingness of the pouvoir constituant and the 
groundbreaking character of the establishment of ‘an order bound together by values 
[wertgebundene] which places the individual human being and [his or her] dignity at 
the focal point of all of its ordinances […]’1123.  
The Basic Law order is depicted as a sui generis totality. The totality of the 
constitutional order is bound by values, hence has a foundational ethical component. 
The ethical is the transcendental; found, as proposed in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, at the limit of the world, precisely where the metaphysical subject, the 
philosophical I, is positioned. The transcendental can only be ‘shown’, not ‘said’, in 
our world. However, as Wittgenstein admits of his own analysis in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, propositions that grasp and utter ‘nonsense’, that is, ‘say’ what 
can only be ‘shown’, could, by analogy with a ladder, be put forward to assist our 
ascendance to an understanding of meaning. The ladder should then be discarded, 
argues Wittgenstein, to ensure the non-institution of a single such proposition 
totalizing our understanding. Throwing away the ladder is called for in critical 
reflection. This process is triggered and catalyzed by ‘nonsensical’, as in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, propositions. The values comprised in the 
order of the Basic Law are propositions stating what cannot be ‘said’. The pouvoir 
constituant and the pouvoir constitué1124, necessarily made up of metaphysical 
subjects, engineered and proferred these values as embedded in the legal language 
games produced.  
In Totality and Infinity, pre-ethics instituted in language as infinity are spelled 
out: hospitality, generosity and responsibility. These are not propositional 
concretizations of the transcendental; rather, the metaphysics of hospitality precede                                                         
1120 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 14-15 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1121 ibid  
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1123 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
1124 Schnapp (1989) 1, 1 
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ontology, that is, are presupposed by all propositions existing in the world. In that 
sense they enable building a ladder in the first place and disposing of it in a spirit of 
critical reflection attuned to the humane practice of law. Imprints of Levinas’ pre-
ethics are traced in the practice of the law of human dignity and fundamental rights. 
Transcendence is, at the same time, transascendance1125; this insight may elucidate the 
spatial figurative rendering of ‘God’ in the Preamble to the Basic Law. For the 
metaphysical subject, the perception and production of meaning is associated with 
ascendance and the traversal of a limit towards a higher point, hence transascendance. 
In light of such phenomenological insights the order of the Basic Law can be 
portrayed as a totality ‘bound together by values’ and premised on the pre-ethics set 
forth in Totality and Infinity. How is the nexus between totality and infinity as two 
sides of the same story depicted, more precisely, in the practice of law? Why has the 
totality of the Basic Law order been characterized as sui generis?   
The order of the Basic Law by analogy with a totality structure ‘places the 
individual human being and [his or her] dignity at the focal point of all of its 
ordinances.’ The concept ‘that human beings possess an inherent worth as individuals 
in the order of creation which uncompromisingly demands unconditional respect for 
the life of every individual human being’ is foundational to the constitutional order, 
and ‘determines the structure and the interpretation of the entire legal order’.1126 The 
practice of the law of human dignity within the totality of the Basic Law order is 
marked by the sui generis coexistence of vision and language, the systematic and the 
social, as in the case of the ordering of values doctrine. The dual sense of ‘something 
missing’ is key to understanding how this coexistence operates.  
Human dignity, the dignity of human beings qua beings is inviolable. The 
linguistic-analytical portrayal of the limit apropos the dual sense of ‘something 
missing’ turns to the symbolic meaning of tautological schemata as analyzed in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and to the metaphysical subject as the limit of the 
world. The limit stands for the meaning, content and form, substance and function, of 
law’s Menschenbild by analogy with the metaphysical subject; it signifies the 
inviolable position of human beings, a reminder of an ought1127. ‘Something missing’ 
as a Leerstelle corresponds to a concrete manifestation of human being-ness. The                                                         
1125 The notion of height is also implied by the metaphor of ascending a ladder in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (6.54) 
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1127 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 1 
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legal guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG protects unborn life in view 
of the prospect of its development from being subject to others’ interests and 
sacrificed to serve others’ ends1128, and presupposes that a separate claim to human 
dignity corresponds to prenatal life.1129 Responding to the claim to a part within the 
realm of law and the objective ordering of values of human beings that have no part 
requires plunging into the context of the Leerstelle with a view to ascertaining its 
meaning and depicting it through language. The phenomenological portrayal builds 
on the linguistic-analytical model.  
iv. Inviolability and morality, the absolutely other, emptiness 
Inviolability can be associated with the proposition of absolute otherness: the 
other can absolve him or herself from the relationship with the self, is thus inviolable. 
The tautological pattern of the definition of morality1130 in Totality and Infinity 
reinforces the relation of the ethical to the limit. The absoluteness of the human 
dignity guarantee is exceptional in the order of the Basic Law. The law of human 
dignity is a Trojan horse within the totality of the German constitutional order. The 
possibility of escape from the totality is foreclosed even on occasion of socio-political 
expediency or necessities of state, or in the case of a general change of the viewpoints 
dominant in the population; these may bring about the fluctuation of the boundaries of 
the totality, but, cannot, alone, effectuate the crack that breaches it. Yet, due to the 
practice of the law of human dignity within it, the constitutional order exists as a 
totality to accommodate the infinity of human being-ness. Human dignity language 
incarnates the meaning of transcendence as transascendance. The dual sense of 
‘something missing’ constitutes a crucial aspect of the meaning of the law of human 
dignity, of the Menschnebild of the Basic Law and of ‘God’ vis-à-vis human beings in 
the Preamble. Practicing the relational account of the law of human dignity amounts 
to deducing meaning from the unique happening of the face-to-face encounter with 
the other. ‘Something missing’ is presupposed by the institution of new meaning 
within legal language games on occasion of that encounter.  
Infinity, ‘the void that breaks the totality’1131, an ‘apparently wholly empty 
notion’1132, signifies, furthermore, the processual aspect of the meaning of the law of                                                         
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human dignity. The dual sense of ‘something missing’ is the other side of the coin of 
the infinity of intersubjective space; it enables the development of that space within 
the totality structure of the order of the Basic Law. The law of human dignity is 
consciously subsumed under the totality of the Basic Law and its ordering of 
values1133, although it has the capacity to effectuate a crack in the totalizing vision of 
the state as self and to transcend the boundaries of any given legal language game, 
thus undermining the uniformity, foreseeability, and clarity of meaning. The practice 
of the law of human dignity in legal language games, in that sense, signifies that law 
provides for the very language – and process – that can subvert it; this is precisely 
what I frame as the human practice of the law of human dignity or any law produced 
in that light. 
v. Face-to-face encounters  
The particularity of face-to-face encounters in the Abortion I Decision is 
attributable to the perplexity of tracing the human factor in three viewpoints within 
the legal language game: the judge, institution and human, the pregnant woman, and 
the unborn child. Different portrayals of the relation of viewpoints subject to the 
authority of the self over meaning are conceivable from the first-person point of view, 
namely the viewpoint of the speaking self, the Court. In one conceivable portrayal, 
the mother and the unborn child are both identified with the other, while in another 
the mother is depicted as self vis-à-vis the unborn and, at the same time, as other vis-
à-vis the speaking self. For the purposes of this argument, the unborn child surfaces as 
the other in either one of the conceivable portrayals. 
Essentially what needs to be further problematized is the portrayal of the 
pregnant woman. If the pregnant woman is just the other, as in the dissenting opinion, 
then the law of human dignity guarantees that the speaking self, in producing 
meaning, respects her radical alterity. The portrayal of this relation, which draws, as a 
hermeneutic and literary enterprise, on the entire content of the speaking self’s legal 
language game, including obiter dictum, should reflect the self’s respect for her 
radical alterity, regardless of the Court’s decision on the arising human dignity v. 
human dignity conflict. If, as in the majority opinion, the pregnant woman is rendered 
at the same time as a self and the other, the constellation of relations within the legal                                                                                                                                                               
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1133 This subsumption is firmly established on Art. 101, 103, 104 GG 
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language game presents further complexities. As self and other, she is schooled at and 
‘reminded of’ responsibilities deriving from her nature. In other words she, as the 
other, is directed by the speaking self as to how she should act as self towards the 
unborn child, the other. The speaking self could be heavily projecting the own 
morality on the other, while assuming – soundly or unsoundly – her viewpoint. The 
different phenomenological portrayals introduce us into the complexity of portraying 
and understanding this instance of practice of the law of human dignity, while 
signaling the need for critical reflection and how this activity should be astutely 
tailored to the alternative constellations of relations’ dynamics within the legal 
language game. 
The law of human dignity ‘uncompromisingly demands unconditional respect 
for the life of every individual human being, even for the apparently socially 
‘worthless’ […].’1134 Life cannot be destructed ‘without legally justifiable 
grounds’1135. Quantification of life cannot ground justifiability; the ‘weighing in bulk 
of life against life’ [Die pauschale Abwägung von Leben gegen Leben]1136, which may 
effectively permit the destruction of an ostensibly smaller group in the interest of 
preserving an allegedly larger sum, ‘is not reconcilable with the duty of an individual 
protection of each single concrete life.’1137 Human dignity is echoed in this 
observation. The interrelatedness of the legal guarantee of human dignity with the 
right to life features centrally in the text the Abortion I Case. Delineating the 
subjective scope of the right to life is critical to asserting whether and how unborn life 
should be protected in light of the Basic Law. The subjective scope of Art. 2 sec. 2 
sent. 1 GG comprises ‘everyone who ‘lives’’, permitting no distinctions ‘between 
various stages of the life developing itself before birth, or between unborn and born 
life’ and understanding ‘everyone’ as ‘every life possessing human individuality’.1138 
Developing life ‘participates in the protection which Art. 1 sec. 1 GG 
guarantees to human dignity’1139 and the state is under a duty to protect this life in line 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG. The Court contended that a distinction between various 
stages of development before birth is not possible and identified ‘human 
individuality’ as the decisive trait of human life, in other words pointed to uniqueness                                                         
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as the defining quality of human being-ness. Uniqueness can be assocatiated with 
absolute otherness and separation in Totality and Infinity; the unattainability of a 
comprehensive understanding of the other, the unique, thus also strange, at least 
initially, human being, is the basis of the self’s desire, and desire fuels the social.  
Where human life exists, human dignity is present to it [‘Wo 
menschliches Leben existiert, kommt ihm Menschenwürde zu’]; it is 
not decisive that the bearer [der Träger] of this dignity [him or 
herself] be conscious of it and know personally how to preserve it. 
The potential faculties present in the human being from the 
beginning suffice to establish human dignity.1140 
Human dignity and human being-ness are inextricably linked; human dignity 
‘is present to’ human life, to wit, is manifested in the existence of human beings. 
From a literary analysis perspective, human dignity, being embedded in human life, 
immediately arises from the human image, the Menschenbild. Hence, its relation to 
human being-ness can be portrayed and perceived as a pictorial rather than 
representational event. Stressing the pictorial character of this coincidence, also 
evoked by the composed term Menschenbild, reinforces the primacy of the face-to-
face encounter in practicing the law of human dignity; the self sees his or her human 
dignity in the face of the other human being.  
The Court clarified, ‘it is not decisive [es ist nicht entscheidend] that the 
bearer of this dignity him or herself be conscious of it and know personally how to 
preserve it.’1141 The phenomenological portrayal shows that the Court takes a course 
different to that of voices in the theoretical discourse on who qualifies as a bearer of 
human dignity and on what grounds. Most paradigmatically, the Leistungstheorie, a 
theoretical stance provoking criticism and opposition in legal theoretical discourse,1142 
proposes a narrow definition of the bearer of human dignity that is a far cry from the 
Court’s position. 
Phenomenology, as defined by its founder Edmund Husserl, studies ‘the 
essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view’1143. This 
analysis focuses on the self’s consciousness of the other. In the statement under                                                         
1140 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41) 
1141 BVerfGE 39, 1 (41); Later the Court expanded on the decisiveness of the evolution of 
consciousness for the constitutional protection of prenatal and postnatal human life. 
1142 Discord as regards the Leistungstheorie is indicative of ambiguity and controversy about human 
dignity meaning; who the human being, the bearer of human dignity, is, is not self-evident, as argued in 
the ontological analysis. 
1143 David Woodruff Smith, Husserl - The Routledge Philosophers (London and New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2007) 1 
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scrutiny, the speaking self is the Court. More broadly, however, all manifested forms 
of the German constitutional state featuring in the text of the Abortion I Case can be 
portrayed as the self. In producing human dignity meaning in the Abortion I Case, the 
Court explained that consciousness of being a bearer of human dignity on the one 
hand, and personal knowledge as to how human dignity can be preserved on the other, 
are not decisive factors. For whom are these criteria ‘not decisive’? The answer is, for 
the self.  
The self’s approach to the other as conveyed in the above excerpt can be 
understood in light of phenomenological insights presented in Chapter One as an act 
spurred by desire that ‘feeds on itself’1144, rather than need that seeks ‘to fill a 
negation or lack in the subject’1145. Desire ‘is positively attracted by something other 
not yet possessed or needed […]’1146. The distance between the self and the other as 
perceived from the first-person point of view is founded on conversation, goodness 
and desire1147. The Court’s position under scrutiny effectively portrays the 
phenomenology of the practice of the law of human dignity in the majority opinion of 
the Abortion I Case. The negative delineatation of the bearer of human dignity in the 
Court’s phrasing, namely not requiring consciousness and knowledge of how to 
preserve human dignity for the ascertainment that it is borne, permits the 
phenomenological portrayal of the speaking self. That the self discerns the 
manifestation of human dignity in the face of the other without requiring that the 
other perceives of it1148 can be understood as goodness, generosity, and hospitality 
towards the other and is consistent with accepting the other’s absolute separation.  
Human dignity can be grounded on potentiality as an inherent quality of 
human being-ness; ‘the potential faculties present in the human being from the 
beginning suffice to establish human dignity.’ Potentiality is associated with the 
continuity of human being-ness. Guaranteeing human beings their continuity1149 runs 
parallel to the unforced unfolding of human being-ness as presented in the ontological                                                         
1144 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1145 ibid 19 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1146 ibid  
1147 ibid 39 
1148 In the case of unborn life this holds true in any event, because the unborn human being cannot 
perceive of his or her human dignity. The danger of paternalism inheres in most other cases where the 
self evaluates the appropriateness and permissibility of how the other perceives of him or herself as a 
human being and a bearer of human dignity and fundamental rights. The law of human dignity 
mediates the relationship between the self and the other and destroys the radical distance separating 
them in instances of paternalistic practice: the other is not perceived as absolutely Other.  
1149 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21  
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account of the law of human dignity. The dual sense of ‘something missing’ is an 
essential aspect of the meaning of potentiality. The unfolding of human beings 
perceived as a movement towards realizing their potential is a movement towards 
infinity, an ‘apparently wholly empty notion’1150 or ‘something always missing’. The 
progressive development of human beings’ potential institutes positively ‘something – 
previously – missing’. The potential faculties being attained, ‘something missing’ as a 
Leerstelle is filled with concrete meaning. Potentiality as an aspect of human dignity 
meaning is illustrative of the correlation between ‘something missing’ and ‘something 
always missing’ in the practice of the law of human dignity. 
The constitutional duty of the state as self to respect and protect the dignity of 
human beings can be interpreted as an expression of Levinas’ pre-ethics. Prior to 
demonstrating where these positively determined pre-ethics can be traced, it is vital to 
draw attention to clues of practice of the dual sense of ‘something missing’. Turning 
back, then, to Levinas’ pre-ethics, the meaning, the importance of having pre-ethics 
positively uttered as in Totality and Infinity and the contribution of Levinas’ language 
to an affirmative stance towards ‘something missing’ can be better appreciated.  
Law’s Menschenbild entails the dual sense of ‘something missing’ as it 
represent the human face within the realm of law. Law’s Menschenbild trails the 
meaning of the concept of human dignity and, vice versa, the legal guarantee of 
human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG assumes the dual sense of ‘something missing’. 
The practice of human dignity in legal texts stands for the occasion of a face-to-face 
encounter with the other. According to the Court, the particulars of human life, ‘the 
vital basis of human dignity and the prerequisite of all other fundamental rights’1151 
and an ultimate value within the order of the Basic Law, that is, within a totality 
structure, need not be established [night näher begründet warden muss]. Similarly, 
the Menschenbild of law need not be concretized. ‘something missing’ and 
‘something always missing’ allow for the face-to-face encounter, the relational, 
phenomenological meaning of practicing the law of human dignity, to effectuate. 
Different manifestations of state power are represented in the text of the 
Abortion I Case. Where in that text can we trace the face-to-face encounter between 
the self and the other? The Federal Minister of Justice, in an opinion submitted on 
behalf of the Federal Government, noticed the disparity between relationship of the                                                         
1150 ibid 50 
1151 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
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child en ventre sa mere to the mother as a natural phenomenon and its portrayal 
within the realm of law. The Federal Minister of Justice argued against the 
compulsory and uniform penalization of the interruption of pregnancy in view of the 
history of the origin of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG, and the observation that ‘the point at 
issue […] is neither attacks by the state nor defense against attacks by third parties 
because the relationship of the child en ventre sa mere to the mother is of a special 
kind.’1152 In other words, the representative of the executive branch of state power 
resisted the institution of rigid totality structures for dealing with the interruption of 
pregnancy.  
[...] the child en ventre sa mere is united with the body and the life 
of the mother in the most intimate manner conceivable. Nature has 
already placed the protection in the direct care of the mother. The 
possibilities for the legal order to protect unborn life even against 
the mother are limited by the nature of the situation. Penal, 
according to previous experience, can only induce pregnant women 
to bearing the child to term in a limited measure, if the willingness 
is not already present. The duty to protect, therefore, cannot 
establish for the state a thoroughgoing duty to punish. With the 
withdrawal of the penal sanction for an interruption of pregnancy in 
the first weeks of pregnancy the state does not bestow upon the 
mother a right to the operation. The legislature merely limits the 
penal sanction with reference to the fact that other arrangements for 
protection would be seen as more appropriate and effective or to 
take account of interests of the pregnant woman which are worthy 
of protection. 1153  
The Federal Minister of Justice sought to clarify a range of considerations 
raised in the abortion discourse. The juxtaposition of how the unborn child, the other, 
is conceived in law, namely as ‘an intrinsic legal value’, with how it actually exists in 
life, that is, attached to the body and the life of the mother ‘in the most intimate 
manner conceivable’ is illustrative of the chasm between two different perspectives, 
hence also between two fields of sight. Only the pregnant woman can respond as self 
to the unborn child as the other, because nature ‘has already placed the protection in 
the direct care of the mother’. The intimacy and directedness of the relationship of the 
child en ventre sa mere to the mother are elements of the portrayal ensuing from the 
above excerpt. The ‘nature of the situation’ limits the legal order as regards 
interventions aiming at the protection of unborn life against the mother. The 
relationship of the child en ventre sa mere to the mother could perhaps be understood                                                         
1152 BVerfGE 39, 1 (24f.) 
1153 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
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as sui generis social if we consider potentiality sufficient a basis for establishing the 
social, despite the impossibility of a face-to-face encounter in language; in any the 
case the nature of this relationship cannot be reconciled with the notion of totality and 
the order of systems. 
Ultimately, the authority over meaning belongs by nature to the pregnant 
woman. The limited effectiveness of penal measures ‘if the willingness [of the 
mother] is not present’ is empirically verified, and this expression of the state as self, 
Federal Minister of Justice, demonstrated readiness to listen and learn from 
experience. The appreciation of the decisiveness of the willingness of the pregnant 
woman apropos averting the interruption of pregnancy suggests that the Federal 
Minister of Justice as self views her as an absolute, that is, absolving, other. In 
directing the legislature with respect to how it should approach the subject matter 
before it, the Federal Minister of Justice laid out an understanding of the gravity of 
this situation of conflict for the pregnant woman as the other, and noted ‘that the 
decision for an interruption of pregnancy as a rule […] is made in the depths of the 
personality.’1154 
A penal provision, therefore, would not be able regularly to reach 
women inclined to, or ready for, an interruption of pregnancy. 1155 
On those grounds the Federal Minister of Justice stated that ‘the duty to 
protect’, which translates in phenomenological terms into a duty to give a responsible 
answer to the other, ‘cannot establish a thoroughgoing duty to punish.’1156 Punishment 
is not foreclosed as a possible responsible answer; it is the totality of a 
‘thoroughgoing’ duty to punish that this manifestation of the state as self opposes to. 
A further clarification, that ‘withdrawal of the penal sanction […] does not bestow 
upon the mother a right to the operation […]’1157, demonstrates an effort on the part of 
this self to prevent confusion over meaning or unattended to conclusions re the 
implications of an action. This effort to clarify meaning, which constitutes per se an 
indication of strife to demonstrate ability to respond, appears in the identification of 
the motives of the legislature, as another manifestation of the self, in limiting the 
                                                        
1154 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
1155 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26f.) 
1156 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
1157 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
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penal sanction in the statute under scrutiny. ‘Why’ is the legislature ‘speaking’1158 the 
way it does in this statute? Because, as the opinion of the Federal Minister of Justice 
conveyed, penal sanctions do not always amount to a responsible answer to the 
pregnant woman undergoing abortion. Other arrangements ‘would be seen as more 
appropriate and effective’ [geeigneter und wirksamer]1159. Appropriateness and 
effectiveness surface in the text of the Abortion I Case as defining standards of 
responsibility, that is, the ability to respond to the other.   
No more extensive requirement for the structuring of the general 
legal order can be inferred as a matter of principle from Art. 2 sec. 2 
sent. 1 GG than that of guaranteeing appropriate and effective 
protection of unborn life. 1160 
The inquiry into the most appropriate and effective measures is composed of 
common sense assertions and empirical insights. An appeal to common sense is traced 
in the conditional, ‘if a woman should consider an interruption of pregnancy in spite 
of the risk of her own health or indeed her own life, a situation is presented which 
would require a program of counseling and assistance.’1161 Counseling and assistance 
have the prospect of bringing to bear the responsibility towards the pregnant woman 
as appropriate and effective measures, ‘since many of these women still vacillate in 
their decision and have definitely not decided upon an interruption of pregnancy from 
the beginning.’1162 Counseling essentially entails a face-to-face encounter with the 
other and alludes to the infinity of intersubjective space in the thought of Levinas. 
Counseling, argued the Federal Minister of Justice, can cultivate a positive stance 
towards pregnancy in the woman. The humanism of law orients counseling towards a 
concrete goal: ‘[t]hat the counseling must be directed to the continuation of the 
pregnancy is clear.’1163 The opinion reacted against the thoroughgoing threat of 
punishment and the expert opinion required by the regulation of indications; these can 
be portrayed as totalities that respectively weaken the effectiveness of counseling and 
harm the direct and straightforward participation of the pregnant woman in the 
                                                        
1158 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 18 [Introduction by John Wild] 
1159 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
1160 BVerfGE 39, 1 (24) 
1161 BVerfGE 39, 1 (27) 
1162 BVerfGE 39, 1 (27) 
1163 BVerfGE 39, 1 (28) 
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counseling process1164 as a face-to-face encounter. From a phenomenological 
perspective, this expression of the state as self clearly favored approaching the other 
in responsibility, hospitality and generosity, rather than subsuming the other under 
rigid totality structures and the impersonal neutrality of expert opinions.  
The Federal Minister of Justice called for respect for the personal 
responsibility of pregnant women. A value decision giving support to the personal 
responsibility of the pregnant woman would be of ‘decisive constitutional 
meaning’1165. The legislature would ground the regulation of this area of life on the 
natural responsibility of the woman for her child en ventre sa mere. Regulations 
attuned to the natural responsibility convey correspondence between law and nature. 
The phenomenological significance of the ‘constitutional meaning’ produced is 
evident in the allusion to the legislature as the self, as the one who must speak in 
order for that meaning to eventuate. The role of the legislature as a manifested form 
of state power is to survey all legal positions and bring them into balance ‘in the face 
of the reciprocally influencing and limiting value decision and fundamental 
rights.’1166 From a phenomenological point of view, the legislature as the self is 
expected to consider diverse legal responses emanating from the viewpoint of other 
selves, and to counterbalance them. The Federal Minister of Justice concluded that the 
regulation of terms of the Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law was compatible with 
Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 2 GG, and that addressing the social phenomenon of abortion, 
namely responding to human beings involved, with the counseling of pregnant 
women during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy ‘guarantees even without penal 
sanction, the necessary protection of unborn life.’1167  
The Court turned to the explanations provided by the representative of the 
Federal Government in the deliberations of the Special Committee for the Reform of 
the Penal Law for the justification of the indications in the statutory provision. 
                                                        
1164 BVerfGE 39, 1 (27) [‘A thoroughgoing threat of punishment even for the first period of pregnancy 
as it is proposed in the regulations for indications decisively weakens the effectiveness of the 
counseling and offers of assistance. Since a regulation of indications inevitably presupposes in a certain 
form a system of expert opinion, it subjects the pregnant woman to the compulsion of abiding by this 
expert opinion. This, however, would be harmful to a candid participation of the pregnant woman in 
the counseling and would frequently lead in the cases of women inclined toward and ready for abortion 
to the result that the path to counseling and to the expert opinion center would be avoided from the 
beginning.’] 
1165 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
1166 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
1167 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
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The decisive viewpoint [Der entscheidende Gesichtspunkt] is that in 
all of these cases another interest equally worthy of protection, from 
the standpoint of the constitution [vom Standpunkt der Verfassung], 
asserts its validity with such urgency that the state's legal order 
cannot require that the pregnant woman must, under all 
circumstances, concede precedence to the right of the unborn. 1168 
A phenomenological portrayal of the relation between the self and the other as 
manifested in the above excerpt demonstrates the exceptional complexity confronted 
in the Abortion I Case decision. The speaking self, the Court, and, more generally, the 
state as self is under a duty to protect developing life. In certain indicated cases, the 
pregnant woman as the other and the Other calls into question, merely by being 
present, the spontaneity of the self1169. This is what Levinas names ethics1170. The 
urgency of the circumstances constitutes a crucial element of the portrayal. The 
indications evoke images and narratives that reinforce the justification of recognizing, 
in the instance of a pregnant woman experiencing the burden, an interest equally 
worthy of constitutional protection1171. The other, the human being under 
extraordinary burden, calls into question the same, namely the portrayal emanating 
from the requirement ‘that the pregnant woman must, under all circumstances, 
concede precedence to the right of the unborn.’ Upholding the constitutional 
relevance of the interest of the pregnant woman under such urgent circumstances 
despite its implications for the precedence to the right of the unborn signifies the 
commitment to ad hoc production of meaning ‘from the standpoint of the 
constitution’. 1172 
The life of the unborn child is protected as an intrinsic legal value in line with 
Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG1173. The majority of the FCC claimed that there are no clearly 
discernible lines separating the various stages of development of human life1174. 
Significant steps in the process of development, such as the phenomena of 
                                                        
1168 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1169 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43 
1170 ibid 
1171 According to feminist legal theorist Robin West ‘the function of literature is to produce a virtual 
experience in the reader; and the truth of that experience lies in the reader’s empathic response rather 
than in correspondence to any actual event. […] not of what occurred, but of what such an occurrence 
would feel like.’ In Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 182, citing Robin West, 
‘Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Jurisprudence of Franz Kafka and 
Richard Posner’ (1985) 99 Harvard Law Review 384  
1172 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1173 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
1174 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
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consciousness ‘which are specific to the human personality’1175, appear for the first 
time after birth. The subjective scope of protection of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG can 
therefore not ‘be limited either to the ‘completed’ human being after birth or to the 
child about to be born which is independently capable of living.’1176 The FCC argued 
that ‘the sense and purpose of this provision of the Basic Law’1177 demand the 
extension of that protection to the life developing itself en ventre sa mere1178; 
otherwise, ‘the security of human existence against encroachments by the state would 
be incomplete’1179. 
Portraying the child, the other, as ‘an independent human being who stands 
under the protection of the constitution’1180 denotes, argued the FCC, the social 
dimension to the interruption of pregnancy. Abortion is a phenomenon of social life 
that ‘raises manifold problems of a biological, especially human-genetic, 
anthropological, medical, psychological, social, social-political, and not least of an 
ethical and moral-theological nature, which touch upon the fundamental questions of 
human existence.’ 1181 The social character of abortion renders it ‘amenable to and in 
need of regulation by the state.’1182 The FCC demonstrated awareness of the 
multifarious considerations associated with abortion. Appreciation of the social 
phenomenon under scrutiny led the Court to assert that regulation was required. In his 
introduction to Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, John Wild observes, ‘prior to these 
systems, which are required to meet many needs, and presupposed by them’1183 one 
finds the human factor and the ethical choice to engage in a face-to-face encounter 
with the other. The social precedes the systematic; at the same time, it calls for the 
systematic. Systems as totality structures serve the need to render the social somehow 
graspable. The right of the woman to the free development of her personality ‘can 
also, it is true, likewise demand recognition and protection.’1184 
                                                        
1175 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
1176 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
1177 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
1178 BVerfGE 39, 1 (38) [‘This extensive interpretation corresponds to the principle  (Grundsatz) 
established in the opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court, ‘according to which, in doubtful cases, 
that interpretation is to be selected which develops to the highest degree the judicial effectiveness of 
the fundamental legal norm’ [cited cases omitted].’] 
1179 BVerfGE 39, 1 (37) 
1180 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
1181 BVerfGE 39, 1 (36) 
1182 BVerfGE 39, 1 (42) 
1183 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 14-15 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1184 BVerfGE 39, 1 (43) 
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The standard for a responsible answer to the unborn child as the other in the 
Abortion I Case is the effectiveness of protection. The Court as the speaking self 
deferred to the legislature as the state power under the duty to ensure the effective 
protection of developing life1185. How the duty to effectively protect the unborn child 
is fulfilled ‘is, in the first instance, to be decided by the legislature.’1186 In presenting 
the syllogism that led it to decide which response abides by the standard of effective 
protection, the Court extensively discussed the issue of the penalization of abortion, 
noting, ‘the guiding principle of the precedence of prevention over repression is […] 
valid particularly for the protection of unborn life [cited cases omitted].’1187 The 
speaking self, the FCC, directed the state ‘to employ, primarily, social, political, and 
welfare means for securing developing life […]’1188 in exercising authority over 
meaning as self. The legislature was deemed the competent and responsible state actor 
with respect to the particulars of assistance measures. 
Turning to the responsibility towards the pregnant woman, the Court 
considered strengthening ‘readiness of the expectant mother to accept the pregnancy 
as her own responsibility and to bring the child en ventre sa mere to full life’ 1189 to be 
the ‘primary concern’. 
Regardless of how the state fulfills its duty to protect [Bei aller 
Schutzverpflichtung des Staates], it should not escape our attention 
that developing life itself is entrusted by nature in the first place to 
the protection of the mother. To reawaken and, if required, to 
strengthen the maternal duty to protect, where it is lost, should be 
the principal goal of the endeavors of the state for the protection of 
life [Den mütterlichen Schutzwillen dort, wo er verlorengegangen 
ist, wieder zu erwecken und erforderlichenfalls zu stärken, sollte 
das vornehmste Ziel der staatlichen Bemühungen um Lebensschutz 
sein.]. Of course, the possibilities for the legislature to influence are 
limited. 1190 
Law’s confrontation with nature is one of the central thematic axes in the 
Abortion I Case. The FCC treated this clash differently than the Federal Minister of 
Justice in the submitted opinion (see supra)1191. The state, in particular the legislature 
                                                        
1185 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) 
1186 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) 
1187 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) 
1188 BVerfGE 39, 1 (44) 
1189 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
1190 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45) 
1191 In the opinion of the Federal Minister of Justice, awareness of the limited possibilities of state 
influence led the self to understand the pregnant woman as an absolute other, and to allow her to 
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as an expression of the state with competence and responsibility to respond, can exert 
only limited influence on the decision of the pregnant woman and, more generally, on 
the evolution of events, due to the nature of this concretization of human being-ness. 
The mother is entrusted by nature with the responsibility to protect the life developing 
in her womb. What amounts to responsible answer on the part of the state to the 
pregnant woman according to the FCC? While admitting that the nature of the 
situation renders the effectiveness of state intervention limited, the FCC understood 
the meaning of the duty of the state to protect to be ‘[t]o reawaken and, if required, to 
strengthen the maternal duty to protect, where it is lost’1192.  
The duty of the state, in the Court’s view, is to protect the fundamental right to 
life of developing life on the one hand, and to stimulate the duty of the pregnant 
woman to protect the unborn child on the other. From a phenomenological 
perspective, the speaking self demanded of the pregnant woman, as the other and at 
once the critical – by nature – self vis-à-vis the unborn child, to produce certain 
meaning and tailor her conduct accordingly. An analogy was drawn in Chapter One 
between the absolute guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and the 
Levinas’ position that the absolutely other cannot be subsumed under the totality of 
the vision of the self, which may be established on mediating concepts, but rather 
‘escapes [the] grasp’1193 of the self by not being ‘wholly in [the self’s] site’1194. Is the 
enterprise of reawakening and strengthening the maternal duty to protect, where 
ostensibly lost, compatible with the law of human dignity understood as a guarantee 
of the ability of the other to absolve him or herself from the relation with the self? The 
desideratum is not a clear-cut response to this question, which, in any event, does not 
fall within the scope of the present study; rather, the phenomenological portrayal of 
this issue in the Court’s reasoning hints at the necessity of and sets the stage for 
critical reflection.  
What is, usually, framed as the problem of state paternalism can be rendered, 
from a phenomenological perspective, as a concern about whether seeking to mold the 
very viewpoint of the pregnant woman and to influence her willingness impairs her                                                                                                                                                               
absolve from state intervention in the form of legal consequences to the extent permissible by other 
conflicting interests. 
1192 BVerfGE 39, 1 (45); See also BVerfGE 39, 1 (52f.) [‘It is constitutionally permissible and to be 
approved if the legislature attempts to fulfill its duty to improve protection of unborn life through 
preventive measures, including counseling to strengthen the personal responsibility of the woman.’] 
1193 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39 
1194 ibid 
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absolute otherness. Comparing the argumentation of the FCC to that of the Federal 
Minister of Justice apropos how these proceed from the realization of the limited 
influence that the legislature can exert on decisions subject to the sphere of natural 
maternal responsibility unveils two disparate appreciations of the other. For the 
Federal Minister of Justice, the natural responsibility of the pregnant woman 
corresponds to ‘something missing’, that is, an empty space within the realm of law, 
as perceived from the point of view of the state looking through the law on abortion. 
Within the realm of law, what could the concrete content of this Leerstelle be? In light 
of Levinas’ phenomenology, the other, at present the pregnant woman, can be 
encountered, on an ad hoc basis, in responsibility and hospitality. The self inquires 
into, listens, and learns from lived experience, rather than assuming and totalizing. 
Still, the intimacy of this relationship might limit the possibility for the self to survey. 
The affinity of the nature of this relationship to facets of human being-ness renders 
the experience of maternal responsibility an infinitely empty space, ‘something 
always missing’, to be filled only ad hoc as a Leerstelle (‘something missing’). 
Critical reflection zooms in on the range of assumptions about the other, her 
viewpoint and circumstances. Are these assumptions and their premises sufficiently 
attended to? Reawakening implies that what should be – naturally – manifested is 
dormant; strengthening implies a weakness of will, or a will ‘lost’. Motherhood, 
maternal duty, pregnancy are portrayed as neutral and impersonal signifiers under the 
grasp of the self. Assuming a priori the viewpoint of the other human being 
forecloses the very possibility of a face-to-face encounter and of human community 
as a relation ‘instituted by language’1195. Conversely, if who the other is, is deduced 
from a face-to-face encounter, then the demonstration of the sources of insights into 
the lived experience of the other and the methods for assessing those afford this 
understanding of the other soundness. Knowledge of the other ‘would be the 
suppression of the other by the grasp’1196. According to Levinas, if the movement of 
metaphysics leads to the transcendent being as such, namely the human being, 
‘transcendence means not appropriation of what is, but its respect’1197.  
This analysis does not thoroughly oppose reawakening or strengthening the 
willingness of the mother to bear the child to full term; rather, I insist on the need to                                                         
1195 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213-214 
1196 ibid 302 
1197 ibid 
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expose how the reawakening and strengthening shall be prompted to critical reflection 
in view of the implications of invasive means, for instance penal measures, for the 
accomplishment of law’s humanism. The FCC criticized statutory measures 
introduced by the legislature as ‘frequently only indirect and effective only after 
completion of the time-consuming process of comprehensive education and the 
alteration in attitudes and philosophies of society achieved thereby’. However, the 
shift in statutory law may be understood as the upholding of non-coercive, unforced 
change of an individual or collective – in the case of society – self who is led to 
discover ‘the famous naïvité of its thought, which thinks ‘straight on’ as one ‘follows 
one’s nose’.’1198  
Approaching the pregnant woman through a sociological lens, the Court 
observed that the implications of pregnancy ‘often mean a considerable change of the 
total conduct of life and a limitation of the possibilities for personal development 
[…]’1199, and acknowledged that ‘[t]he right to life of the unborn can lead to a 
burdening of the woman1200 which essentially goes beyond that normally associated 
with pregnancy.’1201 The word ‘normally’ [normalerweise] occasions an opportunity 
for critical reflection. Again, the distinction between the burden normally associated 
with pregnancy and excesses appears to be self-evident for the Court. The standard 
for assessing responsibility towards the other, namely whether not compelling the 
pregnant woman to bear the child to term is justified, is ‘reasonableness’ 
[Zumutbarkeit]1202. The question of reasonableness is ‘the question of whether the 
state, even in such [excessive burden], may compel the bearing of the child to term by 
means of penal law.’ 1203 From a phenomenological perspective, the critical question 
is whether, first, compelling the bearing of the child and, second, doing so by means 
of penal measures totalizes the other, the pregnant woman, and impairs her absolute 
otherness. 
Tackling the conflict between respect for unborn life and for the right of the 
woman not to be compelled ‘to sacrifice the values in her own life in excess of a                                                         
1198 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37 
1199 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1200 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) [‘This burden is not always and not completely balanced by a woman finding 
new fulfillment in her task as mother and by the claim a pregnant woman has upon the assistance of the 
community (Art. 6 sec. 4 GG). In individual cases, difficult, even life-threatening situations of conflict 
may arise.’] 
1201 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1202 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1203 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
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reasonable measure in the interest of respecting this legal value’1204 requires, argued 
the FCC, the exercise of special restraint on the part of the legislature. Special 
restraint, that is, maintenance of the absolute separation from the other, is called for in 
view of the difficulty of ‘an unequivocal moral judgment’ on the issue, and the 
realization that ‘the decision for an interruption of pregnancy can attain the rank of a 
decision of conscience worthy of consideration.’ 1205 Not forcing the pregnant woman 
to sacrifice the values in her own life on account of respect for the legal value of 
unborn life means, in phenomenological terms, not provoking the interruption of her 
continuity by bringing her in a position where she no longer recognizes herself. 
The practice of the law of human dignity as in the Basic Law constituting the 
legal order of the state, whilst a totality, allows for – if not embodies – the calling into 
question of the same by the other. The FCC introduced the standard of 
unreasonableness and recognized the latitude of the legislature to leave free of 
punishment other cases of comparably extraordinary burdens for the pregnant woman. 
From a phenomenological perspective, the legislature as the self is granted a fluency 
in engaging in a face-to-face encounter with the other: ‘metaphysics, transcendence, 
the welcoming of the other by the same […] as the ethics that accomplishes the 
critical essence of knowledge.’1206 The emphasis on urgency, from a hermeneutic and 
literary perspective, can be understood as an element of the portrayal of the pregnant 
woman who struggles with inner conflicts or faces an unreasonably weighty burden 
of, or analogous to, those indicated.  
In encountering the pregnant woman as the other, the FCC noticed that her 
general situation and that of her family ‘can produce conflicts of such difficulty that, 
beyond a definite measure, a sacrifice by the pregnant woman in favor of the unborn 
life cannot be compelled with the means of the penal law.’ 1207 The Court asserted that 
the general emergency or social indication as statutory response to the other should 
meet certain requirements in the practice of the law of human dignity and 
fundamental rights as the practice of responsibility. The gravity of the social conflict 
justifying the non-punishment of an interruption of pregnancy should ‘be clearly 
recognizable’1208 and should be compatible ‘from the point of view of                                                         
1204 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1205 BVerfGE 39, 1 (48) 
1206 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43 
1207 BVerfGE 39, 1 (49) 
1208 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
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unreasonableness’1209 with the other indicated cases. The ‘clearly recognizable’ 
presupposes that the conflict is clearly illustrated. The legislature has the latitude to 
remove ‘genuine cases of conflict of this kind from the protection of penal law’1210 
without thereby violating the duty of the state to protect life. 
Merely inquiry into and certification of an occasion of grave social conflict, in 
other words ‘the statutory prerequisites for an abortion free of punishment’, does not 
necessarily satisfy the duty originating in the law of human dignity and fundamental 
rights to respond to the other responsibly. Rather, added the FCC, ‘the state will also 
be expected to offer counseling and assistance with the goal of reminding pregnant 
women of the fundamental duty to respect the right to life of the unborn, to encourage 
her to continue the pregnancy and – especially in cases of social need – to support her 
through practical measures of assistance.’1211 Generosity, hospitality and service to 
the other as in Levinas’ phenomenology – even more so in cases of ‘social need’, that 
is, vulnerability are conveyed in the requirements of counseling and assistance.1212 
Morality, as construed in Totality and Infinity, can be parallelized to human dignity. 
Responding to a vulnerable human being with the means required by the 
particularities of her condition, for instance ‘with practical measures of assistance’ to 
encourage bringing the child to full term, evokes the notion of morality and, to extent 
that abortion, as portrayed by the Court, is a social phenomenon and a matter to be 
addressed by a network of members of society, conveys solidarity and fraternity. 
Counseling and assistance serve the goal of ‘reminding pregnant women of the 
fundamental duty to respect the right to life of the unborn’ [die Schwangere an die 
grundsätzliche Pflicht zur Achtung des Lebensrechts des Ungeborenen zu 
mahnen]1213. This proposition calls for critical reflection. ‘Reminding’ [mahnen] the 
pregnant woman of a fundamental duty, which, as noticed earlier in the text, is 
‘natural’1214, could be signifying a paternalistic stance that destroys the distance 
between the self and the other. As noted supra, the choice of language implies the 
dormant state of the natural maternal duty. Can the self understand an experience 
involving the other’s most intimate sphere of human being-ness to an extent that 
justifies assumptions about the reasons underlying the intention to interrupt the                                                         
1209 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1210 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1211 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1212 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1213 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50) 
1214 BVerfGE 39, 1 (26) 
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pregnancy? In that respect, the didactic tone associated with ‘reminding’ the pregnant 
woman of her ‘fundamental duty’ begs critical reflection in light of the 
phenomenological interpretation of the absolute law of human dignity. Awareness of 
the transformation experienced by the pregnant woman is articulated elaborately in 
the dissenting opinion discussed infra. Could ‘reminding’ the other of a duty that 
originates in the intimate and individual-related experience of pregnancy be redundant 
or irrelevant an enterprise? 
In all other cases the interruption of pregnancy remains a wrong 
deserving punishment: since, in these cases, the destruction of a 
value of the law of the highest rank is subjected to the unrestricted 
pleasure of another and is not motivated by an emergency.1215  
The ‘unrestricted pleasure of another’ can be parallelized to the enjoyment 
involved in the egoism of the self’s existence1216. The primary experience of the self 
is ‘definitely biased and egocentric’1217, the ‘primordial experience of enjoyment 
(jouissance)’1218. The majority of the Court as the speaking self moderates the 
relationship between the pregnant woman as another self and the child en ventre sa 
mere in view of the Basic Law. The pregnant woman is, for the majority, the self vis-
à-vis the unborn child as other by nature, not necessarily however at the level of law. 
The Basic Law introduces mediating concepts for conciliating conflicting interests 
within that relation. The question is, from a phenomenological viewpoint, whether 
these concepts leave the distance between the two parties intact or, in fact, subsume 
them under a totality, destroy the distance, and objectify them. If the meaning of 
mediating concepts institutes, conversely, the possibility of conversation between the 
self and the other, then the moderation of that relation effectively grants the other as 
Other a right over the egoism of the self1219, hence, far from impeding, guarantees 
radical separation. On the other hand, the question that shakes the foundations of the 
Court’s argument from both an ontological and a phenomenological perspective is 
whether one can, and therefore also should, distinguish between a self and an other in 
the relationship of the child en ventre sa mere with the mother, minding that it 
constitutes a sui generis concretization of human being-ness and, accordingly, of 
                                                        
1215 BVerfGE 39, 1 (50f.) 
1216 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 40 
1217 ibid 12 [Introduction by John Wild] 
1218 ibid 
1219 ibid 40 
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law’s Menschenbild. Could we conceive of the pregnant woman and the unborn child 
as a union that makes it impossible to distinguish between the self and the other? 
The incapability of developing life to practice language accounts for a further 
particularity of the case of abortion; the critical traits of the human being-ness of the 
unborn as portrayed in the majority opinion in the Abortion I Case are potentiality and 
continuity. In safeguarding a right of the unborn child, the other, over the portrayed 
egoism of the pregnant woman, a self, and maintaining the distance between them, the 
vulnerability1220 of developing life cannot be ignored. That the decision of the 
pregnant woman can cause ‘the destruction of a value of the law of the highest rank’ 
calls for limits on the arbitrariness of her freedom. Freedom cannot remain 
‘uncriticized’1221 and needs to be tempered with justice1222. The infinity of the 
arbitrariness of freedom is subordinated1223 ‘in welcoming the Other’1224, that is, in 
hospitality, the gist of the phenomenological account of the law of human dignity.  
The constitutional concepts mediating the relation of the child en ventre sa 
mere to the mother and practiced by the Court as moderator in the Abortion I Case 
provide for the subordination of the self to the other as Other in hospitality. Levinas 
notes that ‘[i]n welcoming the Other I welcome the On High to which my freedom is 
subordinated.’1225 Hospitality is grounded on ‘the personal work of my moral 
initiative […], in the attention to the Other as unicity and face […], and not as egoism 
refusing the system which offends it.’1226 Hospitality in the thought of Levinas cannot 
be contingent – exclusively – on systems, that is, either positively instituted by totality 
structures or negatively defined as a reaction to those, hence presupposing them. The 
constitutional concepts mediating the relation of the child en ventre sa mere to the 
pregnant woman should guarantee the practice of the pre-ethics of hospitality, that is, 
the foundations of law’s humanism at the level of language. This understanding, I 
grant, relies entirely on the construing of such concepts as vessels of the 
                                                        
1220 ibid 245 [‘The accomplishing of the I qua I and morality constitute one sole and same process in 
being: morality comes to birth not in equality, but in the fact that infinite exigencies, that of serving the 
poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, converge at one point of the universe. Thus through 
morality alone are I and the others produced in the universe.’] 
1221 ibid 15 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1222 ibid 303 





transcendental, embodiments of infinity, of an understanding of the other as Other, of 
the possibility of an encounter with the ‘On High’ in the words of Levinas.  
Confronting reality, the FCC resorted to empirical knowledge on the motives 
underlying the decision to undergo abortion. It observed that ‘many women who have 
previously decided upon an interruption of pregnancy’ had no reason ‘which is 
worthy of esteem within the value order of the constitution’1227 and were not 
accessible to a counseling in line with § 218c sec. 1 StGB. These women, noted the 
Court, are not led to the decision to interrupt the pregnancy by ‘material distress’ or ‘a 
grave situation of emotional conflict’ [seelischen Konfliktsituation]1228. Rather, they 
undergo abortion ‘because they are not willing to take on the renunciation and the 
natural motherly duties bound up with it.’1229. As a result, developing life ‘is 
abandoned without protection to their arbitrary decision […]’1230. In this excerpt, the 
arbitrariness of freedom, noticed in Totality and Infinity, is directly alluded to. The 
crucial question raised supra is repeated here: Whether the mother can be viewed as a 
totalizer self vis-à-vis her unborn child, the other, should be critically reflected on in 
light of the natural, physical embodiment of developing life in the womb of the 
pregnant woman. Can the unique expression of human being-ness in the relation of 
the child en ventre sa mere to the mother be portrayed as the coexistence of a self, 
who can totalize, and the other, who ‘is abandoned without protection’? 
vi. Self-reflection, the evolving self, the sphere-portrayal of absolute separation, 
responsibility towards the other (Dissenting opinion) 
 The dissenters agreed with the majority that the decision is ‘a matter of 
legislative responsibility’, stating, however, that ‘[u]nder no circumstances can the duty 
of the state to prescribe punishment for abortion in every stage of pregnancy be derived 
from the constitution.’1231 Representing another voice within the Court, another face of 
the speaking self, the dissenters claimed that the legislature should be able to regulate 
equally the counseling and term solution measures and the indications solution. The                                                         
1227 BVerfGE 39, 1 (55f.) 
1228 BVerfGE 39, 1 (56) 
1229 BVerfGE 39, 1 (56); ibid [‘They have serious reasons for their conduct with respect to the 
developing life; there are, however, no reasons which can endure against the command to protect 
human life. For these women, pregnancy is reasonable in line with the propositions reiterated above. 
The behavior even of this group of women, legitimatized by law through the absence of a 
constitutionally important motive for the interruption of pregnancy, is fully covered under §218a of the 
Fifth Statute to Reform the Penal Law.’] 
1230 BVerfGE 39, 1 (56) 
1231 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
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separate opinion contributes to an internal self-reflection of the Court and to self-
reflection among the branches of state power. The dissenters revisited the authority of 
the FCC ‘to annul the decisions of the legislature’ and argued that it ‘demands sparing 
use’ [erfordet einen sparsamen Gebrauch]1232 to avoid imbalance between the 
constitutional organs.  
Constitutional review and the principle of the separation of powers can be 
understood as a self-reflection mechanism of the state; the operation of this 
mechanism requires judicial self-restraint ‘which is designated as the ‘elixir of life’ 
[‘Lebenselexier’] of the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court’1233. In self-
reflection, the I (idem), the same, encounters alterity and either absorbs it into the self 
(ipse), or maintains sameness. This process presupposes a distance between the same 
and the other and judicial self-restraint signifies the commitment to the maintainance 
of that distance. Judicial self-restraint is vital in the practice of fundamental rights 
particularly ‘when involved is not a defense from overreaching by state power but 
rather the making, via constitutional judicial control, of provisions for the positive 
structuring of the social order for the legislature which is directly legitimized by the 
people.’1234 The democratic foundations of the constitutional order legitimize the 
subjection of human beings to the totality structure of the Basic Law. This totality is 
self-imposed, namely originates in the practice of self-determination in democracy. 
However, in cases where unavoidable value decisions touch on the limits of the free 
self-determination of individuals, collective self-determination of the people as 
grounds of legitimacy of a certain understanding of human dignity appears shaky.1235 
The Federal Constitutional Court must not succumb to the 
temptation [nicht der Versuchung erliegen] to take over for itself 
the function of a controlling organ and shall not in the long run 
endanger the authority to judicially review constitutionality.1236 
The constitutional judge is portrayed in this excerpt as an evolving self. As the 
speaking self in the Abortion I Case – and any other case before it – the FCC carries 
the responsibility not to endanger in the long run the authority of the constitutional 
judge to review constitutionality. The human factor, that is, human beings                                                         
1232 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1233 BVerfGE 39, 1 (69) 
1234 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1235 Starck (1981) 457, 462f. [On those grounds Starck questions the relevance of the social welfare 
state or the transsexual cases to the law of human dignity.] 
1236 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
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representing the institution at a given momentum in its historical continuum, features 
prominently in the phrasing of this proposition, despite reference to a ‘controlling 
organ’. The hermeneutic and literary approach to texts as aspects of judicial practice 
permits tracing the human factor in institutional frameworks from an angle different 
to doctrinal or sociological approaches. The anthropomorphism evident in the phrase 
‘must not succumb to the temptation’ reaffirms the aptness of parallelizing the 
manifestation of the separation of powers in the text to a process of self-reflection and 
intimates how the practice of self-restraint rests on the stance adopted by human 
beings representing the institution at a particular time and context. The 
anthropomorphic depiction of this Court as an evolving self entrusted with 
safeguarding the authority of the constitutional judge to review constitutionality, 
namely to respond responsibly within the latitude prescribed in the Basic Law, 
reinforces the observation that the inferable responsibility is borne ultimately by the 
human beings judging the specific case.  
The practice of fundamental legal norms ‘departs from the basis of classical 
judicial control.’1237 Fundamental legal norms at the center of the Basic Law 
‘guarantee as rights of defense to the citizen in relation to the state a sphere of 
unrestricted structuring of one’s life based on personal responsibility.’1238 The 
phenomenological portrayal of practicing fundamental legal norms as rights of 
defense furthers another perception of that sphere by analogy with the radical distance 
between citizens as the absolutely other and the state as self. The ‘classical 
function’1239 of the FCC as a manifestation of the state, ‘lies in defending against 
injuries to this sphere of freedom from excessive infringement by state power.’1240 
The dissenters portrayed the Court’s self-understanding re how it interferes with the 
other. The guarantee of this sphere of freedom conveys a commitment to protecting 
the absolute separation of citizens from the state.  
The arbitrary freedom of the state to interfere with that sphere is tempered by 
justice, in this case justice embodied in fundamental rights. This is a particularity of 
judicial practice of fundamental legal norms: the constitutional judge, an expression 
of state power, is at the same time the defender of a sphere of freedom for the human 
being from the arbitrarily totalizing authority of the state. It should not, however,                                                         
1237 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1238 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1239 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1240 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
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escape our attention that both the identification of that sphere and the dynamics 
between the self and the other are doctrinally determined, hence framed as totality 
structures and subject to the vision of an eye looking through the lens of the Basic 
Law, that is, the dissenters as the speaking self. Does absolute separation survive this 
totality? By artificially destroying distances at the level of language and meaning 
within the text of the decision, the judge can break with the sterilized status quo of the 
tautological proposition of human dignity in order to fine-tune in actuality the 
guarantee of human dignity in law with reality, lived experience.  
On the scale of possible infringements by the state, penal provisions 
are positioned at the top: they demand of a citizen a definite 
behavior and subdue him in the case of a violation with sensitive 
restrictions of freedom or with financial burdens. Judicial control of 
the constitutionality of such provisions therefore means a 
determination whether the encroachment resulting either from the 
enactment or application of penal provisions into protected spheres 
of freedom is allowable; whether, therefore, the state, generally or 
to the extent provided, may punish.1241 
The execution of penal measures interrupts the continuity of human being-
ness. The intensity of the interruption caused by penal provisions is of the highest 
degree among possible infringements by the state. Whereas the question, as it appears 
in the above excerpt, should be whether the state may punish, in the constitutional 
dispute on abortion the majority raised ‘for the first time’1242 the questions ‘whether 
the state must punish’ and ‘whether the abolition of punishment for the interruption of 
pregnancy in the first three months of pregnancy is compatible with fundamental 
rights.’1243 The dissenters reacted to this inversion:  
It is obvious, however, that the disregard of punishment is the 
opposite of state encroachment [Es liegt aber auf der Hand, daß das 
Absehen von Strafe das Gegenteil eines staatlichen Eingriffs ist.]. 
Since the partial withdrawal of the penal provision did not occur to 
benefit interruptions of pregnancies but rather, because the previous 
penal sanction, according to the irrefutable assumption of the 
legislature which has been confirmed by experience, has thoroughly 
proved itself ineffective, an ‘attack’ on the unborn life by the state is 
not even indirectly construable.1244 
                                                        
1241 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1242 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1243 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70) 
1244 BVerfGE 39, 1 (70f.) 
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The dissenters clarified that the motivation underlying the partial withdrawal 
of the penal provision by the legislature renders ‘an ‘attack’ on the unborn life by the 
state […] not even indirectly construable.’ The quotation marks bracketing the noun 
attack [Eingriff] are indicative of the dissenters’ critical stance towards the 
communication of an understanding of the state’s response to unborn life that cannot 
be even indirectly derived from the statutory reform. While it cannot be denied that 
the statutory measures would effectively facilitate undergoing abortion, it is plausible 
to understand those as a responsible response on the part of the state as self in view of 
the proven ineffectiveness of the previous penal sanction. Through the partial 
withdrawal of the penal provision the legislature sought to enhance the effectiveness 
of protection. Similarly to the argument of the Federal Minister of Justice, who noted 
that ‘with the withdrawal of the penal sanction for an interruption of pregnancy in the 
first weeks of pregnancy the state does not bestow upon the mother a right to the 
operation’ [majority opinion]1245, the dissenters distinguished between the purpose of 
the statutory reform and the unattended to and superficial criticism that it favored 
interruptions of pregnancy.  
Essentially the dissenters zoomed in on the legislature as the self and engaged 
in portraying the reasons for the statutory reform or, in phenomenological terms, of 
the self’s response to the other. To the extent that the consciousness of the self in 
practicing the law is assumed and the reasons leading the self to a certain response 
form an aspect of the signification and significance of that response, portraying the 
self as clearly as possible is of crucial importance. The dissenters argued, similarly to 
the Federal Minster of Justice, that the withdrawal of punishment could not be 
equated with a positive stance towards interruptions of pregnancy or even the granting 
of a right to undergo abortion; the ethical appreciation of each response requires 
special scrutiny and clarity as regards the reasons that guided the process of 
lawmaking. The phenomenological approach calls for emphasis on ‘who is speaking 
and why’ than ‘merely […] what is said’1246. From a rhetorical perspective, 
elucidating the depiction of the self and the reasons why the self acts can be 
understood by analogy with the appeal to the character of the orator as a determinant 
of meaning in rhetoric. 
                                                        
1245 BVerfGE 39, 1 (25) 
1246 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 18 [Introduction by John Wild] 
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One mode of practicing responsibility towards the other in a dissenting 
opinion is scrutinizing the demonstrated ability of the self to respond in the majority 
opinion. The dissenters challenged the argument that ‘the reception of Art. 2 sec. 2 
GG unquestionably originated from the reaction to the inhumane ideology and 
practice of the National Socialist regime […]’1247, thus unveiling a further instance of 
possible unfounded certainty and unsound argumentation in the majority opinion. 
They drew a distinction between ‘the constitutional assessment of the killing of a 
child en ventre sa mere by the pregnant woman herself or by a third party with her 
consent’ and ‘such a killing by the state, as, for example, by the Nazi regime.’1248 
They added that the Nazi regime ‘had taken up a rigorous standpoint corresponding to 
its biologically oriented ideology towards population […]’1249, that is, precisely the 
standpoint that Levinas opposes to in the definition of fraternity in Totality and 
Infinity. The dissenters discouraged an association of the prohibition of these cases of 
interruption of pregnancy with the constitutional order’s reaction to National 
Socialism, that is, to ‘the mass destruction of human life by the state in concentration 
camps and, in the case of the mentally ill, sterilizations and forced abortions directed 
by authorities, to medical experiments against their will on human beings, to 
disrespect of individual life and human dignity which was expressed by countless 
other measures of state […]’1250. Therefore, drawing conclusions re the constitutional 
dispute on the interruption of pregnancy by the pregnant woman or a third party with 
her consent appeared ‘less pertinent’ [ist um so weniger am Platze]1251 than 
understanding such a killing by the state in light of the historical background of the 
Basic Law. The effort to clarify who is acting and in what context and, accordingly, to 
ascribe actions – also language games or speech acts – with the greatest possible                                                         
1247 BVerfGE 39, 1 (76); The time-honored practice of the law of human dignity apropos the National 
Socialist historical background of Germany in FCC jurisprudence can be interpreted in light of Michael 
Walzer’s insights into the Biblical prophets as ‘hermeneutic social critics’, in Walzer, Interpretation 
and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), as presented in Guyora Binder & 
Robert Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000) 
198f.: ‘Walzer offers the Biblical prophets as examples of hermeneutic and social critics. Their 
message was neither universal nor esoteric but directed at all Israelites. They condemned the practices 
prevailing in their own societies, but not from the standpoint of universal justice. Instead they 
condemned their society for failing its own professed values.’ Setting the National Socialist past as a 
point of reference can be understood as a condemnation for failing the values professed in the Basic 
Law as a reaction to the specific past and as a commitment to deliver upon the professed values in 
responsibility before God and human beings [Preamble to the Basic Law]. 
1248 BVerfGE 39, 1 (76) 
1249 BVerfGE 39, 1 (76) 
1250 BVerfGE 39, 1 (76) 
1251 BVerfGE 39, 1 (76) 
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precision to those actually responsible appears to be one of the dissenters’ primary 
concerns in the opinion.  
The dissenters demonstrated openness to comparative insights. How does 
another self with similar authority to produce meaning treat this constitutional 
question? In support of the argument that partial withdrawal of punishment for the 
interruption of pregnancy is not tantamount to violation of the legal value of unborn 
life, the dissenters mentioned the position of the Austrian Constitutional Court, which 
denied that the regulation of terms constitutes a violation of fundamental rights 
recognized by Austrian law. In another part of the dissenting opinion, the possibility 
of delineating distinct stages of pregnancy and thereby justifying the differentiated 
penal treatment of interruptions of pregnancy based on the time they are performed 
was grounded on comparative insights from ‘domestic and foreign legal systems’1252 
and the paradigmatic example of Roe v. Wade of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. The dissenters put forward the comparative relevance of the regulation of 
terms and counseling measures. 
That the decision of the German legislature for the regulation of 
terms and counseling neither arises from a fundamental attitude 
which is to be morally or legally condemned, nor proceeds from 
apparently false premises in the determination of the circumstances 
of life is confirmed by identical or similar provisions for reform in 
numerous foreign states. 1253 
The dissenters traced the process of self-reflection between the legislature and 
the majority of the Court as manifested in the constitutional dispute on abortion. From 
a first person point of view – observing in essence the different lines of argumentation 
from the outside – the dissenters contended that the majority of the Court, minding the 
unsuitability of fundamental rights as defense rights ‘from the beginning’ to prevent 
the elimination of penal provisions by the legislature, sought an appropriate 
justificatory basis ‘in the more extensive meaning of fundamental rights as objective 
value decisions.’ The dissenters explained, ‘fundamental rights not only establish 
rights of defense of the individual against the state, but also contain at the same time 
objective value decisions, the realization of which through affirmative action [durch 
aktives Handeln] is a permanent task of state power.’ 
                                                        
1252 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71) 
1253 BVerfGE 39, 1 (94) 
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As defense rights the fundamental rights have a comparatively clear 
recognizable content; in their interpretation and application, the 
jurisprudence have developed practicable, generally recognized 
criteria for the control of state encroachments for example, the 
principle of proportionality. On the other hand, it is regularly a most 
complex question, how a value decision is to be realized through 
affirmative measures of the legislature.1254 
The dissenters furthermore referred to the doctrinal development of this 
distinction in FCC jurisprudence and applauded the effort of the FCC 
[begrüßenswerten Bemühen] to thereby doctrinally ‘lend greater effectiveness to the 
fundamental rights in their capacity to secure freedom and to strive for social justice.’ 
[A. I. 2.]. Emphasis on the effectiveness of fundamental rights practice evokes the 
mutual dependence between the humanism and the pragmatism of law. Effectiveness 
surfaces as the standard for assessing responsibility towards the other in the practice 
of fundamental rights.  
The dissenting opinion demonstrated greater attentiveness to the clarity and 
accessibility of the meaning produced, that is, of what is said, and to the portrayal of 
the self, in that case the FCC. Clear articulation of – even time-honored – doctrinal 
definitions can be viewed as an act of generosity in light of a phenomenology that 
invests in language as the basis of conversation between the self and the other. The 
dissenters as the speaking self strived for intelligibility of meaning and for a more 
transparent portrayal of the majority as the self who produced meaning that has an 
impact at the level of enforcement. The dissenters concluded that the majority 
‘insufficiently considers differences in the two aspects of fundamental rights, 
differences essential to the judicial control of constitutionality.’1255 Failure to 
sufficiently demonstrate the premises of legal arguments can undermine the practice 
of fundamental rights as a responsible answer to the other on the part of the self.  
The task of the state is to protect the legal values guaranteed and recognized 
by the constitution. The Basic Law constitutes the lens through which state actors 
look in practicing the law. Whereas the state should not subject the ethics of society to 
the totality of its vision, it still practices those in propositions communicating the 
legal values of the constitutional order. The concept of legal values guaranteed and 
recognized in constitutional jurisprudence embodies the ethics of the constitutional                                                         
1254 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71); Hoerster (1983) 93, 94-95 [Moral value judgments are unavoidable 
particularly in practicing the law of human dignity.] 
1255 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71) 
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order and society. Do, however, constitutional legal values enjoying state protection 
in fact correspond to the ethics of society? Responding to that question requires 
ongoing sociological inquiry into the ethics of society and, subsequently, hermeneutic 
and literary analysis of the language employed within the realm of society vis-à-vis 
the realm of law. A responsible answer, argued the dissenters, secures ‘an effective 
development of developing life’ while taking into account the interests of the 
pregnant woman ‘which are deserving of protection’.1256 To the extent that penal 
provisions are ‘imperatively’1257 required, hence proportional, the state can employ 
them to secure a responsible response to the other. 
On the whole therefore, in our opinion, the legislature was not 
prevented by the constitution from dispensing with a penal sanction, 
which, according to its irrefutable view, was largely, ineffective, 
inadequate, and even harmful. Its attempt to remedy through 
socially adequate means the manifestly developing inability of state 
and society in the present conditions to serve the protection of life 
may be imperfect; it corresponds, however, more to the spirit of the 
Basic Law than the demand for punishment and condemnation. 1258 
Practicing fundamental rights as ‘necessarily generally held value 
decisions’1259 presents considerable complexity. The value decisions involved ‘can be 
characterized as constitutional mandates which, to be sure, are assigned to point the 
direction for all state dealings but are directed necessarily toward a transposition of 
binding regulations.’1260 Decisions reflected in the value order of the Basic Law 
convey the ethical dimension of the meaning incarnated in fundamental rights. From a 
hermeneutic and literary perspective, noticing that decisions are the wellspring of the 
value order directly evokes the human factor, the metaphysical subject at the limit, 
where ethics and aesthetics lie, human beings within institutions. As another curve 
carved on the lens before the eye of state actors, the ethics of the Basic Law embodied 
in fundamental rights permeate ‘all state dealings’ and determine the direction to be 
taken in producing meaning. The direction is humanism yet as defined in its 
particulars and practiced by those entrusted with the transposition of binding 
regulations in light of the value order to cases springing from lived experience. 
                                                        
1256 BVerfGE 39, 1 (94) 
1257 BVerfGE 39, 1 (94) 
1258 BVerfGE 39, 1 (95) 
1259 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71) 
1260 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71) 
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Conceivable solutions of the conflict are contingent on context, namely ‘the 
determination of actual circumstances, […] the concrete setting of goals and their 
priority and […] the suitability of conceivable means and ways’1261, value judgments 
and pragmatic considerations on the one hand, and the ambiguity and controversy 
ensuing from necessary compromises and the unavoidable course of ‘trial and 
error’1262 on the other. Minding the intense discord on the subject matter, the 
legitimacy of the decision on this constitutional dispute depends on the representation, 
to the highest possible degree, of the viewpoint of the self-determined people of the 
constitutional state, which democratically ensues from equally multifarious and 
conflicting viewpoints. The legislature is responsible for taking that decision, argued 
the dissenters, because it is ‘directly legitimized by the people.’1263 Through the 
legislature the people exercise – granted indirectly – self-determination within the 
totality structure of the constitutional order. The democratic constitutional order 
founded on human dignity institutes concepts and processes, crucially, critical 
reflection mechanisms and tools, that guarantee non-subsumption under a totality 
structure.  
 The dissenters affirmed that the ‘growing significance of promoting social 
measures to effectuate fundamental rights’1264 renders the judicial control of 
constitutionality to a certain extent necessary. To those ends the dissenters deemed 
‘the development of a suitable instrument which respects the freedom of the 
legislature to structure’1265 one of the most compelling tasks of judicial decision-
making in the future.  
As long as such an instrument is lacking, the danger exists that 
judicial control of constitutionality will not limit itself to reviewing 
decisions of the legislature but rather will substitute another 
decision which the Court determines to be better. This danger will 
exist in a heightened degree, when – as here – in sharply 
controversial questions a decision made by the parliamentary 
majority after long debate is challenged before the Federal 
Constitutional Court by the defeated minority. Without prejudice to 
the legitimate authority of those entitled to petition the Court to 
resolve constitutional doubt in this manner, the Federal 
Constitutional Court is unwarily falling in this case into the position 
                                                        
1261 BVerfGE 39, 1 (71f.) 
1262 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
1263 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
1264 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
1265 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
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of a political arbitration board to be used for the choice between 
competing legislative projects.1266 
For the principle of separation of powers to function as a self-reflection 
mechanism, balance in the dynamics and the distance between the branches of state 
power should be maintained, so that each power, when acting as the speaking self, can 
critically reflect on whether absorbing the alterity of another understanding on a given 
subject matter, produced by another branch as a manifestation of the self, is 
compatible with the constitution. The judicial review of decisions of the legislature 
presupposes the distance of viewpoints between state actors representing respectively 
the judicial power and the legislative power. Substitution signifies the destruction of 
the distance essential for self-reflection.  
Critical reflection is the process that guarantees law’s humane practice. 
Depicting the separation of powers as a self-reflection mechanism of the state – a 
portrayal made possible by the hermeneutic and literary methodology employed for 
present purposes – far from projecting an anthropomorphic rendering of institutions, 
underlines how critical reflection constitutes an indispensible aspect of the meaning of 
practicing human dignity in law. The dissenters observed the heightened difficulty in 
the case of ‘sharply controversial questions’1267. This affirms the empirical 
observation that triggered the present analysis, namely that ‘something is missing’, 
experienced as uncertainty re the right answer among various courses of action. The 
defeated parliamentary minority calls upon the FCC to play the role of ‘a political 
arbitration board to be used for the choice between competing legislative projects.’1268 
The FCC is ‘neither competent nor equipped’1269 to answer, that is, has no 
responsibility to respond.  
The idea of objective value decisions should however not become a 
vehicle to shift specifically legislative functions in the formation of 
social order onto the Federal Constitutional Court. Otherwise the 
Court will be forced into a role for which it is neither competent nor 
equipped. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court should 
maintain the restraint […] [cited cases omitted]. This Court should 
confront the legislature only when the latter has completely 
disregarded a value decision or when the nature and manner of its 
realization is obviously faulty. On the other hand, in spite of 
supposed acknowledgement of legislative freedom to structure, the                                                         
1266 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
1267 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
1268 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
1269 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72) 
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majority effectively charges the legislature with not realizing a 
recognized value decision in, according to the majority's view, the 
best manner possible. Should this become the general standard for 
judicial examination, the requirement of judicial self-restraint would 
accordingly be sacrificed.1270 
The formation of social order by state powers should – to the extent possible 
in the context of a democratic state – originate in the self-determination of the people. 
The people practices self-determination primarily through the legislature. The 
egocentric experience of the self with authority over meaning cannot be renounced. 
Conversation, according to the phenomenology of Levinas, grants the other as Other a 
right over the egoism of the self. Dispensing with the totality of the self, especially in 
the practice of law, is neither an option, nor a desideratum. In a democratic 
constitutional order, totality structures ensuing from the formation of social order by 
the legislature are – significantly – self-imposed, in other words generated by the 
collective self, the people, who is granted, as a collective other, a right over the 
egoism of the self with competence and responsibility to respond, that is, of the state 
and particularly legislative power. What is more, conversation is vital to democratic 
procedures. In the controversial constitutional dispute on abortion, noticed the 
dissenters, the parliamentary majority concluded on the statutory reform after long 
debate.  Democracy encourages and feeds on deliberation and politics of dissensus. 
The scope of the Court’s responsibility was further delineated: the FCC 
‘should confront the legislature only when the latter has completely disregarded a 
value decision’1271, in other words has evidently not looked through this particular 
curve of the lens, ‘or when the nature and manner of its realization is obviously 
faulty’1272, namely in the case of an irresponsible response. Similarly to the 
Subsistence Minimum Case, the FCC took on the task of addressing the 
constitutionality of the legislature’s disregard for or ‘obviously’ irresponsible 
response to the other. The assessment, however, of what amounts, from a 
phenomenological perspective, to non-response or an irresponsible response is 
ultimately a value judgment.  
The dissenters criticized the majority of the Court for an inconsistency: ‘in 
spite of supposed acknowledgment of legislative freedom to structure’1273, the                                                         
1270 BVerfGE 39, 1 (72f.) 
1271 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
1272 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
1273 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
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majority claimed that the legislature did not realize a recognized value decision in the 
best manner possible. Whether this practice of judicial review abides by the 
requirement of judicial self-restraint as a reaction to an ‘obviously’ irresponsible 
response on the part of the legislature is a matter contingent on how a responsible 
answer is construed in a given case. Prior to the juxtaposition and evaluation of the 
multifarious understandings of what a responsible answer amounts to, it is imperative 
to portray those; this is the modest objective of the present analysis. The dissenters 
stated ‘[s]hould this become the general standard for judicial examination, the 
requirement of judicial self-restraint would accordingly be sacrificed.’1274 In the 
reasoning that followed, this proposition was elaborated on.  
Our strongest reservation is directed to the fact that for the first time 
in opinions of the Constitutional Court an objective value decision 
should function as a duty of the legislature to enact penal norms, 
therefore to postulate the strongest conceivable encroachment into 
the sphere of freedom of the citizen. This inverts the function of 
fundamental rights into its contrary. If the objective value decision 
contained in a fundamental legal norm to protect a certain legal 
value should suffice to derive therefrom the duty to punish, the 
fundamental rights could underhandedly [unter der Hand], on the 
pretext of securing freedom [aus einem Hort der 
Freiheitssicherung], become the basis for an abundance of 
regimentations which restrict freedom.1275 
The dissenters interpreted the mobilization of the objective value decision 
doctrine in the majority opinion as an inversion ‘of the function of fundamental rights 
into its contrary.’1276 They essentially challenged the compatibility of the meaning of 
objective value decisions embodied in the fundamental rights of the Basic Law with 
the duty of the legislature to respond to abortion by means of penal norms ostensibly 
derived therefrom. According to the dissenters, the appeal to the ethics of the Basic 
Law by the majority of the Court served as a justification for ‘the strongest 
conceivable encroachment into the sphere of freedom of the citizen […]’1277. This                                                         
1274 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
1275 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
1276 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73); ibid (74) [‘[…] it is no longer necessary merely to determine alone whether a 
penal provision encroaches too far into the sphere of rights of the citizens, but also the inverse, whether 
the state punishes too little. Therefore the Federal Constitutional Court will, contrary to the majority 
opinion, not be able to restrict itself to the question whether the enactment of any particular penal norm 
regardless of its contents is required, but in addition must clarify which penal sanction suffices for the 
protection of the respective legal value. In the last consequence the Court may find it necessary to 
determine whether the application of a penal norm in the individual case satisfies the concept of 
protection.’] 
1277 BVerfGE 39, 1 (73) 
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practice of fundamental rights as objective value decisions, argued the dissenters, is 
underhanded and merely a pretext for practicing the law in a manner that, in truth, 
contradicts, rather than advances, humanism. Punishment as the chosen means for 
forcing compliance with that order totalizes the human being in that it interrupts the 
continuity of human being-ness; human beings find themselves in positions where 
‘they no longer recognize themselves’1278 and feel estranged from ‘their own 
substance’1279. In resisting compliance with the doctrine of judicial self-restraint, the 
majority of the FCC acted as a totalizer. When, in exercising judicial review, the FCC 
exceeds the constitutionally determined latitude to produce meaning, and directs the 
legislature to employ penal measures against abortion, a totality is instituted from 
which there is no escape.  
If, however, judicial self-restraint has validity, the Constitutional 
Court a fortiori should not compel the legislature to employ the 
power of punishment, which is the strongest means of state 
coercion, to compensate for the social neglect of duty with the 
threat of punishment. This certainly does not correspond to the 
function of penal law in a liberal social state.1280 
What the dissenters designated as the target of their ‘most important objection’ 
was the failure of the majority ‘to explain how the requirement of condemnation as an 
independent duty is constitutionally derived.’1281 In other words, the dissenters 
identified a leap in the internal justification of the legal argument that leads to the 
majority decision. The dissenters expressed their view that ‘the constitution nowhere 
requires that ethically objectionable behavior or conduct deserving of punishment 
must per se be condemned with the help of the statutory law without regard to the 
desired effect.’1282 
vii. Pluralism, the intersubjective space, and another face-to-face encounter 
(Dissenting opinion) 
The gist of the dissenting opinion in the Abortion I Case from the perspective 
of this phenomenological analysis is found in the excerpt that follows.  
                                                        
1278 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21  
1279 ibid  
1280 BVerfGE 39, 1 (86f.) 
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In a pluralistic, ideologically neutral [weltanschaulich neutralen] 
and liberal democratic community [Gemeinwesen], it is a task for 
the forces of society to codify the postulates of ways of thinking 
[Gesinnungspostulate]. The state must practice abstention in this 
matter; its task is the protection of the legal values guaranteed and 
recognized by the constitution. For the constitutional decision it 
matters only whether the penal provision is imperatively required to 
secure an effective protection of developing life, having taken into 
consideration the interests of the woman which are deserving of 
protection.1283 
Pluralism, according to Levinas, presupposes absolute otherness, thus non-
subsumption under the neutral, the objective, or common knowledge. In Totality and 
Infinity neutrality is considered a totality trait. Here, however, the ideologically 
neutral1284 could well be denoting the empty space, ‘something missing’, guaranteed 
within a pluralistic, liberal democratic community to enable intersubjectivity, that is, 
infinity1285, ‘something always missing’. Attention should be drawn to the German 
original, ‘weltanschaulich neutralen’; the word ‘weltanschaulich’ communicates 
precisely portrayal set up in this study, namely the view on the world, on the lived 
experience of the world within our field of sight, the perspective on the other and the 
Other.  
The practice of self-determination is premised on the liberal and democratic 
character of the community. The determination of ways of thinking, views, 
convictions, and, more generally, the ethics of the community is entrusted to ‘the 
forces of society’. Codification totalizes; the construction of a totality comprising ‘the 
postulates of ways of thinking’ in the community is assigned to the forces of society. 
The legitimacy of this codification, and, more generally, of totality structures in a 
pluralistic, ideologically neutral, liberal and democratic society, is grounded on the 
exercise of self-determination by human beings as citizens of a democratic state and 
members of society. The state should abstain from totalizing the ethics postulated in 
society, in other words should demonstrate respect for the absolute otherness of 
society as a collective account of human being-ness.  
The portrayal of the social phenomenon of abortion in the dissenting opinion 
is telling of deeper inquiry into the specifics of the relationship of the child en ventre 
sa mere and the pregnant woman and of higher attentiveness to the pregnant woman                                                         
1283 BVerfGE 39, 1 (94)  
1284 Köhne (2004) 285, 287 
1285 See Johannes Schwartländer, ‘Freiheit im weltanschaulichen Pluralismus. Zum Problem der 
Menschenrechte’ in Josef Simon (ed), Freiheit (Freiburg and München: Alber, 1977) 205, 205ff. 
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as the other.1286 The dissenters noted how ‘the immediately impressive statements 
about the undisputed high rank of the protection of life neglect the uniqueness of the 
interruption of pregnancy in relation to other dangers of human life.’1287 The legal 
language game of the Abortion I Case comprises various conceivable relations that 
feature in the portrayal of the phenomenon of the interruption of pregnancy. It hence 
constitutes already fertile ground for phenomenological analysis. Correspondingly to 
the ontological, the phenomenological account of the practice of the law of human 
dignity in the Abortion I Case evidences the uniqueness of the meaning of abortion.  
In the European legal history, which has been influenced by the 
Church, a distinction has been constantly made between born and 
unborn life. Even the value decision of the constitution leaves room 
for such a differentiation in the choice of measures of protection 
precisely because the fundamental right of Art. 2 sec. 2 GG is not – 
as the majority formulates – ‘comprehensively’ guaranteed, but 
rather is subject to statutory restriction. Otherwise neither the 
ethical nor the eugenic or even the social indications could be 
established.1288 
The dissenters refrained from developing an abstract theoretical account of 
how the state should react to protect against murderers and killers. Rather than 
subsuming the social phenomenon under the totality of a theory and framing the 
constitutional issue as an academic question, the dissenters turned to historical 
context, namely ‘European legal history’, the text of the Basic Law, and the doctrine 
of value decisions. The first source can serve as grounds for drawing a distinction 
between born and unborn life, which, if maintained, would be per se a crucial aspect 
of the meaning of human being-ness and, particularly, of unborn life as the other in 
the Abortion I Case. The two other sources, constitutional text and doctrine, point to 
the fact that the distinction is mirrored in law. The dissenters engaged in the portrayal 
of the state as the self. Critique, unlike theory, ‘does not reduce the other to the 
                                                        
1286 Justice Rupp-von Brünneck, the sole woman among the 16 members of the FCC at the time, ‘had 
no quarrel with the proposition that the state had an obligation to protect the fetus under the ‘right to 
life’ provision of the Basic Law.’ However, ‘in requiring counseling and providing public support to 
any woman who would carry her child to term, the state had struck a permissible balance between the 
fetus’s right to life and the woman’s right to the development of her personality.’ In the review of ‘the 
post-reunification abortion statute passed by the newly elected, all-German parliament’ (Judgment of 
May 28, 1993, 80 BVerfGE 203, 1993), Justice Rupp-von Brünneck’s reasoning prevailed in the 
decision of the Second Senate of the FCC. Donald P. Kommers, ‘Wiltraut Rupp-von Brünneck’, in 
Rebecca Mae Salokar, Mary L., Women in Law – A Bio-Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, 
Connecticut; London: Greenwood Press, 1996) 281 
1287 BVerfGE 39, 1 (78)  
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same’.1289 From a phenomenological perspective, reference to the first source, 
European legal history, imparts a component of the self-understanding of the German 
state. That European legal history is relevant a source, implies the European identity 
of the German state. This feature of the self can be construed as a substantiation of 
sameness.  
Although the majority of the Court did not challenge the validity of the 
distinction between prenatal and postnatal stages of development, noted the 
dissenters, it did not ‘distinguish […] between the different aspects of fundamental 
legal norms.’ In the case of the state encroachment of fundamental rights as defense 
rights ‘a distinction cannot, of course, be made’1290 between the two stages of 
development of life: ‘the embryo is, insofar as it is a potential bearer of fundamental 
rights, to be protected without exception in the same way as each born human 
life.’1291 Potentiality is the critical quality of this concretization of law’s 
Menschenbild. The dissenters discerned, however, the difference between state 
encroachment and injuries to unborn life by a third party against the will of the 
pregnant woman and ‘to the refusal of the woman to allow the child en ventre sa mere 
to become a human being.’1292 In the latter instances, equal treatment under the law 
has, respectively, limited applicability and no applicability. From a viewpoint 
external1293 to the relation between the self, namely the state, and the other, that is, the 
human beings involved, the dissenters explained how, first, fundamental legal norms 
as defense rights and as objective value decisions serve as distinct lenses through 
which the self looks in encountering the other, hence influence how the other is 
perceived and responded to; second, that the distinction between prenatal and 
postnatal stages of development is irrelevant to the portrayal of law’s Menschenbild 
when fundamental rights as defense rights are involved, to wit law’s Menschenbild 
remains in that respect empty; and, third, the relation between the involved human 
                                                        
1289 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43 
1290 BVerfGE 39, 1 (79)  
1291 BVerfGE 39, 1 (79)  
1292 BVerfGE 39, 1 (79)  
1293 The viewpoint is external to that of the Court and the human beings involved, yet should not be 
rendered as an Archimedian point. Wittgenstein refers to the Archimedian point apropos the world, 
what lies within the limits of our language; the dissenters are metaphysical subjects and interpreters. 
See Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 61f. [‘I do not deny what is obvious, that interpreters think within a 
tradition of interpretation from which they cannot wholly escape. The interpretive situation is not an 
Archimedian point, nor is that suggested in the idea that interpretation aims to make what is interpreted 
the best it can seem.’] 
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beings – all signified as the other vis-à-vis the state as self – is contingent on who the 
self with authority over the meaning of unborn life is.   
The understanding that originates in the encounter of the dissenters as the self 
with the pregnant woman as the other is significantly different from the depiction in 
the majority opinion. The dissenters saw in the person of the pregnant woman ‘a 
unique unity of ‘actor’ and ‘victim’’ 1294. The legal significance of this portrayal of the 
face of the pregnant woman can be appreciated in view of the fact that ‘much more is 
demanded of the pregnant woman than mere omission – as opposed to the demands 
on the one addressed by penal provisions against homicide: she must not only tolerate 
the far-reaching changes in her health and well-being associated with carrying the 
child en ventre sa mere to term, but also submit to encroachments upon her way of 
life which result from pregnancy and birth, and especially accept the maternal 
responsibility for the further development of the child after birth.’1295 The dissenters 
evidently desired the encounter with and a profound understanding of the pregnant 
woman as the other. The portrayal of pregnancy in the dissenting opinion centers on 
the experience of the pregnant woman.  
Legal judgment occurs within legal language games, namely fields narrower 
than the field of life, or subtotals of language games, and presupposes totality 
structures. In the above excerpt, totality is evoked by the ‘lines of demarcation’, 
which, according to the dissenter, Justice Rupp-von Brünneck, are justified in view of 
the ‘lengthy process of development’ leading to the birth of ‘an independently 
existing living being’1296. Before that moment, conversely, developing life is not 
independent from the pregnant woman; the two are organically inseparable. 
Biological continuity constitutes, along with potentiality, an aspect of the human 
being-ness of the child en ventre sa mere. Be that as it may, it is not the critical factor 
determining where lines of demarcation – suggested or ‘at least’1297 permitted – are to 
be drawn. Rather than revolving around the unborn as the other, the dissenter 
emphasized the viewpoint of the pregnant woman. The encounter with the pregnant 
woman as the other, welcoming her, as she understands herself and her world, are 
noticeably portrayed in the above excerpt. The delineation of stages in the pregnancy 
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is tailored to the ‘change in the attitude of the pregnant woman’ 1298 and the ‘growing 
maternal relationship’1299 which, indeed, correspond to ‘the different embryonic 
stages of development’1300. 
The hermeneutic and literary methodological approach to the text permits 
juxtaposition of a line of argumentation grounded in ‘the biological continuity of the 
entire development until birth’ with emphasis on the ‘change in the attitude of the 
pregnant woman’ and of the ‘growing maternal relationship’1301. In Totality and 
Infinity Levinas rejects the biological basis of humanity. The pursuit of a justificatory 
basis for discerning stages in the evolution of pregnancy in the dissenting opinion 
focusing on the portrayal of the pregnant woman indicates desire to encounter the face 
of the other. An understanding founded on biologically defined characteristics does 
not convey, demand or further relational perceptions of the human being-ness of the 
mother and the unborn child. Interest in the experience of the ‘growing maternal 
relationship’ by the pregnant woman – the only one of the two parties able to partake 
in real conversation, besides responsible by nature to protect the unborn1302 – 
connotes openness to real conversation and desire for a face-to-face encounter with 
the other. Language, the basis for deriving meaning from a face-to-face encounter 
with the human being, rather than vision, the means for identifying biological features 
of human being-ness and thereby forming an understanding of pregnancy, drives the 
dissenter in construing and depicting the unique relation of the child en ventre sa 
mere to the mother.  
Revisiting the question of legal consciousness, the dissenter claimed that 
‘[a]ccordingly’ to the possibility of drawing demarcating lines between stages of 
pregnancy supported supra ‘there is a difference between an interruption of 
pregnancy which takes place in the first stage of pregnancy and one which takes place 
in a later phase’1303. This difference is perceptible both in the legal consciousness of 
the pregnant woman and general legal consciousness. Listening and learning from 
experience liberates judgment from the totalizing effect of unattended to analogies. 
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1302 The pregnant woman and the unborn child are not treated as two separated entities in the dissenting 
opinion. Despite being independently addressed, they are viewed as two substantiations of human 
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1303 BVerfGE 39, 1 (80f.)  
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The dissenters approached the interruption of pregnancy as a particular threat to 
human life and reacted to the association of abortion with homicide. 
[…] the legislature can and must proceed […] from the idea that the 
object of protection – the child en ventre sa mere – is most 
effectively protected by the mother herself and that her willingness 
to carry the child en ventre sa mere to term can be strengthened 
through measures of the most varied kinds.1304 
The self with authority over the meaning – signification and significance – of 
unborn life as a concretization of human being-ness is the pregnant woman. The child 
is ‘most effectively protected by her’; this statement at once intimates respect for the 
absolute separation of the other. In view of the natural maternal responsibility of the 
pregnant woman, the legislature not only ‘must’, but also ‘can’ only proceed from an 
understanding of the other as absolutely other. The response is premised on the 
acknowledgment of the effectiveness of entrusting the protection of unborn life to the 
mother practicing her natural responsibility. In that respect, the dissenters 
demonstrated readiness to listen and learn1305 from the world of lived experience.  
The willingness of the mother to carry the child en ventre sa mere to term is 
indicative of the meaning she endows developing life with. The speaking self 
demonstrated awareness of and respect for the viewpoint of the pregnant woman; the 
willingness of the pregnant woman is the determinant of the meaning produced. The 
ability of the state as self to respond can go so far as to strengthen her willingness to 
bear the unborn child to term ‘through measures of the most varied kinds’. Whether 
responsibility is practiced in responding to the other depends on the choice of 
measures. 
Since no penal provision is required by nature to produce and secure 
the maternally protective relationship, the question arises whether a 
disturbance of this relationship, as is evident in the case of 
interruptions of pregnancy, can be obviated directly through a penal 
sanction in an appropriate manner.1306 
The ad hoc phenomenological portrayal of interruptions of pregnancy testifies 
to the uniqueness of the dynamics between the state and the human beings involved, 
as well as between the mother or a third party and the unborn. A phenomenological 
reading of the Abortion I Case portrays a relational understanding of the other, the                                                         
1304 BVerfGE 39, 1 (80)  
1305 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1306 BVerfGE 39, 1 (80)  
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mother or a third party interfering with developing life in the context of abortion, vis-
à-vis the unborn as another manifestation of the other. The dissenters noted that the 
legislature may react differently to the decision of the pregnant woman to undergo 
abortion ‘than to the killing of human life by a third party.’1307 The grounds in defense 
of clarifications of differences between abortion and other actions destructive of life 
are traced, argued Justice Rupp-von Brünneck, not only within the realm of nature, 
namely ‘the natural sensitivities of the woman’1308, but also within the realm of law.  
The dissenter pinpointed the ‘mistaken, if not irrelevant’, hence irresponsible, 
drawing of analogies between the term solution and euthanasia or ‘the killing of 
unworthy life’1309. The family resemblances between the two legal language games 
cannot sufficiently ground their relevance; this remark stresses how linguistic-
analytical and phenomenological portrayals are enterprises aiming at laying out the 
material that later needs to be critically assessed. Were they understood as the final 
word or, oversimplifiedly, as evidence of analogies and similarities requiring no 
further critical reflection, they would result in the production of poor, namely 
uninformed or irrelevant, legal argumentation. 
According to the view of the undersigned Madame Justice, the 
refusal of the pregnant woman to permit the child en ventre sa mere 
to become a human being is something essentially different from 
the killing of independently existing life, not only according to the 
natural sensitivities of the woman but also legally. For this reason 
the equating in principle of abortion in the first stage of pregnancy 
with murder or intentional killing is not allowable principally. 
Firstly, it is mistaken, if not irrelevant, to relate the term solution to 
euthanasia or even the ‘killing of unworthy life’ in order to 
distinguish it therefrom, as has occurred in the public discussion. 
1310 
The employment of empirical insights in the dissenting opinion diverges 
significantly, hermeneutically and literary, from their use by the majority of the Court. 
In deciding how to best reform statutory law on the interruption of pregnancy, that is, 
how to responsibly respond to the other, ‘it was especially significant for the 
legislature […] that the decision for an abortion grows out of a conflict situation 
based on varied motivations which are strongly imprinted with the circumstances of 
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the individual case.’1311 Far from simply drawing attention to the implications of 
individual circumstances for the portrayal of the – constitutional – conflict, the 
dissenters offered examples of economic-material and personal reasons. Each 
example communicates an understanding ensuing from the face-to-face encounter 
with the other.  
In addition to economic or material reasons – for example, 
inadequate living conditions, insufficient or uncertain income for a 
perhaps already large family, the necessity for both spouses to be 
employed – stand personal reasons: the social discrimination against 
unwed mothers, which continues to exist, the pressure of the father 
or the family, fear of endangering the relationship with the partner 
or of strife with parents, the desire or the necessity of continuing 
education already begun, or of continuing to practice a profession, 
difficulties in marriage, the feeling of not being physically or 
emotionally equal to the care and control of more children, and with 
singles, also the unwillingness to educate the child at home in an 
irresponsible way.1312 
Examples illustrate the uniqueness of individual circumstances and lived 
experience. From a hermeneutic and literary perspective, the value of examples is that 
they conjure up images and, thereby, portray, enhance and convey an understanding 
of the other, namely the pregnant woman, and a desire to portray in text her lived 
experience as perceived from her own viewpoint – to the extent that the latter can be 
soundly assumed. Examples stimulate a poetic experience of the humanism of the 
face-to-face encounter. In the face of the other we see the Other, in other words sense 
our separation from God. In phenomenological terms, awareness of the limited 
authority of the self over meaning denotes respect for the other’s absolute separation 
from the self. In linguistic-analytical terms, limited authority over meaning ensues 
from the realization that metaphysical subjects are the limit and equal in that the 
world is to them their world.  
Unlike the majority of the Court, the dissenters spelled out specific reasons 
why a pregnant woman would consider undergoing abortion. This elaborate 
demonstration suggests an effort to encounter the other in responsibility. The 
competence to respond is attained through surveyance of possible reasons leading to 
an interruption the pregnancy, and the examples offered in the above excerpt indicate 
a scanning of what lies within the field of sight that, ultimately, justifies the speaking                                                         
1311 BVerfGE 39, 1 (83)  
1312 BVerfGE 39, 1 (83f.)  
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self’s authority over the production of meaning. Previously in the dissenting opinion it 
was argued, ‘the legislature can and must proceed […] from the idea that the object of 
protection – the child en ventre sa mere – is most effectively protected by the mother 
herself […].’1313 The last example of personal reasons of the pregnant woman, ‘the 
unwillingness to educate the child at home in an irresponsible way’, approached 
through a hermeneutic and literary lens, affirms the consistency of the dissenters’ 
stance towards the mother as an absolutely other bearing the responsibility to protect 
the child. The good faith of the dissenters as regards the virtuous motivation 
underlying the interruption of pregnancy in that case, namely the unwillingness of the 
woman to respond to the future educational needs of the child irresponsibly, is a far 
cry from the didactic stance of the majority of the Court in assuming a weak or 
forgotten maternal responsibility.  
Individuals are organic constituents of society. The social dimension of law’s 
Menschenbild is widely affirmed in FCC jurisprudence and features centrally in all 
the instances of practice of the law of human dignity presently under scrutiny. 
Nowhere, however, in the texts discussed, do we find an approach as sophisticated 
and profound as the succeeding analysis in the dissenting opinion of the Abortion I 
Case.  
The anxiety of the pregnant woman that the unwanted pregnancy 
would lead to a rupture in her personal life-style or in the standard 
of living of the family, the perception that in bearing the child en 
ventre sa mere she could not count on effective help from the world 
about her, but must meet alone the adverse consequences of 
behavior for which she alone is not accountable, often make 
interruption of pregnancy appear to be the only way out for her. 
Even when in the personal situation the imprudent motivations of 
comfort, of egotism, and especially of consumer aspiration are in 
the foreground, the burden cannot rest exclusively with the woman, 
but reflects at the same time the widespread materialistic and child-
hating attitude of the ‘affluent society.’ Also neither the state nor 
society have developed up to this time sufficient institutions and 
life-styles which would enable the woman to combine motherhood 
and family life with personal development of equal opportunity, 
particularly in the professional area.1314 
The dissenters introduce the notion of shared accountability between the 
individual and the collectivity. Who the other is, is to a considerable extent socially 
constructed. Even ‘imprudent motivations’ of an egotistic self are cultivated within                                                         
1313 BVerfGE 39, 1 (80)  
1314 BVerfGE 39, 1 (84)  
 275
the ‘affluent society’. In the portrayal of society ensuing from the above excerpt 
enjoyment is associated with consumer aspiration, materialism and child-hating 
attitude. These are the traits of the community to which individuals belong, noted the 
dissenters. Both the state and society are accountable to give a responsible answer by 
developing ‘sufficient institutions and life-styles’ which would radically alter the 
terms determining how the pregnant woman exercises her authority over the meaning 
of the child en ventre sa mere, and would allow her to conquer the obstacles to the 
possibility of assuming responsibility for the unborn child. The dissenters in essence 
called for a pledge of self-reflection on the part of the state and society. In demanding 
the pregnant woman respond responsibly to the unborn child, the state in all of its 
manifested forms should take into account the shared accountability pointed out by 
the dissenters. The implication of the social dimension of law’s Menschenbild as 
depicted in the above excerpt is that individual and collective concretizations of 
human being-ness are communicating vessels. 
 
4. Concluding observations 
The ontological portrayal of the practice of the law of human dignity in the 
Abortion I Case demonstrates the inconsistency between the realm of life and the 
realm of law as regards the perception of the relation of the mother to the unborn 
child and pregnancy as a concretization of the human image. The majority of the FCC 
treated the two – inseparable in life – human beings as ontologically distinct interests. 
The human image of the unborn is contoured in light of potentiality and continuity 
associated with the traversal of limits in coming-into-being, that is, in evolving into a 
self-determined human being. The analysis shows how humanism and pragmatism are 
interlaced in the (humane) practice of the law of human dignity, and how the former 
might convert into paternalism when a single understanding of the ontology of the 
relation of the mother to the child en ventre sa mere is authoritatively established. 
Static portrayals of the human image within the realm of law amount to a forced 
human image, thus to an impairment of the self-determined unfolding of human 
being-ness guaranteed by the law of human dignity as understood in ontological 
terms. The dissenting opinion as such signifies the institutional provision for 
dissensus and critical reflection in practicing the law.  
In putting together the linguistic-analytical portrayal of the Abortion I Case, I 
read the text to identify how the law operates as a lens before the judge by analogy 
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with the eye or the metaphysical subject, as well as other lenses influencing the eye’s 
perspective on the world. Linguistic-analytical insights allow for a demonstration of 
how ‘something always missing’ as an aspect of human dignity meaning and concepts 
such as the Wertordnung is practiced though ineffable. A parallel can be drawn 
between the principle of proportionality and the logical form, and the function of 
human dignity as the highest value of the constitutional order vis-à-vis other 
fundamental rights and equation in the thought of Wittgenstein. Depicting the practice 
of the law of human dignity as a legal language game renders its intersection with the 
field of sight extending before the eye in the Wittgensteinian graph graspable. The 
dissenting opinion can be understood as a self-reflective look, a legal language game 
that emanates from another eye and comprises the majority opinion, that is, the object 
of critical reflection. The dissenters refigured the viewpoints traced within the 
majority opinion’s legal language game and attended to the multifariousness of 
pregnancy as a concretization of human being-ness and a social phenomenon, offering 
examples that effectively enriched and broadened the boundaries of the legal language 
game.  
The phenomenological account afforded the language for a portrayal of the 
self and the other in the practice of the law of human dignity. Who corresponds to the 
self and the other in the majority opinion significantly differs from such 
identifications in the dissenting opinion. The face-to-face encounter and the theme of 
the evolving self, inviolability and morality, absolute otherness and the interplay 
between totality and infinity surface in the text of the Abortion I Case as read through 
the introduced phenomenological lens. The majority and the dissenters perceived of 
what amounts to a responsible answer to the other on the part of the self differently; 
the very possibility of such divergence intimates that institutional provision is made 
for the pluralism of the intersubjective space. What is more, it hints at the need for 
guaranteeing that such spaces are created in producing human dignity meaning in a 
manner that is humane, that is, remaining true to the process of critical reflection to 
foreclose unbreachable obstacles to human beings’ escape towards the infinite 
movement of coming-into-being.  
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II. The Life Imprisonment Case (1977)1315 
The Life Imprisonment Case presents an opportunity to explore, from an 
ontological, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological perspective, the nexus 
between human dignity and freedom, the face-to-face encounter between the judge as 
self and the human being sentenced to life imprisonment, and the human image of the 
criminal among other themes raised in Chapter One. Although reference to a 
subsistence minimum in line with human dignity and to objectification as a violation 
of the law of human dignity is made in the Life Imprisonment Case legal language 
game, those themes are elaborated on more extensively in the analysis of the 
Subsistence Minimum Case and the Aviation Security Act Case respectively.   
 
1. Decision 
Persons deprived of liberty, and, therefore, of free exercise of any other right, 
are left with only dignity. The Life Imprisonment Case is seminal an instance in FCC 
human dignity jurisprudence, and, minding it was decided as early as 1977, a time-
honored and still manifested point of reference in legal scholarship. The case recites 
the commitment of the German constitutional order to respect for and protection of 
human dignity as the ultimum refugium of human beings within the realm of law.  
The law of human dignity guarantees a chance ‘in principle’ for those 
sentenced to life imprisonment to partake again in freedom at some point in the 
future. Pardon alone does not suffice to guarantee respect for the human dignity of the 
prisoner because it does not ‘in principle’ provide the aforementioned chance; 
statutory regulation is required.1316 The legal guarantee of human dignity, while 
sufficient a justificatory basis for granting parole and leaving thereby open a 
realizable chance to regain freedom1317, cannot go so far as to generally foreclose the 
enforcement of life imprisonment sentencing in the literal sense of the term.1318 The 
rule of law prescribes the conditions and procedures for suspending the execution of 
life imprisonment sentencing.1319                                                         
1315 BVerfGE 45, 187 (1977), First Senate of the FCC 
1316 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 49 [‘gesetzlich geregelt werden’]; Kunig, Art. 1, 
GG Kommentar (2012) para 36 
1317 Starck ibid 
1318 See also BVerfGE 72, 105 (116) (1986) [Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe] 
1319 Kunig (n 1316) para 36; See Schmidhäuser JZ (1978) 265 [Opposed to general non-enforcement of 
life imprisonment in the literal sense of the term.]; See also Starck (n 1316) para 49 [Opposed to 
general non-enforcement of life imprisonment in the literal sense of the term.]  
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Guaranteeing a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity 
[‘menschenwürdiges Dasein’] to the prisoners constitutes another aspect of the 
meaning of practicing the law of human dignity in the context of life imprisonment 
sentencing, discussed extensively in the analysis of the Subsistence Minimum Case 
(infra). Across legal orders, the poetic and rhetorical forcefulness of portrayals of 
human being-ness reaches its pinnacle in the context of death penalty and life 
imprisonment on account of the defensive subjective right and the objective duty of 
the state to protect human dignity1320. 
The 1977 Life Imprisonment Case is just one instance in a line of cases 
occupied with detention and framed as human dignity questions. Previously1321 the 
FCC had proclaimed that constitutional principles are to determine the treatment of 
prisoners, and had expressly deferred to the parliament for the imposition of 
limitations on the rights of prisoners. One year later, in the Lebach Case1322 the Court 
judged the compatibility of broadcasting a documentary comprising sensitive 
information re the person of the prisoner on German television with the Basic Law, 
and found an infringement of the fundamental right under Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in 
conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG on the basis of an individual-oriented and negative 
determination of the prisoner’s fundamental rights and a positive and communitarian 
dimension of constitutional guarantees, such as the guarantee of rehabilitation and 
reintegration of the prisoner into society.  
Life imprisonment sentencing is provided for under § 211 StGB1323 and § 212 
StGB1324 in the sixteenth Section1325 of the Criminal Code. The mandatory penalty of 
life imprisonment is the punishment accorded to extremely egregious circumstances 
of murder, particularly murder ‘out of wanton cruelty or to cover up some other 
criminal activity’1326. Besides raising Art. 1 sec. 1 GG concerns, the District Court                                                         
1320 See also BVerfGE 30, 1 (1970) [Wiretapping Case, Abhörurteil]; BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975) [Abortion 
I Case]; BVerfGE 88, 203 (1973) [Abortion II Case] 
1321 BVerfGE 33, 1 (1972) [Prisoners, Strafgefangene] 
1322 BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973) [Lebach] 
1323 On Mord (murder) [‘(1) Der Mörder wird mit lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe bestraft.’] 
1324 On Totschlag (manslaughter) [‘(1) Wer einen Mensch tötet, ohne Mörder zu sein, wird als 
Totschläger mit Freiheitsstrafe noch unter fünf Jahren bestraft. (2) In besonders schweren Fällen ist auf 
lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe zu erkennen.’] 
1325 ‘Straftaten gegen das Leben’. See Klaus Miebach & Günther M. Sander, Münchener Kommentar 
zum Strafgesetzbuch (Bd. 3, §§ 185-262, Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2003) 
1326 § 211(2) StGB [‘Mörder ist, wer aus Mordlust, zur Befriedigung des Geschlechtstriebs, aus 
Habgier oder sonst aus niedrigen Beweggründen, heimtückisch oder grausam oder mit 
gemeingefährlichen Mitteln oder um eine andere Straftat zu ermöglichen oder zu verdecken, einen 
Mensch tötet.’] 
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challenged the constitutionality of § 211 StGB and § 212 StGB in view of Art. 2 sec. 
2 sent. 2 GG in conjunction with Art. 19 sec. 2 GG and Art. 3 sec. 1 GG. The 
succeeding presentation of core points in the holding of the FCC emphasizes human 
dignity considerations in the decision and in scholarly discussion.  
The defendant, a drug dealer, was blackmailed by a drug addict, who 
threatened to bring into the open the defendant’s illegal activity did he not deliver a 
drug he had ordered and apparently paid for. The defendant visited his customer at an 
appointed time in the latter’s house, and shot him three times at close range in the 
back of the head while the drug addict was injecting the drug. The District Court 
asserted the incompatibility of the penalty of life imprisonment with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, 
specifically the duty of the legislature to respect the human dignity even of a criminal, 
and brought forth the particulars of the deadlock situation experienced by human 
beings realizing that the possibility of return to society is foreclosed: ‘[…] prolonged 
incarceration is so debilitating, spiritually and physically, that life imprisonment can 
be expected to destroy a human being within about twenty years.’1327 The District 
Court argued that ruling out the possibility of reentering society amounts to 
objectification of a human being, and referred the case to the FCC.  
In the Life Imprisonment Case the FCC did not denounce the constitutionality 
of life imprisonment for murder in and of itself; rather, it set standards for how life 
imprisonment sentencing should be performed and how decisions charging life 
imprisonment should be reasoned. The constitutionality of life imprisonment rests on 
the humane execution of the sentence, which translates into instituting a concrete and 
principally attainable possibility to regain freedom at a later point in time, while 
preserving the hope of the criminal for a life of freedom, a notion central to the core 
of the legal concept. In that regard, the FCC found the incumbent legal rules of parole 
insufficient and even thoroughly discussed a reform proposal brought forth by the 
Ministry of Justice. Empirical data as regards the time frame of parole releases 
reinforced the Court’s line of argumentation. Ultimately, the Court, exercising 
restraint, deferred to the legislator for decisions regarding parole regulations, 
expressing however concern for the burden falling on the holder of fundamental rights 
due to uncertainty in the evaluation of the factual background.  
                                                        
1327 Norman Dorsen, Rosenfeld, Sajó & Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials 
(2nd edn, St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2010) 585 
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Fundamental rights are protected even against the legislator. In the 
constitutional review of fundamental rights cases, the legislator’s understanding is not 
binding. Human dignity, the rule of law, and the principle of the social state demand 
the consideration of particulars, ‘the particular situation of each prisoner in terms of 
his or her capacity for rehabilitation and resocialization […]’1328. The Court reviewed 
relevant judicial practice, considered the results of scientific studies, decided that the 
District Court’s referral was valid and ruled out a violation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG if 
those condemned with the sentence of life imprisonment retain in principle a chance 
to partake in freedom. 
Human dignity is a constitutional principle and, along with human personality, 
the highest legal value of the German constitutional order. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG enjoys 
unlimited validity in all areas of law, criminal law having undoubtedly the highest 
demands as to the maintenance of justice. In the Life Imprisonment Case the human 
being is defined as a spiritual-moral being that exercises self-determination, yet 
subject ‘in principle’ to limitations on his or her freedom to act posed by living in 
community with others. The precise limitations to be imposed lie with the legislator; 
be that as it may, two parameters, the constitutional guarantees of equality and human 
dignity, should be considered unfailingly in deciding on the deprivation of liberty. 
These constitutional guarantees notably intimate the meta-dimension of the legal 
concept of human dignity.  
In the area of criminal law the constitutional concept of human dignity 
determines how the nature of penal sanctions, the relation between guilt and 
atonement, and between the severity of the offence and the guilt of the offender 
should be understood. The Court took notice of the progress of criminal law from 
more raw towards more humane and from more simple towards more differentiated 
forms of punishment. No claim to timeless validity of compliance of life 
imprisonment with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG can be made, argued the Court. Rather, the 
adoption of more humane forms of punishment in the future remains an open-ended 
possibility. Penalties should reflect justice, rather than simply the effort to combat 
crime so as not to lead to the objectification of the offender by the state. 
Constitutional limitations on the sentence of life imprisonment, in line with the state’s 
commitment to social justice and with an understanding of human beings as both                                                         
1328 See Kommers (1997) 311 
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individuals and community members, are called for to guarantee prisoners’ 
subsistence minimum.  
Not long after the Life Imprisonment Case, parliament revised the Criminal 
Code in the spirit of the decision, providing the possibility of reevaluation after fifteen 
years of served punishment in view of an ad hoc assessment of the gravity of the 
offender’s guilt1329. In 19861330 the Court discussed the gravity of the crime as a 
criterion for deciding on the constitutionality of life imprisonment. In that case, the 
offender was a member of the SS, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 
murder of fifty persons in concentration camps. Twenty years later, at which point the 
prisoner had reached the age of eighty-eight years, the Frankfurt Superior Court 
blocked the prisoner’s release on grounds of the gravity of the offender’s crime. 
While sustaining the Superior Court’s judgment and the balancing of competing 
interests that led that court to the respective decision, the FCC emphasized once more 
the importance of particulars. By granting priority to the personality, mental situation 
and age of the offender over the gravity of the crime, the Court sharpened and 
deepened the meaning of the requirement to perform judicial weightings in light of 
particulars in the context of life imprisonment sentencing.  
 
2. Discussion 
The state is under a duty to protect human life, the vital basis of human 
dignity, also against attacks of third parties. For that it utilizes, among other measures, 
the repressively effective means of criminal law.1331 The Objektformel doctrine arises 
in the text of the Life Imprisonment Case. The doctrine famously originates in the 
thought of Kant1332 and prohibits treating human beings merely as objects of state 
action. The Life Imprisonment Case reflects the commitment of the constitutional 
order to serve as a basis for the ideologically foundational positions of a pluralistic 
                                                        
1329 See § 57 StGB [‘Aussetzung des Strafrestes bei zeitiger Freiheitsstrafe’] and § 57a StGB 
[‘Aussetzung des Straafrestes bei lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe’]; See also Bernd von Heintschel-
Heinegg, Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch (Bd. 2, §§ 38-79b StGB, Munich: Verlag C. H. 
Beck, 2012) 645 
1330 BVerfGE 72, 105 (1986) [Lebenslange Freiheitstrafe; war criminal sentenced to life 
imprisonment]; See also BVerfGE 64, 261 (1983) [Hafturlaub; The Second Senate of the FCC found 
the denial of a ten-day release of the offender by the Frankfurt Superior Court incompatible with 
fundamental rights in the Basic Law, underlining specifically that the right to human dignity may not 
be denied to the offender.] 
1331 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 92 
1332 See ibid para 17 
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society in view of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and the Basic Law as a whole.1333 The other side 
of this commitment can be framed as resistance to the univocal and static 
understanding of the world1334. In the case under scrutiny the openness to change of 
viewpoints to the world and the perception of society and of the Court as an ipse 
rather than idem are plain to see.  
Human dignity prohibits inhuman, humiliating and degrading1335, treatment. 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG protects the individual human being from a range of state 
infringements on human dignity such as torture, slavery, servitude, human trafficking, 
deportations, stigmatizations, and expulsions1336. In the execution of imprisonment 
sentencing ‘the fundamental requirements of the individual existence of human beings 
should be safeguarded.’1337 As argued in the Life Imprisonment Case, the imposition 
of a sentence to life imprisonment abides by the guarantee of human dignity insofar as 
it preserves a chance to regain freedom. 1338 
Whether a mentally ill or asocial person, or a criminal who is insusceptible to 
rehabilitation, regardless of personal liability or non-modifiable factors underlying the 
perception of the Menschenbild, human dignity always inheres in the human 
being.1339 Actions that express disrespect for human dignity cannot bring about the 
waiving of the protection guaranteed in Art. 1 sec. 1.1340 Human dignity cannot be 
lost.1341 The protection guaranteed under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is effective even in the 
cases of conduct that violates human dignity; the individual cannot renounce 
[verzichten]1342 the fundamental right of human dignity.1343 In line with the law of 
                                                        
1333 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 20; Cf. Stern (1983) FS Scupin 627, 631f. 
1334 Kunig ibid para 21; See also BVerfGE 96, 375 (400) [Kind als Schaden] 
1335 On the concept of humiliation see Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 103f. 
1336 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 90; Kloepfer (2001) 77, 86 
1337 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228); BVerfGE 98, 169 (200) [Arbeitspflict; compulsory labor] 
1338 See Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 98 
1339 Ernst-Joachim Lampe (ed), Beiträge zur Rechtsanthropologie (Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 22, Wiesbaden, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985) 23, 29 
1340 Kunig (n 1333) para 12; State paternalism is the contrasting aspect of that matter, see for instance 
the Peepschow Case, Federal Administrative Court, BVerfGE 64, 274 (1981); v. Olshausen (1982) 
2221 
1341 Spaemann, ‘Über den Begriff der Menschenwürde’, Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde (1987) 
295, 304 [‘unverlierbar’]; Hasso Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ in Hasso Hofmann, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 126 fn 119 
[‘juristiche Sprachlosigkeit’]. 
1342 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1343 Kunig (n 1333) para 12 
 283
human dignity and the principle of the social state, the resocialization of the prisoner 
constitutes an essential aspect of the execution of a sentence to imprisonment1344.  
If the detainee poses an ongoing threat for other human beings, preventive 
custody [Sicherungsverwahrung] of lengthy duration does not infringe on human 
dignity.1345 In that case, even substantial personality deformation and physical and 
mental damages to the detainee are accepted insofar as they cannot be averted by 
further refinement of the terms of detention.1346 Still, a realistic chance for the 
prisoner to regain freedom must be provided. 1347 In the case of grave human dignity 
violations, as those accorded life imprisonment sentencing in criminal law, culpability 
as a determinant of meaning constitutes an objective aspect of the action or the 
omission of action. The clarification of how the inferred subjectivity and the objective 
framing of the intention are reconciled in practice is of significance from a 
hermeneutic and literary perspective. In the case of particularly grave crimes, the 
ascertainment of existing ‘good intention’ cannot remedy the finding of a human 
dignity violation. No requirement of demonstrating a subjective aspect of the meaning 
of the human dignity violation features in the Life Imprisonment Case. Conversely, 
subjective contemptuous intention does not suffice as grounds for identifying a 
violation, if the intervention does not objectively meet the degree of gravity of a 
human dignity violation.1348 
The conclusive aim1349 of certain conduct [Finalist des Handelns] can play a 
decisive role in the identification of violations of human dignity.1350 The protective 
scope of the law of human dignity can be deduced from an overall evaluation 
[Gesamtbetrachtung] of the conclusive aim that precipitated an action as well the 
                                                        
1344 BVerfGE 35, 202 (235 f.) [Lebach Case]; BVerfGE 98, 169 (200) [Arbeitspflicht; compulsory 
labor]; See Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 118; Klaus Lüderssen, 
‘Resozialisierung und Menschenwürde’, Prittwitz & Manoledaki (eds), Strafrecht und Menschenwürde 
(1998) 101 
1345 BVerfGE 109, 133 (151) [Langfristige Sicherheitsverwahrung; long-term preventive custody] 
1346 BVerfGE 109, 133 (150 f.)  
1347 BVerfGE 109, 133 (151); See Herdegen (n 1344) para 98 
1348 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 24 
1349 ‘The subjective ground of desire is the incentive, the objective ground of volition is the motive; 
hence the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective ones, which 
depend on motives that are valid for every rational being.’ In Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785; Allen W. Wood ed and tr, Rethinking the Western Tradition; New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002) 45 
1350 See Herdegen (n 1344) para 49; Cf. Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 90 [in the 
context of biotechnology and biomedicine]; Matthias Herdegen, ‘Die Menschenwürde im Fluß des 
bioethischen Diskurses’ (2001) JZ 773, 775  
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mode of its occurrence.1351  In certain extreme cases, such as discrimination on the 
grounds of race, the underlying purpose is as such the foundation of the violation 
regardless of the gravity of effects.1352 The consideration of the ends-means-relation 
in the finding of a violation requires space beyond the figuratively firmly 
circumscribed conceptual core of human dignity [Begriffskern], a periphery 
[Begriffshof]1353 where the balancing of the gravity of the offense and the essential 
circumstances of pursued ends can take place.1354 This space signifies a zone within 
which violations tangent to the protective scope of human dignity are, exceptionally, 
not judged to be infringements on the law of human dignity in light of a balanced 
overall assessment of all circumstances.1355 This rudimentary balancing is an 
immanent aspect of human dignity meaning.1356  
The central issue discussed in the Life Imprisonment Case is whether the 
sentence of life imprisonment as the legal order’s response to the gravest of crimes is 
constitutional. Framing the imposition and execution of death penalty as an Art. 1 sec. 
1 GG consideration1357 appears – so argue certain voices in the German legal 
literature1358 – redundant, despite relevance to the guarantee of human dignity, in 
view of the prohibition of death penalty under Art. 102 GG. Other approaches 
interpret the abolition of death penalty in the Basic Law to be ensuing directly from 
the legal guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, and resist altogether 
argumentation1359 that puts forward the legitimacy deficit of the Federal Republic as a 
sound basis for not deciding the absolute prohibition of death penalty in view of 
constitutional law.1360 
According to Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 2 ECHR the right to life is limited in the event 
of death sentencing. Protocol No. 6 ECHR1361 abolished death penalty, save in time of 
war (Art. 2 Protocol No. 6 ECHR). The more recent Protocol No. 13 ECHR abolished                                                         
1351 See Herdegen (n 1344) para 90 
1352 See ibid para 49 
1353 Cf. Engish, Einführung in das juristische Denken, 9. Aufl. (1997) 139  
1354 Herdegen (n 1344) 
1355 ibid 
1356 Dürig, Vorauflage, Grundgesetz: Kommentar (1958) para 16; Geddert-Steinacher, (1990) 81 
1357 For the scholarly controversy on whether the death penalty constitutes directly as such an affront to 
human dignity, see Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 143 fn 472 
1358 Herdegen (n 1344) 99 
1359 BVerfGE 18, 112 (117) [death penalty]; BVerfGE 60, 348, 354 [asylum law (Art. 16 sec. 2 sent. 2 
GG) and extradition procedure] 
1360 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 48 
1361 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty as amended by Protocol No. 11 (28.4.1983) 
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death penalty in all circumstances.1362 The major premise of legal syllogisms in 
ECtHR jurisprudence on issues of detention is mainly Art. 3 ECHR.1363 Comparably, 
voices within the Supreme Court of the United States grounded reaction to death 
penalty on the cruel and unusual punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment as an 
offense to human dignity.1364 The Constitutional Court of Hungary has also abolished 
death penalty in October 19901365. In 1995, State v Makwanyane and Another1366, a 
landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, ruled, on the basis of 
the incompatibility of death penalty with sections 9 (life), 10 (dignity), 8 (equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law), the invalidation of the relevant 
criminal law provision.  
3. Analysis 
In the Life Imprisonment Case the practice of the law of human dignity is 
inextricably associated with guaranteeing those sentenced to life imprisonment the 
hope to return to freedom and touches on the requirement of securing a dignified 
subsistence minimum to human beings deprived of their freedom. The ontological, 
linguistic-analytical and phenomenological portrayals spotlight different aspects of a 
story of ‘something missing’ in the text of the case under scrutiny. 
a. Ontological  
The ontological portrayal emphasizes law’s anthropocentricism in light of the 
law of human dignity and fundamental rights, renders the distinction between the 
forced and the forceful unfolding of human beings’ essence more tangible, and 
indicates that the traversal of limits in coming-into-being may be understood to 
operate on different levels.  
i. Humanism: the practice of law not ‘for its own sake’ 
                                                        
1362 Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances (3.5.2002) 
1363 See Herdegen (n 1344) para 50 
1364 See Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 306 (Brennan, J., concurring) [‘Today death is a uniquely 
and unusually severe punishment. When examined by the principles applicable under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity. The 
punishment of death is therefore ‘cruel and unusual,’ and the States may no longer inflict it as a 
punishment for crimes. Rather than kill an arbitrary handful of criminals each year, the States will 
confine them in prison.’]  
1365 Decision 23/1990 
1366 (CCT 3/94) 
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The task of criminal law is the protection of elementary values of community 
life1367. Still, the Hegelian proposition ‘to honor the criminal through the punishment 
as [a human being] with reason’ cannot stand, so it was argued, as grounds for ‘the 
constitutional justification of punishment that deprives human beings of their dignity 
[den Menschen seiner Würde beraube1368] and excludes them for life from 
society’1369. The Court demarcated the realm of law as an independent field of 
production of meaning, that is, not necessarily adhering to interpretations of 
punishment coming from extra-legal, for instance philosophical, sources.  
Criminal law cannot ‘exercise compensation and justice for its own sake’ 
[Schuldausgleich und Gerechtigkeit um ihrer selbst willen zu üben.]1370 The practice 
of criminal law is not self-referential not only due to the higher status of constitutional 
law vis-à-vis criminal law, but also – and most importantly – due to the meta-
dimension of law on account of law’s commitment to anthropocentricism. Humanism 
demands that the practice of law, even per se the law of human dignity, positions 
human beings ‘in differing respects but always deliberately […] into a central place 
[…]’1371 as ends in themselves, instead of developing an autistic and self-referential 
modus operandi. The law of human dignity transcends instituted law; human dignity 
transcends its legal shell, yet without discarding it; equally, the concept of human 
dignity is transcended by human being-ness.1372 
 
ii. Forced and forceful unfolding of human being-ness 
                                                        
1367 BVerfGE 45, 187 (194) 
1368 The verb ‘beraube’ [rob] has a poetic force and alludes to the forceful character of the deprivation. 
1369 BVerfGE 45, 187 (195) 
1370 BVerfGE 45, 187 (195) 
1371 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ 155, 181 [didactic stance] 
1372 We can only be certain of the empirical fact of a linguistic proposition stating the law of human 
dignity in the Basic Law and of the practice of that proposition in FCC jurisprudence. Yet, the mere 
presence of that language is of hermeneutic force. See Gadamer’s reflections on words, Gadamer, 
Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 411 [‘[…] it can […] happen that […] we do not use “the right word” 
for something because we do not recognize the thing. It is not the word that is wrong here but its use. It 
only seems to fit the thing for which it is used. In fact it is the word for something else and, as such, is 
correct. Likewise, someone learning a foreign language assumes that words have real meanings that are 
displayed in usage and conveyed in the dictionary. One can always confuse these meanings, but that 
always means using the “right” words wrongly. Thus we may speak of an absolute perfection of the 
word, inasmuch as there is no perceptible relationship – i.e. no gap – between its appearance to the 
senses and its meaning. […] The “truth” of a word does not depend on its correctness, its correct 
adequation to the thing. It lies rather in its perfect intellectuality – i.e., the manifestness of the word’s 
meaning in its sound. In this sense all words are “true” – i.e., their being is wholly absorbed in their 
meaning […]’ 
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The damaging consequences of life imprisonment on the personality of the 
offender are viewed in the Life Imprisonment Case as extraordinarily severe 
interference with fundamental rights, specifically of the right to personal freedom 
guaranteed under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 2 GG1373. On account of its invasive character, 
life imprisonment sentencing can be rendered as an instantiation of polemos. Forcing 
the polemos occasions an unfortunate happening of the irruption of Being.  Human 
beings are forced outside their essence. The deprivation of freedom and the a priori 
denial to the offender of a chance to return to freedom in the future interfere with 
human dignity, besides – obviously – with liberty, in that they are ‘forceful’; it is 
‘how’ the denial of liberty takes place that substantiates the infringement on human 
dignity.  
The forceful deprivation of freedom evinces human being-ness ex negativo. 
Violations of fundamental rights intimate perversely who the human being is, that is, 
by portraying the intrusion on human being-ness1374. Any such infringement can be 
perceived as an instance of polemos; consequently, aspects of the φύσις of the human 
being are disclosed. What is impaired by forceful disclosure is self-determination or, 
in ontological terms, the integrity of the unfolding of human being-ness. Forcing the 
polemos conflicts with ‘meditating and caring, that human beings be human and not 
inhumane, ‘inhuman,’ that is, outside their essence.’1375 
Forcefully depriving [entkleiden] the human being of [his or her] 
freedom without at least preserving a chance for him to potentially 
someday become partaker of freedom would be inconsistent with 
this understanding of human dignity. 1376  
The poetic consistency of the word ‘entkleiden’, namely ‘to unclothe’, 
captures how the particular encroachment on human dignity compromises human 
being-ness; failure to guarantee human dignity strips human beings of their essence, 
leaving them – metaphorically put – naked. The ‘forceful’ character of the deprivation 
consists in that it thwarts the self-determination of the individual. The Life 
Imprisonment Case illustrates vividly the traumatic event of being forcefully deprived 
of freedom without maintaining the hope to potentially regain freedom.  
                                                        
1373 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1374 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) [‘The demand of respect for human dignity means particularly that cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishments are prohibited [cited cases omitted].’] 
1375 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
1376 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
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‘Forceful’ deprivation may also imply the force of law per se.1377 Criminal law 
constitutes a different cloak of force1378 than fundamental rights, and garbing law’s 
Menschenbild and the meaning of human dignity in the one or the other cloak begets 
distinct significations and significance. The above excerpt triggers a figurative 
representation of the hierarchy between the law of human dignity, that is, the 
backbone of constitutional law, and criminal law as different strata in a multi-layered 
system of force. The law of human dignity can be understood as the fortress of law’s 
humanism, precisely because it transcends its legal shell. Since law per se constitutes 
a cloak of force that transforms perspective into being, legal actors should be on the 
alert for instances of dehumanization through law. 
 
iii. Traversal of limits  
The disclosure of φύσις permits the ascertainment of being, namely the most 
emphatic form of a ‘reminder of ought’.1379 In light of the ontological insights put 
forward in Chapter One, ‘ought’ refers to securing to every human being the 
possibility of traversing limits in the process of unfolding. Are human beings human 
within the realm of law? There is no self-evident response to that question; ad hoc 
evaluation in a spirit of critical reflection is called for. How is the forceful deprivation 
of freedom without a chance to reenter society or, reversely, the guarantee of a chance 
to regain freedom ontologically portrayed as an aspect of human dignity meaning in 
the life imprisonment context? 
The verdict ‘for life’ stricto sensu means the definite expulsion of 
the offender from the society of free citizens. 1380 
[…] The sentence of life imprisonment cannot be enforced 
meaningfully if the prisoner is denied a priori any prospect of 
returning to freedom. 1381 
The particularity of stricto sensu life imprisonment sentencing lies in the 
definiteness of expulsion from a life in freedom, ergo the conclusiveness of the 
unavailability of space that could be occupied by the offender in the society of free 
citizens in the future; no ‘part’ in the realm of fundamental rights corresponds to                                                         
1377 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 [‘[…] law is a particularly potent source and badge of 
legitimacy, and site and cloak of force.’] 
1378 ibid  
1379 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 1 [‘die Feststellung des Seins als nachdrücklichste Form 
einer Anmahnung des Sollens.’] 
1380 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1381 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
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‘those who have no part’1382. Consequently, polemos or dissensus remain uncalled for, 
and the irruptive traversal of a limit is ruled out, as the limit between life in detention 
and life among free citizens cannot be traversed ‘for life’. Conversely, the lack of 
space denotes absence of a subject of fundamental rights and incapacity ‘for staging 
scenes of dissensus’1383. The irruptive disclosure of the essence of the human being 
imprisoned ‘for life’ is the last, ontologically termed, ex negativo revelation of human 
being-ness and, as a result, the final occupation, literally and figuratively, of a space 
by the offender, rather than a phase in the movement to and fro between concealing 
and revealing one’s essence. Life imprisonment stricto sensu can effectively deny the 
offender the status of the subject of fundamental rights. In addition, the FCC held that 
if the prospect of returning to freedom is a priori foreclosed, the enforcement of the 
sentence of life imprisonment could not be meaningful. How is the meaningfulness of 
life imprisonment understood in light of the ontological account of the law of human 
dignity?  
Respect and protection of human dignity belong to the 
constitutional principles of the Basic Law. […] This is based on the 
conception of the human being as a spiritual-moral being, invested 
with the freedom to determine and unfold [him or herself] [sich zu 
entfalten]. 1384 
Life imprisonment is meaningful provided it does not perpetually impede the 
unfolding of the φύσις of the human being, or as the Court put it, ‘[…] the core of 
human dignity is struck if the offender, regardless of the development of his 
personality, must abandon all hope of regaining his freedom.’1385 In freedom, the self-
determined unfolding [‘sich […] entfalten’] happens in the irruptive movement from 
concealment to coming into the unhidden, that is, coming-into-being. This is in 
harmony with a certain conception of law’s Menschenbild that encompasses the 
spiritual and moral dimension of human being-ness. The offender under the sentence 
of life imprisonment is deprived of freedom on criminal law grounds. ‘something 
missing’ as an aspect of the law of human dignity marks the space secured within the 
realm of fundamental rights for the offender to institute him or herself as a legal 
subject or, more fundamentally, to be human.                                                          
1382 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 35  
1383 ibid 69 
1384 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1385 BVerfGE 45, 187 (245) 
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The damaging effects of life imprisonment on the personality of the offender 
should be counterbalanced and counteracted at various levels and by a combination of 
appropriate measures. The distinctive meaning of the law of human dignity in the Life 
Imrpisonment Case1386 being the prospect, ‘chance’, or ‘hope’ of returning to 
freedom, practicing that law means delivering upon the duty to rehabilitate the 
offender in order to increase the possibility of the return to a life in freedom on the 
part of the state. The FCC referred to the ‘substantive limitation of the danger of 
serious damages in the personality’1387 through the practice of pardon, and, more 
generally, the ‘introduction of the possibility of an earlier release.’1388 With respect to 
rehabilitation measures the Court noted: 
The interest in the offender’s rehabilitation flows from Art. 2 sec. 1 
GG in conjunction with Art. 1 GG. The convicted offender should 
have the chance to reenter society after atoning for his crime [cited 
cases omitted]. 1389 
Rehabilitation is the state’s response to the stipulation that the ‘chance to 
regain freedom at a later point in time’ be ‘concrete and in principle also 
realizable’1390. The duty of the state to respect and protect human dignity is thereby 
delivered upon during the execution of life imprisonment sentencing. The requirement 
of a ‘concrete and in principle also realizable’ chance underscores the correspondence 
between the humanism and the pragmatism of law. Cultural criticism reconciles 
humanism and pragmatism by implying that ‘far from excluding aesthetic and 
expressive considerations, […] instrumental policy analysis has a constitutively 
important expressive dimension that literary reading can illuminate.’ Binder and 
Weisberg argue that ‘[t]he best cultural studies of law reveal how policy decisions 
may reshape the expressive possibilities and social identities available to individuals, 
                                                        
1386 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) [‘From Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with the principle of the social state 
derives the duty of the state – and this is valid especially for the execution of criminal penalties – to 
guarantee that existence minimum [Existenzminimum] that accounts for a decent existence [an 
existence in line with human dignity, menschenwürdiges Dasein] in the first place.’]; The guarantee of 
a dignified existence minimum constitutes an equally important condition of life imprisonment, yet not 
a distinctive element of the meaning of the law of human dignity in the Life Imprisonment Case. 
1387 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238) 
1388 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1389 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) 
1390 BVerfGE 45, 187 (245); ibid [‘The review of the constitutionality of life imprisonment revealed 
that, particularly from the vantage point of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and the principle of the rule of law, the 
implementation of the life imprisonment sentence in accordance with human dignity is only secured 
when the sentenced criminal has a concrete and in principle also realizable chance to regain freedom at 
a later point in time; […]’] 
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thereby conditioning the preferences considered by conventional policy analysis.’1391 
The duty to rehabilitate and resocialize originating in the inviolability of human 
dignity and how these are implemented call for an approach through this prism. 
Rehabilitation and resocialization measures deal with the damaging effects of 
detention on the personality and prepare prisoners for a life in freedom1392, but can 
also be understood to serve as impetus for unfolding and – as it has been ontologically 
framed – traversing limits at the spiritual level while physically confined within the 
space of prison. The latter ends presuppose a multidimensional portrayal of law’s 
Menschenbild – both spiritual and physical. The compatibility of life imprisonment 
sentencing with the Basic Law and the alignment of its execution with the law of 
human dignity are conditional on whether the possibility to unfold and traverse limits 
is upheld.  
Prisons are under the duty to strive towards the resocialization of 
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, to maintain their ability to 
cope with life and to counteract the harmful effects of deprivation of 
freedom and also, and most importantly, the thereby caused 
impairing changes in personality. The constitutional soundness of 
this implementation [of life imprisonment] derives from the 
inviolability of human dignity as guaranteed in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.1393 
Minding that Art. 1 sec. 1 GG institutes both a state duty and a claim to 
respect for and protection of human dignity, the duty of the state to rehabilitate and 
resocialize the prisoner would be incomplete without a corresponding claim on the 
part of the one convicted to life imprisonment.  
Assuming that the chance of ever being able to regain his freedom 
must in principle always remain for the one convicted to life 
imprisonment, he must also, consequently, be entitled to a claim to 
rehabilitation, for it may even take serving the sentence for a long 
time to get the chance, to have to set up a life in freedom [cited case 
omitted]. 1394 
From an ontological perspective, the entitlement to a claim to rehabilitation is 
yet another substantiation of law’s humanism in that it ameliorates the initiation and                                                         
1391 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 19 [‘Cultural criticism of law demands that 
normative argument defend institutions on the basis of the kind of identities they will cultivate rather 
than their ability to protect or accurately represent existing personalities.’] 
1392 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) [‘Because, even in such cases, the enforcement of the penalty can set the 
requirements for the achievement of a release, and facilitate the reintegration of the offender into 
society.’] 
1393 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238) 
1394 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) 
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happening of the self-determined, irruptive process of movement from concealment to 
unconcealment that is elemental1395 to instituting human being-ness within the realm 
of law and preserving law’s humane practice. The nexus between the humanism and 
the pragmatism of law is manifested in concretization of the claim to human dignity 
as the claim to a concretely and realistically attainable chance to regain freedom.   
 
iv. The disruption of identity apropos changing context 
The Court panegyrized law’s humanism noting, ‘always-milder punishments 
have replaced those more cruel in character, and that progress is directed from more 
crude towards more humane.’ 1396 The important insight that dissensus, through the 
demonstration of a certain impropriety, disrupts identity suggests the Court’s 
engagement in self-reflection, explored in more depth in the phenomenological 
account of human dignity. The ontological account of the law of human dignity put 
forward in Chapter One permits the identification of the disruption of identity 
involved in the process of critical self-reflection in the text of the Life Imprisonment 
Case. The Court resorted to the historical evolution of criminal justice to justify the 
constitutional admissibility of life imprisonment as opposed to death penalty, hence, 
testified the evolution of an I as ipse rather than idem. The FCC asserted the relevance 
of historical context and background and the influence of up-to-date knowledge on 
the evaluation of the sentence to life imprisonment ‘particularly in view of the 
standards of human dignity and the rule of law.’1397 Historical evolution features as an 
inseparable aspect of human dignity meaning.  
b. Linguistic- analytical 
Compatibility of statutory law with the constitution, particularly so with the 
law of human dignity as the critical lens through which to look at the world and 
produce meaning, can be rendered in view of linguistic-analytical insights as 
subsumption under a legal language game. The linguistic-analytical portrayal ensues 
from the identification of the language that contours the human image of the criminal 
and conveys the meta-dimension of law and of the range of viewpoints comprised in                                                         
1395 Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle's Physics’ 183, 230 [‘[…] the 
κρύπτεσθαι of φύσις is not to be overcome, not to be stripped from φύσις. Rather, the task is the much 
more difficult one of allowing to φύσις, in all the purity of its essence, the κρύπτεσθαι that belongs to 
it.’] 
1396 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1397 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
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the legal language game. Diverse viewpoints within the state, as the Wittgensteinian 
eye, are occasioned by the principle of the separation of powers and may be 
understood as signifying the operation of a self-reflection mechanism. Resorting to 
tautology or equation in the thought of Wittgenstein, I offer an alternative 
understanding of key themes in the legal discourse on human dignity. The linguistic-
analytical portrayal of the Life Imprisonment Case demonstrates how the boundaries 
of the legal language game fluctuate in the process of negative delineation. 
 
i. Compatibility with the constitution as subsumption under a legal language 
game 
The constitutional relevance of concerns arising from § 211 StGB is premised 
on a restrictive interpretation of the Basic Law, which can be portrayed in light of the 
linguistic-analytical model as a narrow legal language game demarcated by rigorous 
boundaries. In deciding on the constitutionality of life imprisonment, the FCC 
reviewed the relevant statutory law and, among other arguments brought forth by state 
organs, the reasons for the District Court’s referral. The FCC attended to the data and 
range of opinions at its disposal and set the frame within which life imprisonment 
sentencing is constitutional. The Basic Law ubiquitously determines the legal 
language game, its boundaries and content, and is considerably formative of the 
viewpoint of the constitutional judge looking through it as a lens1398. Whether 
statutory law conforms to the constitution is understood in linguistic-analytical terms 
as a question about the possibility of subsumption of the former under legal language 
games emanating from an eye that looks through the lens of the Basic Law.  
What is mirrored in legal texts constitutes, as repeatedly noted, just one aspect 
of the practice of the law of human dignity. The text of judicial decisions portrays in 
written form only the outcome of the process of judicial interpretation, perceived in 
the present analysis principally as a hermeneutic and literary process. The language 
that appears in the text has already been polished and fine-tuned, drafted and re-
drafted to mirror subsumption or non-subsumption, that is, the constitutional 
compatibility or incompatibility of the statute under scrutiny. The competence of 
judges as authors and the responsibility to render constitutional compatibility 
                                                        
1398 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
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demonstrable is of profound pertinence to doctrinal, legal-sociological, and 
hermeneutic and literary approaches to law. 
It is worth exploring the extent to which phrasing associations reflect the 
transposition of concerns from one frame to another, at present from criminal law to 
fundamental rights. The FCC stressed the extraordinary and severe character of the 
infringement on the fundamental rights of those sentenced to life imprisonment and 
stated that due to the exceptional intensity of the invasion of personal freedom 
guaranteed under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 2 GG the sentence is located at the very top of the 
catalogue of criminal penalties1399. The far-reaching effects of the invasion render ‘the 
gravity and importance of the constitutional law question clear.’1400 Targeted 
emphasis on the high degree of intensity and the sweeping implications of the 
invasion aims at portraying and conveying the significance of the infringement.  
The implementation of life imprisonment sentencing should abide by the law 
of human dignity. The FCC stated, ‘[i]n all this, one thing should not escape one’s 
attention [darf nicht aus den Augen verloren werden]: the dignity of human beings is 
something indispensable [etwas Unverfügbares] […]’1401. The law of human dignity, 
concluded the Court, demands that the penal system in principle provides the 
possibility to regain freedom. A literary perspective on the text of the case qualifies 
drawing hermeneutically impactful parallels between the Court’s phrasing choices – 
as benign as these may seem from a doctrinal standpoint – and Wittgenstein’s eye and 
field of sight simile. Compatibility with the constitution can be rendered as 
subsumption under a legal language game. The law of human dignity should not 
escape one’s attention; it is an indispensable aspect of the meaning produced and 
decisive in judging the subsumption under the legal language game.  
Human dignity, concluded the Court, ‘is only secured when the sentenced 
criminal has a concrete and in principle also realizable chance to regain freedom at a 
later point in time.’1402 Having in principle a chance to return to a life in freedom is 
paired with the entitlement to ‘a claim to rehabilitation, for it may even take serving 
the sentence for a long time to get the chance, to have to set up a life in freedom 
                                                        
1399 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1400 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1401 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1402 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
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[…]’1403. The claim to rehabilitation renders ‘realizable’ the law of human dignity by 
activating the viewpoint of another metaphysical subject within the legal language 
game, and, what is more, also during the execution of the sentence. 
 
ii. The range of viewpoints within the legal language game  
A range of viewpoints can be identified in the legal language game portraying 
the Life Imprisonment Case. The FCC noted the legislature’s insistence on life 
imprisonment sentencing and the embracement of this punishment by society at large 
and by jurisprudence as ‘self-evident’, despite concerns expressed by the Great 
Criminal Law Commission and scientists1404. In fleshing out the legal language game, 
the FCC drew on the current state of knowledge about the repercussions of the 
sentence of life imprisonment so as to perform an informed assessment of the gravity 
of psychical and physical damage caused to the imprisoned human being. Another 
viewpoint naturally taken into account was that of the District Court. Regardless of 
whether these points of view generate language games or legal language games, their 
inclusion in the text of the Life Imprisonment Case illustrates the breadth and content 
of the legal language game emanating from the viewpoint of the FCC as author of the 
decision. The expansion of the legal language game and the stretching of its 
boundaries reflects the effort to comprehensively survey facts and figures as well as 
opinions in the discourse across disciplines with a view to sharpening, refining and 
updating the appreciation of the subject matter1405 and thereby justifying – not just 
argumentatively, but also hermeneutically – the authority of its viewpoint1406 over the 
meaning produced.  
The FCC questioned the methodological soundness and objectivity of the 
findings on which the District Court grounded the argument about damages caused by                                                         
1403 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239); ibid [‘Because, even in such cases, the enforcement of the penalty can set 
the requirements for the achievement of a release, and facilitate the reintegration of the offender into 
society.’] 
1404 BVerfGE 45, 187 (194) 
1405 BVerfGE 45, 187 (195) [‘[…] the current understanding of criminal justice’] 
1406 The legitimacy of the Court’s authority over meaning is grounded of course in the foundational 
institutions of every democratic constitutional order; these are not disregarded here. Rather, the present 
hermeneutic and literary methodological premises encourage placing emphasis on the text of the legal 
arguments employed. Indeed internal and external justification requires the demonstration of 
surveyance of a given subject matter or discourse. In hermeneutic terms, the broader the scope of the 
surveyed field, the sounder the argument furthered and the meaning produced. In literary terms, the 
language employed determines the quality of the portrayal and the clarity of meaning, which is the 
ultimate goal of any linguistic-analytical discourse. See Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation 
(1989) 221ff. [internal and external justification] 
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life imprisonment to the personality of the prisoner and incorporated scientific 
positions from the discourse on the subject matter, namely insights into the effects of 
the sentence according to theoretical and empirical studies1407, and the opinions of 
experts presented to the Court at the hearing. ‘Established findings’ showing that, in 
practice, ‘the full serving of life imprisonment is a rare exception […]’1408 constitute 
sources of external justification of the Court’s legal argumentation. Such sources 
ameliorate the soundness of associations in legal argumentation; from a linguistic-
analytical perspective, they enrich the language composing the legal language game 
with material found outside its boundaries, yet necessarily within the field of sight of 
the constitutional judge. For example, the definition of harm is grounded on 
empirically acquired knowledge1409, ‘the experience that a protracted imprisonment 
means extraordinary psychical and physical distress and can lead to significant 
impairment of the personality structure of the prisoner’, which explains the 
‘introduction of the possibility of an earlier release’1410. The advancement of an 
understanding premised on lived experience could be figuratively rendered through 
the linguistic-analytical model as an expansion of the boundaries of the legal language 
game.  
The Court moreover considered theoretical approaches to the subject matter, 
namely theories on punishment particularly apropos the telos of criminal law 
sentencing. According to the – time-honored in criminal law and the jurisprudence of 
German courts – unification theory [Vereinigungstheorie] the purposes of 
punishment, rehabilitation, retribution, atonement, and prevention of crime or 
protection of the society are unified and balanced in criminal law sentencing1411. The 
FCC did not join the District Court in the latter’s criticism of life imprisonment 
sentencing as unjustified punishment on the grounds that it does not serve the 
aforementioned purposes. That the discord between the FCC and the District Court 
falls back on a theoretical account of punishment indicates the significance of                                                         
1407 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229ff.) 
1408  BVerfGE 45, 187 (241); ibid [‘Those condemned to life imprisonment are – with the exception of 
a few cases, where the social prognosis is unfavorable, and reasons of public security are offered for 
continuing to serve the sentence – released earlier by means of the practice of pardon.’] 
1409 See another example of the experience of harm and a description of that experience as ‘intangible’ 
and ‘invisible’, in MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 14 [‘Sexual violation is a crime of 
inequality of status […]. It dehumanizes. No material recompense or punishment can restore its 
intangible, invisible harm.’]; 57 [‘[…] the harm of second-class human status does not pose an abstract 
reality question.’] 
1410 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1411 BVerfGE 45, 187 (253) 
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incorporating theory into the legal language game to open up new fields of dissensus 
within its boundaries and to gain refinement and depth of meaning through critical 
reflection. The FCC argued that the sentence of life imprisonment is not 
disproportionate as a punishment for murder1412. 
The Court scrutinized ‘the content and the impact of the sentence to life 
imprisonment’1413 and found no violation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. The constitutional 
judge expressed the willingness to approach the case in a manner ‘consistent with the 
wording’ of the challenged statutory provision and to produce ‘a reasonable meaning’ 
attuned to ‘the identifiable purpose of the law’1414. Eventually, the FCC responded to 
the question of constitutionality brought before it in the affirmative. Although the Life 
Imprisonment Case was deemed ‘a question of simple statutory interpretation’ and, as 
such, ‘a matter for the competent and responsible [zuständigen] criminal courts’1415, 
the FCC still included in its legal language game illustrative alternative courses of 
interpretation, stressing however the non-mandatory character of any single 
interpretation, since ‘the wording and the meaning of this provision allow for an even 
narrower interpretation ensuring that even in […] extreme cases no disproportionate 
punishment must be imposed […]’1416. These variants signify the profound 
enrichment and expansion of the legal language game. At the same time, they 
underline the distinction between hermeneutically and literary defined authority over 
meaning and authority associated with legal effects, granted of pertinence to the 
purposes of mainstream doctrinal accounts.  
 
iii. The decisive lens, the decisive viewpoint, constitutional review and the 
principle of the separation of powers as a self-reflection mechanism, 
critical reflection and practicing the law of human dignity in context 
Applying the linguistic-analytical model, the judge is, by analogy with the 
metaphysical subject, at the limit of the legal language game, and can be viewed as 
the eye in Wittgenstein’s simile. Even when certain phrasing, for instance abstraction 
or passive voice syntax, conceals the legal actor practicing the law, effectively giving 
the impression of identification of the judge with the law or – figuratively rendered –                                                         
1412 BVerfGE 45, 187 (254) 
1413 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1414 BVerfGE 45, 187 (267) 
1415 BVerfGE 45, 187 (267) 
1416 BVerfGE 45, 187 (267) 
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of the merging of the eye with the lens attached to it, the decisive viewpoint is still 
that of the author of the legal text. Imagine law as a lens set before the eye, defining 
the eye’s outlook on life. The figurative rendering indicates how legal language 
games are just part of a broader field of sight, our world; more precisely, how the 
judge by analogy with the metaphysical subject sees through the lens of law, but can 
also look at the world without it, through other lenses1417. Practicing the law of human 
dignity can be portrayed as a sui generis language game, a legal language game 
within the – unlimited for the eye – field of sight corresponding to the world, 
language. 
In the Life Imprisonment Case, the Court determined the latitude of the 
legislature1418 to exercise its powers framed in hermeneutic and literary terms as the 
authority to produce meaning. The right to personal freedom is not absolute; ‘in 
conformity with Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 3 GG it can be limited by an act of parliament.’1419 
In exercising authority over meaning the legislator ‘is limited in several respects.’1420 
The inviolability of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is the determinant of the 
meaning produced. 
The legislature, in exercising the powers granted to it, must take 
account of both the inviolability [Unantastbarkeit] of human dignity 
(Art. 1 sec. 1 GG), the highest principle of the constitutional order, 
and further constitutional norms, in particular the equality provision 
(Art. 2 sec. 1 GG) and the requirements of the rule of law 
[Rechtsstaatlichkeit] and the social state (Art. 20 sec. 1 GG). 1421 
Life imprisonment raises not only legislative but also criminological and 
political considerations regarding the role of criminal law in modern society. In 
appreciation of the multidimensionality of the subject matter the FCC deferred to the 
legislature for decisions on issues exceeding the constitutionally determined 
boundaries of its authority over meaning1422, The legal-sociological underpinnings of 
the boundaries demarcating hermeneutical authority should not escape our attention; 
                                                        
1417 See a methodological remark in Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 12 [‘Mit Hilfe der Rechtsforschung 
kann Justitia, die häufig mit der Binde vor den Augen dargestellt wird, eine Brille aufsetzen.’] 
1418 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 [‘Das vom BVerfG bei der Überprüfung von Gesetzen praktizierte Prinzip des 
sog. judicial self-restraint trägt der aus der parlamentarisch-demokratischen Struktur der Verfassung 
sich ergebenden politischen Gestaltungsfreiheit des Gesetzgebers gebührend Rechnung; es beugt einer 
Politisierung der Justiz ebenso vor wie einer Judifizierung der Politik.’] 
1419 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1420 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1421 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1422 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223f.) 
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the boundaries stand for the scope of competence and responsibility in view of 
constitutional review and the principle of the separation of powers as a self-reflection 
mechanism of the constitutional democratic state. 
The process of critical reflection on the humane practice of the law of human 
dignity guarantees humanism in that it entails attentiveness to the field of sight and 
the viewpoints of metaphysical subjects present within it. ‘Law in context’ 
approaches convey engagement in reflection on the relevance of the legal language 
game to the content of the field of sight beyond its boundaries. The constitutional 
admissibility of the sentence to life imprisonment, according to the Court’s view, is 
bound with historical context.  
New insights may influence, or even convert the evaluation of this 
sentence particularly in view of the standards of human dignity and 
the rule of law. 1423 
The history of the criminal justice system clearly shows that 
always-milder punishments have replaced those more cruel in 
character1424, and that progress is directed from more crude towards 
more humane, and from simpler towards more 
sophisticated/differentiated forms of punishment, and [from this 
evolution] it is clear which path should be followed. 1425 
Critical reflection presupposes the possibility of interaction between the eye’s 
broader field of sight and the legal language game. That the standards of human 
dignity and the rule of law require or, more modestly, provide scope for the meaning 
of life imprisonment sentencing to feed on new insights ensuing from other fields 
affirms that critical reflection is the modus operandi of the law of human dignity. 
New insights brought to the light become part of the world as we know it, namely of 
what ‘can be expressed in language’1426 and lies within the field of sight. These 
insights are not necessarily at once mirrored in the subtotal of the field of sight, that 
is, the legal language game.  
The FCC noted that courts’ jurisprudence had been lagging behind the 
‘increasingly lively’ debate developing within scientific literature. Criminal courts 
held life imprisonment sentencing constitutionally admissible yet, as the FCC                                                         
1423 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1424 BVerfGE 45, 187 (249) [The FCC pointed to a new trend in lawmaking in the 1974 draft of the 
Federal Ministry of Justice for the Fifteenth Amendment to the Criminal Code, namely the provision of 
certain latitude to reevaluate the sentence to life imprisonment after a period of the time was served 
with the consent of the offender] 
1425 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1426 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.43)  
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observed, ‘without further discussion.’1427 The ‘striking’1428 discrepancy between law 
and context can be portrayed – hermeneutically and literary – as ‘something missing’ 
by analogy with the concept of the Leerstelle. The mere identification and depiction 
of aspects of this inconsistency causes the expansion of the boundaries demarcating 
the legal language game in the Life Imprisonment Case1429, and hints at areas of 
discourse on which to draw to fill ‘something missing’. By recourse to context, legal 
actors can ad hoc construe the meaning of ‘something missing’ within scope of their 
competence and responsibility. Meaning is necessarily also ethical as the product of 
legal actors’ good or bad willing1430, which can change the limits of the legal 
language game, thereby rendering it quite another. The legal language game being a 
subtotal of the world, the process of rendering the realm of law quite another entails 
deriving insights from law’s context, namely from the space within the limits of our 
language, that is, the broader field of sight; accordingly, the perspective on the world 
changes.1431 
The law of human dignity as the decisive lens, the viewpoint ensuing 
therefrom and the world of the metaphysical subject within the institution of the 
constitutional judge are mutually reflexive1432. The hermeneutic insight that ‘method 
and object cannot be separated: method has already delimited what we shall see 
[…]’1433 should inform the portrayed mutual reflexivity.  
                                                        
1427 BVerfGE 45, 187 (225) 
1428 BVerfGE 45, 187 (224) [‘Dabei fällt auf […]’] 
1429 See BVerfGE 45, 187 (225ff.); The Court’s authority over the production of meaning translates 
also into the latitude to choose among available interpretation canons. In other words the linguistic-
analytical portrayal of the legal language game does not necessarily involve expansion or contraction 
of boundaries and enhancement with insights deduced from the rest of the field of sight. In the Life 
Imprisonment Case the travaux preparatoires and the history of deliberations in the lawmaking process 
were not considered critical in deciding the question referred to the FCC by the District Court. 
Legislative history and the framers’ ideas and motivation were not deemed decisive influences on the 
interpretation and understanding of the Basic Law provisions under scrutiny. 
1430 The pertinence of the responsibility and the good or bad willing of actors – secondarily also legal 
actors – to the guarantee of human dignity is particularly perceptible in the context of biomedicine and 
biotechnology. See Böckenförde (2003) JZ 809, 809 [‘Verantwortbarkeit von Stammzellenforschung’] 
1431 Insights into the change of perspectives can be drawn from the discussion of perspectivism in 
Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 468 [‘[…] to develop a new interpretive 
perspective is no casual matter since it means living one’s life differently. […] Though there cannot be 
a complete theory of that explains everything, the world does have a distinct character at particular 
times in history because certain perspectives become dominant over others.’]; Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 
(6.43) 
1432 The latitude of the judge as communicated, for instance, in the ‘Spielraumtheorie’ alludes to the 
metaphysical subject, that is, the human factor, within institutions. See Badura (1964) JZ 337, 343  
1433 Palmer (1969) 23 [‘It [method] has told us what the object is as object. For this reason, all method 
is already interpretation; it is, however, only one interpretation, and the object seen with a different 
method will be a different object. […] Explanation will certainly rely on the tools of objective analysis 
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The FCC admitted that the absolute threat of punishment contributes to ‘legal 
certainty and uniform punishment of offenders […]’1434, particularly in a crime as 
serious as murder. While ‘the imperative of substantive justice is a justified request 
working towards an as uniform as possible criminal law practice […]’1435, 
reservations re the results of ‘the use of a rigid threat of punishment’ emphasizing the 
‘therein-lying schematism in the specific case’1436 were also expressed. The 
constitutionality of the absolute threat of punishment as severe as life imprisonment is 
conditional on ‘the possibility of openness in performing the subsumption of concrete 
cases under abstract norms to assert the punishment that is consistent with the 
constitutional principle of proportionality’1437. In other words, the initiation of 
concrete cases into the legal language game can cause its boundaries to flux, to the 
extent that the language introduced can be subsumed under the abstract norms. This 
portrayal shows that not only the lens attached to the eye, but also the world 
extending from the eye shapes meaning (see infra, phenomenological analysis of the 
relation of the self to the world). The association of the practice of the law of human 
dignity with concretization so enthusiastically emphasized in German legal doctrine 
indicates that shaping meaning in ‘performing the subsumption of concrete cases 
under abstract norms’ also signifies transforming meaning.1438 
Minding that the ‘human’ component in human dignity language suggests the 
metaphysical subject at the limit of the field of sight, and that in judicial practice the 
decisive viewpoint is that of the judge as institution and human being, it is 
consequential to claim that new insights can cause the world – for present purposes 
the world extending before the judge’s eye – to change. In the proposed model, law 
ubiquitously permeates the entire legal language game. Most importantly it decisively 
defines the viewpoint of the judge1439. Consequently, law determines to a considerable 
extend the language employed in FCC jurisprudence and the breadth and rigidness of                                                                                                                                                               
but the selection of the relevant tools is already an interpretation of the task of understanding.’]; See 
Grimm, ‘Methode als Machtfaktor’ (1982) 469 
1434 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260) 
1435 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
1436 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
1437 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
1438 BVerfGE 45,m 187 (261) [‘This is however possible – as the hearing has revealed – under the 
requirements of the general part of the Criminal Code and in the manner of a constitutionally 
conforming restrictive interpretation of § 211 StGB, particularly of the elements ‘insidious’ 
[heimtückisch] and ‘in order to conceal another crime’.’] 
1439 Stürner (1998) 317, 330 [Discussing the ‘Kind als Schaden’ problem (see infra, Chapter Two, Part 
B, Abortion I Case), Stürner noted under conclusion 6, reference is made to the constitutional limits of 
judicial competence [die verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen justizieller Kompetenz]. 
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the boundaries of legal language games. The disparity between legal language games 
that do not reflect the evolution occurring in life, in other words resist the introduction 
of new language within their boundaries, and the rest of the field of sight, where 
change eventuates, signifies disregard for maintaining the pertinence of law to life and 
for respecting the human factor. Such disparity indicates the inhumane practice of 
law.  
The portraits of the judge and the legislator hint at the human dimension of 
institutions as the underlying cause of diversification among viewpoints even when all 
possibly responsible variables in the legal language game are fixed and similar. The 
FCC identified a further diversification factor that interferes with the aspiration of 
uniformity. Appealing to lived experience1440, the FCC observed that ‘penalties differ, 
indeed not insignificantly, from court to court even when the circumstances are 
similar […]’1441, and that ‘the judge is generally milder than the legislator and 
sometimes prone to avoid the most severe punishment as much as possible in those 
cases where the legislator would want to know they [the most severe punishments] are 
applied.’1442 The observation of diversification among viewpoints and therefrom-
ensuing legal language games, even within the same branch of state power and in 
response to similar circumstances, is paired with the identification of traits of human 
being-ness in the conventional images of the judge and the legislator. From a 
hermeneutic and literary perspective, the anthropomorphism in the language 
employed by the FCC to juxtapose stereotypical interpretive stances of the judge and 
the legislator towards the necessity of uniform punishment can be understood as an 
intimation of the human factor facet of the respective institutions. The words ‘milder’ 
and ‘prone’ allude to human attitudes. The certainty and uniformity guaranteed 
through the absolute threat of punishment clash with the unavoidable variety of 
metaphysical subjects’ viewpoints manifested in practicing the law and the traits of 
collectivities of metaphysical subjects within a single institution, signified at times as 
legal and institutional culture. 
                                                        
1440 See BVerfGE 45, 187 (261); The empirical premises of the Court’s remarks are asserted without 
further explication of their foundations and methodological soundness. The Court went on to add that 
‘[t]he higher the statutory penalty, the greater this tendency [of the judge being milder than the 
legislator in imposing severe punishment] becomes’ citing, however, legal literature in support of this 
empirical observation. 
1441 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
1442 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
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The law of human dignity delineates the role of the judge and the authority 
over meaning. Foreclosing access to what lies outside the legal language game would 
render the perception of the judge as a metaphysical subject – prior to and besides an 
institution – void. The meta-dimension of the law of human dignity ‘shows’ in the 
crossing of the boundaries of the legal language to examine the consistency of law 
with life. Critical reflection sparked by new insights is the process of the humane 
practice of the law of human dignity and at once guaranteed by that law. The practice 
of the law of human dignity guarantees that respect is accorded to the perspectives of 
metaphysical subjects where these are traced in the linguistic-analytical model. Law 
becomes inhumane when it fails to trail the evolution that takes place in life, 
particularly the evolving meaning – both significance and significations – of human 
being-ness. Apropos the criminal justice system the FCC noted the advancement 
‘from more crude towards more humane […] forms of punishment.’1443 Each instance 
of practicing human dignity language in law can be understood as a reminder of the 
therein-inhering guarantee of law’s humanism. From a linguistic-analytical 
perspective, respecting and protecting human beings qua beings translates into 
recognizing that metaphysical subjects stand at the limit of the world, in other words 
precede their world, thus have authority over the meaning of all that their field of 
sight comprises. 
 
iv. Tautology and inviolability 
The linguistic-analytical tools available permit an understanding of 
inviolability [Unantastbarkeit] in light of tautology. Inviolability expresses the 
guarantee of dignity to human beings by virtue of being human. This tautological 
proposition does not correspond to a picture of reality1444, because it ‘allows every 
possible state of affairs’1445, just as human dignity inheres in every human being. 
(4.462) […] In the tautology the conditions of agreement with the 
world – the presenting relations – cancel one another, so that it 
stands in no presenting relation to reality. 
(4.463) […] Tautology leaves to reality the whole infinite logical 
space; […] 
(4.464) The truth of tautology is certain, of propositions possible, of 
contradiction impossible. (Certain, possible, impossible: here we                                                         
1443 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1444 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.462) 
1445 ibid 
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have an indication of that gradation which we need in the theory of 
probability.)1446 
The proposition of the law of human dignity is tautological precisely because 
it holds true ‘for all the truth-possibilities’.1447 Wittgenstein adds, ‘[t]he proposition 
shows what it says, the tautology and the contradiction that they say nothing.’ 1448 The 
tautology is unconditionally true, that is, ‘has no truth-conditions’ and is ‘without 
sense’1449. Be that as it may, and this is an especially important remark for present 
purposes, tautology is ‘however, not senseless’. Tautology ‘is part of a symbolism’1450 
and does not portray reality. Propositions of logic ‘show in tautologies’ the logic of 
the world.1451 Along similar lines, the ‘absolute Metapher’ characterization of human 
dignity sheds underlines how independence from reality amounts to the non-
requirement of justification of violations.1452 
(5.142) A tautology follows from all propositions: it says 
nothing.1453 
In light of a strict linguistic-analytical understanding of the tautological 
propositions stating the law of human dignity are without sense, yet, not senseless, 
rather symbolical. This strict reading of the law of human dignity, particularly as in 
the German constitution, cannot take us too far with our reasoning. This law has more 
than merely a symbolic impact as practiced in FCC jurisprudence and as discussed in 
German legal doctrine. Framing the law of human dignity as a tautology, rendering it 
inviolable [unantastbar], exempts its practice from the sphere of possible propositions 
composing legal arguments. At the same time, the tautology implied in inviolability 
establishes the irrelevance of the human dignity proposition to reality. Linguistic and 
doctrinal tools of critical reflection, such as the Objektformel, can materialize the 
possibility of objectification at the level of language and meaning and, thus, effectuate 
a break with the tautology only to assess whether inviolability is guaranteed in reality. 
 
v. The vertical and the horizontal axes: height, and depth as breadth                                                         
1446 ibid (4.462), (4.463), (4.464) 
1447 ibid (4.46) 
1448 ibid (4.461) 
1449 ibid 
1450 ibid (4.4611) 
1451 ibid (6.22) 
1452 Baer, ‘Menschenwürde zwischen Recht, Prinzip und Referenz – Enttabuisierungen’ (2005) 571, 
573 
1453 Wittgenstein (n 1444) (5.142) 
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The law of human dignity is the ‘the highest principle of the constitutional 
order.’1454 Above and beyond celebrating the prominence of human dignity in the 
German constitutional order, this statement introduces the dimension of height into 
the legal language game (see infra, the phenomenological analysis) and suggests the 
hierarchical modus operandi of the practice of fundamental rights. The law of human 
dignity is set at the highest point within the constitutional order, as implied by the 
Court, vis-à-vis ‘further constitutional norms’1455. 
Moreover, since the enactment of the Basic Law the understanding 
of the content, function and effects of fundamental rights has 
deepened.1456 
The notion of depth intimates the progress marked in understanding the practice of 
fundamental rights since the enactment of the Basic Law. The passive voice framing 
[‘[…] das Verständnis […] [hat] eine Vertiefung erfahren.’] conceals whose 
understanding has deepened. The documentation of the development of ‘medical, 
psychological and sociological insights into the impacts of the enforcement of life 
imprisonment’1457 enkindles the figurative association of depth reached through 
surveyance1458 of knowledge about the subject matter across disciplines with the 
breadth of the legal language game. Heraclitus fragment 101, ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν [I 
searched myself] alludes to self-reflection as an inquiry into the inner self, which 
could be parallelized to inner morality as in Kant, and as a mode of understanding that 
is essentially different from πολυμαθίη [polymathy, Vielwisserei1459] in fragment 40, 
which refers to the effort to exhaustively survey the content of the field of sight 
extending before the eye. Granted of sociological, besides hermeneutic and literary, 
value, the insight presently gained is that the lens of law alone does not suffice for 
soundly appreciating such a multi-dimensional subject matter, and for grasping its 
meta-dimension, thus also for exercising authority over meaning. 
 
                                                        
1454 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1455 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1456 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1457 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1458 See Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 301 [‘A person who has no horizon does not see far 
enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him.’] 
1459 Thurner (2001) 191 
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vi. Life imprisonment sentencing vis-à-vis death penalty: mediation and equation, 
fluctuation of the boundaries of the legal language game in negative 
delineation 
Although life imprisonment had ‘for ages been at the core of criminal 
sanctions’, it had lost significance in the course of time, since ‘the death penalty was 
the highest criminal penalty.’1460 The Court ascertained the meaning of life 
imprisonment – understood here primarily as significance – apropos another, graver 
criminal penalty. The legal language game demonstrates surveyance of the discursive 
controversy re the meaning of each penalty. The various viewpoints on the 
implications of each punishment and the diametrically opposed stances in tracing the 
evolution of the juxtaposition cause the boundaries of the legal language game to 
expand. The introduction of death penalty language into the legal language game of 
the Life Imprisonment Case refines the produced meaning in that it initiates a ‘vis-à-
vis’ determination, namely occasions dissensus. The flow of reasoning in legal 
language games can be figuratively rendered as a fluctuation of boundaries: in certain 
parts of the analysis the legal language game expands to accommodate language – 
hence also meaning – then eliminated causing it contract.  
The dispute over the death penalty has rendered ‘for life’ an 
alternative, the constitutional permissibility of which has generally 
not been challenged. The effects and consequences of life 
imprisonment on the human personality have been examined in 
depth in older – not insignificant – literature. A popular argument 
for advocates of the death penalty was that life imprisonment is 
more cruel and inhuman (‘Horror without end’ [Schrecken ohne 
Ende]) than the enforcement of the death penalty (‘End with horror’ 
[Ende mit Schrecken]). Not until the debates on death penalty had 
subsided, did scientists in the late 1960s begin to concern 
themselves with the issues of life imprisonment. Since then, the 
discussion of this maximum penalty has not died down. 1461 
The adjectives ‘cruel’ and ‘inhumane’ are central motifs in the portrayal of 
human dignity violations. They feature recurrently in the practice of the law of human 
dignity along with ‘degrading’1462 (see ex negativo portrayals of human being-ness in 
the ontological analysis). The two penalties are measured against each other in terms 
of their cruel and inhumane character. The ‘vis-à-vis’ approach is mediated by the                                                         
1460 BVerfGE 45, 187 (224) 
1461 BVerfGE 45, 187 (224) 
1462 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) [‘The demand of respect for human dignity means particularly that cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishments are prohibited [cited cases omitted].’] 
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notion of humanism. The FCC identified Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and the principle of the rule 
of law1463 as the critical vantage point for reviewing the constitutionality of life 
imprisonment. The law of human dignity fundamentally conveys humanism; 
practicing that law as the standpoint of equations, in other words as a mediating 
concept compasses the telos of humanism.  
The identification and depiction of mediation in the present linguistic-
analytical approach sets the stage for the succeeding phenomenological analysis. The 
introduced model operates essentially as a multilayered hermeneutic and literary 
device for analysis. The modest goal of the linguistic-analytical approach is to 
highlight dominant motifs in the legal language games under scrutiny.   
 
vii. Portrayal of the Menschenbild of those sentenced to life imprisonment and of 
the meta-dimension of law 
The boundaries of the legal language game expand as the portrayal draws on 
Hegelian legal philosophy, yet contract again when the constitutional judge 
challenges the gravity of such foundations for deciding the constitutional 
compatibility of a punishment that contradicts the meaning of the law of human 
dignity in the context of life imprisonment sentencing. The meaning of law’s meta-
dimension in accordance with the law of human dignity surfaces in the rejection of a 
tautological rendering of the practice of criminal law. Constitutional law sets limits to 
what can count as a justification of punishment. 
The thought in Hegelian legal philosophy, ‘to honor the criminal 
through the punishment as a [human being with reason]’, though an 
aspect of the essence of punishment, can in no case stand as the 
foundation and the constitutional justification of punishment that 
deprives the human being of his dignity and excludes him for life 
from society. In a secular and liberal society, it cannot be the task of 
criminal law to exercise compensation and justice for its own sake. 
This would correspond neither to the current understanding of 
criminal justice, nor to a morally acceptable advancement of 
justice.1464 
In the Life Imprisonment Case the ‘individual’ and the ‘community’ feature 
prominently in the portrayal of law’s Menschenbild. The image of the human being 
                                                        
1463 BVerfGE 45, 187 (245) 
1464 BVerfGE 45, 187 (194f.) 
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does not correspond to that of ‘an isolated and autocratic individual’1465. Rather, the 
individual is ‘related to the community and bound by the community’1466. Depriving 
human beings of their dignity and impairing the unfolding of law’s multidimensional 
Menschenbild by incapacitating, to the highest conceivable degree, the social 
dimension of human being-ness are incompatible with the boundaries and content of a 
legal language game ubiquitously permeated by the law of human dignity. ‘In a 
secular and liberal society’ criminal law cannot ‘exercise compensation and justice for 
its own sake.’1467 The practice of criminal law cannot be self-referential; criminal law 
cannot be practiced ‘for its own sake’, in other words cannot be linguistic-analytically 
portrayed as a tautological schema. Tautology is rather reserved only for the phrasing 
and framing of the law of human dignity as noted supra.  
Self-referential practice, the Court noted, would not reflect ‘the current 
understanding of criminal justice’. In linguistic-analytical terms, self-referential 
practice impairs the practice of law’s meta-dimension, ‘something always missing’ 
and renders meaning a-contextual, since ‘the current understanding’ or historical 
context is deemed irrelevant, in other words excludes the very possibility of 
‘something missing’ as a Leerstelle.1468 The rejection of the tautological rendering at 
once implies ‘something always missing’, a higher order, a viewpoint outside the 
realm of criminal law, for the sake of which criminal law should be practiced. 
Constitutional law is the higher law ‘said’ in the practice of criminal law. Due to the 
ethics manifested in the language of the law of human dignity and fundamental rights, 
these aspects of constitutional law are ‘shown’ – and, by analogy with the ladder 
metaphor, also ‘said’ – in the practice of criminal law. 
Ultimately, the constitutional guarantee of human dignity is the highest law in 
that it encapsulates and enables the practice of law’s meta-dimension, namely 
surpasses constitutional law while within its boundaries. Criminal law statutes should 
serve the ‘morally acceptable advancement of justice’ [sittlich anzuerkennenden 
Gerechtigkeitsforderung]1469. The noun ‘advancement’ conceals who is entrusted with 
this task. In truth, legal actors, at once institutions and human beings, advance justice                                                         
1465 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1466 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1467 BVerfGE 45, 187 (195) 
1468 The setting of ‘a secular and liberal society’ corresponds to the world, that is, to the field of sight 
extending before the eye of the legal actor, ‘what is there’.  In the world the concrete meaning of 
‘something missing’ as a Leerstelle can be derived from context. 
1469 BVerfGE 45, 187 (195) 
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through law by mobilizing certain language. ‘Morally acceptable’ suggests the 
influence of ethics, not just law, on the meaning produced for the furtherance of 
justice.  
The law of human dignity, in view of the ‘human’ component linguistically 
and semantically comprised in human dignity language, operates on the borderline 
between ‘what is there’ and ‘something always missing’ as law’s meta-dimension. 
The ethical dimension of the law of human dignity is indisputable. Doctrinal 
insistence on treating the legal concept as an empty – or black – box with respect to 
the ethics composing its meaning, in other words on refraining from singling out a 
particular ethical proposition, serves the pluralism of viewpoints from which concrete 
claims to human dignity spring. This doctrinal stance is attuned to the understanding 
of ethics in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as transcendental. Nothing can be 
said about ethics; the transcendental can only be ‘shown’. In the linguistic-analytical 
model, ethics is located at the limit of the field of sight, precisely where the 
metaphysical subject is found. Ethics is ‘shown’ in the actions – legal language games 
or speech acts – of metaphysical subjects, in the propositions conveying the meaning 
produced by legal actors as metaphysical subjects. The legal proposition of the 
guarantee of human dignity is an example of such action. The introduction of the 
human dignity legal language game into the Basic Law by the pouvoir constituant as 
good willing1470 changed the boundaries of the law, probably reflecting also a change 
of the limits of language post World War II. The meta-dimension of this 
constitutional guarantee at the disposal of the pouvoir constitué enables the constant 
challenging of the boundaries of the law from within. 
c. Phenomenological 
 The phenomenological analysis conceives of criminal law punishments in 
light of the distinction between totality and infinity. Identifying the state with the self 
permits an understanding of constitutional review and separation of powers as a 
critical-reflection mechanism that influences the meaning of the law of human dignity 
produced in the Life Imprisonment Case. The face-to-face encounter of the state as an 
evolving self with the other, namely the human being sentenced to life imprisonment, 
and the totality and infinity traits in the portrayal of this relation are themes that 
                                                        
1470 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (6.43) 
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surface when looking at the text of the Life Imprisonment Case through the introduced 
lens.  
i. Breaching the totality of criminal law punishments  
 The conformity of the penal system with the law of human dignity requires 
that a breach of the rigid totality structure representing the gravest of criminal law 
punishments, life imprisonment sentencing, be provided for. The breach furthers the 
humanism of law as understood in light of the phenomenological insights in Chapter 
One, whilst serving law’s pragmatism, that is, allowing for response to ad hoc cases. 
The FCC defined the scope of state responsibility towards the human being sentenced 
to life imprisonment. Resocialization and the chance to regain freedom at a later point 
in time form the meaning of prisoners’ human dignity. The ‘interest in’ the 
rehabiliation of the offender, which flows from Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with 
Art. 1 GG1471, conveys generosity and hospitality, in that it attends the needs of the 
other that ensue from the social dimension of human being-ness. Guaranteeing the 
chance of the one convicted to life imprisonment to ‘reenter society after atoning for 
his crime’1472 signifies the crack in the totality. The task [Aufgabe] of the state is ‘to 
take all measures within the realm of the possible for the achievement of this goal of 
implementation [Vollzugsziel].’1473 
ii. Constitutional review and the principle of the separation of powers as a self-
reflection mechanism, the face-to-face encounter in responsibility as 
ability to respond 
Responsibility, the ability of the self to respond involves the effort to 
understand the other. The human face, a unique concretization of law’s Menschenbild, 
can never be comprehensively understood or portrayed. In the judicial practice of the 
law of human dignity the identification of traits of human being-ness featuring 
commonly in certain contexts is necessary for the purposes of certainty, uniformity 
and coherence of courts’ jurisprudence. Subjecting the other to the totality of the 
self’s vision and schematically identifying certain characteristics as manifestations of 
human being-ness in the context of life imprisonment is an – ontologically significant 
– transformation of perspective into being, and an essential generalization in view of                                                         
1471 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) 
1472 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) 
1473 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) 
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the modus operandi of law as an institution; totality structures are indispensible to 
law’s practice. Typified features of the human face can be illustrative or even 
representative of who the other is, yet the law of human dignity demands that their 
employment in the signification of concrete instances of human being-ness and, 
consequently, human dignity is at once the expression of a reservation or, conversely, 
opens up a space for dissensus. Phenomenological portrayals of human being-ness 
should demonstrate consciousness of the important insight that the field of sight 
extending from the first-person point of view is a totality and as such only one side of 
the story; another side is infinity, rendered as emptiness that permits the unique 
imprint of the human face on law’s Menschenbild.  
Insights into the portrayal of the human being sentenced to life imprisonment 
ensuing from scientific research are employed as grounds for the association of 
lengthy imprisonment with personality changes of a damaging nature.1474 Definite 
exclusion from society brings about the psychological annihilation of the offender, 
and is discordant with the duty of the legislature to respect the inherent dignity of all 
human beings, ‘even the common criminal’, under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. Due to the 
multidimensionality of human being-ness, composing law’s Menschenbild should be 
an inter-, multi- or/and transdisciplinary enterprise, certainly, in other words, a 
methodological enterprise involving reflexivity, and should be performed on an ad 
hoc basis. A responsible answer to the other in view of the law of human dignity 
requires openness to sources of external justification. 
The reasoning of the FCC as regards the latitude of the legislator to limit 
personal freedom1475 shows how the latter, as the self entrusted with the production of 
meaning in accordance with constitutional review and the principle of the separation 
of powers, should approach the other.  
[…] the FCC has the duty to protect fundamental rights against 
[infringements from] the legislature. The Court is therefore not 
bound by the legal interpretation of the legislature in its review. 
Insofar, however, as evaluations and factual assessments of the 
lawmaker are of importance [to constitutional review], the Court 
may in principle overrule them only when they are refutable. 
However, it seems puzzling that even in cases where grave 
infringements of fundamental rights are under review, ambiguities 
                                                        
1474 BVerfGE 45, 187 (192) 
1475 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 [Grundrechtsbindung der Legislative and Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit] 
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in the evaluation of the facts will come at the expense of the holder 
of the fundamental right. 1476 
 
Constitutional review and the separation of powers set in motion a mechanism 
of self-reflection1477. In that process of self-reflection the constitutional judge takes 
the leading role.1478 The Court emphasized the interest of the ‘holder of the 
fundamental right’; the focus intimates the particularity of the role of the 
constitutional judge as a representative of state power in the practice of fundamental 
rights and conveys concern about the allocation of the burden of attaining and 
demonstrating the ability to respond to the other. Since dealing with ambiguities in 
the evaluation of the facts does not fall within the scope of responsibility of the legal 
subject, such shortcomings should not burden the other.   
The constitutional judge triggers off the self-reflection of the state in 
pronouncing how another actor should practice the law of human dignity; delineates 
the scope of the latitude of another branch of state power; and guides the respective 
actors as to how their viewpoint should be shaped.  
The latitude of the legislator is limited in several respects. […] The 
freedom of the individual is already such an important legal interest 
[Rechtsgut], that it may be limited only on the basis of especially 
weighty reasons [cited case omitted], and therefore the lifelong 
deprivation of this freedom demands particularly strict scrutiny by 
the standard of the principle of proportionality. 1479 
Can the dangerousness and the incorrigibility of the offender as, respectively, 
a frequent justification and an underlying assumption of life imprisonment sentencing, 
justify interference with the human dignity of the individual for the protection of 
society in light of the principle of proportionality?1480 The tautological proposition                                                         
1476 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238) 
1477 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238) 
1478 Mutual responsiveness among courts of different instances can also be portrayed as self-reflection 
within one and the same branch of state power. The FCC referred to a statement of the First Senate of 
the Federal High Court of Justice with jurisdiction over criminal cases, which was in its turn probably 
triggered by the question referred to the FCC by the Verden District Court. The statement of the 
Federal High Court defended life imprisonment on the grounds that it is compatible with the 
constitution, and in conformity with the general view of the law [‘allgemeiner Rechtsanschauung’] and 
existing jurisprudence. While criminological-political questions re the role of criminal law in modern 
society rest with the legislature, which had decided to that date to retain life imprisonment for the most 
serious offenses, the FCC understood its own role to be the examination of consistency with the 
constitution within the scope of submissions to it. The constitutional judge as the critical self and 
author of the decision evidently considered the inclusion of other courts’ position relevant. BVerfGE 
45, 187 (223ff.) 
1479 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
1480 BVerfGE 45, 187 (194ff.) 
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conveying the meaning of human dignity by analogy with the notion of morality in 
Totality and Infinity expresses the inviolability of human dignity. Freedom is not 
justified by freedom; the only tautology among fundamental rights provisions in the 
Basic Law is implied in the law of human dignity. Levinas notes that freedom is 
irrational due to the infinity of its arbitrariness and needs to be tempered by justice. 
Human dignity is the basis for setting limits to personal freedom in order to protect 
society; the justification of restrictions to individual freedom evokes hospitality, 
namely allowing the face of the other – who can also be conceived of as a collectivity 
– to approach the individual as self from a dimension of height and thus dominate the 
self. The right to personal freedom can be limited by an act of parliament in 
accordance with Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 3 GG.  
The inviolability of human dignity in the provision of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is 
grounded on the tautological phrasing implied in the human dignity guarantee, 
namely that respect and protection of human dignity is accorded to human beings by 
virtue of being human. From a phenomenological perspective, this proposition not 
only signifies morality, the accomplishing of the I qua I as understood in Totality and 
Infinity, but also constitutes as such a manifestation of generosity, namely an 
articulation of the world by the self and an offering of that world to the other. The 
inviolability of human dignity is the first factor to be taken into account by the 
legislature in exercising its authority over meaning. That human dignity is ‘the highest 
principle of the constitutional order’1481 intimates the notion of height, which appears 
in the discussion of morality and the association of transcendence with 
transascendance in Totality and Infinity. Morality, according to Levinas, originates in 
the fact that multifarious manifestations of human vulnerability converge at a ‘point 
in the universe’; the dimension of height enhances the spatial rendering of that critical 
point.  
Further constitutional norms influencing the latitude of the legislator to 
interfere with the right to personal freedom, even of the ‘common criminal’, are the 
equality provision (Art. 2 sec. 1 GG), the requirements of the rule of law and the 
social state (Art. 20 sec. 1 GG), and the principle of proportionality. The notion of 
equality as explored in Levinas’ phenomenology offers fertile ground for displaying 
the intersection between the humanism and the pragmatism of law. Equality lies                                                         
1481 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) 
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where the other commands the same and reveals him or herself to the same in 
responsibility; otherwise practicing equality is but reference to an abstract idea and 
only a word, hence void and merely rhetorical. The meaning of equality cannot be 
detached from humanism perceived as the welcoming of the face, of which equality is 
a moment.  
In light of the hermeneutic tools presently employed, the rule of law can be 
rendered as an all-encompassing totality structure. The rule of law corresponds to the 
assertion about the indispensability of totality structures to the practice of law, 
particularly fundamental rights. In what sense does the rule of law set limits to the 
interference of the legislator with personal freedom? The rule of law guarantees that 
the distillation of law’s humanism is maintained within the uniform, foreseeable, 
certain, coherent totality structure of law. The principle of the social state evokes 
fraternity and solidarity as in Totality and Infinity. Fraternity is instituted in language, 
precedes and constitutes the ipseity of human beings, guarantees the very possibility 
of the face-to-face encounter, and encapsulates a relational understanding of human 
being-ness and consequently of human dignity. Fraternity and solidarity are premised 
on language, rather than resemblance or a ‘common cause of which they would be the 
effect’, which would effectively impose the totality of such causality on the meaning 
of human being-ness. 
The principle of proportionality1482 by analogy with the logical form ‘shown’ 
in propositions in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus denotes law’s meta-dimension 
and is shown in linguistic-analytical practice within legal language games. In 
phenomenological terms, limitations to the legislator’s authority over meaning in 
view of the principle of proportionality manifest infinity, the maintenance of an 
intersubjective space within which infinite weighing and interpretation ensuing from 
real conversation take place. Practicing the principle of proportionality constitutes per 
se an appeal to the intersubjective space associated with God in Levinas’ 
phenomenology.  
 While the practice of pardon ‘results to a further substantive limitation of the 
danger of serious changes in the personality [of the prisoner]’1483, it is not sufficient                                                         
1482 BVerfGE 45, 187 (223) [‘The freedom of the individual is already such an important legal interest 
[Rechtsgut], that it may be limited only on the basis of especially weighty reasons [cited case omitted], 
and therefore the lifelong deprivation of this freedom demands particularly strict scrutiny by the 
standard of the principle of proportionality.’] 
1483 BVerfGE 45, 187 (241) 
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[genügt das Institut der Begnadigung allein nicht] from the vantage point of the law 
of human dignity to guarantee a chance ‘in principle’ for those sentenced with life 
imprisonment to partake in freedom in the future.1484 This chance must be ‘concrete’ 
and ‘realizable’ not on occasion, but rather in principle1485. Only a pragmatic chance 
to regain freedom amounts to a responsible answer to the other in line with the law of 
human dignity. The abandonment of all hope of regaining one’s freedom is regarded 
as an interference with the core of human dignity.  
 The Court acknowledged that life imprisonment ‘is the most severe penalty in 
presently valid law’ and argued that it ‘should be preserved because it is necessary to 
protect the common good [Allgemeinheit] from serious criminal offences.’1486 The 
protection of the common good might require not only the imposition, but also the 
carrying out of the life imprisonment sentence. The FCC resorted to empirical insights 
[Die Erfahrungen hätten jedoch gezeigt […]]1487 showing that ‘from the standpoint of 
the protection of society [unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Schutzes der Gesellschaft]’1488 
carrying out the sentence imposed until the death of the offender is not necessary in a 
considerable number of cases. Identification of the protection of society as the critical 
standpoint suggests how the FCC, in practicing the law of human dignity, influences 
and administers the dynamics of the relation between various, different others it 
encounters1489. In the Life Imprisonment Case the other signifies the offender, an 
individual human being, but also the society as a collective other. Responding 
responsibly presupposes an appreciation of the relations between human beings. 
The FCC noted that a significant number of the perpetrators of the murders in 
question ‘in all probability will not repeat the crime’1490, and most of these crimes are 
‘situational actions and actions related to the perpetrators’ personalities […].’1491 On 
the basis of this portrayal, the Court argued, ‘[i]n such cases of positive social 
prognosis the sentence of life imprisonment can hardly be justified criminologically-                                                        
1484 BVerfGE 45, 187 (245) 
1485 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250f.) [‘The individual and case-by-case determination of whether the offender 
merits parole could not however solve the problem satisfactorily. [Leading officials] from the various 
states had indicated in their resolution of 16th of March 1972 that the law then valid would have to be 
corrected by a uniform practice of pardon [at the level of the Federal Republic].’] 
1486 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1487 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1488 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1489 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 468 [‘The distribution of perspectives in a 
society and the relationships among them, at one time or over time, may have a distinct shape – at least 
from the perspective of a particular observer.’] 
1490 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1491 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
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politically.’1492 Prior practice affirms this observation, since it had been ‘hardly 
regular’ to that date that every offender would remain imprisoned until his or her 
death. The experience of ‘extraordinary psychical and physical distress’ resulting 
from protracted imprisonment can cause ‘significant impairment of the personality 
structure of the prisoner’1493, therefore could call for ‘the introduction of the 
possibility of an earlier release.’1494 The impairment of offenders’ personality 
structure can be understood as an interruption of their continuity. The intensity of the 
impairment is contingent on the prospect of returning to freedom. If the prisoner is 
‘denied a priori’ this chance, namely if there is no escape from the totality of life 
imprisonment sentencing, then ‘[t]he sentence […] cannot be enforced 
meaningfully’1495. Meaningful enforcement of life imprisonment sentencing provides 
for the possibility of a breach of the totality, that is, for transcending its boundaries.  
In the case of offenders who are dangerous to the common good the prospects 
of rehabilitation are poor. The implementation of the punishment is tailored to the 
offender as an individual human being1496; the practice of law is premised on a 
relational-phenomenological perception of humanism, the face-to-face encounter with 
the other. Were the execution of life imprisonment sentencing rather conditional on a 
fixed determination of the sentence as such, the face of the other would be totalized.  
The commitment to a face-to-face encounter with the other as an individual 
human being is evinced and enhanced in the elaboration on the principle of guilt 
[Schuldgrundsatz]1497. 
According to the principle of guilt [Schuldgrundsatz] which derives 
from Art. 1 sec. 1 and Art. 2 sec. 1 GG (dignity and individual 
responsibility of the human being) and from the rule of law, facts 
and legal consequences must – in line with the idea of justice – be 
properly aligned [cited cases omitted]. Therefore, the threatened 
punishment must be tailored to the severity of the offense and the 
degree of culpability [guilt] of the offender; the penalty imposed 
shall not exceed the guilt of the offender. 1498 
Justice demands correspondence of legal consequences to facts. Interestingly, 
a responsible answer to the other depends on the fulfillment of the formal requirement                                                         
1492 BVerfGE 45, 187 (251) 
1493 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1494 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250) 
1495 BVerfGE 45, 187 (250f.) 
1496 See BVerfGE 45, 187 (258) [under (c)] 
1497 Badura (1964) JZ 337, 337f. 
1498 BVerfGE 45, 187 (259f.) 
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of argumentative soundness of the constructed legal syllogism and of the substantive 
requirement of tailoring the threatened punishment to the severity of the offense and 
the degree of the guilt of the offender as an individual human being, namely of 
alignment with the humanism of the face-to-face encounter.  
The Court as the speaking self and author of the decision directed the 
legislator as another manifestation of the self to deliver upon the ‘constitutional duty 
[…] to introduce appropriate legislation’1499, namely to produce meaning1500. The 
requirement that legislation be ‘appropriate’ translates into the duty of the legislator to 
respond responsibly to the other. Relying on previous FCC jurisprudence the Court 
granted ‘a reasonable time’ to the legislator ‘to gain experience [‘die Sammlung von 
Erfahrungen’] on account of the evolving complexes to which problems of life 
sentence and its execution belong.’1501 A responsible answer to the other presupposes 
acquiring an informed field of sight. The legislator was given ‘reasonable time’ to 
inquire into the subject matter in line with Levinas’ definition of responsibility as the 
ability to respond to the other. 
iii. The evolving self 
The evolving self absorbs the self as other into the same, thus exercising 
ipseity. The multidimensionality and ubiquitousness of the self-reflection process are 
plain to see in the phrasing and framing of the following excerpt.  
[…] since the enactment of the Basic Law the understanding of the 
content, function and effects of fundamental rights has deepened 
[hat das Verständnis […] eine Vertiefung erfahren]. Also, medical, 
psychological and sociological insights into the impacts of the 
enforcement of life imprisonment have developed. Especially for 
the assessment of the constitutional admissibility of the sentence to 
life imprisonment important factors are to a considerable extent 
time-relevant.1502 
Whereas the development of medical, psychological and sociological insights 
is directly attributable to actors operating within the respective disciplines, passive 
voice effectively conceals whose understanding has deepened apropos the enactment 
of the Basic Law. Is the self implied in this excerpt the FCC as part of the evolving 
                                                        
1499 BVerfGE 45, 187 (252) 
1500 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
1501 BVerfGE 45, 187 (252) 
1502 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
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society and as a mirror of its evolution? The dimension of depth is associated with the 
dimension of height; both connote movement on a vertical axis.  
The judgment of what corresponds to the dignity of the human 
being can thus only be based on the present state of knowledge and 
not on a claim to timeless validity. 1503 
The world subjected to the totalizing vision of the self is absorbed by the self. 
The self in its ipseity confronts the otherness of the world and absorbs it, claims 
Levinas in Totality and Infinity. The constitutional judge expects the legislature to 
confront the evolution in the world and integrate this experience into the legislation 
introduced, thereby rendering it ‘appropriate’. The evolution of the self is contingent 
on the evolution of the world and vice versa; the ability to respond to the other is 
premised on the phenomenological insight of mutual reflexivity. If the legislature 
‘fails a later review and improvement, despite [having] adequate experience for a 
more appropriate solution’1504, then the constitutional judge shall intervene. The 
responsibility of the FCC involves reviewing the response of the legislator a 
manifestation of state power is to ensure the responsible response of the legislator. 
The above excerpt indicates at the same time that, in portraying the human being at 
the receiving end of a responsible response, the self seeks to unveil the particulars of 
that being in a specific time and context.  
‘New insights’1505, the change in the world, can alter the signification and 
significance of life imprisonment sentencing. The law of human dignity and the rule 
of law1506 are the lenses defining the viewpoint of the self; they mediate the 
production of meaning. Levinas warns against the kind of mediation that destroys the 
radical distance between the self and the other. Adopting this lens becomes imperative 
in view of the indispensability of human dignity. 
In all this, one thing should not escape one’s attention [darf nicht 
aus den Augen verloren werden]: the dignity of human beings is 
something indispensable [etwas Unverfügbares].1507 
The expression used in the original text, ‘darf nicht aus den Augen verloren 
werden’, evokes directly the concept of vision and offers an opportunity to touch on                                                         
1503 BVerfGE 45, 187 (259) 
1504 BVerfGE 45, 187 (252) 
1505 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1506 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1507 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
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the value of totality stories. Vision enables the surveyance of the world, hence permits 
the development of an informed viewpoint. Enlarging the field of vision, that is, 
stretching the boundaries of the legal language game, enriches the context of 
‘something missing’ as a Leerstelle; the deduced meaning of the Leerstelle is thereby 
enhanced and more soundly justified. Permitting a crack in the totality of the world – 
always limited and uniquely perceived by each human being as metaphysical subject 
– presupposes the institution of a totality structure. Extending the emphatic 
affirmation of the indispensability of practicing the law of human dignity to the 
transcendental, understood presently as the breach of totality, results in the presence 
of language that escapes the grasp of any self, ‘something always missing’, within 
law. 
The Court’s observation that the constitutional admissibility of life 
imprisonment is ‘to a considerable extent time-relevant’ reinforces the portrayal of the 
judge as an evolving self1508. The evolving self1509 – presumably collective, in lack of 
concrete determination – is directed towards more humane forms of punishment. The 
Court emphasized, as noted supra, the nexus between knowledge of human dignity 
meaning and historical evolution. Historical evolution shows that the criminal justice 
system compasses humanism, since ‘always-milder punishments have replaced those 
more cruel in character, and […] progress is directed from more crude towards more 
humane’1510. This knowledge, gained through surveyance and evaluation of changes 
in that system, led the Court to the conclusion that ‘it is clear which path should be 
followed […]’.1511The syntactical choice of passive voice conceals precisely who the 
self is.  
 In a later part of the Court’s reasoning, the shift from a perception of 
imprisonment as pure incarceration to considering rehabilitation one of its prime                                                         
1508 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 132 [‘Interpretive dialogue is a matter of 
fusing the horizons of text and interpreter. Clearly the interpreter’s horizon can shift by learning 
information about the past – but how can the horizon of a past text move or expand? The Gadamerian 
answer is that the past we interpret consists not of authors, but of artifacts that command our attention 
only as contributions to a continuing tradition. It is the nature of textual meaning to shift over time, as 
the concerns that movtivate reading the text change […].’] 
1509 See also Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238, 270 (Brennan, J., concurring) (1972) [‘Ours would 
indeed be a simple ask were we required merely to measure a challenged punishment against those that 
history has long condemned. That narrow and unwarranted view of the Clause, however, was left 
behind with the 19th century. Our task today is more complex. We know “that the words of the 
[Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static.” We know, therefore, that the Clause “must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.” […] That knowledge, of course, is but the beginning of the inquiry.’] 
1510 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1511 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
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purposes signals change. The FCC, the evolving self, had repeatedly emphasized the 
association of the ‘call for resocialization’ with the self-understanding of a 
community ‘that sets human dignity at its center and commits itself to the principle of 
the social state [Sozialstaatsprinzip]’.1512 The Court perceived of the shift towards a 
policy of rehabilitation and resocialization as an indication of correspondence 
between law and life, and as the result of collective self-reflection spurred by human 
dignity and the principle of the social state.  
iv. Tracing totality and infinity: the notion of height, non-mediation, critical 
reflection as the process for attaining the ability to respond to the other 
            How can the dimension of height in ‘highest legal values’ be portrayed 
applying the introduced model? How is the finitude resulting from subsumption under 
totality structures connoted in the phrase ‘legal values’ reconciled with the infinity of 
the ethical? How, if at all, does the transcendental meaning of human dignity surface 
in the above excerpt? Who is conceivably at the receiving end of the duty deriving 
from the constitutional guarantee of human dignity and borne by all forms of state 
power? Approaching the issues raised by these questions in a spirit of critical 
reflection can take two different courses. The first would be full-scale skepticism 
about whether the ethics conveyed in human dignity language can be subject to law 
as, partly yet dominantly, a totality structure. The humane practice of the law of 
human dignity should guarantee a crack in the totality. The second course of critical 
reflection would set off from the premise that the totality portrayal constitutes just one 
side of the story. The other side of the story is infinity, emptiness. Are both sides of 
the story traceable in the following excerpt?  
The free human personality and its dignity are the highest legal 
values within [innerhalb] the constitutional order [cited cases 
omitted]. State power in all its manifested forms 
[Erscheinungsformen] is under a duty [Die Staatsgewalt ist […] die 
Verpflichtung auferlegt] to respect and protect the dignity of the 
human being.1513 
 The FCC grounded the meaning of the law of human dignity and freedom of 
personality in a ‘conception of the human being as a spiritual-moral being, invested 
                                                        
1512 BVerfGE 45, 187 (239) 
1513 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
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with the freedom to determine and unfold [entfalten] [him- or herself].’1514 It zoomed 
in on the ‘human’ component of ‘human dignity’ in producing the meaning of the 
legal concept. Construing law’s Menschenbild, the Court appealed directly to the 
transcendental as an aspect of human being-ness, and to the self-determination of the 
human being. The ‘freedom to […] unfold’, the unforced movement analyzed in the 
ontological account, is enhanced by the phenomenological portrayal. The ontological 
understanding of this unfolding is premised on the polemos required to traverse a limit 
in coming-into-being; the law of human dignity guarantees that the irruptive event of 
disclosure is not forced but allowed to happen. The phenomenological account 
amplifies the portrayal of the movement: it is transcendence of a limit towards 
infinity. The breach of the totality can be paralleled to the ‘happening of the irruption 
of Being’ and the traversal of a limit, though transcendence, as Levinas shows, can 
only occur in the relation with the other. The dimension of height in the 
phenomenological portrayal of the unfolding points to the direction of the movement; 
transcendence is, argues Levinas, transascendance. 
Totality qualities are apparent in the above excerpt. Respect and protection of 
human dignity ‘belong to’ [gehören zu]1515 the constitutional principles of the Basic 
Law, and the free human personality and its dignity are the highest legal values 
‘within’ the constitutional order. Classification under the total of constitutional 
principles of the Basic Law and inclusion of the identified values within the totality of 
the constitutional order denote exposure to the totality of vision. The totality framing 
of the dimension of height in ‘highest legal values’ provokes reflection on how height 
is actually conceived and on where the apex is located apropos the constitutional 
order.1516 The highest legal values lie ‘within’ the totality of the constitutional order; 
in other words, are in certain respects encompassed and finite. The state, in all its 
manifested forms, has the duty to practice the law of human dignity, namely to 
respect and protect the human being.  
Reference to values and to the duty imposed on state power indicates the 
meta-dimension of practicing the law of human dignity. However, since the ‘highest 
legal values’ and the legal concept of human dignity are located within the totality of 
the constitutional order, the story told seems to ignore the transcendence of a limit                                                         
1514 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1515 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
1516 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
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towards the infinity beyond it as an indispensible aspect of human dignity meaning. 
Allusion to the duty of state power to practice human dignity sheds new light on the 
puzzling portrayal of the inclusion of transcendental ethics and infinity in the totality 
of the constitutional order.  
 State power is ‘under a duty’ [Die Staatgewalt ist […] die Verpflichtung 
auferlegt […]] to respect and protect the dignity of the human being. This – probably 
benign observation from a mainstream viewpoint – carries enormous weight from a 
hermeneutic and literary perspective. Since state power is ‘under a duty’ to practice 
the law of human dignity, that duty must originate beyond state power; the 
constitutional order of the Basic Law generates it. This claim could lead one to assert 
that only a totality story is conceivable, since the constitutional order per se is still a 
totality. What, then, should we make of the fact that the Basic Law encompasses 
human dignity language? Practicing human dignity language in law, indeed operating 
as a totality structure, influences at once the content and the form of the constitutional 
order. Human dignity incarnates the notion of the limit. The portrayal of the meaning 
of practicing the law of human dignity as a two-sided story, totality and infinity, 
results from a hermeneutic and literary analysis that demonstrates and develops an 
affirmative stance towards ‘something always missing’, the signifier of infinity.  
 In light of the Preamble to the Basic Law, the duty to respect and protect 
human dignity is a responsibility towards human beings and God. In delivering upon 
this duty, the self has authority over the meaning produced1517. Understanding the 
practice of the law of human dignity through the lens of Levinas’ pre-ethics 
substantiates the transcendental meaning of the legal concept on the one hand, and 
responsibility and generosity on the other. The legal guarantee of human dignity 
comprises an appeal to human being-ness, hospitality, fraternity, and solidarity 
instituted in language and real conversation, rather than vision and subjection to 
vision. This perception of human dignity meaning rules out the totalizing 
thematization of the other approached through mediating concepts that effectively 
destroy the absolute separation from the self.  
 Non-mediation or mediation that does not destroy the distance between the 
self and the other are evidenced in the tautological phrasing of the guarantee to 
respect and protect human beings qua beings. Moreover, themes permeating the                                                         
1517 The democratic pedigree of that authority is a factor of legitimacy that influences the modus 
operandi of constitutional review and the separation of powers practiced as self-reflection mechanisms. 
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phenomenological portrayal, language as the foundation of the face-to-face encounter, 
goodness as hospitality and generosity, desire for the Other traced in the face of the 
other, and understanding God as the intersubjective space resulting from real 
conversation all bespeak immediacy and maintenance of the absolute separation. The 
law of human dignity guarantees that the self’s authority over meaning is exercised in 
critical reflection. Critical reflection is, then, the process for attaining the ability to 
respond to the other, responsibility.1518 In responding to the other the law of human 
dignity is a mediating concept used as a Wittgensteinian ladder.1519  
 Nothing in the language employed in the above excerpt forecloses telling 
another parallel story of ‘something missing’; on the contrary, the shift of perspective 
enables zooming in on language alluding to law’s meta-dimension. The phrase 
‘highest legal values’ suggests the totality structure within which values are visible 
and graspable, without detracting from their transcendental, ethical dimension. 
Likewise the totality of the ‘constitutional order’ confines human dignity within its 
horizons, yet, at the same time, embraces the language that can effectuate a breach of 
its boundaries, the possibility of a crack in the instituted totality. The doctrinal 
distinction between human dignity and the law of human dignity (see infra, the 
phenomenological analysis of the Aviation Security Act Case) is illustrative of the 
coexistence of the totality and infinity in FCC jurisprudence.  
v. Self-determination and the face-to-face encounter: freedom, fraternity, 
autonomy and absolute separation, morality 
 The FCC added that the Basic Law understands human freedom ‘not as that of 
an isolated and autocratic individual, but rather as that of an individual related to the 
community and bound by the community [cited case omitted].’1520 The passage 
evokes the notions of freedom and fraternity as in Totality and Infinity. Freedom is 
arbitrary, thus needs to be tempered by justice, and irrational due to the infinity of its 
arbitrariness.  
On account of being community-bound, the freedom of the 
individual cannot be ‘in principle unlimited’ [prinzipiell 
unbegrenzt]. The individual must allow those limitations of his 
freedom of action that the legislator deems generally reasonable for                                                         
1518 In the practice of law, compliance with this process should be demonstrated. Legal doctrine serves 
the economy of the required demonstration in that respect.  
1519 Wittgenstein, Tractatus (6.54) [the ladder metaphor] 
1520 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227) 
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the maintenance and promotion of social life within the limits of the 
given subject matter […].1521 
 Freedom is not justified by freedom, but rather needs to be subordinated to the 
hospitality of the self who welcomes the other and allows the face of the other to 
approach and dominate the self from a dimension of height. In Totality and Infinity, 
the human I is posited in fraternity, which is not added as a moral conquest to 
individual human beings, but precedes them and constitutes their ipseity. From a 
phenomenological perspective, the position of the I is effectuated already in fraternity 
and on those grounds is the face-to-face encounter, the relational account of the 
meaning of practicing the law of human dignity, possible. Human beings in fraternity 
are self-referential individualities. God then signifies that human kinship is founded 
on the Other in the face of the other and connotes height. 
[…] the autonomy of the person must be preserved (BVerfGE 30, 1 
(20); Wiretapping Case, Abhörurteil]). This means that also in the 
community each individual must be recognized principally as a 
member with equal rights and value of [his or her] own. It therefore 
goes against human dignity to render human beings mere objects 
of/in the state [‘im Staate’] [cited case omitted]. The proposition, 
‘the human being must always remain an end in itself’, is fully 
applicable in all areas of law; for the inalienable dignity of human 
beings as persons consists exactly in the self-evident preservation of 
the recognition of [human beings as] personalities who bear 
responsibility for themselves. 1522 
 The autonomy of the person, of which the absolute separation between the self 
and the other is a relational depiction, must be preserved. The FCC understood this 
statement as denoting the equal rights and unique value [Eigenwert] of individuals as 
members of the community. According to Levinas, equality ‘is produced where the 
other commands the same and reveals himself to the same in responsibility […]’1523. 
Equality is thus contingent on the welcoming of the face ‘of which it is a moment’1524 
and, unless practiced ‘in responsibility’1525, tantamount to ‘an abstract idea and a 
word’1526. The unique value of individuals, the ‘value of their own’, evokes morality, 
the accomplishing of the I qua I, as in Totality and Infinity. Morality is distinguished 
from the notion of equality; equality is not the origin of morality. Morality ensues                                                         
1521 BVerfGE 45, 187 (227f.) 
1522 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) 





from ‘the fact that infinite exigencies, that of serving the poor, the stranger, the 
widow, the orphan, converge at one point in the universe […]’1527. The coexistence of 
the self and others is premised on this perception of morality.  
 The law of human dignity rules out rendering human beings ‘mere objects 
of/in the state’.1528 In the phenomenological portrayal, state power in all its 
manifested forms corresponds to the self. The institutional facet of the FCC as self is 
subject to the totality of the law1529, while the human factor, metaphysical subjects 
representing institutions, escapes the subsumption. The inviolability of human dignity 
stated in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG means that the very possibility of objectification is 
foreclosed; the other can always ‘absolve’ him or herself from the relation with the 
self. Consistent with an institutional perception of law free from imponderabilities 
associated with the human factor – what is more, the egoism and pleasure of the self – 
it would be impossible for the pouvoir constitué looking through the lens of the Basic 
Law1530 to render the other a ‘mere object’ of state action. What is, then, the 
significance of objectification language in the Court’s legal language game? Why 
does the meaning articulated and shared by the Court as self comprise objectification 
language, when the critical lens for looking at the world, the law of human dignity as 
in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, excludes the possibility of such language?  
 The breach of totality is effectuated through language, ‘where there is always 
room for the diversity of dialogue, and for further growth through the dynamics of 
question and answer’1531. Objectification language in the self’s legal language game 
demonstrates awareness of the dangers that inhere in entrusting human beings 
representing institutions with authority over meaning, while the third-party effect 
indicates the possibility of objectification of human beings by other human beings. 
The Objektformel doctrine enhances critical reflection and self-reflection. Critical 
reflection is the process most apt to ensure a responsible answer to the other. 
Assuming that the human being can become a ‘mere object’ of state action opens up a 
field of dissensus. A further conceivable understanding of objectification of human                                                         
1527 ibid 245 
1528 Badura (1964) JZ 337, 339 [‘Handlungen, die den Menschen nicht als Selbstzweck, sondern als 
Mittel zu einem ihm äußerlichen Zweck, als Objekt staatlicher Tätigkeit, benutzen, verletzen Art. 1 I 
GG.’]; See also Dürig (1956) 81 AöR 117, 127 
1529 From a legal sociological perspective, I grant, the distinction between the institutional facet and the 
human factor is not always clearly traceable. Yet, for present purposes, associating institutional 
features with law as a totality structure serves the hermeneutic and literary analysis. 
1530 Schnapp (1989) 1, 1 
1531 Levinas (n 1523) 16 
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beings reverses the equation: institutions can totalize the human being1532. The 
neutrality and foreseeability associated with the practice of law can impair the radical 
distance between the self and the other. 
The proposition ‘the human being must always remain an end in itself’ 
originates in the thought of Kant. The FCC noted that it is ‘fully applicable in all areas 
of law’1533. Self-determination brings about self-responsibility. The other is absolutely 
other, that is, can always absolve him or herself from the relation with the self. The 
offender, the concrete substantiation of law’s Menschenbild in the Life Imprisonment 
Case, ‘must not be made the mere object of crime prevention to the detriment of his 
constitutionally protected right to social worth and respect.’1534  The forceful 
deprivation [entkleiden] of freedom without a chance to potentially reenter the society 
of free citizens ‘would be inconsistent with this understanding of human dignity.’1535 
 The hermeneutic process evident in the Court’s syllogism serendipitously 
affirms the methodological premises of this analysis; the meaning of the law of 
human dignity is deduced from the portrayed understanding of the ‘human’ 
component. In the context of life imprisonment as means to crime prevention, the 
offender as a human being ‘must not be made the mere object’ of state action in view 
of the ‘constitutionally protected right to social worth and respect [des sozialen 
Wertanspruchs und Achtungsanspruchs]’ 1536 and must be guaranteed both individual 
and social existence.  
 In interpreting the law of human dignity as the guarantee of preserving a 
chance for prisoners to partake again in the society of free citizens, the Court as self 
responded to the other. The hope of freedom prohibits the interruption of the 
continuity of prisoners’ human being-ness. Preserving a chance for prisoners to 
partake in freedom as members of society amounts to a responsible response in the 
spirit of morality as defined in the work of Levinas; maintaining the hope of freedom 
prohibits the interruption of their continuity as human beings, ‘making them betray 
[…] their own substance’1537. The Court demonstrated throughout its reasoning the 
                                                        
1532 See on institutional humiliation, Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 1 
1533 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) 
1534 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) 
1535 BVerfGE 45, 187 (229) 
1536 BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) 
1537 Levinas (n 1523) 21  
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ability to respond to the other, the human being sentenced to life imprisonment, for 
whom it required a ‘meaningful treatment’ 1538 in line with human dignity. 
 Prisons as a manifested form of state power are under the duty ‘to strive 
towards the resocialization of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, to maintain 
their ability to cope with life and to counteract the harmful effects of deprivation of 
liberty and also, and most importantly, the thereby caused changes in personality.’1539 
In line with the relational account of the law of human dignity, that is, responsibility 
towards the other, and the insight that violence occurs not only in ‘injuring and 
annihilating’1540 human beings, but rather, predominantly, ‘in interrupting their 
continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves, 
making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them 
carry out actions that will destroy every possibility of action […]’1541, resocialization 
constitutes a concrete manifestation of practice of the law of human dignity, namely 
the duty of the state to protect the human dignity of prisoners.  
vi. The interplay between totality and infinity: absolute threat of punishment or 
‘Strafrahmen’? 
From a phenomenological perspective, the most compelling question in the 
Life Imprisonment Case is ‘whether it is compatible with the principle of 
proportionality to accord every case of murder of wanton cruelty or murder to conceal 
another crime solely life sentence’1542. This concerns ultimately the decision between 
the regular ‘frame of penalty within which the adjudicating court has to determine the 
appropriate penalty in a concrete individual case’1543 opened by the legislature and the 
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with absolute threat of punishment. The 
referring court had also called for discretion [Strafrahmen] re the adjustment of the 
penalty ‘to the demeritorious content of the offense and to the culpability of the 
offender, so as not to be forced to impose what seems an inappropriately high 
sentence […]’1544. The two possibilities construe different portrayals of the practice of 
the law of human dignity.                                                          
1538 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238) 
1539 BVerfGE 45, 187 (238) 
1540 Levinas (n 1523) 21 
1541 ibid  
1542 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260) 
1543 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260) 
1544 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260) 
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Opening a frame of penalty means leaving room for mobilizing the principle 
of proportionality. Practicing the law of human dignity in accordance with that 
principle strongly evokes in phenomenological terms the task of infinitizers, and 
connotes the opening of an intersubjective space. Since the encounter of human 
beings in the intersubjective space operates as a process of reflection, weighing and 
deliberating on the appropriate punishment within a frame is not only presupposed by, 
but also leads to perpetual alteration and enrichment of that space. Levinas hints at the 
existence, ‘perhaps’, of God in the intersubjective space1545. Understanding the 
principle of proportionality by analogy with the concept of intersubjective space 
intimates its meta-dimension. Instituting the absolute threat of punishment is the 
second conceivable mode of practicing the law of human dignity in the context of life 
imprisonment sentencing. As the Court noted, the absolute threat of punishment ‘is a 
contribution to legal certainty and uniform punishment of offenders.’1546 The 
language employed directly calls forth traits of totality structures. How does the FCC 
deal with the issue before it? 
Claiming an empirical basis for its assertions1547, the FCC effectively 
portrayed an intersubjective space, observing how ‘penalties differ, indeed not 
insignificantly, from court to court even when the circumstances are similar.’1548 Even 
when the facts presented to different courts are similar, argued the Court, the 
production of meaning by courts results in disparate corresponding legal 
consequences. The existence of an intersubjective space is additionally attributed to 
differences between the judge and the legislator as selves. The former, being 
‘generally milder’, is ‘sometimes prone to avoid the most severe punishment as much 
as possible’, while the latter would opt for their application1549. Another factor 
influencing the tangibility of this difference between the judge and legislator is the 
gravity of the statutory penalty or the degree of its intensity as an interference with the 
offender’s fundamental rights1550. The Court presented both advantages and 
shortcomings of the totality pattern of the absolute threat of punishment.  
                                                        
1545 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 290 
1546 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260) 
1547 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260f.) [‘Experience shows […]’] 
1548 BVerfGE 45, 187 (260f.) 
1549 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
1550 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
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Especially in the case of a crime as serious as murder, the 
imperative of substantive justice is a justified request working 
towards an as uniform as possible criminal law practice. Of course 
it must be acknowledged that the use of a rigid threat of punishment 
can lead to unsatisfactory results even because of the therein-lying 
schematism in the specific case. 1551 
Positive and negative reasons why totality structures are – and should be – one 
side of the story of practicing the law of human dignity can be traced in the above 
excerpt. In applying criminal law, legal actors interfere with the law of human dignity 
and fundamental rights; the possibility of arbitrary exercise of their freedom to 
produce meaning ‘especially in the case of a crime as serious as murder’ needs to be 
tempered by justice. On the one hand, uniformity serves the imperative of substantive 
justice. On the other, the rigidity of the absolute threat of punishment can bring about 
or intensify the ‘therein-lying schematism in the specific case’. Schematism can be 
rendered as subsumption under totality framings, yet should be perceived as just one 
side of the practice of law in view of the explicit commitment to humanism in the 
order of the Basic Law. Totality patterns constitute an indispensible aspect of 
practicing the law of human dignity. 
The absolute threat of such severe punishment can only be 
constitutionally acceptable, if the possibility of openness in 
performing the subsumption of concrete cases under abstract norms 
to assert the punishment that is consistent with the constitutional 
principle of proportionality is preserved from the part of the 
judge.1552 
For ‘the absolute threat of such severe punishment’ to be constitutionally 
acceptable, the possibility should be left open for the constitutional judge to examine 
whether and how the facts of concrete cases are subsumed under abstract norms. That 
the punishment should be consistent with the constitutional principle of 
proportionality constitutes, in phenomenological terms, an affirmation of the 
indispensability of a processual understanding of the law of human dignity as 
language opening up an intersubjective space of dissensus and weighings, as a totality 
structure containing concepts that convey the transcendental, namely the very 
meaning that can compromise it.  
 
4. Concluding observations                                                         
1551 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
1552 BVerfGE 45, 187 (261) 
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This hermeneutic and literary analysis of the Life Imprisonment Case traces 
and unveils the human factor within the legal language game as a figurative rendering 
of just an aspect of practice. What guarantees the humane imposition of the sentence 
of life imprisonment? Guaranteeing the possibility of the traversal of limits to the 
human being sentenced for life, the ontological portrayal indicates; practicing critical 
reflection and self-reflection, in other words processes premised on an affirmative 
stance towards the dual sense of ‘something missing’, understanding the tautological 
proposition of the law of human dignity as the guarantee, at the propositional level, of 
inviolability, as the linguistic-analytical portrayal demonstrates; and securing the hope 
of breaching and escaping totalities towards infinity physically, when released, or 
psychically and spiritually, that is, while imprisoned, to the human being on account 
of the constitutional guarantee, a totality structure per se, of human dignity, as the 
phenomenological portrayal furthers.  
III. The Transsexual I Case (1978)1553  
The signification and significance of ‘something missing’ within the realm of 
law, despite substantiation of the transsexual human image within the realm of life, is 
considerably clarified in the analysis of the Transsexual I Case. The case under 
scrutiny is illustrative of the sense in which ‘something missing’, from a hermeneutic 
and literary perspective, can be treated as a Leerstelle, that is, in line with Wolfgang 
Iser’s conception, an empty position the meaning of which should be sought in the 
language that surrounds it, or context. Linguistic-analytical and phenomenological 
portrayals emphasize the implications of inconsistency between law and life for the 
boundaries of the legal language game and the responsibility borne by the judge as the 
self with authority over the production of meaning to respond to the other and to 
engage in a conversation with the other.  
 
1. Decision 
The complainant in the Transsexual I Case was assigned on the basis of her 
external sexual characteristics at the time of birth to the male sex, but later felt she 
belongs in all respects to the female sex and – after changes to her appearance 
                                                        
1553 BVerfGE 49, 286 (1978), First Senate of the FCC 
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[äußeren Erscheinungsbildes] – lived the life of a woman, while continuing to be 
legally treated as a man (male transsexuals). The complainant had changed ‘his’ sex 
from male to female through sex-change operation. A local civil court in Berlin 
permitted that ‘he’ would change his civil status to that of a woman. The complainant 
was accordingly registered in the birth registry as a woman. The Berlin District Court 
reversed the local civil court’s decision. The Federal High Court of Justice affirmed 
the District Court’s decision, and the civil status of the complainant changed once 
again to that of a man. The complainant then appealed to the FCC, bringing forth the 
claim that her human dignity and personality rights were violated. With her 
constitutional complaint, she turned against the rejection of the change of sex from 
‘male’ to ‘female’ in the entry to the birth registry.  
The FCC found that ‘the contested decision violates the complainant’s 
fundamental right under Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.’ The 
complainant was, as medical opinions before the Court affirmed, physically a woman, 
in accordance with the perceived [gefühlten, felt] gender, yet was treated as a man in 
legal life [Rechtsleben]. Not being able to legally bear a female first name manifested 
the lack of identity between physical, exterior appearance and personal legal status. 
The conflict experienced by the complainant was interpreted as strife within the most 
intimate area of personality. Scientific research to that date showed the failure of 
attempts to dissuade transsexuals from their psychosexual basic structure, and 
prescribed adaptation to the experienced gender identity through psychotherapy and 
hormone therapy as the only meaningful means for averting self-harm and suicide 
incidents. Relying on the opinions of medical experts, the Court maintained that the 
new gender role is fully recognized only when the name and the personal status of 
transsexuals change to correspond to his or her gender identity. State intervention in 
that sphere is only justified in case of special public interest. The Court reversed and 
remanded the case to the Federal High Court of Justice. 
Definitions employed in the decision, as well as insights into the origin and 
causes of transsexualism were rooted in the state of knowledge at that point in time. 
The Court availed itself of scientific research to juxtapose the case of transsexuals to 
that of hermaphrodites, homosexuals, fetishists, or persons with psychosexual 
anomalies and perversions. That is to say, in the Transsexual I Case the meaning of 
transsexualism is predominantly negatively determined. The Court additionally drew 
on scientific studies that documented the variety of physical intersexuality to reinforce 
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its understanding of transsexualism. Admitting certain remaining doubts with regards 
to the origin and the cause of transsexualism, the FCC turned to the facts of the case 
before it: the complainant was irreversibly a transsexual and had undergone a sex-
change operation.  
In the Transsexual I Case the interpretation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG by the FCC 
focused on the individuality of the human being and the protection of self-
determination first and foremost as the development of self-consciousness. Self-
responsibility is associated in the Court’s decision with being autarkic and controlling 
one’s own destiny. Human dignity in conjunction with the fundamental right to the 
free development of personality dictate the coordination of the gender identity 
experienced psychically and physically by the transsexual with her legal status.  
Mindful of moral limitations on the fundamental right to the free development 
of personality, the Court moved on to state that transsexualism effectuated no 
infringement on the moral law. The FCC pointed out that transsexuals do not intend to 
manipulate their sex. Transsexualism, in the Court’s view, is related to personal self-
understanding, not sexuality. According to expert opinions the motivation underlying 
transsexualism stems from the desire to reinstate the unity of psyche and body. The 
integrity of human beings is a core element of the constitutional guarantee of human 
dignity. The FCC went on to tackle, first, the irrationality of the association of 
marriage with reproduction and, second, contentions regarding the immorality of 
marriage post sex-change operations. Once again, the Court put forward a line of 
argumentation that laid stress on the moral evaluation of transsexuals’ motivation in 
desiring to marry heterosexual partners.  
The FCC maintained that the refusal to correct the record on the sex-
classification of transsexuals in the birth registry violated fundamental rights 
standards. Despite the absence of a statutory provision on the matter, the Court, 
reacting to the position of the Federal High Court of Justice re the lack of authority of 
the judicial power to address such gaps in law, decided that the issues under scrutiny 
could be confronted by direct resort to constitutional law, particularly the fundamental 
right ensuing from Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG; therefore, 
there were in actuality no gaps in the specific area of legal regulation. Although 
deferring to the legislator for the regulation of persons’ civil status would indeed 
serve best the interest of legal certainty, the FCC defended the constitutionality of its 
interference in light of Art. 1 sec. 3 GG. The Court remanded the case to the Federal 
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High Court of Justice, and decided that the definition of the point in time when the 
legal validity of sex-change could take effect fell within the latitude of that court. 
 
2. Discussion  
Self-determination in structuring one’s life and protection of the sphere of 
one’s personality in view of the guarantee of human dignity and the general right to 
personality1554 are central constitutional interests. The proximity of the general right 
to personality [allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht] to Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is established in 
legal scholarship1555 and FCC jurisprudence,1556 where propositions in Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG combined with those in Art. 2 sec. 1 GG1557 form an independent fundamental 
right. Unlike the absolute guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, the 
general right to personality can be restricted by means of statutory law1558 in line with 
the application of the system of restraints on liberty rights [Schrankensystematik], 
despite originating also in the human dignity guarantee.1559 The claim to autonomy 
rooted in the demand for respect [Achtungsgebot] for human dignity has regularly 
priority.1560 In legal scholarship concern is expressed as regards the danger of 
relativization of the guarantee of human dignity through the practice of the general 
right to personality. 
The protection of sexual autonomy under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG entails, according 
to Herdegen, independently from Art. 2 sec. 1 GG, the right of transsexual persons to                                                         
1554 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 84; See how the general right 
to personality, which is founded on the law of human dignity, is also understood as a concept that is 
destined to attend to instances of ‘something missing’ [here, ‘Lücke’], Dieter Grimm, 
‘Persӧnlichkeitsschutz im Verfassungsrecht’ in Karlsruher Forum 1996 – Mit Vortrӓgen von Dieter 
Grimm und Peter Schwerdtner (Karlsruhe: Vel. Versicherungswirtschaft, 1997) 3, 3 [the existence of a 
general right to personality does not foreclose the protection of personality through other fundamental 
rights]; ibid [‘[…] Komplementaritӓt zwischen dem allgemeinen Persӧnlichkeitsrecht und den übrigen 
Grundrechten […] die als “allgemeines” Persӧnlichkeitsrecht bezeichnete Rechtsposition keine 
Schӧpfung des Grundgesetzes, sondern ein richterrechtlich entwickeltes Institut ist, das gerade jene 
Lücke schließen sollte, die sich aus der speziellen Schutzfunktion und der historischen Bedingheit der 
Einzelgrundrechte ergeben.’]; ibid 4 [openness and dynamism of the general right to personality make 
it difficult to grasp doctrinally] 
1555 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 10 
1556 See BVerfGE 27, 344 (1970) [Divorce Act Case, Ehescheidungsakten] 
1557Art. 2 sec. 1 GG reads: ‘Everyone has the right to free development of his personality insofar as he 
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or morality.’; See 
Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde’ (1995) 857, 862 [‘Die dogmatische Konstrucktion 
als Kombinationsrecht […] jedenfalls wirft mehr Fragen auf als sie Lösungen auch nur anzudeuten 
vermag.’] 
1558 BVerfGE 99, 185 (195) (1998) [Scientology Case] 
1559 Kunig (n 1555) para 36; ibid para. 35ff.; See Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde’ 
(1995) 857, 862 
1560 Kunig, ibid para 34 
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opt for a particular gender. It moreover requires respect for this option on the part of 
the state, reflected especially in the law on personal status.1561 That the Court in the 
Transsexuals I Case regards Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 2 sec. 1 GG independently 
constitutes a deviation from the interplay between the two provisions in FCC 
jurisprudence.1562 On account of its openness to varying contexts of practice and to 
ongoing evolution, the general right to personality can be viewed as a bundle of 
fundamental rights [Grundrechtsbündel].1563 
The concept of personality in the constitutional law connotes the ‘general 
freedom of action’ [allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit].1564 This fundamental right 
operates as a general clause that fills in gaps, namely the – figuratively rendered – 
space that special liberty rights leave open.1565 Its protective scope can stretch so as to 
include actions that would not fall under the guarantee of personality in the colloquial 
use of the term.1566 Art. 1 sec. 1 GG sets limits to extensive restrictions on the general 
right to personality; it emphasizes the pressing need for the protection of personality 
as an indispensible manifestation of individuals’ human dignity.1567  
In relevant jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States sexual 
orientation has been associated with equal protection, as in Romer v. Evans1568, and 
privacy constitutional concerns. A seminal instance in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of the United States is Lawrence v. Texas1569. The Court held that the 
Texas statutory ban on sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
[…] adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the 
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain 
their dignity as free persons.  
                                                        
1561 Herdegen (n 1554) para 87 
1562 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297); BVerfGE 60, 123 (124) (1982) [Young Transsexuals Case, Junge 
Transsexuelle; no rigid age limits for the change of personal status]; BVerfGE 115, 1 (14) (2005) 
[Transsexuelle III]; BVerfGE 121, 175 (2008) [Transsexuelle V; The duty of state is not sufficiently 
observed, when the recognition of the chosen gender of the transsexual through the law on personal 
status is conditional on the prior divorce of an existing marriage.] 





1568 Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
1569 Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
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 Turning to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey1570, 
where the Supreme Court stated that ‘these matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
[…]’, and added – indeed loading the argument with ontological meaning – that ‘at 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of life’1571, the Court challenged Bowers v. 
Hardwick1572, reversed and remanded. In her concurring opinion in Casey Justice 
O’Connor did not overrule Bowers, yet attacked the statute on narrower equal 
protection grounds along the lines of Romer. Interestingly, the Supreme Court 
explicitly sought comparative relevance and referred to ECtHR jurisprudence, 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.1573 In this case, laws forbidding homosexual conduct 
were invalidated. The Supreme Court made a remark of cultural, besides legal, 
importance: since the decision of the ECtHR was authoritative in all member states of 
the Council of Europe ‘(21 nations then, 45 nations now)’, Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom ‘is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was 
insubstantial in our Western civilization’. 
 
3. Analysis 
                                                        
1570 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
1571 Casey 833 (851) (1992) 
1572 Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986); In Bowers v. Hardwick sexual orientation is framed as a 
privacy constitutional question. At issue was the application of a Georgia sodomy statute (which 
applied to all acts of sodomy) to consensual homosexual sodomy. Justice Blackmun stressed in his 
dissent the ‘right to be left alone’ and the interpretations of the right to privacy by the Supreme Court 
as decisional autonomy apropos sexual intimacy and spheres free from interference. Justice Stevens, 
dissenting, noted that prior cases established that sodomy could not be prohibited within the marital 
bedroom or between unmarried heterosexual adults and that, since the representatives had voted for a 
neutral law, the state could not save the statute by announcing that it would only enforce that law 
against homosexuals withou reason.  
1573 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, no. 7525/76, § 45, ECHR 1981; Catherine Dupré, ‘Unlocking human 
dignity: towards a theory for the 21st century’ (2009) European Human Rights Law Review 190, 196 
[‘By acknowledging the importance of ‘psychological make-up’, the European Court of Justice 
extended the anti-discrimination clause to protect transsexuals, who were originally not included by the 
contested piece of European law. Through the reliance on dignity and the extended interpretation of the 
prohibition of discrimination, the European Court of Justice recognized more fully the transsexuals’ 
identity and their aspirations to happiness, understood here as the right to be considered by the law as 
being equally worthy of the widower’s pension entitlement. These rulings provide an indication of the 
impact of human dignity on the mainstream human rights approach (here prohibition of discrimination) 
and on how it can open up legal analysis to a broader range of human dimensions.’]; See also P v S and 
Cornwall CC (C-13/94) [1996] E.C.R.; I-2143 ECJ; KB v NHS Pensions Agency (C-117/01) [2004] 
E.C.R. I-541 ECJ, at [7]; B v France (1992) 16 E.H.R.R. 1 ECtHR. 
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In the analysis that follows, the ontological, linguistic-analytical and 
phenomenological portrayals of the Transsexual I Case show how ‘something 
missing’ can be filled with meaning by looking at the context of the Leerstelle, how 
this enterprise affects the boundaries of the legal language game and how ‘something 
always missing’ and the transcendental are practiced in the text of the Transsexual I 
Case where a face-to-face encounter, the moral law and the coexistence with others in 
fraternity are traced.   
a. Ontological  
This analysis points at language of ontological significance in the text of the 
Transsexuals I Case. Minding that telling five stories story of ‘something missing’ in 
Chapter Two also serves the purpose of demonstrating how the introduced 
philosophically grounded hermeneutic and literary lens is to be applied, it should be 
noted that the ontological analysis of the Transsexuals I Case is a most apt 
performance of how this new lens permits the identification and ad hoc filling of 
‘something missing’ with meaning. 
 
i. Identifying ‘something missing’ and inconsistency between life and law 
In line with Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in 
irreversible, according to medical findings, cases of transsexualism, and following a 
sex-change operation, it is ‘in any event correct’ to register the male sex of a 
transsexual in the birth registry. A closer look at the language employed in defining 
transsexualism intimates the tension between life and law. The coming forth in the 
polemos1574 in life preceded harmonizing their Physis and Psyche to disclose their 
essence in law. Life is not mirrored in law, if someone who effectively lives ‘the life 
of a woman’ is treated as a man.  
The complainant is one of the persons that have been assigned on 
the basis of their external sexual characteristics at the time of birth 
to the male sex, but later felt they belong in all respects to the 
female sex and today – after changes to their appearance [äußeren 
Erscheinungsbildes] – live the life of a woman, while continuing to 
be legally treated as men (male transsexuals).1575 
                                                        
1574 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 [Heraclitus, fragment 53] 
1575 BVerfGE 49, 286 (286) 
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Unlike sociological or doctrinal studies of transsexualism, which could, for 
instance, inquire into and reflect on the empirical validity of the male-female 
distinction and classification to start with1576 or question the ratio of registration of 
the sex at the time of birth, this hermeneutic and literary approach has the more 
modest goal of highlighting and portraying that the language practiced within the 
realm of law functions as a cloak of force.1577 In the Transsexual I Case, law resists 
the recognition of the new gender identity; but precisely such recognition, rather than 
ad hoc treatment, shall permit the occupation of the space that corresponds to 
‘something missing’ with new meaning, that is, the meaning of the part that has no 
part.  
In a heavily gendered world, the explicitly defined ontological signification of 
concrete instantiations of law’s Menschenbild can also denote, implicitly, a particular 
ontological significance or value.1578 The following remarks by MacKinnon offer an 
explanation why this is so in the case of women. 
Nice neutral world, difference […]. Nevermind that differences can 
simply be fragmented universals. It doesn’t improve one’s ability to 
analyze hierarchy as socially constructed to add more pieces called 
differences if the differences are seen as biologically determined to 
begin with. You have […] a biological theory of gender, and you’ve 
gotten equally nowhere in terms of dismantling social hierarchy. Put 
another way, if women don’t exist, because there are only particular 
women, maybe Black people don’t exist either, because they are 
divided by sex. Probably lesbians can’t exist either, because they 
are divided by race and class; if women don’t exist, woman-
identified women surely don’t exist, except in their heads. We are 
reduced to individuals1579, which, of all coincidences, is where 
liberalism places us. With its affirmation of women’s 
commonalities in all their diversity, it is feminism that rejects the 
view that ‘woman’ is a presocial, that is, biologically determined, 
category and the notion that all women are the same.1580                                                         
1576 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) [‘The principle that derives from our legal order and social life is that 
every human being is of either “male” or “female” sex, regardless of possible anomalies in the genital 
area.’] 
1577 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
1578 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299); The gendered perspective can be ‘[…] in the case of the transsexual 
complainant the feeling that he is a man is missing according to the medical opinions submitted to the 
court, along with every externally apparent indication of male sex. In addition, his social behavior 
matches that of a woman. This is supported also by his professional activity as a nurse 
[Krankenschwester].’ 
1579 Being ‘reduced to individuals’ in MacKinnon’s argument, is not, I argue, in contradiction of 
encountering the concrete face of the other in the thought of Levinas; it can be rather viewed as an 
affirmation of Levinas’ proposition that the absolutely other is related to others, on the basis of 
language, in fraternity and solidarity that does not interfere with their radical separation.  
1580 MacKinnon, Are Women Human? (2006) 53 
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This excerpt, besides criticizing biologically determined 
identifications1581similar to the approach taken here, affords this analysis a snapshot 
of the implications of identifying human beings with different particulars or, as 
MacKinnon notes, ‘fragmented universals’. MacKinnon’s bold rhetorical style 
contributes to alarming us to appreciate what is really enjeu in choosing specific 
language, that is, particular identifications, in filling ‘something missing’ with 
concrete meaning.  
The ontological account of the law of human dignity emphasizes the guarantee 
of the self-determined disclosure of the human being and the claim vis-à-vis the state 
and third parties to refrain from forcefully interfering in this irruptive process.1582 
‘Something missing’ as an integral feature of human being-ness and, on the basis of 
linguistic and semantic overlapping, of the law of human dignity is the part of those 
who have no part1583 within the realm of fundamental rights. In accord with how she 
‘felt’, the complainant in the Transsexual I Case adjusted her appearance [äußeren 
Erscheinungsbildes] to that of the female sex to restore the lack of correspondence 
between Physis and Psyche. The term Erscheinungsbild alludes to the ‘unhidden’ and 
signals ad absurdum the concealed, psychical dimension of human being-ness that 
generated the transsexual’s desire to come-into-being as a unified human being.  
In the Transsexual I Case judicial practice relies heavily on empirical insights 
and takes on a pragmatic, outcome-oriented approach to the phenomenon under 
scrutiny. The ambiguity associated with the fact that the origin and the cause of 
transsexualism ‘are not yet entirely [endgültig] clear […]’1584 calls for resorting to 
available research findings re the success of ‘attempts to dissuade transsexuals from 
their psychosexual basic structure through psychotherapy or hormone therapy 
[…].’1585 According to those findings, such attempts had to that date failed. The Court 
relied on research findings, namely sources of external justification, for the adoption 
of the criterion of diagnosed irreversibility of the traversal of the limit in coming-into-
being at the psychosexual level.  
                                                        
1581 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 214 [mysterious participation in causality] 
1582 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 
1583 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 35 
1584 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287); ibid [‘In particular it is not clear whether and which are the prenatal 
determinants of [a person’s] evolution into a transsexual.’] 
1585 BVerfGE 49, 286 (288) 
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The full recognition of the new gender role is, nevertheless, 
completed for the transsexual only with the change of name and 
personal status, as medical experts support.1586 
The Transsexual I Case was one of the earliest cases to confront the issue of 
transsexualism. The above excerpt intimates not only how coming-into-being in life 
preceded the documentation of the traversal of this limit in law, but also how life and 
law mutually feed on each other. Olympe de Gouges argued that it was impossible to 
draw a clear borderline separating bare life and political life, particularly ‘when 
women were sentenced to death as enemies of the revolution.’1587 Since their bare life, 
that is, life ‘from the standpoint of its being able to be put to death’, depended on a 
political judgment, it was per se political1588. This holds true analogously for the 
distinction between bare life and legal life [Rechtsleben] in the Transsexual I 
Case1589.  
It is in the polemos that the essence of the human being comes forth, discards 
and supervenes upon limited, man-made classifications and disciplinary boundaries. 
In the Transsexual I Case the polemos marks state interference with the most intimate 
spheres of personality1590, which caused the ontology of transsexualism to unfold by 
external force. The law denied transsexuals the traversal of the limit separating life 
from legal life, the occupation of the part guaranteed to them in view of the law of 
human dignity, and their establishment within the realm of law as subjects of 
fundamental rights.  
The complainant, who is, according to the medical opinions before 
the court, psychically a woman, and through hormone treatments 
and operations his appearance has adapted, within the realm of the 
medically attainable, to the perceived [gefühlten, felt] gender, is 
treated as a man against his will in legal life [Rechtsleben]. Thus he 
is denied the possibility of an inconspicuous, socially adjusted life 
as a woman.1591 
The self-determination of the complainant was not respected and protected. 
She was denied a life ‘socially adjusted’ to her essence. Limits traversed in life, in the 
                                                        
1586 BVerfGE 49, 286 (288) 
1587 Rancière (n 1583) 68-69 
1588 ibid 
1589 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297) 
1590 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) [‘[…] the spheres that are affected by these belong to the most intimate 
area of personality, which in principle is protected against state interference and, in any case, should 
only be intruded into for reasons of special public interest [cited case omitted].’] 
1591 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297) 
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irruptive unfolding of the essence of human beings, are only fully recognized when 
law mirrors the ontologically unconcealed human being-ness. Are human beings 
human? Are transsexuals human? Gender is a fundamental aspect of who the human 
being is. According to medical experts, transsexuals perceive of their new gender role 
as complete only with the registration of the new name and the corresponding 
personal status in the birth registry.1592 The transsexual seeks the representation in law 
of the human image in life. Due to the impossibility of sharply separating bare life 
from legal life, the harmony of Physis and Psyche is disrupted unless a female first 
name and personal status are legally recognized. The female first name figuratively 
occupies the space where pragmatism and symbolism intersect. On the one hand, a 
female first name would practically prevent conflict situations for the complainant, 
and on the other, it would positively manifest gender identity.  
ii. Filling ‘something missing’  
Guaranteeing identity between the psychical and physical dimensions of 
human being-ness in the case of transsexuals amounts to ‘mediating and caring, that 
human beings be human and not inhumane, “inhuman,” that is, outside their 
essence.’1593 As regards the realm of law, the ontological account of practicing the 
law of human dignity in the Transsexual I Case is apposite to the ‘manifestation’ of 
the identity of Psyche and Physis, namely to the presence of a unified Menschenbild 
at the legal level. 
The lack of identity between exterior appearance and personal legal 
status is manifested by the fact that it is not possible for [the 
complainant] to legally bear a female first name. […] Even as far as 
a gender-neutral name is concerned, conflict situations cannot be 
excluded […].1594 
Who is the transsexual? The ontology of transsexualism is intensely inquired 
into in the Transsexual I Case. In a 1974 document of the German Society for Sex 
Research the essence of transsexualism was found to be ‘the complete psychical 
identification with the other, i.e. with one’s own body of conflicting 
[widersprechenden] sex.’1595 Transsexualism was distinguished from the case of                                                         
1592 BVerfGE 49, 286 (288) [‘The full recognition of the new gender role is, nevertheless, completed 
for the transsexual only with the change of name and personal status, as medical experts support.’] 
1593 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
1594 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297) 
1595 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287) 
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hermaphrodites in an effort to construe a negative delineation of its meaning. 
Transsexuals, unlike hermaphrodites, present at the time of birth ‘genetically 
identifiable male or female sex’ and normal reproductive organs and functions, rather 
than ‘somatic, physical intersexes.’1596  
Unfolding, being inside one’s essence, coming-into-being is guaranteed under 
Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, the freedom to develop one’s 
abilities and strengths. 
Human dignity and the fundamental right to the free development of 
personality demand, therefore, that a human being’s civil status is 
governed by the sex with which he psychically and physically 
identifies himself. 1597 
The sex of the human being is a foundational experience 
[Grunderfahrung]1598. ‘Something missing’ in the case of the transsexual complainant 
was  ‘the feeling that he is a man’1599 as affirmed by medical opinions submitted to 
the Court, along with ‘every externally apparent indication of male sex.’1600 The 
Court went on to utter the gendered observation, ‘[t]his is supported also by his 
professional activity as a nurse [Krankenschwester] […]’1601, which signifies that 
social norms too are a cloak of force and ‘participate in [the] transformation of 
perspective into being.’1602 Ontologically significant traits of transsexualism are the 
conflict of Physis and Psyche, experienced as anguish and being outside one’s 
essence1603, and the human desire for unity [Einstimmigkeit, harmony] of Psyche and 
Physis.1604 
The Court evaluated the possible drives underlying transsexualism and stated 
that sex-change operations are motivated by the desire for unity of Psyche and Physis, 
‘rather than sexuality’1605, and therefore the sex-change operation ‘should be viewed’ 
as a necessary course of action towards realizing that goal.1606 The discussion on the                                                         
1596 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287) 
1597 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1598 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1599 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1600 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1601 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1602 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
1603 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) [‘The anguish of transsexuals as portrayed in medical texts is impressively 
confirmed by the medical opinions that were presented in the complainant’s case.’] 
1604 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 85 [Strack refers to the human desire for unity 
[das menschliche Streben nach Einheit].] 
1605 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1606 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
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right of transsexuals to marry indicates that constitutional law, particularly the law of 
human dignity and fundamental rights, is the critical determinant of perspective and 
meaning. The irrational moral disapproval by the general population of the marriage 
of a male transsexual to a man cannot stand in the way of practicing a constitutionally 
guaranteed right. Thus, spouses should be granted broad latitude to exercise their self-
determination in shaping their community of life [Lebensgemeinschaft].1607 
The FCC reacted to the contention of the Federal High Court of Justice re the 
lack of authority of the judicial power to address regulatory problems pertinent to 
transsexualism. The precedence of constitutional law – explicitly, fundamental rights 
– over statutory provisions and its thoroughgoing validity was brought forth in 
support of the duty of courts to confront the issues raised in the Transsexual I Case. 
To the extent that existing gaps in law can be treated by direct resort to constitutional 
law provisions, such as Art. 2 sec. 1 GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, these cannot be defined 
as statutory lacunas in the first place1608. Neither the question, why certain values and 
aspects of life are reflected specifically in constitutional law, is original, nor the 
response; constitutional law comprises the fundamentals in each given legal order. 
The crucial question is, rather, what it means to respect and protect the dignity of 
human beings and to place it in a prominent position among fundamental rights. In the 
Transsexual I Case, ‘something missing’ as an aspect of human dignity meaning 
corresponds to the empty space reserved for them within legal life, that is, first and 
foremost within the realm of fundamental rights.  
Since it is inconsistent with Art. 2 sec. 1 in conjunction with Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG to refuse to correct the record on the sex-classification of 
transsexuals in the birth registry, the duty of courts to deal with this 
situation in light of fundamental rights standards should not be 
denied on grounds of absence of a statutory provision. 1609 
The FCC expressed its concern re the point in time when the legal validity of 
sex-change should develop its effects. It was suggested that ex nunc effects would be 
a constitutionally acceptable treatment of the matter. This position addresses the a                                                         
1607 BVerfGE 49, 286 (300) [‘Marriage is under the Basic Law (Art. 6 sec. 1 GG) the union of man and 
woman to fundamentally irresolvable community of life [Lebensgemeinschaft] [cited case omitted]. 
Designing this community according to their perception is the task of the spouses. It may be that 
among the general population, the marriage of a male transsexual with a man is rejected due to the 
underlying idea that it is morally disapproved [zu mißbilligen]. However, irrational views cannot 
preclude the substantiation of a marriage [cited case omitted].’] 
1608 BVerfGE 49, 286 (303) 
1609 BVerfGE 49, 286 (301) 
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posteriori identification of ‘something missing’ once it becomes ‘something there’, 
that is, ontologically present within the realm of fundamental rights. Be that as it may, 
the FCC stated that this decision exceeded the latitude of the constitutional court, and 
remanded the case to the Federal High Court of Justice.  
In the Transsexual I Case, the ontological account of human dignity serves to 
stress the inviolability of human beings’ coming-into-being. The state and third 
parties should refrain from interfering in the happening of the irruption of Being. This 
movement or unfolding, crossing the limit, moving from a state of concealment 
towards disclosure, should occur in self-determination, and this proposition 
encapsulates the ontological meaning of the law of human dignity and explains why I 
distinguish between forced and the forceful. External intervention impairing the self-
determined unfolding brings about the forced disclosure of human being-ness; the 
forceful alludes rather to the violent quality and intensity of such interference. 
Restrictions on the self-determined unfolding of human being-ness ‘can result from 
the coexistence of the individual with his fellow human beings, to the extent that these 
do not touch on the inviolable, innermost sphere of life.’1610 This remark presents an 
appropriate transition to the relational, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological, 
analyses. 
b. Linguistic-analytical 
The linguistic-analytical approach to the text of the Transsexuals I Case allows for the 
depiction of incompatibility with the constitution as non-subsumption under the legal 
language game emanating from the eye of the judge when looking through the lens of 
the Basic Law. External justification and negative delineation are resorted to in order 
to contour the human image of the transsexual human being and cause the boundaries 
of the legal language game to fluctuate. The mere cognizance of the viewpoint of the 
metaphysical subject indicates the relation between the critical eye with authority over 
the meaning of the legal language game and the broader field of sight and attests to 
the origin of the concretization of the Menschenbild in a relational practice of the law 
of human dignity. Finally, the moral law alluded to in the decision can be viewed as 
another lens before the eye of the judge.  
                                                        
1610 BVerfGE 49, 286 (300) 
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i. Incompatibility with the constitution as non-subsumption under a legal 
language game 
The FCC held that the decision of the Federal High Court of Justice 
[Bundesgerichtshof] violated the fundamental right of the complainant under Art. 2 
sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, reversed the lower court’s decision, 
and remanded the case to the Federal High Court of Justice. In linguist-analytical 
terms, the FCC identified the non-subsumption of the lower court decision under the 
legal language game ensuing from looking through the lens of the Basic Law. The 
viewpoint of the complainant could not be missing from the Court’s legal language 
game. The constitutional complaint rebutted the rejection of the change of sex from 
‘male’ to ‘female’ in the entry to the birth registry. The elliptical knowledge on and 
limited understanding of transsexualism and what it stood for at that time can be 
depicted as ‘something missing’ by analogy with a Leerstelle. The reasons why 
‘something missing’ eventuates in legal language games are as diverse and unique as 
the context of cases. The legal syllogism reflects the effort to elucidate who the 
transsexual human being is; sometimes sporadic and patchy, the reasoning of the FCC 
in the Transsexual I Case is a movement into muddy waters.  
In disagreement with the contention of the Federal High Court of Justice that 
judicial power lacked authority to resolve the arising regulation problems, the FCC 
argued that, to the extent that omissions in statutory law can be addressed by direct 
resort to constitutional law, here, particularly, to the fundamental right emerging from 
Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, one cannot speak of gaps in 
legal regulation1611. The argument restates the all-permeating influence of 
constitutional law as the lens before the eye that instigates the legal language game. 
More importantly it underlines the Court’s authority over meaning and diagnoses the 
filling of the Leerstelle within the legal language game that incorporates fundamental 
rights language, and emanates from an eye, as in Wittgenstein’s graph, that looks 
through the lens of the law of human dignity, namely an all-encompassing concept, to 
produce meaning. 
                                                        
1611 BVerfGE 49, 286 (303) 
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ii. Fluctuation of the boundaries of the legal language game: external justification 
and negative delineation  
The FCC first surveyed the present state of knowledge. The employment of 
insights deduced from a 1974 document of the German Society of Sex Research into 
the essence of transsexualism can be figuratively rendered as an expansion of the 
boundaries of the legal language game1612 in view of the content of the Court’s 
broader field of sight. In that document, transsexualism was defined as ‘the complete 
psychical identification with the other, i.e. with one’s own body of conflicting 
[widersprechenden] sex.’1613 Transsexualism was negatively defined apropos the 
phenomenon of hermaphrodites: transsexual human beings present at the time of birth 
no somatic, physical intersexuality, but rather the genetically identifiable male or 
female sex and the respective ‘normal reproductive organs and reproductive 
functions.’ 1614  
Two remarks are vital at this point of the linguistic-analytical analysis: first, 
the distinction between Psyche and Physis leaves an imprint on law’s Menschenbild 
and constitutes an important element of the portrayal of the legal language game 
corresponding to the Transsexual I Case; and second, the implications of the word 
‘normal’, notwithstanding the fact that its use is not directly attributable to the Court, 
should be identified at the outset as language requiring exposure to critical reflection. 
Regardless of whether certain language is directly attributable to the metaphysical 
subject responsible for producing meaning, all language comprised in legal language 
games can be compelling in that it signals actors’ choices of sources – internal or 
external – of justification and introduces meaning transduced from other relevant 
viewpoints into the legal language game. Evidencing the integration of language into 
the legal language game fleshes out the portrayal of the interplay between life and 
law.  
Ambiguity re the origin and cause of transsexualism1615 is a sign of 
‘something missing’, that is, of a Leerstelle within the legal language game. In quest 
of the meaning of transsexualism the Court resorted to further medical findings.                                                         
1612 See graph 4 (text to n 495) 
1613 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287) 
1614 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287) 
1615 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287) [‘The origin and the cause of transsexualism are not entirely [endgültig] 
clear. In particular it is not clear whether and which are the prenatal determinants of [a person’s] 
evolution into a transsexual.’] 
 346
Based on those insights, the FCC engaged in negative delineation – namely vis-à-vis 
homosexuality, fetishism, and psychosexual anomalies and perversions1616 – of what 
the Menschenbild of transsexual human beings stands for.  
Not sexuality, but the problem of personal self-understanding is of 
crucial importance to the transsexual, as it manifests in the gender 
role and the gender identity. The male transsexual rejects the 
homosexual man and seeks expressly the heterosexually oriented 
partner. 1617 
Despite the scientific premises of this insight, the language used schematically 
portrays the motivation underlying transsexualism. Sexuality was explicitly rejected 
as transsexuals’ drive and the problem was framed as one of personal self-
understanding. Therefore, the depiction of the meaning, signification and significance, 
of transsexualism involves the exclusion of certain elements from the portrayal of the 
Menschenbild and the embracement of others. In the supra excerpt the nature of 
motives associated with transsexualism are stipulated rather than indicatively 
suggested. That the assumption is verified by scientific research does not render the 
identification of the decisive motive of transsexualism and the presence of language 
conveying it within the legal language game any less schematic. Premising the 
allusion to the experienced [erlebten] gender identity of transsexuals on scientific 
insights does not absolve the FCC from the responsibility to critically reflect on the 
language employed to present scientific results, and to review the phrasing in light of 
the Basic Law as the lens forming decisively the eye’s viewpoint. The inconsistency 
between the world, namely the realm of life by analogy with the limitless – for the eye 
– field of sight, and legal life, figuratively rendered a subtotal of the eye’s field of 
sight, is evident in the portrayal of the complainant as a human being who is, if 
looked at through the lens of medicine, psychically a woman and physically ‘within 
the realm of the medically attainable’ attuned to the ‘perceived [gefühlten, felt] 
gender’, and still a man in legal life [Rechtsleben].1618 
Because the law on civil status is recognizably based on the premise 
that a person’s first name must reveal the sex of its bearer [cited 
                                                        
1616 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287) 
1617 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1618 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297) 
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case omitted], the complainant can change his name only after the 
entry of his sex is changed in the birth registry. 1619 
Is commitment to the ‘normal’ traced in the supra phrasing? Faced with an all-
new category, the legal actor, the eye, may seek to appropriate it and to render it 
graspable within a horizon of language and meaning. The aphoristic tone of 
propositions in the above excerpt suggests a value judgment re the significance of 
personal self-understanding1620 as the motivating force for transsexualism as opposed 
to sexuality. In another part of the decision ‘reliable findings of scientific research’ 
are brought forth in support of the thesis that ‘transsexuals do not intend to 
manipulate their sex.’1621 The phrasing conveys that, at the time, justifying 
transsexualism and the intentions underlying it and associating them with an ethically 
acceptable motivation in accordance with the mainstream were deemed to be essential 
aspects of the meaning produced.  
According to available research, attempts to dissuade transsexuals 
from their psychosexual basic structure through psychotherapy or 
hormone therapy, have to date failed. The only meaningful and 
helpful therapeutic measure consists, according to scientists, in 
adapting the body of the transsexual as much as possible to the 
experienced [erlebten, lived] gender identity.1622 
The boundaries of the legal language game in the Transsexual I Case are in a 
constant state of flux, as insights derived from available research refine the quest for 
the determination of transsexualism. The insight that transsexuals’ problems concern 
their psychosexual basic structure reinforces the claim that transsexualism entails 
personal self-understanding complications. Scientific research afforded insights into 
the experience of transsexualism that permit the approximation of transsexual human 
beings as manifestations of law’s Menschenbild and the portrayal of their viewpoint 
and field of sight as metaphysical subjects. External justification, namely invoking 
scientific sources in the process of cultivating an understanding of transsexualism, 
amplified the soundness of assuming the transsexual’s viewpoint and incorporating it 
into the Court’s legal language game. The ‘only meaningful and helpful therapeutic 
                                                        
1619 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1620 Framing the experience of the transsexual as a problem of self-understanding, rather than sexuality, 
indeed grasps more holistically what is enjeu for the transsexual. The process of self-understanding is 
discussed infra in the phenomenological analysis of the Transsexual I Case.  
1621 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1622 BVerfGE 49, 286 (288) 
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measure’1623 that can restore the imbalance experienced by the transsexual, is sex-
change operations; the experience of imbalance is a central aspect of the portrayal of 
this concretization of the Menschenbild. 
iii. Cognizance of the viewpoint of the metaphysical subject in concretizing the 
Menschenbild 
The concretization of law’s Menschenbild in the Transsexual I Case is a 
dichotomized human being.  The transsexual experiences conflict between the Psyche 
and the Physis. Though physically a man, the complainant was psychically a woman. 
Through medical intervention her appearance adapted to the perceived [gefühlten, 
felt] gender. The language used here conveys the viewpoint of the transsexual, 
namely her perception of her gender identity, while the word ‘gefühlten’ in the 
original German text hints at the intensely and immediately impactful experience of 
gender and, particularly, of belonging to another gender. Whereas within the realm of 
life, and after she had undergone hormone treatments and operations, the 
inconsistency between her Psyche and Physis was restored, in legal life she was still 
treated as a man against her will.  
Human dignity and the fundamental right to the free development of the 
personality1624, the Court argued, demand that the civil status of human beings ‘is 
governed by the sex with which [they] psychically and physically [identify 
themselves].’1625 Critical reflection is the process of practicing the law of human 
dignity; in the linguistic-analytical model this proposition translates into maintaining 
the boundaries of the legal language game in a state of flux, constantly scrutinizing 
not only the subsumption of concrete manifestations of human being-ness under the 
legal language game, but also law’s relevance to the world or life by analogy with the 
field of sight simile.  
The distinction between legal life and social life is not always clear. This 
observation applies, apropos the linguistic-analytical model, to the boundaries of the 
legal language game, which effectively demarcate the realm of law within the totality 
of life. On certain issues, however, law and life intersect. This is particularly evident 
in language expressing time-honored, mainstream portrayals of human being-ness.                                                         
1623 BVerfGE 49, 286 (288) 
1624 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) [‘Art. 2 sec. 1 GG when seen in relation to Art. 1 sec. 1 GG guarantees the 
free development of a person’s abilities and strengths.’] 
1625 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
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Does cognizance of the viewpoint of the metaphysical being, the transsexual and, in 
specific, the complainant, in the end exert formative influence on the perspective 
transformed into being in producing meaning? 
The principle that derives from our legal order and social life is that 
every human being is of either ‘male’ or ‘female’ sex, regardless of 
possible anomalies in the genital area.1626 
The FCC went on to challenge the premises of the decision of the Federal 
High Court of Justice, namely the absoluteness of ‘the thesis on the immutability of 
sex, which is determined on account of external sexual characteristics at the time of 
birth’1627. The constitutional judge expressed doubts about whether the thesis was 
‘still tenable in the depicted absoluteness’1628. Scientific proof of ‘various forms of 
somatic (physical) intersexuality […]’1629 along with medical findings documenting 
‘the dissociation between form [Morphe] and psyche’ in cases of hermaphrodite births 
that, according to ‘reliable scientific evidence’1630, apply most sharply to transsexuals, 
call into question the ‘depicted absoluteness’ [geschilderten Absolutheit] in the lower 
court’s decision.  
Be that as it may, stressed the Court, ‘[t]he “foundational experience” 
[Grunderfahrung] that the sex of a human being is determined, innate and immutable 
on the basis of his physical sexual characteristics, should not be seriously questioned 
in light of medical insights on the psychosexuality resulting from inherited and 
environmental influences.’1631 Affirming the soundness of the thesis of immutability 
on grounds of a ‘foundational experience’ counterbalances the critique of its absolute 
defense in the contested decision. Reading the two arguments together permits the 
inference of the Court’s reluctance to adopt a position on matters the substance of 
which it was neither competent to appropriately understand nor responsible to decide 
on. Rather, a parallel reading indicates how critical reflection is practiced, namely as a 
movement to and fro between law and life with a view to dissolving the possible 
arbitrariness of rigid, absolute theses in law’s practice, while ensuring law’s relevance 
                                                        
1626 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1627 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1628 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1629 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1630 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298f.) 
1631 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
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to the evolution eventuating in life and the Court’s integrity as the decisive authority 
over meaning. 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG protects the dignity of the human being, as he 
conceives of himself in his individuality and becomes conscious of 
his self. This comprises the notion that each human being is autarkic 
[über sich selbst verfügen] and controls his own destiny self-
responsibly.1632 
Attention is cast on the constitutional protection of human dignity under Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG. The intended non-determination of law’s Menschenbild, embraced 
wholeheartedly in German doctrine and probably presumed in the supra excerpt, 
guarantees availability of space for human beings as metaphysical subjects at the limit 
of the world, in truth their world, to establish their human being-ness within the realm 
of law. While the meaning of their human being-ness is produced in self-
determination as emanating from their own viewpoint, the introduction of this 
perception of meaning into the realm of law requires the political, social and aesthetic 
traversal of the limit. As practiced in the Transsexual I Case, the law of human 
dignity guarantees that the human being has the decisive authority over the meaning 
of his or her human being-ness in line with the conception ‘of himself in his 
individuality’1633. This understanding of the protection of human dignity is attuned to 
‘the notion that each human being is autarkic’ and in control of his or her own destiny 
in self-responsibility1634. The language employed by the FCC brings to mind the 
ontological reading of ‘the disjunction of gods and human beings’1635 as denoting the 
self-determination of human beings and the understanding of the transcendental 
apropos the inviolable limit in the linguistic-analytical account of the law of human 
dignity.  
iv. Another lens before the eye of the judge: the moral law 
Another lens before the eye of the constitutional judge in setting limits to the 
right to the free development of personality is the moral law1636. In the Transsexual I 
Case the Court held that the moral law was not violated, yet abstained from deciding 
the substantive question ‘[w]hether an operation to change one’s sex that is not                                                         
1632 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1633 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298) 
1634 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298); The notion of self-responsibility is discussed infra in the 
phenomenological analysis of the Transsexual I Case. 
1635 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 
1636 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
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therapeutically necessary should be considered immoral […]’1637. Instead it deferred 
to ‘available [expert] opinions’ according to which ‘a sex-change operation was 
indicated in the case of the complainant.’1638 In other words, the FCC only 
appreciated ad hoc the compatibility of law’s practice with the moral law, not the 
moral character of sex-change operations as such1639. Judicial practice in the 
Transsexual I Case demonstrates alertness about the ethics ‘shown’ in the concrete 
practice of the right to the free development of personality. By emphasizing the 
scientific foundations of the need for a sex-change operation in the case before it, it 
effectively resisted moral propositions, that is, ‘saying’ what can only be ‘shown’, 
within its legal language game.  
The practice of law’s meta-dimension, most paradigmatically conveyed in the 
law of human dignity and fundamental rights, is manifested in the exercise of 
authority over meaning in accordance with metaphysical subjects’ own perception of 
the world. The meaning of the moral law, both in its abstraction and concrete practice, 
evokes the transcendental as in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, namely ethics 
and aesthetics, what cannot be said, only ‘shown’, the inexpressible or nonsense. The 
association of ‘something missing’ as a Leerstelle with ‘something always missing’ 
surfaces when the transcendental is involved in law’s practice. Law’s Menschenbild, 
the metaphysical subject, is empty in its abstraction, ‘something always missing’, and, 
as such, admitting of ad hoc concretizations in lieu of ‘something missing’ as a 
Leerstelle. The Leerstelle allows for concrete imprints of law’s meta-dimension, 
‘something always missing’, to feature in legal language games.  
The Court’s abstention from deriving the meaning of the Leerstelle from 
context and thereby determining the specifics of moral compatibility resulted in a 
genuinely elliptical legal argument. Reference to moral law in the Transsexual I Case 
hints at its significance but does not elucidate its signification. Various explanations 
for this stance are conceivable; non-determination of what the moral law signifies 
could be a sign of judicial restraint, while, subject to a sociological reading, it could 
                                                        
1637 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1638 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) 
1639 As new claims become old, that is, are repeatedly brought before the judge, the clarity and 
meaningfulness of the language practiced and, consequently, understanding and communication 
ameliorate. See Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 166  
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indicate reluctance to utter bold assertions on a subject matter that was at that time – 
and still is – controversial1640, especially from a mainstream point of view. 
c. Phenomenological 
The phenomenological analysis enriches the relational account of the practice 
of the law of human dignity in the Transsexual I Case in the linguistic-analytical 
portrayal. The self’s responsibility to respond to the other and the face-to-face 
encounter in light of the moral law, as well as the theme of absolute separation of the 
other from the self are examples of the phenomenological themes raised in the 
following analysis. 
i. The portrayal of responsibility as ability to respond to the other 
The phenomenological portrayal centers on the notion of responsibility 
understood as the ability to respond, namely to give a responsible answer to the other. 
How is the complainant and, more generally, the transsexual human being1641 as a 
concretization of law’s Menschenbild portrayed in the Transsexual I Case, and to 
what extend does the portrayal reflect the ability of the constitutional judge as the 
speaking self to respond to the other? The other signifies the complainant and the 
transsexual human being. 
The other belongs to ‘the persons that have been assigned on the basis of their 
external sexual characteristics at the time of birth to the male sex [die aufgrund ihrer 
                                                        
1640 Evoking an Anglo-American perspective on judicial interpretation of comparative value, Walzer, 
Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) 18f. [‘[…] a code is a 
law or a system of laws, while an interpretation is a judgment, the proper work of the judicial branch. 
The claim of interpretation is simply this: that neither discovery nor invention is necessary because we 
already possess what they pretend to provide. Morality, unlike politics, does not require executive 
authority or systematic legislation. We do not have to discover the moral world because it has already 
been invented – though not in accordance with any philosophical method. No design procedure has 
governed its design, and the result no doubt is disorganized and uncertain. It is also very dense: the 
moral world has a lived-in quality, like a home occupied by a single family over many generations, 
with unplanned additions here and there, and all the available space filled with memory-laden objects 
and artifacts. The whole thing, taken as a whole, lends itself less to abstract modeling than to thick 
description. Moral argument in such a setting is interpretive in character, closely resembling the work 
of a lawyer or judge who struggles to find meaning in a morass of conflicting laws and precedents.’] 
1641 The schematism of the phrasing ‘transsexual human being’ serves solely the purposes of analytical 
clarity and intelligibility; it does not seek to reproduce arbitrary labeling. This clarification is necessary 
in view of the danger of understanding transsexual human beings as a solitary class. See, for instance, 
how the amendment to Colorado’s constitution struck down by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) included within a specified class of persons homosexuals, 
lesbians and bisexuals, which, in fact, reflected ‘animosity’ towards this class of persons and served no 
rational and legitimate governmental purpose. From a hermeneutic and literary perspective, such 
examples of practice of language and law heighten the importance of sensitization towards phrasing 
and framing choices.  
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äußeren Geschlechtsmerkmale im Zeitpunkt der Geburt dem männlichen Geschlecht 
zugeordnet worden sind] […]’1642 but later adjusted their physical appearance to their 
psychical identification as women. Belonging to ‘the’ persons ‘that’ signals the 
exceptional character of this identification. The passive voice syntactical construction 
has the effect of non-attribution of the classification at the time of birth to a specific 
viewpoint with authority over meaning. Classifications presuppose totality structures 
and aim at rendering the other graspable under the self’s vision. The passive voice 
construction could assumedly imply the state or the mainstream in society as the self; 
in either case, the viewpoint of the FCC as the self and author of the decision appears 
to be attuned to the implied viewpoint. Noting that male transsexuals were still 
‘legally treated as men’ [rechtlich weiterhin als Männer behandelt werden]1643, the 
FCC produced another passive voice syntactical structure, which, however, in view of 
the explicit allusion to the realm of law, probably points to the state in all its 
expressions as self.  
The juxtaposition, first, of psychical condition with physical appearance prior 
to sex-change operations, and, second, of the other’s lived experience with her legal 
status elucidates what was enjeu in the Transsexual I Case: life had no traceable 
imprint on law’s Menschenbild. The FCC explored transsexualism as a manifestation 
of human being-ness. The Transsexual I Case was one of the first confrontations with 
the issue in FCC jurisprudence, thus also one of the first attempts to define the 
responsibility of the self towards the other, in other words the ability to respond to the 
other. A relational understanding of the practice of the law of human dignity 
essentially entails the portrayal of the process for cultivating that ability as this 
surfaces in the text under scrutiny. 
The FCC turned to medically grounded insights to explore the meaning of 
transsexualism and cultivate an appreciation of the viewpoint of the transsexual as the 
other. The Court, the self, appears to have been prepared to listen and learn from 
experience as processed and documented in another discipline. Transsexuals 
experience a conflict, which can be resolved by adjusting their physical appearance to 
the felt gender. This is driven by ‘desire for unity [Einstimmigkeit, harmony] of                                                         
1642 BVerfGE 49, 286 (286) [‘The complainant is one of the persons that have been assigned on the 
basis of their external sexual characteristics at the time of birth to the male sex, but later felt they 
belong in all respects to the female sex and today – after changes to their appearance [äußeren 
Erscheinungsbildes] – live the life of a woman, while continuing to be legally treated as men (male 
transsexuals).’] 
1643 BVerfGE 49, 286 (286)  
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psyche and nature [Physis], rather than sexuality’1644. Transsexualism is understood as 
a ‘problem of personal self-understanding […] as it manifests in the gender role and 
the gender identity’1645 rather than an issue of sexuality. Empirical medical findings 
on the motives of transsexualism informed the Court’s perspective on the other.  
In the Transsexual I Case, self-determination, a central aspect of human 
dignity meaning, refers to the self-portrayal [Selbstdarstellung] of the individual 
outwardly.1646 Self-portrayal denotes the disclosure of the particulars of individual 
human beings’ self-understanding and personality profile. The wide realm of self-
portrayal and self-expression, of constructing a self-determined image of life 
[Lebensbild], and of protection of the data related to personality and the – spatially 
represented – sphere of personality are long since determined by the general right to 
personality which has been developed by the FCC through the combined application 
of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 2 sec. 1 GG.1647 
To assertively state the meaning of transsexualism, the FCC as the self and 
author of the decision incorporated the informed viewpoint of medical experts into the 
legal language game to substitute for the viewpoint of the male transsexual, who 
‘rejects the homosexual man and seeks expressly the heterosexually oriented 
partner.’1648 On the basis of medical experts’ insights, the viewpoint of the transsexual 
human being depicted in the Transsexual I Case is soundly assumed. The 
commitment of the Court to sound justification can be interpreted as responsibility.  
[…] according to the state of scientific knowledge the male 
transsexual does not desire homosexual relationships, but rather 
seeks relations with a heterosexual partner and, after a successful 
sex-change operation is also capable of engaging in normal sexual 
intercourse with a male partner. 1649 
Awareness of the self’s limited perspective on the other and deferral to the 
viewpoint of those most competent to understand this multidimensional phenomenon 
and to portray the other substantiates the ability of the FCC as self to respond. The 
negative delineation of ability is also a manifestation of responsibility. 
Notwithstanding the ameliorating effect of external justification by recourse to                                                         
1644 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299)  
1645 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287)  
1646 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 84 
1647 ibid 
1648 BVerfGE 49, 286 (287)  
1649 BVerfGE 49, 286 (300)  
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scientific sources, a question arises about the significance of expressly and 
conclusively stating who the other is within the totality of the legal language game 
corresponding to the Transsexual I Case. Such statements about the meaning of 
otherness can establish a status quo, hence disregard ‘something always missing’ 
ensuing from the perception of the other as absolutely Other, by permitting the 
assumption that everything we need to know about the other to be able to respond is 
already visible; the absolute separation of the other from the self would therefore be 
ignored. The schematic fashion in which the sexual orientation of the partner rejected 
or expressly sought by the male transsexual is defined begs the question whether this 
response to the other occurs as a face-to-face encounter that leaves the distance 
separating the two entities intact, or, conversely, arbitrarily totalizes and destroys that 
distance.  
Research on transsexualism points to the only responsible answer to the 
transsexual human being as the other, namely the change of name and personal status 
in law in line with the new, ‘experienced’ [erlebten]1650 gender identity in life. The 
occurrence of the face-to-face encounter is discernible in how the complainant, as the 
other before the Court, is portrayed. 
Adapting the appearance of the transsexual human being ‘within the realm of 
the medically attainable’ to the perceived [gefühlten, felt] gender in life1651 denotes 
the scope of responsibility of another self, namely the physician, towards the 
transsexual as other within the realm of life. Responsibility as ability to respond 
encapsulates the interrelatedness between responsibility and competence. The 
physician undertakes the adaptation of the Physis to the Psyche of the transsexual. 
Scientific insights set the foundations for the depiction of the human image of the 
complainant in the Transsexual I Case. The choice of language, the ‘felt’ gender, 
directly alludes to emotions. A literary approach permits an association of the ‘felt 
gender’ with the desire of the transsexual as an ipse1652 to unfold, namely to absorb 
the own ‘felt’ otherness into the self. The self’s non-response to the other in the 
Transsexual I Case causes the interruption of unity and continuity.  
 
ii. Generosity and hospitality                                                          
1650 BVerfGE 49, 286 (288)  
1651 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297)  
1652 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39 
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The FCC deferred to medical experts’ authority over meaning: ‘for the 
transsexual’ only the change of name and personal status results in the ‘full’ 
recognition of the new gender role. The precedence given to the viewpoint of the 
transsexual apropos what amounts to a full recognition of his or her human being-
ness, renders the transsexual as the other the decisive authority over meaning. The 
production of human dignity meaning is, in that sense, premised on the generosity and 
hospitality that are, according to Levinas, instituted in language1653. It is, indeed, 
medical experts who defined what full recognition amounts to. Be that as it may, the 
constitutional judge turned to their knowledge in responsibility for an informed – if 
only partial – understanding of the other, endorsed insights emanating from their 
viewpoint, grounded the meaning of the Menschenbild and the law of human dignity 
on those insights, and welcomed the other.  
Another portrayal of the incorporation of empirical insights into the legal 
language game by the constitutional judge as self would emphasize particularly how 
the transsexual imbues with meaning the concept of human dignity. This enterprise 
can be figuratively rendered, in light of the phenomenological layer of the introduced 
model, as the self’s relation to the world: the self absorbs the otherness of the world 
into the self. At the same time, reflection on the world has implications for the 
relation of the self to the absolutely other. The self as ipse listens and learns in the 
process of absorbing the alterity of the self and the world, and this evolution and 
knowledge influences the self’s ability to respond to the other1654. That the 
complainant ‘is treated as a man against his will at the level of law [Rechtsleben, legal 
life]’ means that her self-determination is not reflected in the practice of law. Non-
response at the legal level, argued the Court, is effectively tantamount to a denial of 
‘the possibility of an inconspicuous, socially adjusted life as a woman.’1655 
In Levinas’ phenomenology, pre-ethics originates in the practice of language; 
we put our world into words and offer it to the other in generosity. The effort to 
understand the other, even when occasionally resulting in schematism and in the 
articulation of who the other is, is perceived respectively as a manifestation of desire 
for the Other and a precondition for critical reflection. In articulating who the other is                                                         
1653 Levinas ibid 14 [Introduction by John Wild]; ibid 300 
1654 Knowledge is associated in the thought of Levinas with totality structures under which the other is 
subsumed; this analysis illustrates in what sense they are an indispensable aspect of the humane 
practice of law. 
1655 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297)  
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in the text of the Transsexual I Case, the self, egocentric as it is, welcomes the other 
in hospitality and gives the other a right over this egoism.1656 Articulation opens up 
the possibility of critical reflection on the portrayal of the transsexual; the former is a 
substantiation of generosity, while the latter of hospitality. 
 
iii. The face-to-face encounter: restoring non-response or irresponsibility? 
From a phenomenological perspective, the all-permeating force of the law of 
human dignity lies in a hermeneutic and literary interpretation of the concept as 
denoting the pre-ethics originating in language: the welcoming of the other as an 
absolutely Other and the responsible response that maintains the distance separating 
the self from the other. The self encounters the Other in the face of the other. All 
human beings partake in infinity, ‘something always missing’; the crack in the totality 
of law guarantees that the other is not subsumed under any sort of totality structure, 
even legal propositions embodying law’s humanism per se. In line with this insight, 
an understanding of transsexualism as a concretization of human being-ness should 
also not presume a totality structure, for instance the rigidly demarcated realm of law.  
The perception of the transsexual human being ensuing from the portrayed 
meaning in the text of the Transsexual I Case is at once the response of the Court, as 
the speaking self, to the other. From a phenomenological perspective, transsexualism 
as a concretization of human being-ness and law’s Menschenbild signifies the 
absorption of the other into the same. The ‘lack of identity’ can be described as the 
state of seeing oneself as other. Levinas argues that this alterity is absorbed by the self 
and as such is constitutive of the self’s ipseity. Transsexualism as portrayed in the text 
of the Transsexual I Case is a paradigmatic example of the phenomenological 
implications of the experienced ‘lack of identity’. While in life the alterity of the self 
is reabsorbed into the new gender identity and, in fact, becomes apparent as a 
consequence of hormone therapy and sex-change operations, in law the alterity is 
maintained and amounts to an interruption of human being-ness. 
The poetic and rhetorical character of legal recognition is evinced in the 
Court’s observation that ‘[t]he lack of identity between exterior appearance and 
personal status is manifested [zeigt sich schon darin] by the fact that it is not possible 
                                                        
1656 Levinas (n 1652) 40 
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for him to legally bear a female first name.’1657 Emphasis on manifestation alludes to 
the notion of the image and the ontological disclosure of human being-ness. The lack 
of identity between exterior appearance, the image in life, and personal status, the 
image in law, marks the inconsistency between the imprint on law’s Menschenbild 
and the face of the other. The unavailability of legal provision for the change of name 
and personal status is tantamount to exclusion of the transsexual human being from 
human being-ness within the realm of law. Such exclusion, I grant of obvious 
ontological meaning, can be interpreted in light of phenomenological insights either 
as non-response, if the absence of legal provision is considered a gap in law, or as 
irresponsibility, that is, failure to respond despite the ability to respond.  
The infra excerpt directs us towards understanding the manifestation of lack of 
identity between transsexuals’ Physis and Psyche in the realm of law as an 
irresponsible response, rather than non-response, to the other. The meaning of 
practicing the law of human dignity entails responding to and welcoming the other 
with respect for his or her absolute separation from the self. The constitutional 
guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG rules out the non-response 
scenario.   
[…] the duty of courts to deal with this situation in light of 
fundamental rights standards should not be denied on grounds of 
absence of a statutory provision.1658 
Due to its higher rank as a constitutional provision and its foundational 
character in the German Basic Law, the law of human dignity is the critical lens for 
the production of meaning, the determinant of legal actors’ perspective in practicing 
language in law, and the incarnation of Levinas’ pre-ethics. Denying the complainant 
the change of her first name in the birth registry may therefore be portrayed as 
irresponsibility towards the face of the other. Since the constitutional guarantee 
demands the protection of the dignity of human beings ‘as they conceive of 
themselves in their individuality and become conscious of their self.’1659 
Transsexuals, the other, absolve themselves as self-determined, autarkic and 
self-responsible individuals from an arbitrary understanding of their human being-
ness by a totalize self. Practicing the law of human dignity means responding to                                                         
1657 BVerfGE 49, 286 (297f.)  
1658 BVerfGE 49, 286 (301)  
1659 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298)  
 359
human beings while respecting their radical separation from the self. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG 
guarantees the protection of the dignity of human beings as they conceive of 
themselves in their individuality and self-consciousness. How can the Court 
appreciate human beings’ self-understanding? As noted supra, the Court turned 
necessarily to the opinions of medical experts.  
The mobilization of the law of human dignity in legal language games carries 
the promise of restoring the correspondence between law and life. The dual sense of 
‘something missing’ as an aspect of human dignity meaning accounts for the open-
endedness of responsible answers to the other. The duty of the state to protect the 
dignity of the human being, understood by analogy with the notion of responsibility in 
Totality and Infinity, involves the task of establishing the ability to respond through 
recourse to sources of both internal1660 and external justification, that is, of becoming 
competent to act in responsibility. 
iv. The face-to-face encounter: the moral law  
In the text of the Transsexual I Case, ethics feature in the statement that the 
right to the free development of personality under Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG guarantees ‘the free unfolding of the capabilities and strengths 
in human beings’1661, yet ‘within the limits of the moral law [Schranken des 
Sittengesetzes].’1662 Human dignity has been paralleled to the notion of morality in the 
thought of Levinas on the basis of their propositional commonality as tautologies. 
Morality ‘comes to birth […] in the fact that infinite exigencies […] converge on one 
point in the universe’ and is the basis of solidarity and fraternity. According to the 
Court, the change of name and legal status in the registry does not compromise the 
moral law; no threat of that sort is posed by transsexualism. The delimitation of the 
free unfolding by moral law brings to mind the need to restrict the arbitrariness of 
freedom stressed in Totality and Infinity. 
The FCC demonstrated awareness of ‘remaining doubts’1663, that is, ambiguity 
and controversy, re the phenomenon of transsexualism, its origin and cause, yet 
argued that ‘in the present case’, namely the ad hoc instance of practice, the exercise 
of the right to the free development of personality caused no violation of the moral                                                         
1660 The source of internal justification is the constitutional provision in this example.  
1661 BVerfGE 49, 286 (298)  
1662 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299)  
1663 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299)  
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law. The analysis of the face-to-face encounter in Totality and Infinity sheds new light 
on the meaning of ad hoc ascertainment of compatibility with the moral law. The 
FCC abstained from explicating what the moral law is and why exercising the right to 
the free development of personality in the specific case is not at odds with that law. 
For the justification of this assertion the Court rather turned to external sources, the 
expert opinions affirming the ad hoc necessity of the sex-change operation. In other 
words, the FCC preferred to defer to the ability of experts to respond to the other for 
the portrayal of the transsexual as a concretization of law’s Menschenbild, and 
refrained from taking responsibility for moral statements, probably in view of its own 
lack of competence to inquire into the deeper motivations underlying 
transsexualism.1664 
Committed to the ad hoc assessment of compatibility with constitutional and 
moral law, that is, to the face-to-face encounter with the other and the particulars of 
the other’s self-portrayal and lived experience, the FCC clarified that the immorality 
of a sex-change operation ‘that is not therapeutically necessary’ was ‘not to be 
decided here’1665. ‘Reliable findings of scientific research’ on the motivation 
underlying transsexuals’ decision to undergo a sex-change operation show that 
transsexuals do not intend to manipulate their sex, but rather desire the unity of 
Psyche and Physis; hence ‘the operation should be viewed as part of this goal’s 
realization’1666. In this last statement, the Court assertively directed the reader of the 
decision as to how medically necessary sex-change operations should be viewed, thus 
called for the coordination of viewpoints on the matter within society. The Court 
collated medical texts portraying the anguish of transsexuals and the medical opinions 
on the conflict experienced by the complainant and concluded that the former were 
‘impressively confirmed’1667 by the latter; the FCC thereby deduced that, in the ad 
hoc instance, the sex-change operation could not be deemed immoral.                                                         
1664 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299) [‘Whether an operation to change one’s sex that is not therapeutically 
necessary should be considered immoral is not to be decided here. According to the available [expert] 
opinions, a sex-change operation was indicated in the case of the complainant. According to reliable 
findings of scientific research transsexuals do not intend to manipulate their sex. The desire for unity 
[Einstimmigkeit, harmony] of psyche and nature [Physis], rather than sexuality, stands at the 
foreground, and in that sense the operation should be viewed [anzusehen ist] as part of this goal’s 
realization. The anguish of transsexuals as portrayed in medical texts is impressively confirmed by the 
medical opinions that were presented in the complainant’s case. Accordingly, the sex-change procedure 
to which the complainant was subjected cannot be regarded as immoral.’] 
1665 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299)  
1666 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299)  
1667 BVerfGE 49, 286 (299)  
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v. The ‘inviolable, innermost sphere of life’ and coexistence with others in 
fraternity  
In the Transsexual I Case the Court referred to an established position in FCC 
jurisprudence, to wit that ‘one’s exclusive right to self-determination of his or her 
private sphere’ can be subject to limitations on account of the ‘coexistence of the 
individual with his or her fellow human beings [Mitmenschen]’1668. The Court argued 
that such limitations should not ‘impinge on the inviolable, innermost sphere of 
life.’1669 
Reference to the Mitmenschen, fellow human beings, evokes the notion of 
fraternity as discussed in Levinas, namely the coexistence of self-referential 
individualities, rather than the establishment of humanity on resemblance. The self, 
the human I, is posited to the other in a relation of fraternity. Fraternity is not a moral 
conquest that informs the meaning of human being-ness, but rather a notion preceding 
human beings and constitutive of their ipseity. Due to the position of the human being 
as an I in fraternity, the face of the other can be presented to the self as a face. The 
inviolability of the ‘innermost sphere of life’1670 as guaranteed by the fundamental 
right under Art. 2 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG can be perceived as 
an indication of the radical distance separating the self from the other. 
vi. The democratic pedigree of statutory regulation and self-determination as 
absolute separation of the other from the self 
Judicial power constitutes one prong of the state as a self-reflecting self. 
Judicial review founded on the principle of separation of powers operates as a self-
reflection mechanism.1671 The Court admitted that legal certainty is best served by 
deferring to the authority of the legislature over that of judicial power to regulate 
issues concerning the personal status of transsexuals. ‘As long as this has not 
happened’, the courts could not be denied this task, ‘particularly when the 
jurisprudence is directly associated with fundamental rights (Art. 1 sec. 3 GG).’1672 
Why is the legislature as a manifestation of state power entrusted with the 
                                                        
1668 BVerfGE 49, 286 (300)  
1669 BVerfGE 49, 286 (300)  
1670 BVerfGE 49, 286 (300)  
1671 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 
1672 BVerfGE 49, 286 (303)  
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construction of totality structures required for regulating the phenomenon of 
transsexualism, that is, for responding to the other?  
The underlying legitimacy consideration translates into legitimacy of 
exercising authority over meaning. In turn, the latter should be interpreted in 
accordance with the meaning of the law of human dignity as the guarantee of absolute 
separation of the other from the self and, consequently, also self-determination of the 
other. The counter-majoritarian difficulty famously associated with the institution of 
judicial review precipitates a deficit in self-determination: in democratic 
constitutional states the shortcomings of – indeed vital to the legal order – totality 
structures are compensated for by provision for the guarantee of ontologically defined 
space; are linguistic-analytically understood as recognition of the inviolable limit; and 
are phenomenologically rendered as absolute otherness. Statutory regulation affords 
legal certainty not only through its totality structure, but also, more importantly, 
because of its democratic pedigree that preserves the intersubjective, the social and 
the relational, hence also the transcendental, in the process of lawmaking, that is, 
producing meaning.1673 
 
4. Concluding observations 
‘Something always missing’ is prerequisite to guaranteeing infinitely possible 
critical reflection and dissensus re the ad hoc filling of ‘something missing’ with 
meaning. Critical reflection, genuinely and, in the linguistic-analytical sense of the 
term, logically, requires the affirmation of a meta-dimension and the possibility of 
transcendence. In this hermeneutic and literary analysis of the Transsexual I Case I 
have shown how this process eventuates and in the practice of the law of human 
dignity and guarantees the humane mobilization of that law in the text of legal 
decisions. 
                                                        
1673 Schnapp (1989) 1, 8 [‘Das vom BVerfG bei der Überprüfung von Gesetzen praktizierte Prinzip des 
sog. judicial self-restraint trägt der aus der parlamentarisch-demokratischen Struktur der Verfassung 
sich ergebenden politischen Gestaltungsfreiheit des Gesetzgebers gebührend Rechnung; es beugt einer 
Politisierung der Justiz ebenso vor wie einer Judifizierung der Politik.’] 
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IV. The Aviation Security Act Case (2006)1674 
 
The Court’s reasoning in the Aviation Security Act Case has been a point of 
controversy in German and Anglo-American legal scholarship. The Aviation Security 
Act Case is a panegyrical revival of the Objektformel and an illustrative instance of 
the interplay between the self and the other with respect to the critical actor with 
authority over meaning under the circumstances of the case. For this, an exhaustive 
portrayal of viewpoints within the legal language game is deemed vital, and is 
performed in the linguistic-analytical portrayal. The objectification of human beings 
most emphatically challenges the Menschenbild and its ontological meaning. From a 
relational, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological, perspective, objectification 
may be portrayed, respectively, as subsumption under a legal language game or the 
vision of the self that realizes this non-human image of the other at the level of 
language. Unless understood, instead, as a tool of critical reflection, uttering ex 
negativo the violation of human dignity only to examine and ascertain or reject its 
occurrence, the Objektformel introduces language that subverts human dignity 
meaning within the legal language game. 
 
1. Decision 
The Aviation Security Act [Luftsicherheitsgesetz – LuftSiG] authorized the 
armed forces to shoot down aircrafts intended to be used as weapons in crimes against 
human lives. The FCC found the respective clause, § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG, was 
incompatible with the Basic Law, and, consequently, void, and grounded its decision 
in two distinct legal bases: federalism and fundamental rights considerations. With 
regards to the former, the Court held that Art. 35 sec. 2 sent. 2 GG and Art. 35 sec. 3 
sent. 1 GG, which regulate the use of armed forces in cases of natural disaster or 
grave accidents, prohibit the ordering of such missions by the Federation. Issuing 
such a regulation exceeds, noted the Court, the scope of the legislative powers 
constitutionally vested in the Federation. The other line of argumentation touches 
precisely on the constitutional guarantee of human dignity. To the extent that the                                                         
1674 BVerfGE 115, 118 (2006), First Senate of the FCC; Followed by a Plenary Decision on the 3rd of 
July 2012 [BVerfG, 2 PBvU 1/11 vom 3.7.2012, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 89)], which did not however deal with 
the fundamental rights issues raised in the judgment of the First Senate, that is, does not affect the 
human dignity legal language game that portrays the practice of the law of human dignity in the 
Aviation Security Act Case. 
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employment of armed force to avert danger affects innocent persons on board the 
aircraft, § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is, argued the Court, incompatible with Art. 2 sec. 1 sent. 
1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. In the Court’s view, killing innocent 
human beings on board the aircraft to save those on the ground is tantamount to 
treating the former as mere objects, hence violating their constitutionally guaranteed 
human dignity.   
Passengers and crewmembers on board experience deadlock, since they are 
unable to influence the circumstances of their lives, that is, practice self-
determination. The rescue operation undertaken by the state in line with § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG leads to the objectification of desperate individuals on board. They 
effectively become objects of an operation aiming at the protection of others, hence, 
noted the FCC, are not respected and protected as subjects of fundamental rights, 
most importantly, of human dignity. These persons are victims, thus in need of 
protection; the operation put forward in § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is instead equivalent to 
refusal to protect the victims on grounds of their worth as human beings. Furthermore, 
stressed the Court, the evaluation of the circumstances that set in motion such an 
operation cannot rely on a sufficient and correct assessment of facts, due to the 
particularity of the situation. Most critically, the restricted time available for setting in 
motion a complex mechanism of execution of the operation is an important pragmatic 
factor. 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG prohibits intentional attacks against persons finding 
themselves in a state of despair and helplessness. The Court rejected the assumption 
that passengers or crew members exercise self-determination in boarding on the 
aircraft in the first place, thus consent to the possibility of being killed if the 
circumstances laid out in § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG arise, as grounds to its line of 
argumentation. It also refuted the argument that killing innocent persons on board is 
justified since, under the circumstances, they are anyway going to die, noting that 
such an assessment renders the operation no less an infringement of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. 
The duration of life is not determinant of the constitutional respect for and protection 
of life and human dignity.  
Moreover, according to the FCC, the objectification of human beings under 
the specific circumstances, namely the figurative yet literal rendering of persons as 
part of a weapon, is plain to see and signals incompatibility of the statute with Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG. The Court discussed a further argument brought forth in legal scholarship, 
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namely the duty of those on board to sacrifice their life, if that is the only way to 
protect the state and the constituted body politic from destructive attacks. Finally, the 
duty of the state to protect those on the ground, whose life is in peril due to the attack, 
does not influence the decision re the unconstitutionality of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG in the 
situation specified, argued the Court, since the measures employed to deliver upon the 
duty to protect human life and human dignity on the part of the state should not, as 
such, be incompatible with the Basic Law. 
The FCC considered the alternatives of a pilotless aircraft and of an aircraft 
aboard which the only passengers are persons intending to employ it as a weapon 
against the lives of those on the ground. In these cases, decided the Court, shooting 
down the aircraft in accordance with § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is compatible with Art. 2 
sec. 2 sent. 1 GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. In the second alternative, the direct use of 
armed force, argued the FCC, corresponds to the attacker’s criminal conduct and is 
therefore in line with treating him or her as a self-responsible subject of fundamental 
rights exercising self-determination. What is more, if the only ones on board the 
aircraft are the perpetrators of the crime, the principle of proportionality is conformed 
to. Although the state indeed infringes on the right to life of the attackers, such state 
intervention is justified in view of the seriousness of the event and the purpose served 
by § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG. Since the attackers’ actions, for which they are held 
responsible, occasion state intervention by means of an armed force operation, and 
since the perpetrators can avert the danger by abstaining from carrying out the crime 
at any time, the gravity of the offense to their fundamental rights is substantially toned 
down.  
In sum, § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG was found void, not only because the Federation 
lacked the legislative competence to order the employment of armed forces, but also 
on fundamental rights, particularly human life and human dignity considerations.   
 
2. Discussion 
The protection of human dignity in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG stands clearly higher to 
that of life.1675 The fundamental right to life can be subject to legal restrictions, of 
course only to the extent that these serve the protection of the life of others and under 
                                                        
1675 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 5 
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strict conditions.1676 According to Kunig, the fundamental right to life can be 
balanced, for instance, when a greater group of human beings is at risk or the state as 
such is in danger. Be that as it may, the state can never expect of a human being to 
sacrifice his or her human dignity.1677 The two fundamental rights, combined, result in 
a categorical imperative, which becomes particularly sharp in the extreme scenario of 
the Aviation Security Act Case.1678 
Human dignity in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is understood as direct reaction against the 
National Socialist regime.1679 Human beings shall not be treated merely as objects by 
the state or third parties, shall not be left at the total disposal of other human beings, 
cannot be objectified, cannot be perceived as numbers in a collectivity or as cogs in a 
wheel’1680 and, as a consequence, be stripped of individual spiritual-moral or physical 
existence.1681 The Objektformel doctrine originates in the ethics of Kant1682 and the 
thought of Wintrich.1683 As formulated by Dürig, the Objektformel has become a 
prevailing pattern of interpretation. Shortcomings in the practice of this doctrinal 
formula are associated with the difficulty of reliable prognosis of human dignity 
violations and the decisionism reflected in the treatment of violations [dezisionistische 
Handhabung]1684. The deficiency of the Objektformel, observes Herdegen, is best 
understood apropos the proposition in the thought of Kant1685 that human beings be 
treated not ‘only’ as means but ‘also’ as ends.1686 Herdegen, bringing up the example 
of the Peep-Show Case1687, argues that the Objektformel easily lapses into an 
invocation pattern of a certain instrumentalization rhetoric 
                                                        
1676 ibid 
1677 ibid 
1678 ibid  
1679 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 17 
1680 ibid 
1681 ibid 
1682 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 36; Starck, ibid 
1683 Josef M. Wintrich, ‘Über Eigenart und Methode verfassungsgerichtlicher Rechtsprechung’ (1952) 
Festschrift für Wilhelm Laforet 227, 235 ff. [‘[…] muß aber der Mensch auch in der Gemeinschaft und 
ihrer Rechtsordnung immer “Zweck an sich selbst” (Kant) bleiben, darf er nie zum bloßen Mittel eines 
Kollektivs, zum bloßen Werkzeug oder zum rechtlosen Objekt eines Verfahrens herabgewürdigt 
werden.’]; Cf. critically, Josef M. Wintrich, ‘Die Bedeutung der “Menschenwürde” für die Anwendung 
des Rechts’ (1957) BayVBl. 137, 140; See also Herdegen ibid para 36; ibid para 36 fn 1 
1684 Herdegen ibid 
1685 Herdegen notices, however, the problematic implications of the Kantian interpretation of means 
and ends for the practice of the law of human dignity. Herdegen ibid para 36; ibid para 36 fn 4; ibid 
para 36 fn 5 
1686 Herdegen ibid 
1687 BVerfGE 64, (278) [Peep-Show Case]; Opposing, Hoerster (1983) 93, 95f.  
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[Instrumentalisierungsrhetorik]. The problems of the Objektformel1688 are also 
acknowledged in FCC jurisprudence, albeit repeated employment of this doctrine in 
practicing the law of human dignity.1689 The Objektformel doctrine has not to date 
been displaced in its entirety by another interpretive approach to the meaning of 
human dignity violations.1690 
Die Menschenwürde ist getroffen, wenn der konkrete Mensch zum 
Objekt, zu einem bloßen Mittel, zur vertretbaren Größe 
herabgewürdigt wird.1691  
Herdegen notes that the tautological element of the Objektformel accounts not 
only for the problems arising from its practice but also for its attractiveness.1692 It 
cannot be denied that there are forms of instrumentalization, which are ethically 
legitimate.1693 Whether instrumentalization occurs depends on the evaluation of the 
concrete facts of a case before the Court.1694 The Objektformel functions as a 
generalized formula applied in such instances of violation for which there is strong 
evidence and consensus, namely most cases entailing a negative determination of 
human dignity meaning.1695                                                         
1688 BVerfGE 30, 1 (25 f.) [Wiretapping Case, Abhör-Urteil] [‘Was den in Art. 1 GG genannten 
Grundsatz der Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde anlangt, der nach Art. 79 sec. 3 GG durch eine 
Verfassungsänderung nicht berührt werden darf, so hängt alles von der Festlegung ab, unter welchen 
Umständen die Menschenwürde verletzt sein kann. Offenbar läßt sich das nicht generell sagen, sondern 
immer nur in Ansehung des konkreten Falles. Allgemeine Formeln wie die, der Mensch dürfe nicht 
zum bloßen Objekt der Staatsgewalt herabgewürdigt werden, können lediglich die Richtung andeuten, 
in der Fälle der Verletzung der Menschenwürde gefunden werden können. Der Mensch ist nicht selten 
bloßes Objekt nicht nur der Verhältnisse und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, sondern auch des Rechts, 
insofern er ohne Rücksicht auf seine Interessen sich fügen muß. Eine Verletzung der Menschenwürde 
kann darin allein nicht gefunden werden. Hinzukommen muß, daß er einer Behandlung ausgesetzt 
wird, die seine Subjektqualität prinzipiell in Frage stellt, oder daß in der Behandlung im konkreten Fall 
eine willkürliche Mißachtung der Würde des Menschen liegt. Die Behandlung des Menschen durch die 
öffentliche Hand, die das Gesetz vollzieht, muß also, wenn sie die Menschenwürde berühren soll, 
Ausdruck der Verachtung des Wertes, der dem Menschen kraft seines Personseins zukommt, also in 
diesem Sinne eine “verächtliche Behandlung” sein.’ (spelling as in the original text)]. 
1689 See BVerfGE 9, 89 (95) (1959) [Gehör bei Haftbefehl]; BVerfGE 27, 1 (6) (1969) [Mikrozensus]; 
BVerfGE 28, 386 (391) (1970) [Kurzzeitige Freiheitsstrafe]; BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) (1977) [Life 
Imprisonment Case]; BVerfGE 50, 166 (175) (1979) [Ausweisung I; expulsion of alien convicted for 
illegal possession of weapons]; BVerfGE 87, 209 (228) (1992) [Tanz der Teufel]; BVerfGE 115, 118 
(161 ff.) (2006) [Aviation Security Act Case]; See Herdegen (n 1682) para 36 
1690 Herdegen (n 1682) [how the Objektformel is essentially practiced in ECtHR jurisprudence, 
specifically Tyrer v. United Kingdom] 
1691 Dürig, Vorauflage, Grundgesetz: Kommentar (1958) para 28; ibid (1956) 81 AöR 117, 127; See 
also Enders (1997) 20ff.; Peter Häberle, ‘Die Menschenwürde als Grundlage der staatlichen 
Gemeinschaft’, in Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Bd. 1, 3rd edn, Heidelberg: C. I. Müller, 2004) 317 para 43 
1692 Herdegen (n 1682) 




The Objektformel comes in for serious objections. These surface frequently in 
the argumentation of the FCC. 1696 While the Objektformel may be of assistance in 
identifying conventional and evident cases of human dignity violations, it otherwise 
presents weaknesses. As Dreier puts it, this formula is extremely vague and thus it is 
fair to call it, as is often the case, an empty formula or an empty shell [Leerformel 
oder leere Hülse] 1697. The vagueness, thus need for concretization, of the Kantian 
foundations of the Objektformel doctrine is affirmed in Schopenhauer’s criticism of 
Kant.1698 The most important argument against the Objektformel as a Leerformel is 
that, according to Dreier, ‘its ostensibly ideologically indifferent phrasing turns out to 
be, at closer look, a passe-partout for all sorts of subjective valuations’1699. A 
pragmatic approach to the practice of the Objektformel in human dignity legal 
language games would unveil that, unavoidably, human beings are sometimes treated 
as means, rather than ends, in everyday life.1700 The employment of the Objektformel 
in pursuit of violation-based determinations of the meaning of the law of human 
dignity entails the identification of challenges to the subject-quality of human beings 
or deliberate disrespect for their dignity. This approach is not absolutely functional, 
minding that even an unintentional violation of human dignity infringes on the legal 
guarantee under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. In other words, when human beings are objectified, 
                                                        
1696 ibid para 53; See BVerfGE 9, 89 (95) (1959) [Gehör bei Haftbefehl]; BVerfGE 27, 1 (6) (1969) 
[Mikrozensus]; BVerfGE 28, 386 (391) (1970) [Kurzzeitige Freiheitsstrafe]; BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) 
(1977) [Life Imprisonment Case]; BVerfGE 50, 166 (175) (1979) [Ausweisung I; expulsion of alien 
convicted for illegal possession of weapons]; BVerfGE 50, 205 (215) (1979) [Strafbarkeit von 
Bagatelldelikten, criminalization of minor offenses]; BVerfGE 57, 250 (275) (1981) [V-Mann, right to 
fair trial of the accused and limited reliability of anonymous informant as witness of ‘hearsay’]; 
BVerfGE 72, 105 (116) (1986) [Life Imprisonment]; BVerfGE 87, 209 (228) (1992) [Tanz der Teufel] 
1697 Dreier ibid 89; ibid para 53 fn 168 
1698 Schopenhauer, The World As Will And Idea, 447 [450] [‘If a prince desires to extend mercy to a 
criminal who has justly been condemned, his Ministers will represent to him that, if he does, this crime 
will soon be repeated. An end for the future distinguishes punishment from revenge, and punishment 
only has this end when it is inflicted in fulfillment of a law. It thus announces itself as inevitable in 
every future case, and thus the law obtains the power to deter, in which its end really consists. Now 
here a Kantian would inevitably reply that certainly according to this view the punished criminal would 
be used ‘merely as a means.’ This proposition, so unweariedly repeated by all the Kantians, ‘Man must 
always be treated as an end, never as a means,’ certainly sounds significant, and is therefore a very 
suitable proposition for those who like to have a formula which saves them all further thought; but 
looked at in the light, it is an exceedingly vague, indefinite assertion, which reaches its aim quite 
indirectly, requires to be explained, defined, and modified in every case of its application, and, if taken 
generally, is insufficient, meagre, and moreover problematical.’] 
1699 Dreier (n 1697) 
1700 See Badura (1964) JZ 337, 342; Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution (1965) 60; ibid 60 fn 18; 
Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 111 [examples of treatment of human 
beings as objects in private and public life]; BVerfGE 30, 1 (25 f.) 
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the intentions of violators, even when these act ‘in good faith’, do not decisively 
influence the ascertainment of the occurrence of a human dignity violation.1701 
When violations of human dignity are attributed neither to the manner of 
treatment, nor to the conclusive aim [Finalität] of an action, namely, respectively, the 
conscious volition to harm on the one hand, and the ethnic-racial or generally 
disrespectful of human dignity discrimination on the other, then the bilanzierende 
Gesamtbetrachtung [balanced overall assessment] of ad hoc instances of practice is, 
so argues Herdegen, the appropriate method of evaluation of physical and psychical 
infringements on human dignity and permits an appreciation of how the highest legal 
interests should be preventively protected.1702 The problems associated with the 
treatment of such infringements on human dignity would be diminished, if the 
coercive measures employed were judged purely as human dignity violations in utter 
abstraction from the intended protection of life.1703 The balancing necessary, argues 
Herdegen, does not have to operate at the inter-norm level of the colliding provisions, 
that is, Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG; rather, balancing is immanent 
[normimmanent] to the norm and occurs through the concretization of the claim to 
human dignity.1704 This process calls for ‘reliable normative control in light of the 
value order of the Basic Law’.1705 In that sense, the content of the human dignity 
claim cannot be detached from the protection of life or any other constitutional 
value.1706 The constitutional guarantee of human dignity reaches it’s apogee in 
instances where human beings threaten the human dignity of other human beings.1707  
In the Aviation Security Act Case, the FCC distinguished between the 
hijackers and those hijacked by reference to situation- and role-based distinct spheres 
of control and responsibility contoured by looking at factual context.1708 The 
requirement of concretization in practicing the law of human dignity is manifested in 
the Aviation Security Act Case.1709 Whoever rejects the ad hoc concretization of the                                                         
1701 Dominant position in the legal literature: Dreier (n 1697) para 53; Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 46; 
Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 110-11; Kloepfer (2001) 77, 94 
1702 Herdegen, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (55. Lfg., May 2009) para 50 
1703 Herdegen ibid; Cf. Kloepfer (2001) 77, 97f.; See also Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) 
para 78 
1704 Herdegen ibid 
1705 ibid 
1706 Affirmed in BVerfGE 49, 24 (53) [incommunicado] 
1707 See Dürig (1956) 81 AöR 117, 128; Kloepfer (n 1703) 97 
1708 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160 ff.) 
1709 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153); Consistently with BVerfGE 30, 1 (25) [Wiretapping Case – [‘Abhör-
Urteil’]; BVerfGE 109, 279 (311) [eavesdropping; ‘Großer Lauschangriff-Urteil’] 
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claim to human dignity through a situational overall assessment [situative 
Gesamtwürdigung], argues Herdegen, discards the value of considering 
circumstances; such is the interconnectedness of actors and circumstances in 
practicing the law of human dignity, that refraining from an overall assessment leads 
the reasoning to a point where ‘the roles of the perpetrator and the victim make no 
difference.’1710 
Other voices in German legal literature explicitly express abstention from the 
Objektformel and1711, rather, opt for another approach that essentially presupposes 
positive legal [positiv-rechtlich]1712 grounds for ascertaining human dignity 
violations.1713 As argued by Wieacker1714, the positive legal order has windows to 
supra-positive standards, which enable a certain view and indicate what is referred to 
presently as the meta-dimension of law.1715 Without openness towards the supra-
positive, recourse to pre-positive [vorpositive] standards is not acceptable 
[zulässig].1716 The close proximity of this position in the doctrinal discourse to an 
affirmative stance towards ‘something missing’ is plain to see.1717  
The state has, in view of Art. 2 sec. 1 GG, the duty to protect human life 
against attacks by third parties.1718 Repressively effective criminal law measures and, 
to the extent possible, preventively effective measures of police law, as well as 
maintenance of a competent police force can be employed to those ends. If, in 
absence of milder means, the active protection of life threatens the life of the attacker, 
a balancing of conflicting interests needs to be undertaken1719; the life of those 
attacked has priority over the life of the attacker. 1720 This does not challenge the 
status of the attacker as a legal subject of fundamental rights, because the attack falls 
within his or her sphere of authority.1721 Attacks against innocent human beings, such                                                         
1710 Herdegen (n 1702); Josef Isensee, ‘Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach 
dem Absoluten’ (2006) 131 AöR 173, 193 
1711 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 17 
1712 ibid 
1713 Starck (1981) JZ 457ff. 
1714 Franz Wieacker, Zum heutigen Stand der Naturrechtsdiskussion (Köln und Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965) 12 [‘Es bleibt ein Paradox, überpositives Recht durch die positive 
Gesetzesregel selbst einfangen zu wollen – etwa so, wie die Schildbürger, die in ihrem Rathaus die 
Fenster vergessen hatten, das Sonnenlicht nun in Säcken hineinzutragen gedachten.’] 
1715 Wieacker ibid; See also Badura (1964) JZ 337, 340; Starck (n 1711) para 17 fn 71 
1716 Starck (n 1711) para 17 fn 71 
1717 ibid para 17 
1718 ibid para 92 
1719 ibid  
1720 ibid para 98 
1721 BVerfGE 115, 118 (161ff.) [Aviation Security Act Case] 
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as the passengers and crew of the aircraft in the Aviation Security Act Case, cannot be 
addressed in the same way as when the only human beings threatened by state action 
are the attackers, because that would render the former defenseless objects not only of 
the attackers but also of the state. 1722 
The ‘final rescue shot’ [finale Rettungsschuss]1723 by police forces against the 
perpetrator for the protection of life and limb constitutes the ultima ratio and, thus, 
not an infringement on his or her human dignity.1724 Accepting the killing of innocent 
human beings for the protection of the lives of others cannot be justified on the basis 
of the guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, which categorically 
prohibits the balancing of life v. life.1725 This proposition curtails the problem of 
balancing constitutional interests of equally high rank.1726 According to Herdegen, the 
violation of human dignity ‘can’ be found in a violation of the fundamental right to 
life, if, for instance, killing many to save few is accepted, that is, the principle of 
proportionality is blatantly disregarded.1727  
The claim to dignity of every human being denies the state the 
making of a choice tailored to the essence [Sosein] of the individual 
by setting itself up as the judge of the ‘value’ [Wertigkeit] of 
individual human life. The balancing of loss and of the protection of 
human life violates the claim to human dignity in that the 
equivalence of human existence is as such put into question. The 
problem is accepting the killing of non-participants in the crime in 
light of human dignity, if turning to life is not a means but indeed an 
inevitable (and in that sense also necessary) consequence of the 
defense against danger. 1728 
The right to life can affect human dignity when the state demands of the 
individual to sacrifice him or herself for the public interest in the name of 
solidarity.1729 In the Aviation Security Act Case, the shooting down of an aircraft with 
innocent passengers and crew on board to save the victims on the ground is                                                         
1722 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153ff.)  
1723 Herdegen (n 1702) para 96; Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 68 





1729 Herdegen ibid [Only in the state of war is such sacrifice on the part of the victim constitutional, 
namely in the military service of conscripts and voluntarily serving soldiers.]; Otto Depenheuer, ‘Das 
Bürgeropfer im Rechtstaat – Staatsphilosophische Überlegungen zu einem staatsrechtlichen Tabu’ in 
Otto Depenheuer, Markus Heintzen, Matthias Jestaedt & Peter Axer, eds., Staat im Wort, FS für Josef 
Isensee (Heidelberg: 2007) 43; See Christoph Enders, Art. 1, in Karl Heinrich Friauf & Wolfram 
Höfling (eds), Berliner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Loseblattsammlung since 2000, Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag, July 2005) para 93  
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considered an objectification of human beings on board that violates their dignity.1730 
According to Herdegen, this verdict attributes ultimately no decisive significance to 
the already encountered authority of the hijackers over their victims and their lives by 
the state.1731 What is more, the FCC equates the undoubtedly existing difficulties of 
reliable assessment of threat in a situation of general insecurity to the exclusion of any 
margin of prognosis.1732 Assessing categorically the violation of the human dignity of 
those hijacked, the Court was faced with the issue of dealing with terrorist attacks 
within the realm of constitutional law.1733  
Certain points of concern encountered along this line of argumentation are 
identified in German legal literature: first, whether existential threats to the 
community justify a restriction of the dignity of individuals;1734 second, whether the 
association of the right to life of the victims of an externally controlled and lethal 
operation with human dignity in the Aviation Security Act Case is under-complex.1735 
The shooting down of a hijacked aircraft in a terrorist attack cannot be interpreted as 
sacrifice grounded in solidarity on the part of individuals1736; thus, the nationality of 
the hostages need not raise practically any further considerations.1737 
 
3. Analysis 
The following analysis commences with an ontological portrayal of the 
experience of deadlock and its association with objectification, struggles with the 
distinction between human dignity as a fact (descriptive) and as law (prescriptive), 
and draws attention to the Objektformel doctrine as perceived when looking through 
the introduced lens in this hermeneutic and literary approach to the practice of the law                                                         
1730 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153ff.) 
1731 Herdegen (n 1702); In disagreement with this position, Otto Depenheuer, Selbstbehauptung des 
Rechtsstaates (2nd edn, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007) 95ff. 
[Bürgeropfer , citizen-victims] 
1732 Herdegen ibid 
1733 For the international humanitarian law implications of the killing of innocent people by terrorists 
see Herdegen (n 1702) para 96 fn 4; Andreas Zimmermann & Robin Geiß, ‘Die Tötung unbeteiligter 
Zivilisten: Menschenwürdig im Krieg?’ (2007) 46 Der Staat 377, 387ff.; See Art. 51 UN Charter 
(1945); See UN Security Council Resolution S/Res. 1373/2001 (28.9.2001); See for an analysis of the 
disposition of the German legal order towards terrorism and particularly the ‘September 11’ events in 
the United States, yet prior to the adoption of the Aviation Security Act, Kim Lane Sheppele, ‘Other 
People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11’ (2004) 50 Loyola Law Review 89; Kim 
Lane Scheppele, ‘We Are All Postr-9/11 Now’ (2006) 75 Fordham L. Rev. 607 





of human dignity. Human dignity as morality and the notions of responsibility, 
hospitality and generosity surface in the analysis. Finally, reflections on sacrifice and 
an interpretation of the principle of proportionality in light of Levinas’ conception of 
the intersubjective space in Totality and Infinity turn the spotlight on the hermeneutic 
outreach of a story of ‘something missing’. 
a. Ontological 
The ontological portrayal of the Aviation Security Act Case casts the focus 
primarily on the ontologically relevant traversal of limits, precisely because under the 
circumstances of the case, this possibility is foreclosed for innocent passengers and 
crew on board the aircraft. Objectification is most vividly portrayed in the Aviation 
Security Act Case because, besides constituting a simile, ‘like objects’ or ‘as objects’, 
it actually materializes. The ontological analysis engages, furthermore, in another 
reading of the discussion on the descriptive or prescriptive meaning of the law of 
human dignity. From a hermeneutic and literary perspective, the happening of 
polemos is plain to see; the ontologically significant implications of that event thus 
need to be addressed.  
 
i. The experience of deadlock: objectification on the borderline between the 
literal and the non-literal1738   
The Aviation Security Act was challenged on the grounds that it permitted the 
state to intentionally kill the victims of a crime, in other words attack those who, 
through no volition of their own, have become part of the aircraft that the perpetrators 
intend to use as a weapon. Unable to exercise self-determination under the 
circumstances, human beings are stripped of their human being-ness, that is, forced 
‘outside [their] essence’.1739 
The experience of deadlock, a recurring underlying theme in the portrayal of 
human dignity violations, features most evocatively in the Aviation Security Act Case. 
Regarding the passengers as part of the weapon that the hijacked plane has been 
turned into renders them ‘mere objects of state action and deprives them of their 
                                                        
1738 Stephen J. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980) 4 [‘[…] the facts of life are less artless than they look, […] both 
particular cultures and the observers of these cultures are inevitably drawn to a metaphorical grasp of 
reality […].’] 
1739 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
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human quality and dignity.’1740. Through an ontological lens, the objectification of 
human beings translates most emphatically into being outside one’s essence, or in 
Heidegger’s words, being ‘inhuman’.1741 In the Aviation Security Act Case the 
proximity of the literal and metaphorical occurrence of objectification is striking. 
‘The Act makes them [human beings] mere objects of state action.’1742 The powerful 
figurative rendering effectuated by objectification language in the Aviation Security 
Act Case and the aptness of an ontological reading are evident in the infra passage, 
where the transformation of perspective into being is most vividly depicted. 
The opinion expresses in a virtually undisguised manner [bringt 
geradezu unverhohlen zum Ausdruck] that the victims of such an 
incident are no longer perceived as human beings but as part of an 
object, a view by which they themselves become objects [dass die 
Opfer eines solchen Vorgangs nicht mehr als Menschen 
wahrgenommen, sondern als Teil einer Sache gesehen und damit 
selbst verdinglicht werden].1743 
The Menschenbild of the Basic Law and the ‘virtually undisguised’ 
manifestation of an ontology so diametrically opposed to that of human being-ness, 
namely the perception of human beings as components of a weapon, that is, of an 
object, are irreconcilable. That innocent human beings on board become objects is 
due to the fact that they are viewed as part of an object first by the perpetrators and 
second, as the Court argues, by the state shooting down the hijacked aircraft. 
The duty of the state to protect every human life and prohibit encroachments 
upon the fundamental right to life by state action is grounded in the relation between 
the right to life and human dignity. The constitutional protection of human life and 
human dignity is not contingent on ‘the duration of the physical existence of the 
individual human being’1744, namely on quantitative considerations. What is more, it 
is not decided on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, but rather as a matter of principle. 
Harm – in the multiplicity of its manifestations – and deadlock are dominant themes 
in the portrayal of infringements on the respect for human dignity ensuing from FCC                                                         
1740 BVerfGE 115, 118 (126); Starck (1981) JZ 457, 459f. [representative list of cases of 
objectification] 
1741 Heidegger (n 1739) 
1742 BVerfGE 115, 118 (126) 
1743 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158f.) 
1744 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158); ibid (152) [‘All human beings possess this dignity as persons, 
irrespective of their qualities, their physical or mental state, their achievements and their social status 
[cases omitted]. It cannot be taken away from any human being. What can be violated, however, is the 
claim to respect which results from it [cases omitted]. This applies irrespective, inter alia, of the 
probable duration of the individual human life [cases omitted].’] 
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jurisprudence. Deadlock situations are impedimental to the unforced traversal of 
limits, and this foreclosure of escape is the flipside of self-determination and self-
responsibility. The language employed by the FCC communicates the experience of 
despair as a consequence of deadlock, thereby enhancing the portrayal of the 
inhuman. 
In such an extreme situation, which is, moreover, characterized by 
the cramped conditions of an aircraft in flight, the passengers and 
the crew are typically in a desperate situation. They can no longer 
influence the circumstances of their lives independently from others 
in a self-determined manner. 1745 
Whoever denies this or calls this into question denies those who, 
such as the victims of hijacking, are in a desperate situation that 
offers no alternative to them precisely the respect which is due to 
them for the sake of their human dignity […].1746  
Who is the human being? Practicing self-determination in freedom is 
explicitly regarded as an integral aspect of human φύσις in the above excerpt. The 
Objektformel doctrine associates the guarantee of legal subjects’ self-determination 
with the prohibition of objectification.1747 A hermeneutic and literary approach to this 
doctrine indicates a leap from the definition of the human being as a creature 
practicing self-determination to the assertion that it may not be reduced to a mere 
object of state action.  
 
ii. The law of human dignity: on the borderline between fact1748 and law 
Statutes restricting the fundamental right to life under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG 
must ‘be regarded in light of the fundamental right and of the guarantee of human 
dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, which is closely linked with it.’1749 The right to life, 
framed as a liberty right under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG, guarantees the protection of 
the biological and physical existence of every human being against encroachments by 
the state ‘from the point in time of its coming into being until the human being’s 
death, independently of the individual’s circumstances of life and his or her physical 
state and state of mind.’1750  It is obscure whether the phrasing of the proposition 
‘[e]very human life as such has the same value [citing the Abortion I Case, BVerfGE                                                         
1745 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154) 
1746 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158) 
1747 Starck (1981) 457, 459f.  
1748 ‘Fact’ should not be confused with an indication of the propositional fact. 
1749 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) 
1750 BVerfGE 115, 118 (139) 
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39, 1 (59)]’1751 affirms a fact or implies a norm. Law as a cloak of force, in 
postulating anthropocentrism, effectively transforms into being the egalitarian 
pedigree of fundamental rights as it surfaces in the quoted passage both formally and 
substantively.1752 Beyond doctrinal controversy and dominant opinions in the legal 
discourse, the ontological account of the law of human dignity directs us to seek the 
meaning of propositions on the borderline between fact and norm and, analogously, 
natural law and positivism uttered in practicing fundamental rights1753.  
The present analysis aims at demonstrating another possible understanding of 
the interplay between the fact and the law of human dignity. The key question is, why 
preserving the distinction between the fact and the law, that is, between Art. 1 sec. 1 
sent. 1 GG and Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG, and, consequently, allowing for their 
interplay, matters. Law transforms perspective into being, and the human being is the 
‘the most emphatic form of an ought’. A hermeneutic and literary approach to the text 
of the Aviation Security Act Case zooms in on the language employed in defining who 
the human being is in light of the law of human dignity.  
All human beings [Jeder Mensch] possess [besitzt] as persons this 
dignity, irrespective of their qualities, their physical or mental state, 
their achievements and social status [cited cases omitted].1754 
Who the human being is, is not concretely determined, but rather remains an 
open question as ‘irrespective of’ indicates. Human beings ‘possess’ human dignity, 
and, as the phrasing suggests, this can be perceived to be a fact1755. Understanding 
human dignity as a possession of every human being is tantamount to recognizing it 
as a quality of human being-ness, in other words an integral aspect of who the human 
being is. The inextricability of the link between human being-ness and human dignity 
is further highlighted by the proposition that ‘[i]t cannot be taken away from any 
human being.’1756 It can be inferred that ‘something missing’, incidental to the open-
endedness of the interrogative ‘Who is the human being?’, constitutes an aspect of 
human dignity meaning. The fact that every human being possesses human dignity                                                         
1751 BVerfGE 115, 118 (139) 
1752 MacKinnon, Toward a FTS (1989) 237 
1753 Denninger (1982) JZ 225 
1754 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) 
1755 See Nissing, ‘Vorwort’ in ibid (ed), Grundvollzüge der Person 7, 7 [‘Personsein heißt: eine Natur 
zu haben, eine Weise des Lebens nicht nur zu sein, sondern sich zu ihr zu verhalten.’]; See also 
Tiedemann, Menschenwürde als Rechtsbegriff (2010) 244 [on Robert Spaemann: ‘Personen sind nicht 
ihre Eigenschaften, sondern sie haben ihre Eigenschaften.’] 
1756 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) [‘Sie kann keinem Menschen genommen werden.’] 
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permits the logical assumption that ‘something missing’ is also an essential – that is, 
ontological – feature of law’s Menschenbild. The FCC moved on to note: 
What can be violated, however, is the claim to respect which results 
from it [cited cases omitted].1757 
The distinction between the fact and the law of human dignity is elucidated: 
while the former cannot be violated, the latter can be infringed on. The law of human 
dignity gives rise to a claim to respect on account of the inviolability of human 
dignity. An ontological approach to the relation between the fact and the law of 
human dignity as portrayed in the Aviation Security Act Case and the Objektformel 
doctrine shows how the claim to respect per se is key to the practice of the law of 
human dignity in a manner attuned to the concept’s ontological meaning, to wit the 
unforced traversal of limits in coming-into-being. The claim to respect is an 
expression of self-determination and an affirmation of the nexus between the 
humanism and the pragmatism of law; besides instituting an inscription, the law of 
human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG enables making something of that inscription.  
What is the hermeneutic and literary impact of doctrinally upholding the 
distinction between the fact and the legal claim? The ontological analysis initiates 
critical reflection on the distinction and on the Court’s explicit opting for the authority 
of the fact over law’s perspective in view of the insight that law constitutes a cloak of 
force transforming perspective into being. How does the ontological account of the 
law of human dignity elucidate the terms of the interplay?  
 
iii. Ad hoc determination: building cases of verification through polemos 
The state should not violate ‘the ban on the disregard of human dignity’1758. 
The duty to protect entails furthermore the promotion of the life of every individual, 
‘which means above all to also protect it from unlawful attacks, and interference, by 
third parties’1759 in accordance with Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG. Ontologically conceived, 
the prohibition of state action against the life of the human being in light of the 
guarantee of human dignity means forbidding the external, forceful ‘happening of the 
irruption’ in coming-into-being.1760                                                         
1757 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152)  
1758 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) 
1759 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) 
1760 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149 
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What this duty means, in concrete terms, for state action cannot be 
definitely determined once and for all. […] such a treatment [that is, 
the lack of respect for human dignity] […] must be stated in 
concrete terms in the individual case in view of the specific 
situation in which a conflict can arise [cited cases omitted].1761 
Attention is drawn first to the requirement of ad hoc determination of what the 
duty ensuing from the law of human dignity means and, second, to the need to 
identify and concretely state the specifics of treatment interfering with the 
constitutional guarantee of human dignity. The need for ad hoc determination of 
human dignity meaning corresponds to the open-endedness of the question of who the 
human being is within the realm of law, and stresses that responses to that question 
should never be deemed a priori self-evident. If subjects of fundamental rights are 
‘surplus names’1762 setting stages of dissensus, then practicing the law of human 
dignity mantles each concrete instance of polemos, due to the sweeping effect of 
human dignity language, as a cloak that, instead of imposing a single ontology, 
conversely, enables diverse, unique manifestations of human being-ness in law’s 
practice. At the same time, in line with Presocratic philosophy, ‘something missing’ 
or the concealed as an ontological quality of human being-ness guarantees the 
essential space for the unique imprint of human beings on law’s Menschenbild and 
their presence within the realm of fundamental rights. The explicit adumbration of 
how concrete affronts to human dignity feature in the Aviation Security Act Case is 
discussed extensively in the linguistic-analytical analysis, infra.  
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG protects the individual human being not only 
against humiliation, branding, persecution, outlawing, and similar 
actions by third parties or by the state itself [cited cases omitted]. 
Taking as a starting point the idea of the constitution-creating 
legislature that it is part of the nature of human beings to exercise 
self-determination in freedom and to freely develop themselves, 
[…] the obligation to respect and protect human dignity generally 
precludes making a human being a mere object of the state [cited 
cases omitted]. What is thus absolutely prohibited is any treatment 
of a human being by public authority which fundamentally calls 
into question his or her quality of a subject, his or her status as a 
legal entity [cited cases omitted] by its lack of the respect of the 
value which is due to every human being for his or her own sake, by 
virtue of his or her being a person [cited cases omitted].1763  
                                                        
1761 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1762 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 68 
1763 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
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Besides motifs of actual harm, such as ‘humiliation, branding, persecution, 
outlawing’1764, in the portrayal of violations of human dignity by the state or third 
parties, the underlying pattern to all affronts to human dignity is that they render the 
human being a mere object of state action. Exercising self-determination ‘in freedom’ 
and freely developing oneself in coming-into-being and revealing one’s essence are 
part of the φύσις of human beings. Not only the event of actual objectification, but 
also ‘fundamentally calling into question’ the quality of the human being as subject 
and ‘his or her legal status as a legal entity’ constitute affronts to the constitutional 
guarantee of human dignity in that they challenge the essentials of the depiction of 
law’s Menschenbild and the ontologically perceived space reserved for legal subjects 
as surplus names within the realm of law. 1765 
The constitutional complaint premised on Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 2 sec. 2 
sent. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 19 sec. 2 GG directly challenged § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG, the statutory provision permitting the state to intentionally attack an aircraft 
with persons on board who have become victims of the perpetrators of the crime. On 
those constitutional grounds, the complainants built a case of verification availing 
themselves of their status as legal subjects simply by virtue of being human. Through 
the thereby provoked dissensus, the inscription comprehended in the law of human 
dignity and the fundamental right to life was subject to verification. The portrayal of 
law’s Menschenbild in the practice of the law of human dignity in the Aviation 
Security Act Case centers on the juxtaposition of subject- and object-quality. 
Dissensus as a process of verification results in the delineation of ‘the world in which 
those rights are valid, together with the world in which they are not.’1766 The 
admissibility of the constitutional complaint was established by reason of the direct 
violation of fundamental rights, namely the attack on the bare life of the 
complainants.1767  
What are the effects of state action by means of direct force against an aircraft 
in accordance with § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG? Minding the attack would ‘practically always                                                         
1764 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1765 See BVerfGE 115, 118 (158f.) [under (3)] 
1766 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 69 
1767 BVerfGE 115, 118 (126) [‘The constitutional complaint is admissible. The complainants’ 
fundamental rights are directly violated by the challenged regulation. Because they frequently use 
planes for private and professional reasons, the possibility that they could be affected by a measure 
pursuant to § 14.3 LuftSiG it is not merely a theoretical one.’]; ibid (137) [‘Pursuant to these principles, 
the complainants are entitled to lodge the constitutional complaint. They have credibly stated that they 
frequently use civil aircraft for private and professional reasons.’] 
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result in its crash’1768, what is enjeu from an ontological perspective is the survival of 
human beings on board.1769 The forceful happening of the irruption of Being in the 
Aviation Security Act Case evokes ex negativo the human being-ness of the 
passengers and crew on board and in concreto infringes on the law of human dignity 
in that the possibility of any further movement to and fro between concealing and 
revealing one’s essence is excluded. That the innocent persons on board the aircraft 
are ‘doomed anyway’ does not influence the decision on the constitutionality of § 14 
sec. 3 LuftSiG1770, argued the Court. The state infringes on the right to human dignity 
when it attacks and kills innocent people in despair. Under the contested statute the 
innocent on board are not only denied protection by the state, but also exposed to 
encroachment upon their lives while defenseless.1771 
Thus any procedure pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG disregards, as 
has been explained, these people’s positions as subjects in a manner 
that is incompatible with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and disregards the ban on 
killing that results from it for the state. The fact that this procedure 
is intended to serve to protect and preserve other people’s lives does 
not alter this. 1772 
Through the independent evaluation and juxtaposition of the case of those on 
board the aircraft on the one hand and those on the ground on the other, the Court 
attempted to demonstrate why only in the former case state action challenges the 
status of innocent human beings as legal subjects, namely Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. Innocent 
persons on board a hijacked aircraft find themselves before a fatal deadlock, ‘a 
situation that is hopeless for them’1773, and, therefore, experience despair. The 
violation of their human dignity by the state can be rendered, in ontological terms, as 
polemos. The polemos unveils human being-ness; who the human being is comes 
forth into the unhidden. Shooting down the aircraft is tantamount to the forceful 
deprivation of human being-ness. Human being-ness is portrayed ex negativo in both 
its physical and psychical dimension since respectively state action causes the 
innocent human being on board to die and the experience of deadlock enkindles 
despair. The operations prescribed in § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG in the case of an aircraft                                                         
1768 BVerfGE 115, 118 (140) 
1769 BVerfGE 115, 118 (140) [‘The consequence of the crash, in turn, will with near certainty be the 
death, and consequently the destruction of the lives, of all people on board the aircraft.’] 
1770 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158) 
1771 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) 
1772 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) 
1773 BVerfGE 115, 118 (157) 
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with innocent persons on board do not comply with law’s meta-dimension understood 
as law’s humanism. Even if refraining from shooting down the aircraft seems from a 
third viewpoint a symbolic action, since the passengers and crew are anyway doomed, 
it however signifies, according to another reading of the Court’s view, the stance of 
‘meditating and caring, that human beings be human and not inhumane, “inhuman”, 
that is, outside their essence.’1774 
b. Linguistic-analytical 
The linguistic-analytical analysis draws an analogy between tautology in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the notion of inviolability, which will then be reinforced 
by reference to the concept of morality in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, and presents 
how the Objektformel can be viewed as a tool of critical reflection in light of the 
Wittgensteinian ladder metaphor. Imponderabilities of circumstances in the Aviation 
Security Act Case can be signified as ‘something missing’ and dealing with those 
causes the boundaries of the legal language game to fluctuate.  
i. Tautology and inviolability, the Objektformel in light of the ladder metaphor 
The proposition of the inviolability [Unantastbarkeit] of human dignity in Art. 1 sec. 
1 GG is, according to Dreier, prescriptive rather than descriptive.1775 This is so, 
explains Dreier, first of all because legal texts by definition can only make normative 
statements. Expansion of the sense and meaning of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG ensues from the 
fact of the manifold violation [Antastung] of human dignity.1776 However, Art. 1 sec. 
1 sent. 1 GG can be seen as promulgating, with the vigor of a constitutional provision, 
that non-respect for human dignity does not affect the integrity of the involved human 
being.1777 The vulnerable, ‘the tortured, the outlaws, the persecuted’ 1778, do not lose 
their human dignity. The FCC has combined both facets of the meaning of Art. 1 sec. 
1 GG in its jurisprudence, stating that, while human beings cannot be deprived of 
                                                        
1774 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
1775 Dreier, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2004) para 131 [Dreier concurs with the dominant view in 
legal literature]; See also Giese, Das Würde-Konzept (1975) 46; Krawietz (1977) 245, 255f.; Müller-
Dietz (1994) 8; Hofmann, ‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’ (1995) 104, 111 fn 36; Rolf Gröschner 
& Oliver W. Lembcke (eds), Das Dogma der Unantastbarkeit. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Absolutheitsanspruch der Würde (1st edn, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010); Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG 
Kommentar (2010) para 33 




their human dignity, their claim to respect springing from the guarantee can be 
violated.1779 
What follows from the inviolability of human dignity is the absolute 
prohibition of balancing [ausnahmslose Unabwägbarkeit]1780. ‘The scope of 
guarantee and the limits of violation of the dignity norm are identical.’1781 Every 
infringement on human dignity amounts to a violation of the provision under Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG and there is no room for the usual distinction between the protective scope 
of and restrictions on fundamental rights [Grundrechtsschranken].1782 Conflicts with 
the fundamental rights of others, human beings or legal entities such as animals or the 
environment (Art. 20a GG) cannot justify ‘touching on’ [Antastung] human 
dignity.1783 Human dignity v. human dignity conflicts challenge the expansion of the 
absolute prohibition of balancing on all conceivable cases of human dignity 
violations1784; when an infringement on the human dignity of one legal subject shall 
or must take place for the human dignity of another to be guaranteed the question 
arises how this conflict should be treated. Such conflicts are either simply denied or 
declared unsuitable for justifying a violation of human dignity.1785 Before such 
constellations, the notion of justifiable conflict of duties should not be excluded a 
priori. 1786 
The practice of the law of human dignity, framed as a tautological proposition of 
inviolability, deviates radically from the balancing model of the argumentation 
process of fundamental rights because Art. 1 sec. 1 sent. 1 GG puts forward an 
absolute validity claim.1787 As noted supra, the Objektformel1788 can be understood to 
serve the practice of the law of human dignity as a tool of critical reflection that 
materializes the possibility of objectification at the level of language and meaning 
within the legal language game emanating from a viewpoint formed by Art. 1 sec. 1                                                         
1779 See BVerfGE 87, 209 (228) (1992) [Tanz der Teufel]; See also Winfried Brugger, Menschenwürde, 
Menschenrechte, Grundrechte (1997) 35 
1780 Dreier ibid para 132 
1781 Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 83 
1782 Dreier (n 1775); Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 26 
1783 Dreier ibid 
1784 ibid para 133 
1785 ibid; ibid para 133 fn 434-35 [further references] 
1786 ibid para 133 
1787 Höfling, ‘Die Unantastbarkeit der Menschenwürde’ (1995) 857, 862; Cf. Poscher (2009) JZ 269, 
274 [‘Wenn die Rechtsprechung zum Kernbeichschutz zeigt, dass der Schutz der 
Menschenwürdegarantie der Abwägung mit Sicherheitsinteressen zugänglich ist, wird unverständlich, 
warum eine solche Abwägung im Fall des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes und der Folter grundsätzlich 
ausgeschlossen sein soll’] 
1788 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
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GG, only in order to, indeed artificially, open up a space of dissensus, an 
intersubjective space, and set in motion a process of critical reflection. The 
Objektformel breaks the tautology of inviolability, and objectification language 
triggers the confrontation with reality, indeed a reality of human dignity violations.1789  
As a tool of critical reflection, the Objektformel can be interpreted by analogy with 
the ladder metaphor; as language within the legal language game, it does not 
constitute meaning as a status quo. Once the reflexive purpose this formula serves is 
fulfilled, it shall be discarded. The Objektformel is more extensively discussed infra, 
in the phenomenological analysis of the text of the Aviation Security Act Case. 
ii. Imponderabilities: the interplay between life and law or between the field of 
sight and the legal language game and recourse to other viewpoints 
In an effort to portray the circumstances giving rise to the application of the 
statute, the Court emphasized and dramaturgically plotted the aerial incident and 
conceivable parameters influencing the outcome and, accordingly, the reaction on the 
part of the state mechanism. In doing so, the Court assumed and depicted the 
viewpoint of metaphysical subjects, that is, human beings, involved; the crucial 
questions for present purposes are how the Court presented those viewpoints within 
the legal language game and whether it made the effort to establish the soundness of 
the assumptions. The experience of deadlock in the following excerpt is associated 
with hopelessness. 
 
Even if in the area of police power, insecurities concerning forecasts 
often cannot be completely avoided, it is absolutely inconceivable 
under the applicability of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG to intentionally kill 
persons such as the crew and the passengers of a hijacked plane, 
who are in a situation that is hopeless for them, on the basis of a 
statutory authorisation which even accepts such imponderabilities if 
necessary. 1790 
In such cases [only perpetrators on board], it is therefore easier to 
ascertain with sufficient reliability and also in a timely manner that 
an aircraft is intended to be abused as a weapon for a targeted 
crash.1791 
                                                        
1789 By analogy with the remark on whether we have delivered on our promises as regards gender 
equality in Baer, ‘Triangle’ (2009) University of Toronto Law Journal 417 at 425, fn. 11 
1790 BVerfGE 115, 118 (157) 
1791 BVerfGE 115, 118 (161) 
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Imponderabilities [Unwägbarkeiten] in this context are therefore 
attributable to the offenders’ sphere of responsibility. 1792 
Uncertainty interferes with the soundness of the justification in the Court’s 
legal syllogism. The circumstances of an aerial incident do not always allow for a 
correct assessment and ‘complete picture of the factual situation’; unpredictability is a 
key element in the portrayal of such incidents. The possibility ‘that the course of 
events will be such that it is no longer required to carry out the operation’1793 cannot 
be foreclosed. The FCC reinforced the depiction of factual uncertainty by recourse to 
findings deduced from written opinions submitted in the proceedings and statements 
made in the oral hearing. The interplay between the legal language game and the 
broader field of sight can be portrayed as an enlargement of the scope of surveyance 
and, consequently, a fluctuation of the boundaries of the former. The Court 
demonstrated an effort to inquire into the assumed viewpoints of those directly 
affected in such incidents; these are mirrored in the text of the Aviation Security Act 
Case. The Cockpit Association, for instance, noticed that the ascertainment of 
requirements for establishing a major aerial incident as in the contested statute ‘is 
already fraught with great uncertainties.’1794 
The critical point in the assessment of the situation was said to be to 
what extent the possibly affected crew of the plane was still able to 
communicate the attempt at, or the success of, hijacking an aircraft 
to the decision-makers on the ground. If this was not possible, the 
factual basis was said to be tainted with the stigma of a 
misinterpretation from the very beginning.1795 
Employment of such language as the ‘stigma of misinterpretation’, the ‘vague’ 
character of findings ‘gained from reconnaissance measures and checks’, the 
‘speculative to the very end’ assessment of ‘the motivation and objectives of the 
hijackers of an aircraft’ is illustrative of ambiguity and controversy as integral aspects 
of the factual situation dealt with in the contested statute.1796 
[…] the danger concerning the application of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG 
was said to be that the order to shoot down the aircraft was made 
too early on an uncertain factual basis if, within the time slot 
available, which as a general rule is extremely narrow, armed force                                                         
1792 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162) 
1793 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154f.) 
1794 BVerfGE 115, 118 (155) 
1795 BVerfGE 115, 118 (155) 
1796 BVerfGE 115, 118 (155) 
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was at all supposed to be used in a timely manner with prospects of 
success and without disproportionately endangering people who are 
not participants in the crime [unbeteiligter Dritter]. 1797  
The decisiveness of the influence of pragmatic considerations on the meaning 
produced in the Court’s legal language game is plain to see. The uncertainty of the 
factual basis paired with the limited available time render the proportionality of the 
use of armed force questionable. In assessing the effectiveness of such a mission, one 
would necessarily have to accept ‘from the very beginning that the operation was 
possibly not required at all.’1798 The Court, reacting to the likelihood of an 
intervention that would prove unnecessary, brought forth the assumed viewpoint of 
the populace: ‘reactions would probably often have to be excessive.’1799 
The viewpoint of the Independent Flight Attendant Organization UFO was 
also introduced into the legal language game of the Aviation Security Act Case. 
Uncertainty features as a central theme in the respective field of sight; the 
‘complicated and error-prone channels of communication’1800 between cabin crew and 
cockpit on board on the one hand, and the cockpit and the ground on the other, paired 
with the unpredictability of the evolution of events on board the aircraft, render the 
reliable assessment of subsumption of the facts under the contested statutory 
provision ‘practically impossible’1801. Those on the ground ‘who must decide under 
extreme time pressure’1802 how to react, would have to do so ‘on the basis of a 
suspicion only and not on the basis of established facts.’1803 
Language games originating in other viewpoints and incorporated into the 
legal language game become aligned with the viewpoint of the Court; the eye of the 
judge looking through the lens of the Basic Law filters and reflects on the 
propositions emanating from other eyes within the field of sight. Affirming the 
persuasiveness of insights derived from such other viewpoints, the Court added, ‘the 
complicated, multi-tiered decision-making system, which depends on a large number 
of decision-makers and persons concerned […] will require considerable time in the 
case of an emergency.’1804 The relatively small overflight area of Germany                                                         
1797 BVerfGE 115, 118 (155f.) 
1798 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1799 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1800 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1801 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1802 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1803 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1804 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
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accelerates ‘the time pressure on decision-making but also the danger of premature 
decisions.’1805 
How did the FCC as the eye, the speaking self and author of the decision 
address imponderabilities, uncertainty and unforeseeability causing the 
embarrassment of the decision-making system when encountering this emergency 
situation? To regain authority over meaning, the FCC used the figure of spheres of 
responsibility1806. It thus tackled complications arising within the realm of life in such 
cases of emergency at the legal level. A sphere of responsibility is a conceptual 
artifact, that is, a constructed means to the solution of the problem at hand. Such 
spheres delineate spaces within which imponderabilities are attributable to an actor 
and, in that sense, manageable by the Court. The Court thereby attempted to grasp and 
integrate into the legal language game circumstances escaping its hold at the level of 
life. 
 
iii. Portrayal of other viewpoints within the legal language game 
To rebut the argument that ‘the persons who are on board a plane that is 
intended to be used against other people’s lives within the meaning of § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG are doomed anyway […]’1807 the FCC concentrated exclusively on the 
viewpoint of passengers and crew on board the hijacked aircraft, the ‘innocent people 
in a situation that is desperate for them which an operation performed pursuant to this 
provisions as a general rule involves.’1808 The motif of despair, a pervasive theme in 
the literary portrayal of human dignity violations, features centrally in the field of 
sight originating in that viewpoint. The law of human dignity as the critical lens 
before the eye of the judge guarantees the precedence of the viewpoint of 
metaphysical subjects over seemingly common sense conveyed in the estimation that 
they are doomed in any case. In other words, the practice of the law of human dignity 
centers on the human factor. Metaphysical subjects and their viewpoint and field of 
                                                        
1805 BVerfGE 115, 118 (156) 
1806 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162) 
1807 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158); ibid [‘In addition, uncertainties as regards the factual situation exist here 
as well. These uncertainties […] influence a prediction of how long people who are on board a plane 
which has been converted into an assault weapon will live and whether there is still a chance of 
rescuing them. As a general rule, it will therefore not be possible to make a reliable statement about 
these people’s lives being “lost anyway already”.’] 
1808 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158) 
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sight, as mirrored in the legal language game of the FCC, are, in light of human 
dignity, respected and protected first and foremost in linguistic-analytical terms. 
Linguistic-analytical practice is the elemental layer of each instance of law’s 
practice. In the Aviation Security Act Case, the focus on the viewpoint of 
metaphysical subjects and their world is manifested most potently in the divergent 
treatment of the innocent on board the aircraft and the perpetrators. The FCC argued 
that if the only passengers on board are the criminals, then the aircraft could be shot 
down pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG. The notion of uncertainty surfaces once again 
in the Court’s argumentation, yet, as argued, uncertainties in the assessment of the 
factual basis do not interfere with the constitutionality of shooting down the hijacked 
aircraft when only criminals are aboard. How is the viewpoint of the perpetrators is 
taken into consideration, thus respected, in deciding whether to shoot down the 
aircraft? The perpetrators have authority over the meaning produced within their field 
of sight; they can avert the danger and communicate their willingness to do so to 
those on the ground. Self-determination precipitates self-responsibility. The Court 
treats the perpetrators as self-responsible actors and defers to their viewpoint and the 
reasonably assumed meaning derived from their actions. Therein lies the ‘easier’ 
ascertainment ‘with sufficient reliability and also in a timely manner’ of the intention 
to abuse the aircraft ‘as a weapon for a targeted crash’.1809 
The FCC did not practice the law of human dignity in responding to human 
beings on the ground, ‘against whose lives the aircraft that is abused as a weapon for a 
crime within the meaning of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is intended to be used.’1810 The duty 
of the state to protect those on the ground, argued the Court, cannot justify state action 
pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG if there are innocent human beings on board the 
aircraft. In linguistic-analytical terms, the Court referred to the perspective of those on 
the ground but did not subsume it under the legal language game that originates in the 
viewpoint formed by looking particularly through the law of human dignity as the 
decisive lens. Addressing, however, their perspective causes a fluctuation of the 
boundaries of the human dignity legal language game in that these expand to treat the 
circumstances of those on the ground and contracts when they excludes them from the 
scope of protection pursuant to Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.1811                                                         
1809 BVerfGE 115, 118 (161) 
1810 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162ff.) 
1811 BVerfGE 115, 118 (164) 
 388
c. Phenomenological 
The phenomenological portrayal reflects the dual sense of ‘something 
missing’, discussed on occasion of the distinction between the fact and the law of 
human dignity. Notions such as morality and sacrifice are associated respectively with 
human dignity and the transcendental. The principle of proportionality is perceived as 
an appeal to intersubjective space within the totality of legal language games. 
i. The law of human dignity: on the borderline between fact and law, the dual 
sense of ‘something missing’ 
The major premise of the Court’s syllogism in the Aviation Security Act Case 
is composed of the fundamental right to life under Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG, which is 
‘subject to the requirement of the specific enactment of a statute pursuant to Art. 2 
sec. 2 sent. 3 GG […]’, and the guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG 
‘which is closely linked with it.’1812 The statute that restricts the fundamental right to 
life must be regarded in light of Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG. The Court stated that ‘[h]uman life is the vital basis of human dignity as 
the essential constitutive principle, and as the supreme value, of the constitution 
[…].’1813 
[...] this dignity [...] cannot be taken away from any human being. 
What can be violated, however, is the claim to respect which results 
from it [cited case omitted]. This applies irrespective [unabhängig 
von], inter alia, of the probable duration of the individual human 
life (see BVerfGE 30, 173 (194)1814 on the human being’s claim to 
respect of his or her dignity even after death).1815 
The phrases ‘all human beings’ and ‘irrespective of’ convey infinite emptiness 
as an aspect of the meaning of law’s Menschenbild perceived in light of the inherent 
dignity of human beings.1816 The second appearance of the phrase ‘irrespective of’ 
establishes that, due to the absolute character of human dignity, individual human life 
cannot be quantified1817. The supra excerpt refers to the dual sense of ‘something                                                         
1812 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) 
1813 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) [Citing: BVerfGE 39, 1 (42); 72, 105 (115) (1986) [Life Imprisonment]; 
109, 279 (311) (2004) [Großer Lauschangriff]] 
1814 BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971) [Mephisto] 
1815 BVerfGE 115, 118 (152) 
1816 It is plain to see that Leistungstheorie-conceptions are unequivocally rejected. 
1817 See however an enhancement of the relation of the law of human dignity and the fundamental right 
to life in Hufen (2004) 313, 317 [violations of human life are not necessarily at the same time 
violations of human dignity]; See also Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, ‘Systematische Bedingungen der 
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missing’. ‘Something always missing’ alludes to infinity as an aspect of the relational 
meaning of human being-ness; the other is absolutely Other. ‘Something missing’ as a 
Leerstelle describes the space reserved within legal language games, that is, totalities 
produced in practicing the law, for the human being-ness of the other, who is 
portrayed ad hoc from the first-person point of view, to eventuate within them. The 
concrete meaning of the duty of the state to respect and protect human dignity under 
Art. 1 sec. 2 GG ‘cannot be definitely determined once and for all […].’1818 The dual 
sense of ‘something missing’ in the phenomenological depiction of the practice of the 
law of human dignity enables the welcoming of the other as absolutely Other. This 
space is offered to the other as a concrete and unique face; the infinitely unique 
imprints of who the other is materialize through the face-to-face encounter and may 
be deduced ad hoc from the context of the Leerstelle. 
Human beings cannot be deprived of the dignity they ‘possess’. Only the 
claim to respect the human dignity of individuals can be violated. What does the 
distinction between human dignity and the claim to human dignity suggest? The 
proposition of the inviolability of inherent human dignity declares a fact; the claim to 
respect and protection guaranteed in law is premised on a legal norm. The fact that all 
human beings possess human dignity by virtue of being human brings to mind the 
notion of morality as elaborated on in Totality and Infinity. The tautological schema 
intimates the notion of the limit and the meta-level beyond it. The legal norm 
guaranteeing a claim to respect for and protection of human dignity or, as presently 
put, the law of human dignity may be portrayed as a totality structure. Only a totality 
can be infringed on; totalities are presupposed by war. 
By analogy with the concept of war in Totality and Infinity, violations of the 
claim to respect human dignity as grounds for negative definitions – a time-honored 
doctrinal discussion in Germany – can be revisited and perceived as ex negativo 
signifiers of the infinity of human being-ness. The portrayal of violations as war 
points to infinity as the other side of the totality story. As Levinas observes, 
‘[v]iolence bears upon only a being both graspable and escaping every hold.’1819 The 
infinity of human being-ness can be sensed in the occurrence of violence, in war. It 
should be born in mind that this remark concerns merely a pattern of hermeneutic and                                                                                                                                                               
Garantie unbedingten Schutzes der Menschenwürde in Art. 1 GG – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Probleme am Anfang des Lebens’ (2001) DÖV 925, 926 
1818 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1819 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 223 
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literary depiction of infinity; the humane practice of law is set side by side with the 
unforced manifestation of infinity.  
In war reality rends the words and images that dissimulate it, to 
obtrude in its nudity and in its harshness. Harsh reality (this sounds 
like a pleonasm!), harsh object-lesson, at the very moment of its 
fulguration when the drapings of illusion burn war is produced as 
the pure experience of pure being.1820 
Violations of human dignity generate images of the inhumane, while, at the 
same time, alluding to the meaning of the humane. The ‘gut-feeling’ suggests the 
poetic sensing of the infinity of human being-ness and, consequently, of the law of 
human dignity on occasion of assaults on human dignity. Poetics are intimated in that 
meaning arises from images – such as the Menschenbild – and figurative 
representations. All that can be sensed, according to Levinas, through poetics is our 
separation from the Other, ‘something always missing’. 
ii. The Objektformel: portraying breaking with the inviolability of human dignity 
only to guarantee it 
Prior to embarking on the analysis of the practice of the Objektformel doctrine 
in the Aviation Security Act Case, it bears noting again that the state has essentially an 
institutional and a personal dimension. For purposes of intelligibility of the argument 
put forward, let us first zoom in on the institutional aspect of the state. Can the 
constitutional state, that is, an institution constituted on the – prescriptive as per 
dominant opinion – proposition of inviolability and assuming the respect and 
protection of human dignity, produce language – and meaning – implying that it 
could, as self, objectify the other? If constitutional law is the decisive lens through 
which the state looks at the world to produce meaning, how is the possibility of 
objectifying the other even conceivable? Can this constitutional self speak, articulate 
and share a world using language that contradicts the morality it panegyrizes? 
The questions raised and the overall economy of the analysis require, first, a 
linguistic-analytical approach to the practice of the Objektformel and only on the basis 
of observations deduced therefrom, a phenomenological analysis. Consistently with 
the all-permeating validity of the law of human dignity1821 as the critical lens for                                                         
1820 ibid 21 
1821 The tautological pattern of the proposition of inviolability [‘Unantastbarkeit’] corresponds and 
accounts for the all-permeating validity of the law of human dignity. Wittgenstein notes, in 
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looking at the world, objectification language cannot be found within the boundaries 
of legal language games. The paradox consists in the appearance of objectification 
language in the sharing of a world, namely the order of the Basic Law that originates 
in the inviolability of human dignity, despite the fact that the viewpoint of any 
expression of the German constitutional state, looking through the lens of the Basic 
Law in producing meaning, lacks the means to generate objectification language. 
Merely the phrase ‘[r]endering the human being a mere object of state action’ 
materializes objectification at the level of language.  
What might the presence of objectification language then mean? First, 
minding that the lens of the Basic Law per se forecloses the practice of such 
language, who accounts for practicing the Objektformel doctrine? More elementally 
than the obvious assertion that the Objektformel constitutes legal doctrine, thus is 
evidently attributed to authors, the presence of objectification language within legal 
language games produced by state actors witnesses reductio ad absurdum the eye, the 
metaphysical subject or human factor1822. The responsibility for practicing 
objectification language is credited to the human factor traced in the speaking self, at 
the same time an institution and a human being. The world actually articulated and 
shared exceeds the linguistic and semantic possibilities provided by the lens of the 
Basic Law and particularly the law of human dignity. Awareness of the paradox in the 
portrayal – at least on first reading – begs a further question, namely why the 
constitutional judge as the speaking self1823, in practicing the law of human dignity, 
employs objectification language. 
These remarks about the implications of the Objektformel at the level of 
language enhance an understanding of this doctrine as a tool of critical reflection that 
stirs real conversation, reinterpreation1824, the shaking of the certainty nurtured by the 
tautological form of the inviolability proposition to create anew an intersubjective 
space1825. The proposition that Art. 1 sec. 1 GG ‘precludes making a human being a 
mere object of the state’ spells out what the law of human dignity exorcises, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.463) ‘[…] Tautology leaves to reality the whole infinite logical space; 
[…].’ 
1822 This does not mean that the institutional component of state actors cannot be the source of 
violations of human dignity, see Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 1 [institutional humiliation] 
1823 Focusing on the constitutional judge serves the purposes of an analysis tailored to the text under 
scrutiny; granted, objectification language is practiced in doctrinal discourse among legal scholars.  
1824 Levinas (n 1819) 13 [Introduction by John Wild]  
1825 Levinas, ibid 290; See also Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 390 [‘fusion of horizons’] 
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thereby forces once again the face-to-face encounter with the other and listening and 
learning from the other’s lived experience1826 to verify the humane practice of the 
law. Objectification has undeniably phenomenological meaning. The distinction 
between the fact and the law of human dignity elucidates how a human being can be 
rendered a mere object of state action or the action of third parties, namely can be 
subsumed under the gaze of someone who exercises authority over meaning from the 
first-person point of view. The Objektformel points directly to the human factor 
underling institutions.  
The reasons rendering a confrontation with the possibility of objectification 
necessary in the German context could be sought in history, specifically the historical 
background of National Socialism, and sociological and psychological research. The 
hermeneutic and literary lens applied here does not ignore the importance of 
approaches within other disciplines; rather, it engages in a portrayal of considerations 
arising from the presence of objectification language to advance another 
understanding of the Objektformel that serves – in line with phenomenological 
insights in Chapter One – the humane practice of the law of human dignity. The 
Objektformel1827 is a tool of critical reflection, instituted doctrinally, namely as a 
totality structure. This doctrine declares the existence of the human factor as a facet of 
institutions, and articulates and depicts violations of human dignity, thus triggering 
questions in a process of critical reflection.  
In linguistic-analytical terms, sharing a world within which the risk of 
objectification becomes a fact, namely is embodied in a proposition, breaks with the 
tautology of the inviolability of human dignity1828, thus allowing engagement with 
reality, an inclination of infinitizers in Totality and Infinity1829. Inquiry into the 
meaning of the Objektformel in the practice of the law of human dignity shows that 
legal actors, here the FCC and legal scholars developing this doctrinal formula, can 
construct and institute tools that crack even those totality structures providing for 
law’s meta-dimension. The reality check provoked by objectification language 
guarantees the humane practice of the law of human dignity by ensuring the sound 
justification, that is, responsible practice, of the tautological proposition; from a                                                         
1826 Levinas, ibid 16 [Introduction by John Wild] [‘The basic difference is between a mode of thought 
which tries to gather all things around the mind, or self, of the thinker, and an externally oriented mode 
which attempts to penetrate into what is radically other than the mind that is thinking it.’] 
1827 Starck (1981) 457, 459f. 
1828 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (4.462), (4.463), (4.464) 
1829 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 17 [Introduction by John Wild]  
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phenomenological perspective, the employment of the Objektformel enables the 
verification that a response reflects the ability to respond. The Objektformel doctrine 
artificially raises a challenge for those practicing the law to demonstrate that they 
have responsibly surveyed, listened and learned from lived experience, and responded 
to the other.  
In linguistic-analytical terms, the employment of the Objektformel can be 
viewed as a sui generis Wittgensteinian ladder. Instead of constructively guiding us in 
ascending to the meaning of the practice of human dignity, it generates an image of 
the deconstruction of human dignity, that is, the objectification of the other. The 
image triggers further reflection and scrutiny. Once the reflection required to reach an 
understanding of the ad hoc instance of practicing human dignity is demonstrated, this 
ladder can be discarded.1830 Unless discarded, objectification, both the language and 
the doctrine, may become a status quo within the legal language game, thus part of 
the world shared by the self in generosity. Unless discarded, objectification language 
results in portrayals of the state as a totalizer self and of the other as no longer 
absolutely other in accordance with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. At the level of language, not 
throwing away the ladder, not discarding the totality structure of the Objektformel 
doctrine after ascending, would force the signification of human beings as either 
subjects or objects and, thus, cause the reduction of language directly invoking human 
being-ness1831; consequently, the linguistic and semantic hook for identifying the 
practice of law’s meta-dimension, the word ‘human’, would falter.  
The Objektformel doctrine in FCC jurisprudence and German legal 
scholarship is, from a hermeneutic and literary perspective, a tool of critical reflection 
employed in the practice of the law of human dignity to guarantee the responsible, 
that is, substantial and effective, response to the other. Mobilizing the Objektformel in                                                         
1830 Wittgenstein (n 1828) (6.54) 
1831 Relational accounts of human being-ness and human dignity instituted in language preserve the 
humane character of practicing the law of human dignity, precisely in that it resists hinging on the 
subject-object distinction. To the extent that the text of judicial decisions primarily conveys real 
conversation between the speaking self and author of the decision and the other, namely human beings 
involved in the case, apropos the law of human dignity, which per se exists as a textual reference, and 
secondarily opens up an ‘interpretive dialogue’ with future readers the subject-object language can be 
avoided. This remark reveals the advantages of the Gadamerian perception of hermeneutics presently 
followed. See Hoy, The Critical Circle (1982) 40 [‘Speaking about the intention of the text has the 
potential theoretical advantage of avoiding the traditional vocabulary of Cartesian philosophy of 
consciousness and hence the antinomies of subject-objet language. Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as well 
as Heidegger’s, has this force. Once the appeal to the consciousness of the author is eliminated, 
however, other questions remain, including how the intention of a text is determined by the interpreter. 
One answer is provided by the hermeneutic theory hermeneutic theory of Gadamer, who argues that the 
text takes part in an interpretive dialogue.’] 
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a process of critical reflection can be seen as the act of an infinitizer. The infinitizer is 
motivated by desire for the other as Other.1832 In the presently introduced relational 
phenomenological understanding, the Objektformel is not interpreted as a doctrine 
that totalizes; rather, the imperative of engaging in face-to-face encounter with the 
other is enhanced by a doctrinal tool for diagnosing the objectification of the other, 
despite the prescription of inviolability in Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. The ‘bad willing’1833 of 
the human factor within institutions accounts for such abuse.  
Harm as ‘humiliation, branding, persecution, outlawing’1834, in other words 
‘injuring and annihilating’1835 human beings, is not the only conceivable kind of 
violence. We have already distinguished between the forced and the forceful. The 
language used to describe violence in the legal language game of the Aviation 
Security Act Case depicts the other as vulnerable, and evokes the meaning of 
morality1836 in Totality and Infinity and its association with the idea of human dignity 
as established in the phenomenological account of the law of human dignity.1837 
Another conceivable sense of violence, ‘making a human being a mere object of the 
state’ or third parties is precluded, noted the FCC, by the duty to respect and protect 
human dignity.1838 Before shedding light on what this further sense of violence could 
mean in view of the phenomenological insights in Chapter One, it is vital to trail the 
syllogism preceding objectification language.  
Objectification is violence against the other, an interruption of the continuity 
of human beings, ‘making them play roles in which they no longer recognize 
themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance, 
                                                        
1832 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 33 
1833 Wittgenstein (n 1828) (4.23), (4.3) 
1834 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1835 Levinas (n 1829) 21 
1836 ibid 245 
1837 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) [‘Art. 1 sec. 1 GG protects the individual human being not only against 
humiliation, branding, persecution, outlawing and similar actions by third parties or by the state itself 
[cited cases omitted].’] 
1838 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) [‘Taking as a starting point the idea of the constitution-creating 
legislature that it is part of the nature of human beings to exercise self-determination in freedom and to 
freely develop themselves, and that the individual can claim, in principle, to be recognized in society as 
a member with equal rights and with a value of his or her own [cited case omitted], the duty to respect 
and protect human dignity generally precludes making a human being a mere object of the state [den 
Menschen zum bloßen Objekt des Staates zu machen] [cited cases omitted]. What is thus absolutely 
prohibited is any treatment of a human being by public authority which fundamentally calls into 
question his or her quality of a subject, his or her status as a legal entity [cited cases omitted] by its lack 
of the respect of the value which is due to every human being for his or her own sake, by virtue of his 
or her being a person [cited cases omitted].’] 
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making them carry out actions that will destroy every possibility of action.’1839  This 
understanding of violence brings to mind the experience of deadlock signaling the 
impairment of self-determination. The other is subsumed under a totality from which 
there is no escape. Objectification language vividly evokes the betrayal of human 
being-ness, of human beings’ ‘own substance’ within the realm of law, namely their 
legal subject status. This, however, also stands as an ontological remark. What would, 
then, a distinctly phenomenological reading be? The relational phenomenological 
approach is premised on the supra discussion about the danger of objectification at 
the level of language and sharpens overall the appreciation of the meaning of the 
Objektformel in the practice of the law of human dignity in FCC jurisprudence.  
The humanism of law lies, in accordance with Levinas’ phenomenology, in 
the provision for the possibility of transcendence and transascendance.1840 Unless the 
law of human dignity as a totality structure is perceived as the guarantee of a crack in 
the totality it institutes, the humane practice of that law and fundamental rights is 
foreclosed. Infinitizers view totality systems as the violence of a ‘permanent tyranny 
[…] which free men should resist […]’1841, and identify the practice of language in 
the face-to-face encounter as the antidote to the violence of vision. The Objektformel 
doctrine, per se a totality structure, expresses and prohibits the subsumption of the 
other under a totality. What is the signification and significance of objectification 
language in the practice of the law of human dignity? It should not escape our 
attention that in the Aviation Security Act Case objectification language is telling of 
how the FCC understood and portrayed itself as the speaking self, the state as self 
more generally, the other, that is, human beings involved in the case, and the relation 
between the self and the other.  
The legal norm of human dignity, a totality structure, paradoxically 
encompasses the infinity that can cause its rupture. The presence of the Objektformel 
in the practice of the law of human dignity engenders another paradox, which 
becomes visible when the fact that it constitutes per se language, the social, is 
emphasized. As language, objectification manifests the ethical choice of the speaking 
self to welcome the stranger1842, while at the same time assumes, as legal doctrine, a 
totality structure, the systematic. Articulation as sharing precedes the systematic. The                                                         
1839 Levinas (n 1829) 21  
1840 See also the metaphor of ascending a ladder in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (6.54) 
1841 Levinas (n 1829) [Introduction by John Wild]  
1842 ibid 245 
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presently furthered argument operates first at this pre-level, aspiring to then ground an 
understanding of the function of the Objektformel within the realm of law.  
iii. Human dignity as morality and the face-to-face encounter in responsibility, 
hospitality, generosity 
The language of absolute respect for and protection of human dignity features 
dominantly in the practice of the concept in the Aviation Security Act Case. The most 
important implication of absoluteness is that human dignity cannot be subject to 
balancing, save in the case of human dignity v. human dignity conflicts. In the 
discussion about the applicability of the principle of proportionality, the FCC 
employed language that evokes themes found in Totality and Infinity. Drawing 
parallels between the text and insights derived from the work of Levinas to portray 
how the law of human dignity is practiced in the Aviation Security Case this 
phenomenological analysis confronts in main the following question: Who is the other 
apropos the Court as the speaking self in the practice of the law of human dignity? 
How are instantiations of the self portrayed in the text of the Aviation Security Act 
Case, and does the self-understanding of the FCC1843 as regards how it relates to the 
other countersign the meaning of practicing the law of human dignity? Demonstration 
of the particulars of the face of the other, namely of his or her imprint on ‘something 
missing’ as an aspect of the meaning of law’s Menschenbild, is a first step towards 
remedying the identified objectification. 
When it is that such a treatment occurs must be stated in concrete 
terms in the individual case in view of the specific situation in 
which a conflict can arise [cited cases omitted].1844 
 The other in the Aviation Security Act Case is the one who can no longer 
exercise self-determination, namely human beings experiencing the deadlock of no 
longer being able to ‘influence the circumstances of their lives independently from 
others in a self-determined manner.’1845 § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is incompatible with Art. 
2 sec. 2 sent. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG ‘to the extent that the 
shooting down of an aircraft affects people who, as its crew and passengers, have not                                                         
1843 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 463 [Cultural criticism of law ‘treats law as a 
dimension of culture insofar as it: […] [i]nterprets self-portrayal as a project that, whatever its 
instrumental payoffs, also has aesthetic and expressive import.’] 
1844 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1845 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154) 
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exerted any influence on the occurrence of the non-warlike aerial incident assumed 
under [the statutory provision].’1846 In such an ‘extreme situation’, marked ‘by the 
cramped conditions of an aircraft in flight’1847, the standard for assessing whether an 
answer on the part of the state as the self is responsible is certainty: ‘it must be 
possible, pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG, to assume with certainty that the aircraft is 
intended to be used against human lives.’1848 
The FCC outlined the circumstances which should be ascertained with 
certainty for § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG to take effect: the aircraft ‘must have been converted 
into an assault weapon by those who have brought it under their command […]’ and 
‘must be used by the perpetrators in a targeted manner as a weapon for the crime, not 
merely as1849 an auxiliary means for committing the crime, against the lives of people 
who stay in the area in which the aircraft is intended to crash […]’1850. The other, 
human beings involved in the Aviation Security Act Case, are the passengers and 
crew, the perpetrators, and the people who stay in the targeted area; they all surface in 
the portrayal of the minor premise in the Court’s legal syllogism. 
The Court depicted the ‘desperate situation’ experienced by the passengers 
and the crew ‘at the moment in which the order to use direct armed force against the 
aircraft involved in the aerial incident pursuant to § 14 sec. 4 LuftSiG is made 
[…]’1851. 
The desperateness [Ausweglosigkeit] and inescapability 
[Unentrinnbarkeit] that characterize the situation of the people on 
board the aircraft who are affected as victims also exist vis-à-vis 
those who order and execute the shooting down of the aircraft. Due 
to the circumstances, which cannot be controlled by them in any 
way, the crew and the passengers of the plane cannot escape [nicht 
ausweichen] this state action but are defenseless and helpless in the 
face of it with the consequence that they are shot down in a targeted 
manner together with the aircraft and as result of this will be killed 
with near certainty. Such a treatment ignores the status of the 
persons affected as subjects endowed with dignity and inalienable                                                         
1846 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1847 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154) 
1848 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153) 
1849 Hoerster distinguishes between ‘bloß als Mittel’ and ‘als Mittel’. Hoerster (1983) 93, 94; See also 
reflections on objectification in Margalit, The Decent Society (1996) 91 [‘We must distinguish between 
treating humans as if they were objects and treating them as objects. In the first case the “objectifier” 
does not actually believe that the people involved are things but simply treats them that way. In the 
second case the “objectifier” actually believes that the person toward whom the “thingish” behavior is 
directed is a sort of object.’] 
 
1850 BVerfGE 115, 118 (153f.) 
1851 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154f.) 
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rights. By their killing being used as a means to save others, they 
are treated as objects and at the same time deprived of their rights; 
with their lives being disposed of unilaterally by the state, the 
persons on board the aircraft, who, as victims, are themselves in 
need of protection, are denied the value which is due to a human 
being for his or her own sake.1852 
 The language employed in practicing the law of human dignity, namely in 
addressing the denial of ‘the value which is due to a human being for his or her own 
sake’ to the passengers and crew on board, portrays dramatically the experience of 
deadlock: ‘desperateness’, ‘inescapability’, ‘victims’, ‘cannot escape’, ‘defenseless’, 
‘helpless’ all communicate the harm experienced.   
The deadlock renders the passengers and crew ‘objects not only of the 
perpetrators of the crime’ but also of the state, ‘which in such a situation resorts to the 
measure provided by § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG’, thereby effectively treating them, argued 
the FCC, ‘as mere objects of its rescue operation for the protection of others.’1853 The 
hermeneutic and literary interpretation of the meaning of objectification comes in 
handy, along with the phenomenological foundations of the introduced model in 
Chapter One, for the analysis of this assertion. In one of the relational portrayals of 
the legal language game produced by the speaking self, namely the FCC, the other 
corresponds to the victims, the innocent human beings on board the aircraft, while the 
self to both the perpetrators of the crime and the state. The actions of the perpetrators 
and the state cause the disruption of the self-determination of the victims, that is, of 
their ability to control the circumstances.  
It is plain to see that the perpetrators as the self violate the human dignity of 
the victims as the other. The assumption, however, that the state shooting down the 
aircraft ‘in a targeted manner’ totalizes the passengers and the crew on board, ignores 
their status as subjects ‘endowed with dignity and inalienable rights’, and objectifies 
and deprives them of their rights because it kills them in order to save the lives of 
those on the ground, begs critical reflection. Objectification, in phenomenological 
terms, means that the other can no longer absolve him or herself from the relation 
with the self with his or her integrity intact.1854 The way of existing of human beings 
treated as mere objects of state action is no longer their ‘final answer’. 
                                                        
1852 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154) 
1853 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154) 
1854 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 16 [Introduction by John Wild]  
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Critical reflection concentrates, from a linguistic-analytical perspective, on the 
portrayal of the viewpoint of the eye, while, from a phenomenological, of the self who 
produces meaning. It has been demonstrated supra how the Objektformel can – and 
should – be understood as a critical reflection mechanism. In the Aviation Security Act 
Case, the FCC found that state action in line with § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG in the case of an 
aircraft carrying innocent passengers and crew amounts to the objectification of 
innocent passengers and crew, hence to an infringement on their human dignity. 
Presumably, the Court’s claim that these human beings are treated as mere objects of 
state action is founded on the outcome of critical reflection artificially provoked by 
the Objektformel doctrine and language. Since all that can be derived from the text of 
the Aviation Security Act Case is the meaning produced, the outcome, the 
phenomenological approach to the self can only generate interrogatives as regards the 
soundness of assumptions. Deeming objectification by the state possible is attuned to 
the commitment to guarantee de facto that the claim to respect and protection of 
human dignity is not violated. Delivering upon this commitment means exercising the 
responsibility to fuel critical reflection with the findings of a reality check.  
Second, state action is parallelized to the action of the terrorists1855, not only 
apropos its consequences, but also – this is particularly relevant to the purposes of a 
phenomenological analysis – with respect to how it is perceived by the other. Can the 
meaning of shooting down an aircraft to avert an attack be analogized with using it as 
a weapon against the lives of human beings on the ground? Can, from the viewpoint 
of the passengers and the crew on board, an attack on the part of the state be 
comparable to the actions of the perpetrators? Does the FCC equate the portrayal of 
the state as the acting self with that of the perpetrators of the crime? From a 
hermeneutic perspective on law, the decisive question would be, who, the self or the 
other, or what, the action as such1856, determines critically the meaning produced? It 
can be safely argued that in practicing the law of human dignity in the Aviation 
Security Act Case the Court does not sufficiently depict the self. Regardless of                                                         
1855 BVerfGE 115, 118 (154) [‘[…] the state itself even encroaches on the lives of these defenseless 
people. Thus any procedure pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG disregards, as has been explained, these 
people’s positions as subjects in a manner that is incompatible with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and disregards the 
ban on killing that results from it for the state.’] 
1856 BVerfGE 115, 118 (157) [‘[…] it is absolutely inconceivable under the applicability of Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG to intentionally kill persons such as the crew and the passengers of a hijacked plane, who are in a 
situation that is hopeless for them, on the basis of a statutory authorization which even accepts such 
imponderabilities if necessary [...]’;  ibid (160) [‘ […] the victims of an attack who are held in the 
aircraft are entitled to their lives being protected by the state.’] 
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whether the self should be the determinant of meaning – a matter contingent on a 
methodological choice among various theoretical strands of hermeneutics – the 
Court’s reasoning does not attend to the advancement of an understanding of who the 
state as self vis-à-vis the perpetrators is.  
It should be noted that deferring to the viewpoint of the other for the 
determination of objectification is compatible with phenomenological insights derived 
from Totality and Infinity. Instead of subsuming the other under a hermetically closed 
totality of meaning, the Court welcomes the other, attends to the experience of 
deadlock and gives precedence to the viewpoint of the other as bearer of human 
dignity and fundamental rights over other viewpoints. This does not, however, mean 
that developing and demonstrating an understanding of the state, the self, should be 
neglected. Why does the state shoot down the aircraft? How is the motivation of the 
state different from that of the perpetrators, and to what extent does such disparity 
constitute an aspect of the meaning produced within the legal language game? What 
are the ethics underlying state action and the action of the perpetrators? How can the 
soundness of the assertion that the victims of an attack are ‘denied’ the value of their 
lives on the part of the state, although de facto the state cannot actually protect them 
under the circumstances, be appreciated? How can one deny what exceeds the bounds 
of possibility? The latter question suggests that the significance of the Court’s 
reasoning in the Aviation Security Act Case may be the statement uttered per se. This 
realization affirms the aptness of a hermeneutic and literary methodological approach 
to the text of this particular case. 
Far from a doctrine ostensibly comprehending all conceivable violations of 
human dignity, and a pretext for schematic oversimplification, the Objektformel 
doctrine presents, from a hermeneutic and literary perspective, an opportunity for the 
self to attain and demonstrate the ability to respond to the other1857, while becoming 
aware of arbitrariness. The cultivation of responsibility, namely the ability to respond 
in a justifiable manner to the other, calls for critical reflection on the portrayal of the 
other as in the Aviation Security Act Case. The FCC associated ‘being used as a 
means to save others’ with being treated as an object. An interruption of the 
continuity of human beings, however, does not necessarily follow from their use as 
means to certain ends. Identifying objectification with being used as means to ends,                                                         
1857 ibid 14 [Introduction by John Wild]; See Thurner (2001) 185 
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unless grounded on sound arguments and interpreted in light of context, develops the 
totalizing effects of oversimplification. For the association to soundly hold true, 
critical reflection and justification tailored to ad hoc cases1858 of using human beings 
as means to ends are needed. The discussion of sacrifice infra, an occasion of 
becoming means to ends, offers an opportunity for enhancement of the latter 
argument.  
The FCC rebutted, first, the assumption ‘that someone boarding an aircraft as 
a crew member or as a passenger will presumably consent to its being shot down, and 
thus to his or her own killing’ on the grounds that it ‘lacks any realistic grounds and is 
no more than an unrealistic fiction’1859. The Court thereby identified verification 
grounded on realistic assertions as a standard for ascertaining whether the answer to 
the other is responsible. The Court furthermore rejected that ‘the nature of an 
infringement’ on the right to dignity of ‘persons who are on board a plane that is 
intended to be used against other people’s lives within the meaning of § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG’ can be removed from ‘the killing of innocent people’ who experience the 
despair involved in such an operation ‘as a general rule’ on account of the assessment 
that they ‘are doomed anyway.’1860 
The constitutional protection of human life and human dignity cannot be made 
contingent on a quantitative appreciation of human being-ness, in other words ‘the 
duration of the physical existence of the individual human being’. Denying or 
challenging this proposition is tantamount to renouncing the victims of the attack, 
who find themselves ‘in a desperate situation that offers no alternative to them’ and 
are, therefore, deprived of self-determination.1861 Not according them the respect 
which is due to them for the sake of their human dignity could be portrayed in light of 
phenomenological insights in Chapter One as the turning of the face away from the 
other, the forbearing from face-to-face encounter. The notion of morality as                                                         
1858 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162) [‘[…] situations are conceivable in which it can be reliably ascertained 
that the only people on board an aircraft which is involved in an aerial incident are offenders 
participating in such an incident, and in which it can also be assumed with sufficient certainty that a 
mission pursuant to §14 sec. 3 LuftSiG will not have consequences that are detrimental to the lives of 
people on the ground. Whether such a factual situation exists depends on the assessment of the 
situation in the individual case.’] 
1859 BVerfGE 115, 118 (157) 
1860 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158) [‘Human life and human dignity enjoy the same constitutional protection 
regardless of the duration of the physical existence of the individual human being […]. Whoever denies 
[leugnet] this or calls this into question denies those [verwehrt denjenigen] who, such as the victims of 
a hijacking, are in a desperate situation that offers no alternative to them, precisely the respect which is 
due to them for the sake of their human dignity […].’] 
1861 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158) 
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elaborated on in Totality and Infinity gives the gist of what amounts to a responsible 
answer in view of the second assumption refuted by the Court, that is, quantification. 
Non-quantification alludes to the notion of infinity, of seeing the Other in the face of 
the other; denying or challenging the non-quantification contention constitutes an 
affront to human being-ness, hence, also, to human dignity and compromises 
morality, through which alone ‘are I and the others produced in the universe’1862. 
Not seeing the human being in the face of the other forecloses the very 
possibility of language and the pre-ethics of responsibility, hospitality and generosity. 
This instance of practicing human dignity language can be portrayed by analogy with 
the concept of morality or the accomplishing of the I qua I1863 as defined in Totality 
and Infinity. The innocent human beings on board are vulnerable, a concrete 
substantiation among infinite exigencies converging at one point in the universe1864. 
Prior to the legal subject, defined as such in terms of the system of law, it is the face 
of the vulnerable other that should be approached by the state as self in service and 
generosity in accordance with the relational, phenomenological account of the law of 
human dignity.  
The Court furthermore reacted against the assumption that ‘anyone who is 
held on board an aircraft under the command of persons who intend to use the aircraft 
as a weapon of a crime against other people’s lives within the meaning of § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG has become part of a weapon and must bear being treated as such […].’1865 
The language employed, on the borderline between metaphor and le mot juste, 
conjures up an evocative picture of the other totalized by the perpetrators. The 
figurative rendering of the totality imposed on those human beings is evident in the 
following excerpt.  
[...] the victims of such an incident are no longer perceived as 
human beings but as part of an object, a view by which they 
themselves become objects. This cannot be reconciled with the 
Basic Law’s concept of the human being and with the idea of the 
human being as a creature whose nature it is to exercise self-
determination in freedom [cited case omitted], and who therefore 
may not be made a mere object of state action.1866  
                                                        
1862 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 245 
1863 ibid 
1864 ibid 
1865 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158) 
1866 BVerfGE 115, 118 (158f.) 
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 The elusive passive voice framing, ‘are no longer perceived as human beings 
but as part of an object’, effectively conceals the self who is charged with viewing the 
other as ‘part of an object’. This observation affirms the need for critical reflection on 
the inadequacy or unavailability of a portrayal of the self, to wit the critical viewpoint. 
The prevalent phenomenological framing of the observation of causality between how 
the victims are perceived and how, due to exposure to the meaning produced, they 
become themselves objects points to the correlation between how the other is 
perceived and how the other consequently ends up viewing him or herself. The other 
is objectified, that is, totalized, and subsumed under the meaning projected on him or 
her. The self-understanding of the other may eventually coordinate with who or what 
the other is perceived to be. Where the dividing line between phenomenology and 
ontology is to be drawn, appears ambiguous. The phenomenologically grounded 
standard for evaluating whether responses amount to responsible answers to the other 
is respect for the self-determination of the other as an absolutely Other.  
iv. Reflections on sacrifice 
 An idea furthered in legal scholarship1867 drew the Court’s attention, namely 
‘that the individual is obliged to sacrifice his or her life in the interest of the state as a 
whole in case of need if this is the only possible way of protecting the legally 
constituted body politic from attacks which are aimed at its breakdown and 
destruction’1868. The FCC argued that assuming a duty to sacrifice one’s life cannot 
justify the state action prescribed in the contested statutory provision.  
In this context, the Senate need not decide whether, and should the 
occasion arise, under which circumstances such a duty of taking 
responsibility, in solidarity, over and above the mechanisms of 
protection provided in the emergency constitution can be derived 
from the Basic Law. For in the area of application of § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG the issue is not averting attacks aimed at abolishing the 
body politic and at eliminating the state’s legal and constitutional 
system.1869 
 The Court shared an understanding of sacrifice as ‘the duty of taking 
responsibility, in solidarity, over and above the mechanisms of protection provided in 
the emergency constitution’, yet abstained from identifying the circumstances under                                                         
1867 BVerfGE 115, 118 (159) [The FCC referred parenthetically ‘for instance’ to Enders, in: Berliner 
Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, vol. 1, Artikel 1, marginal no. 93 (as of July 2005).] 
1868 BVerfGE 115, 118 (159) 
1869 BVerfGE 115, 118 (159) 
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which a duty to sacrifice oneself can be derived from the Basic Law. The Court stated 
it ‘need not’ engage in further elaboration on sacrifice as an aspect of the justificatory 
basis of state action in line with § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG, because the statutory provision 
was anyway not designed to address attacks against the body politic and the state’s 
legal and constitutional system1870. Sacrifice entails becoming means to ends, yet 
signifies in a sense the antipode of objectification as it involves transcendence and 
transascendance of the self in solidarity, fraternity and responsibility. Resisting 
overall involvement with the question whether the constitutionality of § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG can be grounded in the duty to sacrifice oneself for the protection of the body 
politic and the state’s legal and constitutional system, the FCC noticed that these aims 
are excluded from the area of application of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG. In other words, the 
Court remained silent on the matter, producing legal arguments about the objective of 
the contested statute instead.  
Critical reflection – through a hermeneutic and literary lens – on how the 
theme of sacrifice features in the Court’s argumentation would probably encourage 
inclination towards the assessment of consistency with linguistic-analytical insights 
on the metaphysical subject as the limit of the world and transcendental ethics on the 
one hand, and with the phenomenological distinction between totality and infinity on 
the other. The ideas of solidarity, fraternity, responsibility and morality as they appear 
in the thought of Levinas shed light on aspects of the meaning of the duty to sacrifice. 
The ethics manifested in these concepts allude to the notion of transcendence. The 
presence of such language in the practice of law indicates law’s meta-dimension, 
namely transcendence of the boundaries of legal language games, that is, totality 
structures, and, at the same time, transascendance towards infinity.  
What can only be shown cannot be said; the Court’s abstention from 
elaborating on the irrelevance of a duty to sacrifice apropos the legal language game 
can be viewed as an affirmation, in practice, of Wittgenstein’s proposition. Individual 
human beings are metaphysical subjects and the limit of their world; as such, they are 
respected for being absolutely Other. The Court evaded the elucidation of the duty to                                                         
1870 BVerfGE 115, 118 (159) [‘§§ 13 to 15 LuftSiG serve to prevent, in the context of police power, the 
occurrence of especially grave accidents within the meaning of Art. 35 sec. 2 sent. 2 and 3 GG. As 
appears from the reasoning of the Act, such accidents can be politically motivated but can also be 
caused by criminals or by mentally confused persons acting on their own. […] Under these 




sacrifice and the demonstration of reasons for resisting its institution as a basis for 
justification within the realm of law. In similar fashion to the Court’s position on the 
duty of the mother to sacrifice herself in the Abortion I Case, such duty found no 
place in the totality of the Aviation Security Act Case legal language game.  
Self-determined human beings can virtuously sacrifice themselves; this 
cannot, however, be expected of them within a constitutional order founded on the 
law of human dignity, since it would mean the destruction, in phenomenological 
terms, of the radical distance between the state as self and human beings as the other, 
and would compromise respect for the other as absolutely Other. Virtue of character 
manifested in the willingness of the metaphysical subject to change the limits of the 
world or the legal language game as a subtotal of the world cannot be forced on 
human beings – only, perhaps, cultivated. The analysis of the duty to sacrifice oneself 
intimates most paradigmatically the idea of asymmetry1871 in the relational – 
linguistic-analytical and phenomenological – accounts of human dignity in Chapter 
One. No standard for evaluating whether the answer to the other is responsible is 
offered here. Be that as it may, the Court introduced an important clarification, which 
essentially affirms that both totality and infinity constitute aspects of the meaning of 
practicing the law of human dignity. The FCC pointed to the lens of law as the 
determinant of what can be said within the totality of the legal language game 
produced. Delineating a totality substantiates that something, or ‘something missing’, 
lies beyond and outside that space.  
v. An alternative portrayal: the perpetrators as the other 
To this point in the analysis of the Aviation Security Act Case, the perpetrators 
have been viewed as another self who harms the other. A parallel drawn between the 
state shooting down the aircraft to avert the danger for the lives of those on the 
ground on the one hand, and the offenders of the crime apropos the harm inflicted on 
the passengers and crew on board on the other, can be identified in the text of the 
Aviation Security Act Case. The FCC treats the perpetrators not only as a self, but also 
as the other, and this dual depiction occasions the second conceivable portrayal of the 
practice of the law of human dignity in this legal language game.  
                                                        
1871 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 244 [‘God sees the invisible and sees without being seen.’] 
 406
§ 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is, however, compatible with Art. 2 sec. 2 sent. 
1 GG in conjunction with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG to the extent that the 
direct use of armed force is aimed at a pilotless aircraft or 
exclusively [ausschließlich] at persons who want to use the aircraft 
as a weapon of a crime against the lives of people on the ground.1872 
 The other is defined as the person who intends to use the aircraft ‘as a weapon 
of a crime against the lives of people on the ground’. The definition encapsulates the 
phenomenology of the relation between the perpetrator as the self and the people on 
the ground as the other and, at the same time, expresses the perception of the 
perpetrator as the other from the viewpoint of the speaking self, namely the Court.  
Unlike the use of armed force against a pilotless aircraft, on the constitutionality of 
which no elaboration is deemed necessary1873, whether armed force aimed 
‘exclusively’ at the perpetrators constitutes a responsible response to this 
concretization of the other begs critical reflection and close scrutiny.  
Whoever, such as those who want to abuse an aircraft as a weapon 
to destroy human lives, unlawfully attacks the legal interests of 
others is not fundamentally called into question as regards his or her 
quality as a subject by being made the mere object of state action 
[…] if the state defends itself against the unlawful attack and tries to 
avert it, complying with its duty to protect vis-à-vis those whose 
lives are intended to be annihilated. On the contrary, it exactly 
corresponds to the attacker’s position as a subject if the 
consequences of his or her self-determined conduct are attributed to 
him or her personally, and if the attacker is held responsible for the 
events that he or she started. The attacker’s right to respect of the 
dignity that is inherent also to him or her is therefore not 
impaired.1874 
The assertion that the punishment honors the criminal was deemed 
incompatible with the Basic Law in the Life Imprisonment Case, where the Court 
essentially distinguished between criminal law and constitutional law as lenses 
through which to look at reality in order to decide on the subsumption or non-
subsumption of facts and issues, theories and doctrine under the legal language game 
produced. The Court outlined the sphere of responsibility of the offenders under the 
circumstances and how this influences the gravity of the encroachment. 
                                                        
1872 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) 
1873 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) [‘To this extent the guarantee of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is 
not contrary to the ordering and carrying out of an operation pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 GG. This goes 
without saying in operations against a pilotless aircraft but also applies in the other case.’] 
1874 BVerfGE 115, 118 (161) 
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However, the encroachment upon fundamental rights carries much 
weight because the execution of the operation pursuant to § 14 sec. 
3 LuftSiG will with near certainty result in the death of the people 
on board the plane. But under the combination of circumstances that 
is assumed here, it is these people themselves who, as offenders, 
have brought about the necessity of state intervention, and that they 
can avert such intervention at any time by refraining from realizing 
their criminal plan. It is the people who have the aircraft under their 
command who determine the course of events on board, but also on 
the ground in a decisive manner. Their killing can only take place if 
it can be established with certainty that they will use the aircraft that 
is under their control to kill people, and if they keep to their plan 
even though they are aware of the danger to their lives that this 
involves for them. This reduces the gravity of the encroachment 
upon their fundamental rights. 1875 
In this portrayal of the perpetrator as the other, self-determination and self-
responsibility constitute the defining aspects of human dignity meaning. Self-
responsibility presumes the ability to practice self-determination. The Court noted, 
not only is the quality of the subject in the face of the perpetrators not challenged by 
state action as prescribed in § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG, but, on the contrary, the state as self 
accords them the constitutionally guaranteed respect for their human dignity by 
responding to their self-determined conduct. State action using armed force 
‘exclusively’ against the perpetrators is compatible with the phenomenological 
account of the meaning of practicing human dignity in law, in that it mirrors an 
understanding of the other as a self-determined and self-responsible, hence absolutely 
separated from the self, human being. The uncertainty and imponderability arising 
from the circumstances of an operation pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG fall within the 
sphere of the perpetrators’ self-determination and self-responsibility. Uncertainty and 
imponderability distort the task of a totalizer self and the validity of synoptic thought. 
The speaking self is thus challenged to address those traits of life in a responsible 
manner. As the following excerpt shows, the speaking self deals with the uncertainty 
and imponderability incidental to the circumstances of the case by locating those 
within the sphere of responsibility of either the state, in the case of innocent 
passengers and crew on board the aircraft, or the perpetrators, when the latter are the 
only ones on board.  
If those who have the aircraft under their command do not intend to 
use it as a weapon, if therefore the corresponding suspicion is 
unfounded, they can, on the occasion of the early measures carried                                                         
1875 BVerfGE 115, 118 (164) 
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out pursuant to § 15 sec. 1 LuftSiG and § 14 sec. 1 LuftSiG, for 
instance on account of the threat to use armed force or on account of 
a warning shot, easily show by cooperating, for instance by 
changing course or by landing the aircraft, that no danger emanates 
from them. The specific difficulties that can arise as regards 
communication between the cabin crew, which is possibly 
threatened by offenders, and the cockpit, and between the cockpit 
and the decision-makers on the ground, do not exist here. […] If no 
indications exist that there are people on board an aircraft that has 
become conspicuous who are not participants in the crime, 
remaining uncertainties – for example as regards the underlying 
motives of the aerial incident – refer to a course of events that has 
been started, and can be averted, by those against whom the 
measure averting danger pursuant to § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is 
exclusively directed. 1876 
The soundness of deducing that the state does not objectify the perpetrators 
from the ascertainment that the latter acted in self-determination and self-
responsibility and asserting that their right to human dignity was not thereby 
compromised calls for critical reflection. As in other instances in the text of the 
Aviation Security Act Case, the Court failed to demonstrate with clarity the 
determinant of the meaning produced. Apparently, the action of shooting down an 
aircraft under the circumstances of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG as such is not univocal; its 
significance depends on who is being shot at. Whose, then, is the decisive viewpoint, 
understood in hermeneutic and literary terms? Should the viewpoint of the self and 
the other be evaluated separately, or examined in relation to one another? In the 
phenomenological portrayal of the Aviation Security Act Case it is plain to see that the 
Court, the speaking self, gives prominence to how the other perceives of him or 
herself, namely to the experiences and the responsibility he or she assumes, and 
centers on the face of the other to make sense of the meaning of his or her actions. 
Precedence to the viewpoint of the other can be interpreted as hospitality towards the 
stranger. In the text of the decision, however, this is paired with abstention from 
enhancing the depiction of the self; the surfacing disparity between the portrayal of 
the other and the non-portrayal of the self requires closer scrutiny and critical 
reflection.  
vi. The self, the human factor within institutions 
Focusing on the production of meaning by the self can be associated with the 
practice of the law of human dignity as a duty to respect and protect human dignity;                                                         
1876 BVerfGE 115, 118 (161f.) 
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emphasizing the other alludes to the corresponding subjective right of defense against 
the state.1877 How the duty ensuing from the law of human dignity is understood and 
portrayed in each case is, therefore, indicative of how the speaking self, the Court, 
portrays the state as self.  
The state and its bodies ‘have a broad margin of appreciation, evaluation and 
organization’ [Einschätzungs-, Wertungs- und Gestaltungsbereich]1878 in complying 
with the duty of protection in line with ‘the objective content of fundamental 
rights’1879. In other words, the self has extensive authority over the meaning produced. 
This duty is not defined ‘in principle’1880. Why is that so? Seeking an explanation for 
‘something always missing’, I resort to the idea of morality in Totality and Infinity. 
The human factor is mirrored in the anthropomorphic portrayal of ‘how the state 
bodies comply with such duties’, namely ‘as a matter of principle, by themselves on 
their own responsibility […].’1881 
vii. The principle of proportionality as an appeal to intersubjective space 
Another constitutional standard employed in the Aviation Security Act Case is 
the principle of proportionality1882, which, similarly to the law of human dignity, 
communicates the meta-dimension of law. Practicing the principle of proportionality 
opens up the possibility of an intersubjective space. The advantage of this 
hermeneutic and literary approach is that it can affirm the happening of the 
intersubjective space in the text of the Aviation Security Act Case, whereas a doctrinal 
approach would simply stress the inapplicability of the proportionality test. The 
objective served by the contested provision is to save human lives. In view of ‘the 
ultimate value’ of human life in the constitutional order of the Basic Law, ‘this is a 
regulatory purpose of such weight that it can justify the serious encroachment upon 
                                                        
1877 BVerfGE 115, 118 (16); ibid (152) [‘In view of this relation between the right to life and human 
dignity, the state is prohibited, on the one hand, from encroaching upon the fundamental right to life by 
measures of its own, thereby violating the ban on the disregard of human dignity. On the other hand, 
the state is also obliged to protect every human life. This duty of protection demands of the state and its 
bodies to shield and to promote the life of every individual, which means above all to also protect it 
from unlawful attacks, and interference, by third [cited cases omitted]. Also this duty of protection has 
its foundations in Article 1 sec. 1 sent. 2 GG, which explicitly obliges the state to respect and protect 
human dignity [cited cases omitted].’] 
1878 BVerfGE 115, 118 (159) 
1879 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) 
1880 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) 
1881 BVerfGE 115, 118 (160) 
1882 BVerfGE 115, 118 (124) 
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the right to life of the offenders on board the aircraft.’1883 The provision was found 
suitable if only the perpetrators are on board the aircraft and it can be predicted that 
shooting it down ‘can avert the danger from the people on the ground […]’1884. It was 
also found necessary for achieving the objective of saving human lives, ‘because no 
equally effective means is apparent that does not impair the offenders’ right to life at 
all, or impairs it less […].’1885 
Finally, the authorisation to use direct armed force against an 
aircraft on board of which there are only people who want to abuse 
it within the meaning of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG, is also proportional in 
the narrower sense. According to the result of the overall weighing 
up between the seriousness of the encroachment upon fundamental 
rights that it involves and the weight of the legal interests that are to 
be protected […], the shooting down of such an aircraft is an 
appropriate measure of averting danger which is reasonable for the 
persons affected if there is certainty about the elements of the 
offence.1886 
Does the contested provision, in the end, reflect that the state is able to 
respond to the other, namely, each time, to the threatened, thus vulnerable, human 
being? The phenomenological analysis of the Aviation Security Act sheds light on the 
importance of the ad hoc evaluation of circumstances in cases marked by the traits of 
uncertainty and imponderability. Ad hoc approaches evoke the practice of the pre-
ethics set out in Totality and Infinity in the face-to-face encounter. As far as the 
applicability of § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG is concerned, the Court explained that if the 
assessment of the ad hoc case leads to ‘the safe judgment that there are only offenders 
on board the aircraft’ and to ‘the prognosis that state action could save the lives of the 
people on the ground’, then ‘the success that is intended to be achieved by § 14 sec. 3 
LuftSiG is furthered’ [wird der Erfolg, der mit § 14 sec. 3 LuftSiG erreicht werden 
soll, gefördert].1887 The FCC concluded that the ability of the state, the self, to 
respond to the other, as manifested in the contested provision, ‘cannot be generally 
denied.’1888 Whether the self acts responsibly should be assessed apropos who the 
other is perceived to be as ensuing from the text of the decision. 
                                                         
1883 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162) 
1884 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162f.) 
1885 BVerfGE 115, 118 (163) 
1886 BVerfGE 115, 118 (163f.) 
1887 BVerfGE 115, 118 (163) 
1888 BVerfGE 115, 118 (162) 
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4. Concluding observations 
The hermeneutic and literary portrayal of the Abortion I Case has 
demonstrated an inconsistency between the meaning of a particular manifestation of 
human being-ness, the relation of the pregnant woman to the unborn child, within the 
realm of life and the rendering of this relation in the legal language game produced by 
the FCC. The imprint of unborn life on the Menschenbild of the signified as 
‘something missing’ prior to its occupation, emphasized qualities such as potentiality 
and continuity. Recognizing the human dignity of the unborn, the Court essentially 
justified commitment to ensuring the traversal of limits by the fetus in coming-into-
being and unfolding its essence.  
V. The Subsistence Minimum Case (2010)1889 
 
The Subsistence Minimum Case touches on those aspects of human being-ness 
with respect to which the Menschenbild and the law of human dignity would be 
expected, on an unsophisticated first reading, to need no concretization ad hoc as, 
apropos the existence of basal needs associated with the very subsistence, all 
particular diverse concretizations of human being-ness are same. However, appearing 
committed to a face-to-face encounter in view of the law of human dignity, the Court 
looked beyond the ostensible sameness, and identified particulars of the human image 
that influence the scope of what amounts to a subsistence minimum, while, moreover, 
addressing the issue of lack of provision for atypical circumstances requiring. In the 
Subsistence Minimum Case the Court engaged in a systematic perusal of the methods, 
models of calculation and sources of data employed by the legislature to estimate the 
amount of benefits. On the basis of its findings, it decided that certain benefits defined 
in the statutory law were incompatible with the constitution on the basis of 
inconsistencies and randomness in their assessment.  
 
1. Decision  
 The fundamental right to a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity 
ensues from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with the principle of the social state 
under Art. 20 sec. 1 GG, and constitutes an autonomous legal basis for the Court’s                                                         
1889 BVerfGE 125, 175 (2010) [Hartz IV, referred to presently as Subsistence Minimum Case], First 
Senate of the FCC 
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argumentation that encompasses both physical existence, which depends on securing 
essential material needs, and access to a minimum participation in social, cultural and 
political life. Though the decision is additionally premised on the absolute guarantee 
of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, the fundamental right that flows from 
human dignity and the social state principle enjoys an independent standing and the 
determination of its practice does not lie entirely in the hands of the legislature. 
However, practicing this fundamental right requires concretization and regular 
updating to ensure that the actual needs corresponding to a subsistence minimum are 
addressed. The development of the polity and the conditions of life are factors to be 
taken into account by the legislator in assessing the adequate amount of social 
benefits. The latitude of the legislator to identify the types of needs and the 
appropriate means to meet those was recognized by the Court, which took into 
account that these are not directly pointed to in the Basic Law.  
 The First Senate of the FCC found the Second Book of the Social Law 
[Zweiten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB II)] provisions re the standard benefit for 
adults and children incompatible with the constitutional guarantee ensuing from Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG, namely the fundamental right to a 
subsistence minimum in line with human dignity. Unconstitutional provisions would 
remain applicable until new ones would be enacted by the legislator. The claim to the 
benefit for atypical needs could be established even before the enactment of the new 
statutory provisions for it was directly grounded on the Basic Law. There was no duty 
on the part of the legislature to retroactively fix the benefits derived from Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG.  
 The requirement of a consistent, transparent1890 and appropriate procedure 
for estimating the expenditure that adequately covers the subsistence minimum is 
central to the Court’s line of argumentation. Ultimately, the benefits should be in tune 
with actual and real needs, and the sources and methodologies used in calculating 
those consistent and accessible. Since the Basic Law offers no orientation with 
regards to how the claim to a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity should 
be concretized, the FCC may engage in a restricted substantive review and consider 
only evidently insufficient benefits1891, leaving the task of concretization to the 
legislature. Apart from assessing whether the benefits conform to an essential                                                         
1890 Spellbrink (2011) 661, 664 
1891 ibid 661, 663f. 
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baseline, the methods employed to calculate those should be subject to scrutiny. 
Emphasis on the consistency of applied methods enhances the traceability of the 
statutory regulation’s conformity to fundamental rights standards and enables the 
ascertainment of justifiability of the decided benefits.  
 In judging the Subsistence Minimum Case, the FCC reviewed the 
legislature’s compliance with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG 
in figuring the benefits, the suitability of methods of calculation, the extent to which 
the surveying of facts required for deciding on the benefits was exhaustive, and, 
finally, whether the legislature had consistently respected the boundaries of its 
latitude. Transparent disclosure of the various components of the calculation 
procedure of the subsistence minimum and corresponding benefits was deemed 
indispensible to the possibility of review by the FCC. If this crucial parameter is not 
observed, the subsistence minimum is presumed to be incompatible with Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG.  
 The standard benefits were not, in the Court’s view, evidently insufficient to 
secure a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity1892. No constitutional 
objection could be raised against the standard benefit amount of €345 on grounds of 
evident insufficiency, since it covered the material needs essential to maintaining a 
subsistence minimum. With regards to the social, cultural and political aspect of the 
subsistence minimum, the latitude of the legislature is considerably broad; hence an 
ascertainment of evident insufficiency could not be established.1893 Along the same 
lines, the amount of €311 for adult partners in a joint household and the amount of 
€207 for children between 7 and 14 years of age were not considered evidently 
                                                        
1892 ibid 
1893 Cf. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice – A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983) 8 [‘There is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral and 
material worlds – or, any such set would have to be conceived in terms so abstract that they would be 
of little use in thinking about particular distributions. Even the range of necessities, if we take into 
account moral as well as physical necessities, is very wide, and the rank orderings are very different. A 
single necessary good, and one that is always necessary – food, for example – carries different 
meanings in different places. Bread is the staff of life, the body of Christ, the symbol of the Sabbath, 
the means of hospitality, and so on. Conceivably, there is a limited sense in which the first of these is 
primary, so that if there were twenty people in the world and just enough bread to feed the twenty, the 
primacy of bread-as-staff-of-life would yield a sufficient distributive principle. But that is the only 
circumstance in which it would do so; and even there, we can’t be sure. If the religious uses of bread 
were to conflict with its nutritional uses […] it is by no means clear which use would be primary. How, 
then, is bread to be incorporated into the universal list? The question is even harder to answer, the 
conventional answers less plausible, as we pass from necessities to opportunities, powers, reputations, 
and so on. These can be incorporated only if they are abstracted from every particular meaning – 
hence, for all practical purposes, rendered meaningless.’] 
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insufficient1894, since it was reasonable for the legislature to assume that the 
expenditure in those cases would be lower, even if the financial minimum needs cover 
basically the physical aspect of the subsistence minimum.  
 The FCC found the legislature’s statistical analysis (statistical model, 
sample survey, selection of reference group, criteria of evaluation) reliable, and the 
empirical data employed suitable. The Court scrutinized, to the extent permitted by its 
latitude, the appropriateness and justifiability of methods. The legislature, noted the 
Court, should be able to demonstrate that the classification of expenditure items in the 
divisions of the sample survey was based on empirical data. The Court stressed the 
importance of ensuring the soundness of the empirical basis used for the various 
estimations in which the legislature engaged in order to ascertain the amount of 
benefits. It found that the standard benefit of €345, although – as mentioned supra – 
not evidently insufficient1895, had in fact not been calculated in a constitutionally 
acceptable manner because the structural principles underlying the statistical model 
had been applied inconsistently without factual justification. The Court moved on to 
identify instances of deviation from the standard set by the legislature and, 
additionally, the absence of reasoning in support of the change of standard. 
 Since the standard benefit of €345 was found unconstitutional, the therefrom 
derived benefits, €311 for partners living together and €207 for children, also did not 
comply with constitutional requirements. With regards to the social allowance of 
€207 for children, the FCC additionally noted that no justifiable method was resorted 
to by the legislature in order to determine the subsistence minimum of a child before 
completing the age of 14. The specific needs of that group were neither inquired into, 
nor systematically juxtaposed to those of an adult. The estimation of the particular 
amount at 40 per cent less than the standard benefit of a single adult appeared to be 
random, that is, not methodically sound and empirically verified. Needs related to 
education were enumerated by the FCC, while not addressing those as claims to a 
dignified subsistence minimum was directly associated with exclusion from chances 
in life. Finally, the Court noticed that nowhere in the procedure followed by the 
legislature did the evaluation of children’s subsistence minimum in line with human 
dignity appear to be contingent on age differences.  
                                                        
1894 Spellbrink (n 1890) 661, 663f.   
1895 ibid 
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Another gap in the statute giving rise to incompatibility with the fundamental 
right under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG was the absence of 
provision for a claim to benefits corresponding to a current non-recurring special 
need. The standard benefit only reflected the average need in usual circumstances and 
was not designed to address atypical needs exceeding it. The granting of a standard 
benefit as a fixed rate was considered in principle permissible. The effectiveness of 
the fixed rate model is associated with the responsibility recognized to the individual 
to organize his or her own expenditure and practice saving up. If, however, these 
sources were proven insufficient to tackle an irrefutable, current, non-recurring 
special need, the legislature would have to provide for a hardship arrangement and 
institute a claim to assistance benefits for the purpose of meeting that special need. 
The responsible state organs are under the duty to protect the dignity of human 
beings from violations by foreign states as third parties1896. Human dignity is thus 
foundational a legal concept to asylum law.1897 That foreigners or stateless persons 
fall within the subjective scope of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG has been established in FCC 
jurisprudence1898. In the context of the protection of the subsistence minimum, the 
FCC as an evolving self1899 appears to be practicing intensely self-reflection and to be 
willing to dig deep to ensure that a responsible answer is given to the other. In the 
recent FCC judgment1900 on the amount of cash benefits paid in accordance with the 
Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, the Court held the amount insufficient on the grounds 
                                                        
1896 Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar (2010) para 41 
1897 BVerfGE 54, 341 (357) (1980) [Wirtschaftsasyl] [‘Voraussetzungen und Umfang des politischen 
Asyls sind wesentlich bestimmt von der Unverletzlichkeit der Menschenwürde, die als oberstes 
Verfassungsprinzip nach der geschichtlichen Entwicklung des Asylrechts die Verankerung eines 
weitreichenden Asylanspruchs im Grundgesetz entscheidend beeinflußt hat. Zu dem asylrechtlich 
geschützten Bereich der persönlichen Freiheit gehören grundsätzlich auch die Rechte auf freie 
Religionsausübung und ungehinderte berufliche und wirtschaftliche Betätigung, die bei den 
Beschwerdeführern ihren Angaben zufolge über die Unversehrtheit von Leib und Leben hinaus 
gefährdet sind. Soweit nicht eine unmittelbare Gefahr für Leib, Leben oder persönliche Freiheit 
besteht, können Beeinträchtigungen der bezeichneten Rechtsgüter allerdings ein Asylrecht nur dann 
begründen, wenn sie nach ihrer Intensität und Schwere die Menschenwürde verletzen und über das 
hinausgehen, was die Bewohner des Heimatstaats aufgrund des dort herrschenden Systems allgemein 
hinzunehmen haben. Das Asylrecht wegen politischer Verfolgung soll jedenfalls nicht allgemein 
jedem, der in seiner Heimat benachteiligt wird und etwa in materieller Not leben muß, die Möglichkeit 
eröffnen, seine Heimat zu verlassen, um in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seine Lebenssituation zu 
verbessern.’]; BVerfGE 56, 216 (235 f.) (1981) [Rechtsschutz im Asylverfahren] 
1898 See BVerfGE 50, 166 (1979) [Ausweisung I]; See also Starck, Art. 1 Abs. 1, GG Kommentar 
(2010) para 82 fn 270 
1899 ‘That the BVerfGE has decided differently in the past, does not stand as an argument.’ In 
Spellbrink (n 1890) 661, 663 [legal science and jurisprudence as interactive processes] 
1900 BVerfGE 132, 134 (2012) [Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz], First Senate of the FCC 
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that it had not been changed since 1993. In judging this case, the fundamental right to 
a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity was put forward. 
The Court portrayed a multidimensional Menschenbild and required that 
physical existence needs and interpersonal relationships as well as a minimum of 
participation in social, cultural and political life be attended to by means of the 
amount secured. The subjective scope of the entitlement to this fundamental right 
expanded to include both German and foreign nationals residing in Germany, 
regardless of residence status. Deviations from this imperative, which expresses the 
vitality of the subsistence minimum and alludes to the law of human dignity as its 
foundation, should be grounded, according to the Court, in consistent substantiation 
of differentiations and transparency of the content of estimation procedures followed. 
Casting the focus on the guarantee of a subsistence minimum in line with human 
dignity shows how rights across levels of constitutionalism seem to further one and 
the same claim and to, thus, generate legal pluralism. Personal legal pluralism1901 
surfaces in the text of the Subsistence Minimum Case since the right deriving from 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 20 sec. 1 GG may also be viewed as a human right. 
 
2. Discussion  
The guarantee of a dignified existence constitutes, historically, the first 
framing of human dignity as a legal concept. In the 1919 Weimarer Reichsverfassung 
the dignified existence [menschenwürdiges Dasein] was protected as an aspect of the 
economic life regulations [Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens].1902  
Human dignity is, according to Spellbrink, the only constitutional foundation 
for the right to a subsistence minimum and the claim to the guarantee of a subsistence 
minimum in line with human dignity. The right under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction 
with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG is fundamental in character and covers not only the standard 
benefit, but also atypical needs. This understanding is attuned to both the 
Mitgifttheorie and the Leistungstheorie conceptions of human dignity meaning. In line 
with the former, every human being is supplied with the essentials; the latter, 
premised on the association of human dignity with achievement or performance, 
                                                        
1901 See Baer, Rechtssoziologie (2011) 90ff. 
1902 Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 2 
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enables the self-care of the individual through the legal claim to elemental 
performance.1903  
Spellbrink argues that focusing on the question of the needs to be included in 
the standard benefit leads to the devaluation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, that is, to the ‘kleine 
Münze’ effect, because it sets the stage for exceeding the truly elemental needs and 
adding to the scope of the standard benefit petty demands.1904 Voices in the legal 
scholarship alert the FCC not to render the guarantee of human dignity a general 
catchphrase for all problems of social law, since these are – save subsistence 
minimum cases – handled in traditional legal doctrine.1905 The FCC in earlier cases 
resisted producing jurisprudence on the duty of the state to deal with material need 
[materieller Not], but later changed this stance.1906 The state must guarantee in any 
case the minimum requirements for an existence in line with human dignity 
[menschenwürdiges Dasein] to those citizens who, due to physical or mental 
disability or in lack of own means to their personal and social development, are 
unable to sustain themselves. 1907  
FCC subsistence minimum jurisprudence emphasizes the latitude and 
discretion [Gestaltungsfreiheit] of the legislator to support individual human beings in 
need and to establish their claim to protection of a dignified subsistence minimum in 
line with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG1908. Starck notes, 
since this claim springs directly from the constitution, its financial effects should be 
clearly assessed and granted irrespective of the financial situation of the state; 
                                                        
1903 Spellbrink (n 1890) 661, 663 
1904 ibid 664 
1905 ibid 661 
1906 BVerfGE 1, 97 (104) (1951) [Hintergebliebenrente I] [the duty of protection on the part of the state 
concerns protection from violations of human dignity by others, not the protection from material need]; 
Cf. Life Imprisonment Case BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) (1977) [the subsistence minimum essential to an 
existence [Dasein] in line with human dignity is guaranteed]; Starck (n 1898) para 41 
1907 BVerfGE 40, 121 (133) (1975) [Weisenrente, orphans’ pension]; BVerfGE 45, 187 (228) (1977) 
[Life Imprisonment Case]; BVerfGE 48, 346 (361) (1978) [widows’ pension]; BVerfGE 82, 60 (85) 
[non-taxable subsistence minimum]; BVerfGE 87, 153 (170) (1990) [Steuerfreies Existenzminimum, 
subsistence minimum and taxation of income]; BVerfGE 91, 93 (111) (1994) [Kindergeld, child 
benefits]; BVerfGE 123, 276 (363) (2009) [Lisbon Case; social state structures in view of the duty to 
ensure a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity and the principle of the social state]; Starck, 
ibid; Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 103f.; V. Neumann, ‘Menschenwürde und Existenzminimum’ (1995)  
NVwZ 426 at 429 f. 
1908 Starck ibid; Wallerath, ‘Zur Dogmatik eines Rechts auf Sicherung des Existenzminimums’ (2008) 
JZ 157, 162 [difficulties in the assessment of the subsistence minimum on account of the subjectivity 
of needs]; Spellbrink (n 1890) 66, 661 [The scrutiny exercised on calculation methods employed by the 
legislature in estimating the standard benefit created the impression that there is a ‘true’ amount of the 
standard benefit that can be derived directly from the constitution.] 
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otherwise they would amount to no more than merely a declaration of good will.1909 
The legislator is therefore under a duty to define – concretize [Konkretisierung] and 
actualize [Aktualisierung]1910 – and safeguard a subsistence minimum in line with 
human dignity.1911 Commenting on the Subsistence Minimum Case, Spellbrink notices 
how the margin of appreciation [Gestaltungsspielraum]1912 of the legislature becomes 
narrower on occasion of the constitutional review exercised by the FCC. The principle 
of the social state compels the legislature to scrutinize closely and determine the 
standard benefit corresponding to a subsistence minimum in line with human 
dignity.1913  
What a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity, comprising physical 
existence needs and the possibility of attending to inter-human relations and ensuring 
participation in social, cultural and political life, entails, evolves in the course of time 
owing to changes of circumstances and viewpoints in the society.1914 Dealing with the 
multifactorial character of this subject matter within the realm of law begs for 
transparency in demonstrating the reality check involved in the estimation of the 
respective amounts. 1915 As Starck explains, the protection of the fundamental right 
extends also to the process of determining the subsistence minimum, because 
scrutinizing the outcome of calculations and evaluations ensuing from the practice of 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG can only be limited.1916 
Wallerath discusses extensively the multidimensional question of resources, a 
dominant discussion across levels of constitutionalism1917, and identifies three 
interlaced problem-zones: the normative deduction of a right from the state duty to 
guarantee the subsistence minimum; whether the claim to a subsistence minimum is a 
subjective right of the individual or an objective duty of the state from which the 
individual reflexively derives benefits; and, on account of the dominant distinction 
between the physical and the socio-cultural aspects of the subsistence minimum, the 
doctrinally established objective scope of the claim and the duty.1918 Discourse on the                                                         
1909 Starck ibid 
1910 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1911 Starck (n 1898) 
1912 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1913 Spellbrink (n 1890) 661, 661 
1914 Starck (n 1898) 41 
1915 ibid 
1916 ibid 
1917 Wallerath (n 1908) 157, 165 ff. 
1918 Ibid 159-60 
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ecological subsistence minimum1919 constitutes another field of critical reflection and 
self-reflection as regards the objective and subjective protective scope it demands in 
line with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 20 sec. 1 GG. 
 
3. Analysis 
The purpose of the following analysis is to portray what amounts to humane 
practice of the law of human dignity, termed ontologically, linguistic-analytically and 
phenomenologically. Themes raised in the analysis are the nexus between humanism 
and pragmatism, the, empty or ad hoc concretized, Menschenbild, and the 
manifestation of the dual sense of ‘something missing’ in the discussion on the lack of 
provision for atypical needs. The interplay between life and law, the effort to survey 
the field of sight and to provoke the intersection of the legal language game with other 
language games, while demonstrating openness to look at the statutory law through 
other lenses, cause the boundaries of the Subsistence Minimum Case legal language 
game to fluctuate. Fraternity and solidarity feature most prominently in the 
phenomenological portrayal of the Subsistence Minimum Case.  
a. Ontological  
The sense in which a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity is 
ontologically relevant and significant is plain to see. In the analysis that follows, I 
discuss aspects of the guarantee, specifically, of a dignified subsistence minimum and 
of seeking to achieve the closest possible interaction between the realms of law and 
life in this area of production of meaning. 
 
i. Humanism and pragmatism: the benefit claim and the 
experience of deadlock when traversal of limits is foreclosed 
The fundamental right to a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity 
derives from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG1920 and                                                         
1919 Geddert-Steinacher (1990) 74ff.; Starck (n 1898) para 93 [Guaranteeing an environmental 
subsistence minimum can be pursued through repressively effective criminal law means addressing 
environmental damage by third parties, and – primarily – preventive administrative law measures 
through which facilities posing a danger for the environment shall be required to attain permission.]; 
See also Art. 20a GG [‘The state, also in its responsibility for future generations, protects the natural 
foundations of life and the animals34 in the framework of the constitutional order, by legislation and, 
according to law and justice, by executive and judiciary.’]. 
1920 BVerfGE 1, 97 (104) [‘Wenn Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG sagt: “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar”, 
so will er sie nur negativ gegen Angriffe abschirmen. Der zweite Satz: “... Sie zu achten und zu 
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establishes a claim grounded on the constitutional guarantee of human dignity, yet 
operates autonomously, that is, above and beyond to Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, and develops 
an absolute effect.1921 The text of the Subsistence Minimum Case conveys the positive 
meaning of the practice of the law of human dignity; granted, whether the law of 
human dignity can be positively determined has been problematized in FCC 
jurisprudence and legal scholarship.1922 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG declares human dignity to be inviolable and 
obliges all state authority to respect and protect it [cited cases 
omitted]. As a fundamental right, the provision is not only a 
defensive right against encroachments on the part of the state. The 
state must also protect human dignity in positive terms [cited cases 
omitted].1923 
Furthermore, ‘[t]he principle of the social welfare state contained in Art. 20 
sec. 1 GG in turn grants to the legislature the mandate to ensure a subsistence 
minimum for all that is in line with human dignity.’1924 The FCC noted that the 
legislature is expected to honor the fundamental right to a subsistence minimum in 
accordance with human dignity, and clarified that the right ‘is not subject to the 
legislature’s disposal […]’1925. The legislature is entrusted with concretizing this right 
to the ends of furthering the humanism of the law and mindful of critical pragmatic 
considerations1926, while receiving a margin of appreciation in the unavoidable 
                                                                                                                                                              
schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt” verpflichtet den Staat zwar zu dem positiven Tun 
des “Schützens” doch ist dabei nicht Schutz vor materieller Not, sondern Schutz gegen Angriffe auf die 
Menschenwürde durch andere, wie Erniedrigung, Brandmarkung, Verfolgung, Ächtung usw. 
gemeint.’]; See also Wallerath (n 1908) 160f.; Spellbrink (n 1890) 661, 663 [the guarantee of human 
dignity under Art. 1 GG is the only available substantive constitutional basis for establishing the basal 
right to the guarantee of subsistence] 
1921 BVerfGE 125, 175 (259) [‘Otherwise, there would be a violation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG which may 
not be accepted even on a temporary basis.’] 
1922 Wallerath (n 1908) 160 
1923 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1924 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1925 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1926 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) [‘[…] [The right] must however be lent concrete shape, and be regularly 
updated, by the legislature, which has to orientate the benefits to be paid towards the respective stage 
of development of the polity and towards the existing conditions of life. It has latitude in bringing 
about this state of affairs.’]; ibid (224) [‘[...] the establishment of monetary benefit claims also entails a 
considerable financial impact on public budgets. Such decisions are however reserved for the 
legislature.’]; ibid (224) [‘It depends on society’s views of what is necessary for an existence that is in 
line with human dignity, and on the concrete circumstances of the person in need of assistance, as well 
as on the respective economic and technical circumstances, and is to be specifically determined by the 
legislature in accordance with them [cited case omitted]. The principle of the social welfare state 
contained in Art. 20 sec. 1 GG obliges the legislature to cover social reality in a manner that is 
appropriate to the present day and realistic with regard to the guarantee of the subsistence minimum 
that is in line with human dignity, which for instance is different in a technological information society 
 421
valuations linked to determining the amount of the subsistence minimum.1927 Not only 
how the dignified subsistence minimum can be maintained, but also ‘the scope of the 
benefits to secure one’s livelihood’ require concretization1928. The role of the FCC is 
to examine whether the outer limits of the legislature’s margin of appreciation are 
respected in deliberating and deciding on ‘non-constitutional law’ measures1929. The 
standard of evident insufficiency or manifest inadequacy1930, far from being a legal or 
legalistic device, reflects the gravity of the threat to human being-ness, which is 
understood in the Subsistence Minimum Case predominantly as a threat to the very 
existence of human beings, and the urgency of restoring the constitutionality of social 
welfare measures.  
In-depth analysis of hermeneutic and literary parallels between the notions of 
the limit traversed and the limit that delineates on the one hand, and the claim – 
constitutional and statutory – to a subsistence minimum that is in line with human 
dignity on the other, aspires to portray law’s meta-dimension as it features in the 
Subsistence Minimum Case. In the following excerpt, the practice of the law of human 
dignity delivers an astute description of the experience of deadlock and conveys law’s 
humanism.  
If a human being does not have the material means to guarantee an 
existence that is in line with human dignity because he or she is 
unable to obtain it either out of his or her gainful employment, or 
from own property or by benefits from third parties, the state is 
obliged within its mandate to protect human dignity and to ensure, 
in the implementation of its social welfare state mandate, that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
than was previously the case. The evaluations which are necessary here are a matter for the 
parliamentary legislature.’] 
1927 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1928 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224f.) 
1929 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) [‘The legislature’s margin of appreciation when it comes to assessing the 
subsistence minimum corresponds to a reserved review of the provisions of non-constitutional law by 
the Federal Constitutional Court.’]; ibid (258) [‘According to the established case-law of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the legislature does not have to retroactively remedy a legal state of affairs which 
is incompatible with the Basic Law if this runs counter to ordered financial and budgetary planning or 
if the constitutional law was previously not sufficiently clarified and the legislature is to be granted a 
suitable period to create new provisions for this reason (see BVerfGE 120, 125 (168) with further 
references). These principles also apply to the disputed benefits to ensure a subsistence minimum that 
is in line with human dignity.’] 
1930 BVerfGE 125, 175 (226) [‘[…] the material review as regards the result is restricted to whether the 
benefits are evidently insufficient [cited case omitted].’]; ibid (231) [‘It can also not be ascertained that 
the amount of Euro 207 that is uniformly applicable to children until completing the age of 14 is 
manifestly inadequate to ensure a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity.’] 
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material prerequisites for this are at the disposal of the person in 
need of assistance.1931  
The inability to obtain an existence in line with human dignity can be 
portrayed as a deadlock situation. Deadlock amounts to foreclosure of the very 
possibility of self-determination. The elemental character of the needs corresponding 
to a subsistence minimum accounts for the ontological significance of practicing the 
law of human dignity in subsistence minimum case law. The law of human dignity 
opens up a possibility of breaking the deadlock and permitting the traversal of the 
limit. The disclosure of human being-ness denotes the practice of law’s humanism, 
that is, according to Heidegger, the true sense of metaphysics. The state acts under the 
duty to protect human dignity and to deliver upon its social welfare responsibilities in 
guaranteeing availability of the material prerequisites for a dignified existence for 
those ‘in need of assistance’. By analogy with the tasks of ‘meditating and caring’ 
discussed in the ontological account of human dignity1932, the duty of the state under 
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 20 sec. 1 GG expresses commitment to the humane practice 
of law, in other words the fostering of humanism.  
It does not suffice, however, to defer to the duty of the state under Art. 1 sec. 1 
GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG to protect those in need of assistance; the 
Court argued that a corresponding benefit claim is constitutionally imperative1933. It is 
the subjective right of the person in need of assistance that guarantees a dignified 
subsistence minimum. Voluntary benefits of the state or third parties cannot stand in 
for the legal and ontological significance of the concrete benefit claim1934. The claim 
per se, regardless of what it substantively and on an ad hoc basis involves, constitutes 
an instance of practice of the law of human dignity. The provision of a claim enables 
individual human beings’ active, self-determined appeal to the law of human dignity. 
In other words, the constitutionally grounded claim is a forceful instrument in the 
hands of subjects of fundamental rights and the traversal of the limit by means of this 
legal tool provokes the irruptive movement associated with the polemos, that is, the 
state in which the ontology of things first appears. The direct constitutional benefit                                                         
1931 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
1932 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ 239, 244 
1933 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222f.) [‘A benefit claim of the holder of the fundamental right corresponds to 
this objective duty from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, given that the fundamental right protects the dignity of each 
individual person [cited case omitted], and it can only be ensured in such emergency situations by 
means of material support.’]  
1934 Wallerath (2008) 157, 161f.  
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claim to a guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity 
abstractly, yet exhaustively, ‘covers those means which are vital’ to maintain a 
dignified existence, namely ‘guarantees the whole subsistence minimum by a uniform 
fundamental rights guarantee’1935 comprising both physical existence and a minimum 
of participation in social, cultural and political life. Abstraction and uniformity in 
practicing the constitutional guarantee are consistent with the non-concretization of 
the meaning of human being-ness, with ‘something missing’ as a quality of law’s 
Menschenbild in light of the law of human dignity. 
The FCC furthermore asserted that ‘[t]he guarantee of a subsistence minimum 
that is in line with human dignity must be safeguarded by a statutory claim.’1936 
According to the Court, ‘[t]his is directly demanded by the protection afforded by Art. 
1 sec. 1 GG.’1937 Why is a statutory claim necessary in addition to the constitutionally 
grounded claim?  
A person in need of assistance may not be referred to voluntary 
benefits of the state or of third parties whose provision is not 
guaranteed by a subjective right of the person in need of assistance. 
The constitutional guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in 
line with human dignity must take place by a parliamentary statute 
which contains a concrete benefit claim on the part of the citizen 
towards the competent benefit institution. […] The benefit claim 
from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG is fundamentally provided by the constitution 
[cited case omitted]. However, the scope of this claim in terms of 
the types of needs and of the means necessary therefore cannot be 
directly derived from the constitution [cited case omitted].1938 
The Basic Law arms the subjects of fundamental rights with a claim to the 
guarantee of a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity, which ‘must be 
constitutionally guaranteed by legal claims’1939. The constitutional claim marks the 
initiation of litigious names opening up ‘the space of a test of verification’1940. The 
statutory claim, namely the concretization of the constitutional guarantee by the 
legislature, constitutes one possible concrete response to verification attempts.  
[…] This is also supported in other constitutional principles. The 
duty incumbent on the legislature to make the provisions material to 
the realization of the fundamental right itself already emerges from                                                         
1935 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
1936 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
1937 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
1938 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223f.) 
1939 BVerfGE 125, 175 (242) 
1940 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 69 
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the principles of the rule of law and of democracy [cited case 
omitted].1941 
An ontological reading of the argument brought forth by the Court to justify 
the indispensability of a statutory claim, that is, ‘a concrete claim on the part of the 
citizen’ which is moreover addressed to a concrete ‘competent benefit institution’1942, 
manifests how humanism and pragmatism feed on each other in the practice of the 
fundamental right. Concretization serves pragmatic concerns, while at the same time 
allows for actual and effective practice, in other words prohibits rendering the claim 
void, a merely rhetorical device.  
If the legislature does not adequately meet its constitutional 
obligation to determine the subsistence minimum, the non-
constitutional law is unconstitutional to the degree that it displays 
this shortcoming.1943 
In that spirit the FCC noted the insufficiency of the Budget Act ‘because the 
citizen is unable to derive any direct claims from this [cited case omitted].’1944 
Concretization by means of a statutory claim is a response to the open-endedness of 
those issues, and enables practicing the law of human dignity in a manner consistent 
with the commitment to humanism expressed in fundamental rights language.   
 
ii. The Menschenbild: empty, multidimensional, and ad hoc concretized 
The Basic Law refrains from adumbrating ‘any precise figure’1945 for the 
claim to a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity. Non-concretization, in 
that sense, runs parallel to the commitment to the dual sense of ‘something missing’ 
as an aspect of the Menschenbild of the Basic Law, namely an image that does not 
correspond to any specific manifestation of human being-ness, but rather remains 
open to ad hoc concretization. The fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence 
minimum in line with human dignity comprises not only the material prerequisites for 
human beings’ physical existence1946, but also a minimum of participation in social, 
cultural and political life, ‘the possibility to maintain inter-human relationships’1947.                                                         
1941 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
1942 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
1943 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223f.) 
1944 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224) 
1945 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225f.) [‘Since the Basic Law itself does not permit any precise figure to be put 
on the claim […]’] 
1946 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) 
1947 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
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Spellbrink emphatically notes, ‘Whoever speaks about human dignity, must at 
the same time clarify its Menschenbild.’1948 In the Subsistence Minimum Case law’s 
Menschenbild appears multidimensional. The multidimensionality of human being-
ness is reflected in the first column of tables depicting the composition of the standard 
rate, where needs such as food, water, electricity, clothing, housing and healthcare are 
listed alongside transport, communication, education, leisure, entertainment and 
culture.1949 The legislature’s margin of appreciation in defining the needs that 
correspond to a person’s physical existence is narrower than the latitude to define ‘the 
nature and scope of the possibility to participate in social life.’ 1950 Be that as it may, 
both kinds of needs are understood to be existential in the text of the Subsistence 
Minumum Case1951.  
A concrete portrayal of the Menschenbild ensues from the treatment of 
children’s needs in the statute under scrutiny1952, a concretization on which the Court 
shed new light. Are children human within the realm of law? Scrutinizing the 
parliamentary practice of the fundamental right in the case of children, the FCC, for 
instance, noted that ‘[a]n additional need is to be anticipated above all with school-
age children.’1953. Emphasis on needs relevant to children’s education1954, not only 
signifies the ad hoc portrayal of law’s Menschenbild, but also indicates the 
multidimensionality of human being-ness as manifested at the most elemental 
ontological level.                                                          
1948 Spellbrink (2011) 661, 661f. [Spellbrink identifies two conflicting theoretical models that respond 
to this question: the Mitgifttheorie and the Leistungstheorie. In the context of labor, which according to 
Spellbrink has not been sufficiently addressed in the Subsistence Minimum Case, it does not follow 
from human dignity that human being must work; rather they have an unconditional right to a 
subsistence minimum. Workfare-philosophy would on the contrary formulate its dogma as follows: 
Whoever does not work, shall not eat.] 
1949 BVerfGE 125, 175 (193ff.) 
1950 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) 
1951 The emphasis on ensuring that the additional needs of school children are covered through an 
adequate social benefit in line with the commitment ‘to create a benefit system which completely 
guarantees the subsistence minimum’ [BVerfGE 125, 175 (249)] witnesses the existential significance 
of participation in social, cultural and political life.  
1952 BVerfGE 125, 175 (245) 
1953 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246); ibid (252) [‘As the Federal Government made it clear in the oral hearing, 
§ 24a of the Second Book of the Code of Social Law is based on the idea that the school-related needs 
are not part of the subsistence minimum of a child to be ensured by benefits according to the Second 
Book of the Code of Social Law. As has already been stated, this is however not compatible with Art. 1 
sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG.’] 
1954 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) [‘Necessary expenditure to comply with school obligations is part of their 
need in line with the subsistence minimum. Without covering these costs, children in need of assistance 
are threatened by being excluded from chances in life because they cannot successfully attend school 
without purchasing the necessary school material, such as school books, exercise books or 
calculators.’] 
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Children are not small adults. Their need, which must be covered in 
order to ensure a subsistence minimum that is in line with human 
dignity, must be orientated in line with child development phases 
and towards what is necessary for the development of a child’s 
personality.1955 
The FCC stressed the danger that the development of school-age children 
whose parents are entitled to receive benefits according to the Second Book of the 
Code of Social Law and the ‘future capability to support themselves by their own 
efforts’1956 could be undermined due to inadequate state benefits. Potentiality, an 
inherent quality of human being-ness, features centrally in the Court’s critical 
reflection on children’s needs. The notion of potentiality implicates ‘something 
missing’ and brings to mind how coming forth into the unhidden presupposes 
concealment. The evolution of children involves the traversal of limits and this 
process may be perceived as the progressive unveiling of human being-ness.  
 
iii. The atypical in life and law, the building of cases of verification, and the 
reinforcement of dissensus as a process of critical reflection 
Provision for ‘needs occurring in special cases of a nature that is not recorded 
or which is atypical in its scope […]’1957 evinces the Court’s understanding of the law 
of human dignity apropos the atypical and unforeseeable, both allusions to ‘something 
missing’ as an inherent quality of human being-ness. The FCC noted that such needs 
were ‘not authoritatively identified by the statistics.’1958 
The standard benefit cannot therefore cover them. Art. 1 sec. 1 GG 
in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG is however also required to 
cover a need which is irrefutable, recurrent and not merely a single 
instance if this is necessary in individual cases for a subsistence 
minimum that is in line with human dignity. 1959 
The ‘atypical’ signifies ‘something missing’, that is, something that comes 
forth unpredictably and urgently. Demanding provision for a claim to irrefutable, 
recurrent and not merely single-instance needs shows how the prescriptive1960                                                         
1955 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) 
1956 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246); See also ibid (247), under (cc) on the subsistence-related needs of 
children. 
1957 BVerfGE 125, 175 (254) 
1958 BVerfGE 125, 175 (254) 
1959 BVerfGE 125, 175 (254) 
1960 Value decisions are an indispensable trait of mobilization of human dignity langauge. Hoerster 
(1983) 93, 95 [distinction between descriptive meaning of terms such as ‘life’ or ‘bodily integrity’ and 
the ‘dignity’ of the human being which is necessarily subject to value decisions] 
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meaning of inviolability in the law of human dignity sets up an inscription that is 
particularly permitting of mobilization on the part of those who have no part1961. 
Accommodation of the ‘atypical’ requires availability of empty space within the 
realm of fundamental rights. It is the claim to a dignified subsistence minimum, as a 
tool of mobilization, that allows subjects of rights to make something of that 
inscription1962, in other words to find a part within surplus names, introduce new 
surplus names or – in hermeneutic and literary fashion – portray new manifestations 
of human being-ness.  
It is also incompatible with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with 
Art. 20 sec. 1 GG that a provision is missing in the Second Book of 
the Code of Social Law which provides for a claim to benefits to 
ensure covering a subsistence minimum that is in line with human 
dignity which is irrefutable, recurrent and not merely a single 
instance. Such a claim is necessary for the needs which are not 
already covered by §§ 20 et seq. of the Second Book of the Code of 
Social Law because the income and consumption statistics on which 
the standard benefit is based only reflect the average requirements 
in customary needs situations, but not special needs going over and 
above this because of atypical needs. 1963 
The law of human dignity in conjunction with the principle of the social 
welfare state guarantees the availability of space for the establishment of – 
hermeneutically and literary understood – ‘atypical’ manifestations of human being-
ness within the realm of its practice. The content and form of the space that 
corresponds to the part that has no part appear once the limit is traversed and human 
being-ness comes forth into the unhidden, namely becomes visible. The limit 
separates and delineates. Ad hoc determination of who the human being is, and, 
consequently, of the space occupied by this Menschenbild within the realm of law is 
attuned to the commitment to metaphysics, defined as humanism, in mobilizing 
fundamental rights in legal language games, and to the practice of the transcendental 
as an aspect of the meaning of the law of human dignity. The uniqueness of each 
metaphysical subject and of its viewpoint and world is affirmed in breaking with the – 
impersonal – average. Therefore, the fundamental right to a subsistence minimum in 
line with human dignity requires provision for special needs beyond ‘the average 
                                                        
1961 Rancière, Dissensus (2010) 35 
1962 ibid 68  
1963 BVerfGE 125, 175 (252) 
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requirements in customary needs situation’, beyond the typified enumeration of 
subsistence needs. 
  ‘Something missing’ as an aspect of the meaning of the law of human dignity 
enables and provokes ongoing reflection on who the human being is. The a priori 
institution of legal claims to cover cases that are presently unforeseeable1964 reinforces 
the process of dissensus as a mode of critical reflection. The statement that ‘[t]he 
statutory benefit claim must be shaped such that it always covers the total needs 
necessary for the existence of each individual fundamental right holder [cited cases 
omitted]’1965 and the Court’s insistence on the decisiveness of acknowledging the 
individuality of human being-ness manifestations1966 highlight commitment to ad hoc 
assessment and convey law’s anthropocentricism. A fine example of such insistence 
is the clarification that ‘each member of a joint household – including children – has 
an individual right to [the guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with 
human dignity], and presumes a need that is absolutely necessary.’1967 Meaning-
giving empty box or black box metaphors and individuality as a trait of human being-
ness are just two sides of a single coin.  
Moreover, argued the Court, the concrete subsistence minimum in line with 
human dignity should be ‘reviewed and refined on an ongoing basis’.1968 The FCC 
underlined the importance of constant critical reflection on what the benefit claim 
entails ‘because a person’s elementary requirement for life can in principle only be                                                         
1964 Binder & Weisberg, Literary Criticism of Law (2000) 132 f. [‘Gadamer treats all texts as canonical 
for some institution, dedicated as much to the preservation of its future viability as to the conservation 
of its past values. In this way Gadamer treats the legal text as the paradigm for all texts. The meaning 
of any text ultimately consists in its contemporary application to problems unforeseen when the text 
was generated. Nothing could be further from the view that textual meaning is fixed by authorial 
intent.’] 
1965 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224); Binder & Weisberg, ibid 197 [‘We can never resolve the meaning of 
justice once and for all, in abstraction from a particular society or social institution. This means that 
whenever questions of justice arise – which is to say whenever social choices are made – the methods 
of the humanities are implicated. We have to ‘read’ the society and its institutions anew, each time, and 
decide what reforms will best maintain or foster self-respect for these people, with these traditions, 
these institutions, these deep disagreements.’] 
1966 BVerfGE 125, 175 (253) [‘Having said that, Article 1.1 of the Basic Law, which protects the 
human dignity of each individual without exception, demands that the subsistence minimum is ensured 
in each individual case.’] 
1967 BVerfGE 125, 175 (232) 
1968 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225); This requirement, which constitutes at once a criterion of soundness of 
justification in the interpretation of facts – minor premises – and the demonstration of their 
correspondence to the law – major premise – can be further enhanced by the remark ‘[…] by reminding 
us of the unpredictability of our future, hermeneutics paradoxically gives us a more accurate self-
portrait and confronts us with our responsibility to make ourselves.’ Binder & Weisberg (n 1964) 134, 
citing Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979) 
373ff. [Edification, Relativism, and the Objective Truth] 
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satisfied at the moment when it arises’1969. The supra maxim indicates when 
‘something missing’ is first identified. As argued in the ontological account, one 
becomes conscious of the empty space within the realm of fundamental rights in the 
polemos, when the human being first comes-into-being and asserts its human being-
ness at the level of law. 
Provision for the ‘atypical’ ensures state response to individual needs of 
persons requiring assistance beyond the statistical average case1970 The FCC noted 
that ‘[t]he expenditure items and amounts which are relevant to standard benefits are 
conceived from the outset as abstract calculation values which do not have to be 
exactly correct for each person in need of assistance, but are only to guarantee in total 
a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity.’1971 Grounding the 
incompatibility of the contested statute with the Basic Law in the neglect of atypical 
needs reaffirms the importance of practicing the law of human dignity in the spirit of 
critical reflection. Law influences decisively the authority of legal actors over the 
production of meaning; in MacKinnon’s words ‘law transforms perspective into 
being’. Law’s meta-dimension understood as law’s humanism is a beacon that signals 
the direction towards which the traversal of limits in accordance with the law of 
human dignity should lead. Critical reflection is the process inextricably linked with 
the possibility of humanism. Guaranteeing the humanism manifested in the law of 
human dignity calls for observing a process of critical reflection in practicing that 
law.  
b. Linguistic-analytical  
The linguistic-analytical portrayal of the practice of the law of human dignity 
in the Subsistence Minimum Case demonstrates the interplay between life and law and 
the engagement of the judge as the critical eye with authority over meaning in 
surveyance of the field of sight and the legal language game and in self-reflection. 
Both the fluctuation of the boundaries of the legal language game in the evolution of 
the Court’s legal reasoning and the identification of atypical needs with ‘something 
missing’ in this analysis is premised on the contoured realms.   
                                                        
1969 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) 
1970 BVerfGE 125, 175 (253) 
1971 BVerfGE 125, 175 (253) 
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i. The interplay between life and law or between the field of sight and the legal 
language game: language as grounds for a relational account of human 
dignity, self-reflection, and surveyance 
In linguistic analytical terms, Art. 1 sec. 1 GG guarantees that the viewpoint of 
metaphysical subjects is respected and protected and presupposes that this viewpoint 
is soundly portrayed in legal texts as aspects of practice, albeit the ultimate authority 
of legal actors, by analogy with the eye that looks through the lens of the law, over 
meaning.  
The state must also protect human dignity in positive terms [cited 
cases omitted]. […] A benefit claim of the holder of the 
fundamental right corresponds to this objective duty from Art.1 sec. 
1 GG […].1972 
The negative and positive determinations of human dignity meaning are 
mutually complementary. The inviolability of human dignity guaranteed in the Basic 
Law grounds the defensive character of the fundamental right on the one hand and 
positively defined state protection on the other. The benefit claim of the holder of the 
fundamental right corresponds to the state duty to protect human dignity. From a 
linguistic-analytical perspective, the claim to a subsistence minimum in line with 
human dignity affirms the central position of the metaphysical subject in the legal 
language game of the Court and reinforces the authority of an eye and viewpoint over 
meaning. As a claim directly emanating from looking through the lens of the Basic 
Law – specifically, the law of human dignity and the principle of the social welfare 
state – the benefit claim is signified as an embodiment of the dual sense of ‘something 
missing’: ‘the scope of this claim in terms of the types of needs and of the means 
necessary therefore cannot be directly derived from the constitution’1973. How did the 
FCC confront the emptiness consequent on the impossibility of directly deducing the 
concrete meaning of this claim from constitutional law? 
[The scope of this claim] depends on society’s views of what is 
necessary for an existence that is in line with human dignity, and on 
the concrete circumstances of the person in need of assistance, as 
well as on the respective economic and technical circumstances, and 
                                                        
1972 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222f.) 
1973 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224) 
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is to be specifically determined by the legislature in accordance 
with them […].1974 
The FCC enriched the content and, thereby, expanded the boundaries of the 
legal language game in the Subsistence Minimum Case by resorting, first, to the 
viewpoint of society re ‘what is necessary for an existence that is in line with human 
dignity’; second, to the viewpoint and field of sight of the metaphysical subject, that 
is, the ‘concrete person in need of assistance’; third, to information within the Court’s 
broader field of sight re economic and technical circumstances as portrayed in the 
legal language game produced by the responsible state power, the legislature.1975 
What is the role of the FCC in view of the recognition of the authority of other eyes 
and their viewpoint over the meaning of a subsistence minimum in line with human 
dignity?  
The FCC, looking through the lens of the Basic Law, sought to ascertain 
whether the amount of the standard benefit is evidently insufficient1976, and whether 
the sources of data and the methods employed for estimating this amount in 
lawmaking were appropriate and consistent. The Court found the procedure followed 
by the legislature in determining the standard benefit, ‘which forms the basis for other 
standard benefit amounts’, to be ‘fundamentally suitable to realistically assess the 
benefits necessary to ensure a subsistence minimum that is in line with human 
dignity.’1977 The ‘realistic’ estimation of standard benefits that sufficiently cover the 
dignified subsistence minimum is of utmost importance. The selected methodology 
and the calculated outcomes are constitutional as long as they realistically guarantee 
that minimum. Such language affirms the value of the interplay between law and life, 
that is, the relevance of the legal language game to the broader field of sight.  
Since it is not possible to establish that the standard benefit amounts 
fixed by law are evidently insufficient, the legislature is not directly 
obliged under constitutional law to set higher benefits. It must, 
rather, implement a procedure to realistically ascertain the benefits 
needed in line with needs which are required to ensure a subsistence 
minimum that is in line with human dignity and in line with the 
indicated constitutional prerequisites and entrench its outcome in 
law as a benefit claim.1978                                                         
1974 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224) 
1975 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224) 
1976 Spellbrink (2011) 661, 663f. 
1977 BVerfGE 125, 175 (232) 
1978 BVerfGE 125, 175 (256) 
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Different models of calculation employed in lawmaking of social welfare law, 
such as the basket-of-goods or the consumption-related method, were juxtaposed and 
comparatively evaluated by the FCC. Commenting on the models, the Court 
demonstrated surveyance and comprehension of the methods employed in lawmaking; 
no constitutional reasons for preferring the one model over the other were found1979. 
The juxtaposition of the two models unveils aspects of law’s Menschenbild in the 
Subsistence Minimum Case. Clearly, physical survival and participation in social life 
are equally existential in light of the guarantee of human dignity in law1980. Likewise, 
the subdivision of children in need of assistance ‘into two age groups until completing 
the age of 14 and from 14 to completing the age of 18’1981, and, consequently, the 
differentiation of benefits for each subgroup in the OECD scale1982 was considered 
insufficiently justified. The Court explained the function of the OECD scale and 
criticized its utilization in the reasoning of the Standard Rate Ordinance, focusing 
mainly on the issue of failing to address the particular needs of children.  
[…] the OECD scale does not provide any information on the needs 
of children in different age groups. It says nothing about which 
benefits are necessary to ensure the subsistence minimum of a child 
that is in line with human dignity, and especially not why the needs 
of children until completing the age of 14 should be 60 % of the 
needs of a single person.1983 
The FCC identified the legislature as the critical eye and viewpoint for making 
the ‘valuing decision as to what expenditure is counted among the subsistence 
minimum’, yet ‘in an expedient, justifiable manner.’1984 The role of the FCC, as 
portrayed here, is to steer the legislature in producing its own legal language game. 
For instance, the FCC demanded an empirical basis of justification for reductions in 
expenditure items; directed the legislature to ‘only regard expenditure which is made 
by the reference group as not relevant if it is certain that it is covered elsewhere or is 
not necessary to secure one’s livelihood’1985; and required the deduction of the                                                         
1979 BVerfGE 125, 175 (187f.) 
1980 BVerfGE 125, 175 (235) [‘The statistical and consumption method indeed has the advantage as 
against the basket of goods method that it does not determine the subsistence minimum which goes 
beyond physical survival by using individual selected needs items, but measures the expenditure 
additionally necessary to guarantee a minimum of participation in society, in addition to the physical 
subsistence minimum, by virtue of actual expenditure conduct.’] 
1981 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) 
1982 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) 
1983 BVerfGE 125, 175 (247) 
1984 BVerfGE 125, 175 (237) 
1985 BVerfGE 125, 175 (237) 
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amount of a reduction from a ‘reliable’ survey. With respect to the latter point, the 
FCC added, ‘[a]n estimate on a sound empirical basis is not ruled out here; “random” 
estimates however run counter to a procedure of realistic investigation, and hence 
violate Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with the principle of the social welfare state 
contained in Art. 20 sec. 1 GG.’1986 Language such as ‘expedient’, ‘justifiable’, 
‘empirical’, ‘not relevant’, ‘reliable’, ‘sound’, ‘random’, ‘realistic investigation’ 
composes the linguistic-analytical portrayal of practicing the law of human dignity in 
the Subsistence Minimum Case. The emphasis on methodological soundness and 
careful delineation of the viewpoint and scope of the field of sight of another state 
power are indications of the effort of the constitutional judge to de facto guarantee 
human dignity in the context of social welfare.  
To make it possible to examine whether the valuations and 
decisions taken by the legislature correspond to the constitutional 
guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with human 
dignity, the legislature handing down the provision is subject to the 
obligation to reason them in a comprehensible manner; this is to be 
demanded above all if the legislature deviates from a method which 
it has selected itself. 1987 
The constitutional judge, the eye looking at life through the lens of the Basic 
Law, created expectations re the content and form of ‘the valuations and decisions 
taken by the legislature’ in order ‘to make it possible to examine’ compatibility with 
the constitutional guarantee of a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity. 
The first expectation is of pertinence to the content of the valuations and decisions 
generating social benefit provisions: the legislature has a duty ‘to reason them in a 
comprehensible manner’, especially if it ‘deviates from a method which it has 
selected itself.’ The logical form of valuations and decisions should be ‘shown’ 
consistently in the respective legal propositions. The second expectation concerns the 
form of the syllogism comprising valuations and decisions: as connoted by the 
phrases ‘to make it possible to examine’ and ‘in a comprehensible manner’, reasoning 
needs to be demonstrable, thus ‘said’, expressed in propositions. Only in that form 
can the meaning produced be comprehensible and subject to examination. These 
expectations are prerequisites to the examination of valuations and decisions, namely 
precede the assessment of the constitutionality of concrete statutory provisions.                                                         
1986 BVerfGE 125, 175 (237f.) 
1987 BVerfGE 125, 175 (238) 
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What is the significance of this observation? Both expectations raised operate 
at the level of language. Reasoning and rendering syllogisms accessible to those 
entrusted with examining them in accordance with the Basic Law are foundational to 
the very possibility of constitutional review. The relational account of humanism is 
instituted in language. Portrayal through language in compliance with the rules of 
demonstration and justification in legal language games precedes reflection and 
judgment on a given case.  This insight is enhanced infra in the phenomenological 
analysis of the Subsistence Minimum Case. 
School-related needs present a prime example of how the assumed viewpoint 
of children as a particular concretization of law’s Menschenbild is portrayed by a third 
viewpoint, that of the constitutional judge, in a legal language game. In the legal 
language game of the Federal Government, which was first created in the oral hearing 
and is integrated into the legal language game of the FCC, we find that the relevant 
statutory provision ‘is based on the idea that school-related needs are not part of the 
subsistence minimum of a child to be ensured by benefits according to the Second 
Book of the Code of Social Law’1988 Looking through the lens of the law of human 
dignity and the principle of the social state, the FCC found this position incompatible 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG and Art. 20 sec. 1 GG and criticized the lack of empirical 
ascertainment of school-related needs of a child in the drafting of the adopted 
provision by the legislature. In linguistic-analytical terms, the Court questioned how 
school-related needs are determined and portrayed in the legal language game 
produced by the legislature. Specifically, it challenged the sufficiency of the extent to 
which insights from the broader field of sight, life, were drawn on to enhance the 
relevance and soundness of that legal language game. The ‘free’, namely random, 
estimation of amounts is not constitutionally acceptable.1989 Both viewpoints 
illustrated in the legal language game of the Subsistence Minimum I Case fail to 
address the particularities of children’s needs, in other words to adequately portray 
this concretization of law’s Menschenbild.   
                                                        
1988 BVerfGE 125, 175 (252) 
1989 BVerfGE 125, 175 (252) [‘Neither the reasoning of the draft Family Services Act, nor the 
statement of the Federal Government, indicate how the amount of Euro 100 per year is composed; it 
was obviously estimated freely.’] 
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ii. Fluctuation of the boundaries of the legal language game: negative delineation 
In working out the breadth of the boundaries of the legal language game, the 
Court engaged in negative delineation, that is, identified parameters that could be 
confused as relevant to the assessment of the standard benefit, and excluded them 
from the scope of the legal language game. For instance, the FCC noted that ‘[t]he 
current pension value […] does not serve to quantify the benefits necessary to ensure 
a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity and to extrapolate the 
change in the need annually […]’1990, and ‘hence [was] not suited to realistically 
extrapolate the subsistence minimum.’1991 At the same time, the FCC drew parallels 
to the standard benefit argumentation for deriving benefits such as social benefits for 
partners living together in a joint household and children. With respect to the social 
benefit for children, the Court moreover found the method employed for the 
determination of the subsistence minimum of a child until completing the age of 14 
unjustifiable1992.  
This mode of reasoning could be portrayed as a fluctuation of the boundaries 
of the legal language game, namely an expansion followed by a contraction. The 
contraction process is meant to clarify meaning by opening up a field of dispenses. 
Eventually, the narrower legal language game comprises the distillation of the 
produced meaning in accord with the viewpoint of the constitutional judge and the 
Basic Law as the critical lens through which this legal actor looks at life.   
iii. The atypical and the dual sense of ‘something missing’ 
Surveying the statutory legal language game through the lens of the law of 
human dignity and the principle of the social welfare state, the FCC noticed the 
absence of provision for ‘a claim to benefits to ensure covering a subsistence                                                         
1990 BVerfGE 125, 175 (243); ibid [‘Rather, it is intended to steer and slow pension payments in 
accordance with general economic factors, maintaining the liquidity of the pensions insurance 
institutions, as well as considering the relationship of active employees to recipients of old-age 
pensions, and serving to guarantee equitable participation in a pay-as-you-go system. Linking the 
current pension value to developments in gross wages reflects developments in prosperity within 
society to a certain degree. Developments in gross wages are however unable to provide any 
information on changes in the necessary needs to cover the subsistence minimum. The factors named in 
§ 68 sec. 1 sent. 3 nos. 2 and 3 of the Sixth Book of the Code of Social Law and in § 255e of the Sixth 
Book of the Code of Social Law do not refer to the subsistence minimum. However, the factors which 
determine the consumption conduct of the lowest quintile, which is relevant to the calculation of the 
standard benefit, namely the available net income and price developments, do not play a role in the 
determination of the current pension value.’] 
1991 BVerfGE 125, 175 (243) 
1992 BVerfGE 125, 175 (231) 
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minimum that is in line with human dignity which is irrefutable, recurrent and not 
merely a single instance’1993 in the Second Book of the Code of Social Law. This 
lacuna in the contested statute brought about incompatibility with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in 
conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG. The statutory lacuna can be associated with the 
dual sense of ‘something missing’. Besides reflecting commitment to the realistic 
determination of a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity, atypical needs 
articulate that which is not representative of a type and indicate the unforeseeable. 
Both the atypical and the unforeseeable are aspects of human being-ness, thus of 
pertinence to the position of the metaphysical subject in the introduced model, namely 
at the limit of the world. The practice of the law of human dignity is evidenced in the 
acknowledgment of the ‘atypical’ and of the guarantee of empty space within the 
legal language game for ad hoc requisites exceeding ‘the average requirements in 
customary needs situations […]’1994, that is, for filling a Leerstelle or ‘something 
missing’ in concreto. In linguistic-analytical terms, law’s humanism is manifested in 
zooming in on metaphysical subjects and demonstrating an effort to realistically, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, assess their needs. The ‘atypical’ is a feature of the 
Menschenbild in light of the law of human dignity. 
Arrangements and calculations that generalize and globalize the needs falling 
under a dignified subsistence minimum in the legal language game of the legislature 
are constitutionally ‘in principle permissible’1995. Be that as it may, the ad hoc 
assessment of the needs of each individual human being is an integral aspect of the 
meaning of practicing the law of human dignity.  
Needs occurring in special cases of a nature that is not recorded or 
which is atypical in its scope are not authoritatively identified by the 
statistics.1996 
Providing those in need of assistance with a lump sum and expecting them to 
administer the allocation of this amount according to their needs was deemed 
acceptable by the Court. This model furthers freedom as an aspect of social welfare                                                         
1993 BVerfGE 125, 175 (255) 
1994 BVerfGE 125, 175 (252) 
1995 BVerfGE 125, 175 (253); ibid (252f.) [‘The granting of a standard benefit as a fixed amount is in 
principle permissible. When systemizing mass manifestations, the legislature may make generalizing, 
globalizing arrangements [cited cases omitted]. This also applies to benefits to ensure a subsistence 
minimum that is in line with human dignity. Having said that, Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, which protects the 
human dignity of each individual without exception, demands that the subsistence minimum is ensured 
in each individual case.’] 
1996 BVerfGE 125, 175 (253f.) 
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law and may be viewed as conveying an understanding of human beings as self-
determined, hence self-responsible, individuals.1997 The lump sum reflects, noted the 
Court, only the average needs of ‘the statistical mean of the reference group’1998 in 
view of a sample survey on income and expenditure. For this reason, the FCC held 
that ‘an additional claim to benefits is still required in cases of need, which is 
irrefutable, recurrent and special, and not merely a single instance, to cover a 
subsistence minimum in line with human dignity.’1999 This additional claim was 
narrowly defined.2000  
 
c. Phenomenological 
Themes developed in Chapter One and traced in the phenomenological 
portrayal of the practice of the law of human dignity in the Subsistence Minimum 
Case are the institution of the relation between the self and the other on language, 
fraternity and solidarity, and the need for both infinity and totality traits in practicing 
the law humanely, exceptionally encountered in the practice of the law of human 
dignity.  
 
                                                        
1997 BVerfGE 125, 175 (253) [‘That the total is composed of statistically recorded expenditure in the 
individual divisions of the sample survey on income and expenditure does not mean that each person in 
need of assistance must always have the individual expenditure items and amounts at their disposal 
without restriction. Rather, it is a feature of the statistical model that the individual needs of a person in 
need of assistance may derogate from the statistical average case. The expenditure items and amounts 
which are relevant to standard benefits are conceived from the outset as abstract calculation values 
which do not have to be exactly correct for each person in need of assistance, but are only to guarantee 
in total a subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity. If the statistical model is applied in 
line with the constitutional prerequisites and the lump sum in particular has been determined such that 
various needs can be balanced out […], the person in need of assistance may as a rule organize his or 
her individual consumption conduct in such a way as to manage on the fixed rate; in case of special 
need, he or she will, above all, have to resort to the potential for saving up that is contained in the 
standard benefit.’]; See also Spellbrink (2011) 661, 664 [‘Dass die pauschalierte Regelleistung völlig 
zur freien Verfügung des Empfängers steht, ist auch ein freiheitsfördernder Aspekt des SGB II.’] 
1998 BVerfGE 125, 175 (254) 
1999 BVerfGE 125, 175 (254) 
2000 BVerfGE 125, 175 (255) [‘It only occurs if the need is so great that the total amount of the benefits 
granted to the person in need of assistance – including the benefits of third parties and taking account 
of potential savings of the person in need of assistance – no longer guarantees a subsistence minimum 
that is in line with human dignity. In view of its narrowly defined, strict prerequisites, this additional 
claim is likely to arise in rare cases only.’] 
 438
i. Language vis-à-vis the unity of a genus: the institution of human community 
in fraternity and solidarity 
Whereas, on first reading, the Subsistence Minimum Case may appear 
centered on the natural ‘foundations’ of sameness2001, namely the, indeed existing2002, 
biological sameness or the common substance2003 of human beings, this 
phenomenological analysis traces and demonstrates how practicing the law of human 
dignity, even to the ends of guaranteeing an elemental subsistence minimum to all, 
entails the relational construing of human being-ness and can be understood to be 
premised on the proposition that human community is ‘instituted by language’2004, 
rather than ‘the unity of a genus’2005. The phenomenological portrayal of human 
being-ness in light of the concepts of fraternity and solidarity2006 in Totality and 
Infinity rejects resemblance as the basis of the relation among human beings. In 
grounding the relation on resemblance or origin in ‘a common cause of which they 
would be the effect […]’2007, Levinas discerns mysterious participation2008 in a 
causality, hence subsumption under a totality. The more opaque and ‘mysterious’2009 
the premises of sameness, the more intensely the implications of the totality implied 
by biological resemblance, for instance bracketing and stereotyping, might appear. 
Biological sameness cannot become a pretext for letting the particularities of ad hoc 
cases slide. In practicing the law of human dignity in the Subsistence Minimum Case, 
the reasoning of the FCC appeared attuned to the pre-ethics in Totality and Infinity.  
 The subjective scope of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG comprises all human beings,2010 
regardless of citizenship status, intellectual maturity, capability for communication or                                                         
2001 Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics’ 183, 229 [‘[…] the 
“nature” of the human being, by which we do not mean the natural “foundations” (thought of as 
physical, chemical, or biological) but rather the pure and simple being and essence of those beings.’] 
2002 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213 [‘There does indeed exist a human race as a biological genus, 
and the common function men may exercise in the world as a totality permits the applying to them of a 
common concept.’] 
2003 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, (2.024) [‘Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.’]; 
ibid (2.025) [‘It is form and content.’] 
2004 Levinas (n 2002) 213 
2005 ibid 214 
2006 Wallerath (2008) 157, 158 [the social state and solidarity, vulnerability, empathy]  
2007 Levinas (n 2002) 214  
2008 ibid 
2009 ibid 
2010 ‘Die Würde “des”, also jedes Menschen ist geschützt.’ Kunig, Art. 1, GG Kommentar (2012) para 
11; Cf. Ernst Benda, ‘Menschenwürde und Persönlichkeitsrecht’ in Ernst Benda, Werner Maihofer & 
Hans-Jochen Vogel (eds), Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts (§ 6, 2nd edn, Berlin – New York: 2004) 
161, 166; Stern (1983) 627; Otto (2005) 473, 477f.; Winfried Hassemer, ‘Über den argumentativen 
Umgang mit der Würde des Menschen’ (2005) EuGRZ 300ff. 
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awareness, or even consciousness of one’s human dignity.2011 In all other texts 
presently under scrutiny – save the reference to the subsistence minimum of prisoners 
in the Life Imprisonment Case – the dual sense of ‘something missing’ manifests and, 
at the same time, accommodates the otherness of human being-ness; in the 
Subsistence Minimum Case it principally accommodates their sameness. Whether the 
FCC proves able to respond to the other rests first of all on how it defines sameness. 
Be that as it may, the meaning of sameness cannot establish a status quo in view of 
the emptiness of the Menschenbild. Beyond the definition of sameness, the law of 
human dignity and the need for ad hoc concretizations of law’s Menschenbild in 
practicing that law require inquiry into the validity, in actuality, of the definition. 
 
ii. Self-reflection and responsibility 
In the Subsistence Minimum Case the Court assumed the role of guiding and 
directing the legislature in the field to be surveyed, the suitability of selected 
procedures and methods for assessing the subsistence minimum in line with human 
dignity, and the measures to be taken2012. Examining ‘whether the legislature has 
covered and described the goal to ensure an existence that is in line with human 
dignity in a manner doing justice to Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 
1 GG’ concretely means scrutinizing ‘whether within its margin of appreciation it has 
selected a calculation procedure that is fundamentally suited to an assessment of the 
subsistence minimum’, in other words ‘whether it has completely and correctly 
ascertained the necessary facts’ and ‘kept within the bounds of what is justifiable in 
all calculation steps with a comprehensible set of figures within this selected 
procedure and its structural principles.’2013 The delineation of the object which is 
subject to review reveals qualities of a responsible response: the limits of the margin 
of appreciation must be observed, minding that the scope of legal actors’ ability, as 
the self, to respond to the other is decisively determined by law, that is, the critical 
lens before the constitutional judge’s eye; the calculation procedure must be suitable 
and appropriate; and, finally, procedures and methods must be justifiable and 
consistently applied.                                                         
2011 Kunig ibid 
2012 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) [‘[…] The legislature must therefore take measures to react promptly to 
changes in the economic framework, such as price increases or increases in consumer taxes, in order to 
ensure at all times that the actual needs are met, in particular if it makes provision for a fixed amount, 
as in § 20 sec. 2 of the Second Book of the Code of Social Law.’] 
2013 BVerfGE 125, 175 (226) 
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Within the material bandwidth left by [the] review of evident errors, 
the fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum 
that is in line with human dignity cannot provide any quantifiable 
requirements. However, it requires a review of the basis and of the 
method of the assessment of benefits in terms of whether they do 
justice to the goal of the fundamental right. The protection of the 
fundamental right therefore also covers the procedure to ascertain 
the subsistence minimum because a review of results can only be 
carried out to a restricted degree by the standard of this fundamental 
right. In order to ensure the traceability of the extent of the statutory 
assistance as commensurate with the significance of the 
fundamental right, as well as to ensure the review of the benefits by 
the courts, the assessment of the benefits must be clearly justifiable 
on the basis of reliable figures and plausible methods of 
calculation.2014 
 The requirement of justifiability calls for further scrutiny in view of its 
pertinence to the modus operandi of constitutional review and the principle of the 
separation of powers. Alexy notes, ‘the claim to justifiability does not include a claim 
to the effect that the speaker him or herself is capable of giving a justification.’2015 
The speaking self can demonstrate the ability to respond by identifying who is 
‘capable of justifying what has been said.’2016 Indicating who is competent to 
responsibly produce meaning ‘can be regarded as a justification argument’2017; ‘like 
every other argument’2018, it is open to critical reflection and discussion.    
The FCC noted how ‘the legislature’s margin of appreciation’ corresponds to  
‘the reserved review of the provisions of non-constitutional law by the FCC.’2019 
Since the Basic Law itself does not permit any precise figure to be 
put on the claim, the material review as regards the result is 
restricted to whether the benefits are evidently insufficient […].2020  
 The principle of the social welfare state ‘grants to the legislature the mandate 
to ensure a subsistence minimum for all that is in line with human dignity […]’2021 
The law of human dignity constitutes the foundation of the claim to a subsistence 
minimum.2022 The major premise of the Court’s legal syllogism is composed of the                                                         
2014 BVerfGE 125, 175 (226) 
2015 Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (1989) 192 
2016 ibid 192 
2017 ibid 
2018 ibid 
2019 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) 
2020 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225f.) 
2021 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
2022 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) [‘Art. 1 sec. 1 GG establishes this claim.’]; See Spellbrink (2011) 661, 
664 [The first commentaries on the procedural law consequences of the Subsistence Minimum Case 
argued that the decision of the FCC postulated a legal claim at the level of a subjective-public right to 
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fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum that is in line with 
human dignity derived from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with the principle of the 
social welfare state contained in Art. 20 sec. 1 GG on the one hand, and the law of 
human dignity on the other. 
As a guarantee right, this fundamental right from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG 
takes on autonomous significance, in its conjunction with Art. 20 
sec. 1 GG, in addition to the right from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG to respect 
for the dignity of each individual, which has an absolute effect. 
Fundamentally, it is not subject to the legislature’s disposal and 
must be honored; it must however be lent concrete shape, and be 
regularly updated, by the legislature, which has to orientate the 
benefits to be paid towards the respective stage of development of 
the polity and towards the existing conditions of life. It has latitude 
in bringing about this state of affairs. 2023 
 The legislature is given a margin of appreciation in performing ‘the 
unavoidable valuations’2024 involved in the concretization of the objective scope of 
the guarantee to a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity2025. The 
requirements of concrete shaping and regular updates of the meaning of the 
fundamental right by the legislature underline that only the ad hoc appreciation of 
what satisfies a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity ensures a 
responsible response. What ensues from this observation is that commitment to the 
face-to-face encounter with the other, those in need of assistance, is an indicator of 
responsibility. A literary approach to the portrayal of the other in the case under 
scrutiny evokes directly vulnerability as in Totality and Infinity and the notion of 
morality, which has been paralleled to human dignity. Vulnerability and morality are, 
thus, motifs in the phenomenological portrayal of the Subsistence Minimum Case. 
How is responsibility, namely the ability to respond, actually practiced as 
conveyed by the text of the Subsistence Minimum Case? The claim ensuing from the                                                                                                                                                               
rational lawmaking. The lawmaker is responsible not only for a law providing for the subsistence 
minimum, but also, what is more, for a good law. This raises, according to Spellbrink, two questions: 
First, is this requirement valid only for the subsistence minimum regulations or for all decision-making 
by the legislature? Can this requirement be transposed to other fields of law? Second, is the 
requirement of transparency valid in all parts of the process of lawmaking in the field of social welfare 
law?]  
2023 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
2024 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
2025 The requirement of a good law for guaranteeing a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity 
alludes to the problematization of restraining the law in Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975, 2004) 316 
[‘In a certain instance he [the person “applying” law] will have to refrain from applying the full rigor of 
the law. But if he does, it is not because he has no alternative, but because to do otherwise would not be 
right. In restraining the law, he is not diminishing it but, on the contrary, finding the better law.’] 
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fundamental right to a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity, besides 
signifying hospitality, renders a responsible answer to the other within the 
constitutional order of the Basic Law possible. The Court guides the legislature as to 
the features that compose a responsible answer, and this activity may be perceived as 
a manifestation of the Court’s ability to respond to the other within its constitutionally 
determined scope of authority over meaning; this kind of response mirrors at once the 
competence and responsibility of the speaking self in the Subsistence Minimum Case. 
The Court directed the legislature to assess all expenditure necessary to guarantee a 
subsistence minimum in line with human dignity realistically, comprehensively, in a 
transparent and expedient procedure, and using reliable figures and plausible methods 
of calculation. A responsible response incorporates the findings of a reality check; 
requires thorough and exhaustive surveyance of the field of sight, that is life – not just 
law; should transparently articulate the world expanding before the eye of the self, so 
that this can effectively be shared in generosity towards the other; should be expedient 
in view of the urgency and importance of the needs corresponding to a subsistence 
minimum; and should be methodologically sound in terms of the sources and methods 
it employs.  
To lend concrete form to the claim, the legislature has to assess all 
expenditure that is necessary for one’s existence logically and 
realistically in transparent and expedient proceedings according to 
the actual needs […]. To this end, it must initially assess the types 
of need, as well as the costs to be expended for them, and on this 
basis must determine the amount of the overall need. The Basic 
Law does not prescribe to it a specific method for doing so […]; it 
may, rather, itself select the method within the bounds of aptitude 
and expedience. Deviations from the selected method however 
require a factual justification. 2026 
 
 The requirement of realistic assessment originates in the principle of the social 
welfare state in Art. 20 sec. 1 GG. The legislature is under a duty ‘to cover social 
reality in a manner appropriate to the present day and realistic with regard to the 
guarantee of the subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity, which for 
instance is very different in a technological information society than was previously 
the case.’2027  Society is depicted as a – collective – evolving self. The FCC demanded 
                                                        
2026 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) 
2027 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
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that law trails society in its evolution.2028 Changing social context affects the meaning 
produced, the language games we play, the words that appear in legal language games 
and the portrayal of the self, the other and their relation.  
Transparency facilitates constitutional review.2029 The FCC noted that the 
legislature is under a duty ‘to disclose the methods and calculations used to determine 
the subsistence minimum in the legislative procedure’2030. Failing to do so 
‘adequately’2031 would result in incompliance of the ascertained subsistence minimum 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG. The FCC can evaluate 
the adequacy of transparency demonstrated in selecting and applying methods and 
calculation procedures to lawmaking on social welfare issues. Transparency enhances 
the articulation of the world by the self and, thereby, its sharing with the other. 
Striving for transparency intimates commitment to the pre-ethics of hospitality in 
practicing language. At the same time, transparency can be associated with the 
totalizing panoramic sense of vision in Totality and Infinity. The argument furthered 
by the FCC affirms the value of totality qualities in practicing the law. What is more, 
transparency as a totality quality amplifies the elucidation of meaning shared and 
effectively fosters the existence of an intersubjective space within the realm of law, 
that is, enhances infinity and advances the practice of law’s meta-dimension.  
By means of the standard benefit paid to secure one’s livelihood 
according to the Second Book of the Code of Social Law, the 
legislature has however, fundamentally, correctly defined the goal 
to guarantee a subsistence minimum that is in line with human 
dignity […]. […] [The legislature] however departed from this in 
various respects in the assessment of the standard benefit of €345, 
without replacing it with other recognizable or viable criteria […]. 
This also leads to the unconstitutionality of the derived benefits 
[…]2032 
The FCC held that the provisions submitted for constitutional review were 
incompatible with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG. In the 
Court’s view, the statute did not mirror the ability of the legislature to respond to the 
                                                        
2028 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) [‘The evaluations which are necessary here are a matter for the 
parliamentary legislature. It is obliged to lend concrete form to the benefit claim in fact and in legal 
consequences. It is fundamentally left up to the legislature to determine whether it ensures the 
subsistence minimum by means of monetary benefits, benefits in kind or services. It also has a margin 
of appreciation in determining the scope of the benefits to secure one’s livelihood.’]  
2029 BVerfGE 125, 175 (226) 
2030 BVerfGE 125, 175 (226) 
2031 BVerfGE 125, 175 (226) 
2032 BVerfGE 125, 175 (227) 
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other2033. Justifying the latitude of the legislature to determine the subsistence 
minimum in line with human dignity and concretize it by means of statutory 
regulation by reason of the democratic pedigree of this prong of state power spurs 
critical reflection. Was the decision of the FCC in the Subsistence Minimum Case 
aligned with democratic theory?2034 Criticism boils down to whether, or to what 
extent, the response to the other and the treatment of the subject matter are defined by 
political process.2035 
 
iii. Tracing totality and infinity: discussion of the benefit claim 
The Court stressed the duty of the state, ‘within its mandate, to protect human 
dignity and to ensure, in the implementation of its social welfare state mandate, that 
the material prerequisites for this are at the disposal of the person in need of 
assistance […]’2036, that is, the vulnerable2037. The vulnerable human being is 
portrayed as the one who ‘does not have the material means to guarantee an existence 
that is in line with human dignity because he or she is unable to obtain it either out of 
his or her gainful employment, or from own property or by benefits from third 
parties.’2038 
A benefit claim of the holder of the fundamental right corresponds 
to this objective duty from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, given that the 
fundamental right protects the dignity of each individual person 
[…], and it can only be ensured in such emergency situations by 
means of material support.2039 
In light of the phenomenological account of the law of human dignity, the 
benefit claim of the holder of the fundamental right can be construed as a 
manifestation of the pre-ethics of hospitality2040. The recognition of a benefit claim                                                         
2033 Wallerath (2008) 157, 160 [the need for concretization of the principle of the social state by the 
legislator springs from the ‘social’ telos of the state and the ‘democratic’ structural decision in the 
Basic Law] 
2034 See Daniela Piana, ‘Beyond Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and Judicial Accountabilities in 
Assessing Democratic Quality’ (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology 40 [The author questions the extent to 
which judicial independence can sufficiently illuminate as a concept the actions of judges in judicial 
practice. Taking into account that judicial governance is influenced by the multilevel constitutionalism 
reality of today, the author explores the relation between reconstructions of judicial governance and the 
democratic quality of decisions.] 
2035 Spellbrink (2011) 661, 665 
2036 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
2037 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 245 
2038 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222) 
2039 BVerfGE 125, 175 (222f.) 
2040 Levinas (n 2037) 300; See Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1999) 
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that corresponds to the duty of the state to guarantee a subsistence minimum in line 
with human dignity essentially means welcoming the other, in his or her absolute 
otherness, to exercise their own authority over meaning. The practice of the law of 
human dignity in the Subsistence Minimum I Case involves, to a considerable extent, 
language that – at least on first reading – alludes to sameness. The contrast of 
sameness with portrayals of absolute otherness in the text is, therefore, only 
intensified in this phenomenological reading. Guaranteeing the benefit claim is 
tantamount to giving the other a voice, that is, welcoming the other to dominate the 
self, giving the other a right over the egoism of the self, who would otherwise, as a 
totalizer, egoistically assume who the other is. The other can mobilize the benefit 
claim and articulate his or her world. Real conversation opens up an intersubjective 
space within the totality structure of the legal language game. Generosity on the part 
of the self consists in the self affording the other the means through which the former 
can be dominated. 
The direct constitutional benefit claim to a guarantee of a 
subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity only covers 
those means, which are vital to maintain an existence that is in line 
with human dignity. It guarantees the whole subsistence minimum 
by a uniform fundamental rights guarantee which encompasses 
[umfasst] both the physical existence of the individual, that is food, 
clothing, household goods, housing, heating, hygiene and health 
[…], and ensuring the possibility to maintain inter-human 
relationships and a minimum of participation in social, cultural and 
political life, given that humans as persons of necessity exist in 
social relationships […].2041 
The institution and practice of a fundamental right to a subsistence minimum 
in line with human dignity in order to guarantee this dignified minimum suggests the 
need for totality traits in the practice of law. The guarantee ‘encompasses’, in the 
panoramic sense of vision2042, and assumes a comprehension of the needs related to 
both physical existence and inter-human relationships. The qualities of law portrayed 
in the above excerpt make up a totality story. As shown infra, however, the dual sense 
of ‘something missing’ or infinity features in the Court’s argumentation on special 
needs and their inclusion in the objective scope of the fundamental right to a 
subsistence minimum in line with human dignity.                                                          
2041 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
2042 Levinas (n 2037) 34; ibid 295 [‘For vision is essentially an adequation of exteriority with 
interiority: in it exteriority is reabsorbed in the contemplative soul and, as an adequate idea, revealed to 
be a priori, the result of a Sinngebung.’] 
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This guarantee ‘must be safeguarded by a statutory claim’ in line with ‘the 
protection afforded by Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.’2043 The other, the one ‘in need of assistance’ 
[Hilfbedürftiger]2044, shall not rely on voluntary benefits of the state or third parties 
‘whose provision is not guaranteed by a subjective right’2045. By demanding not only 
that elemental needs are covered, but, most importantly, that individuals can claim a 
response to their needs, the state as the self encounters the vulnerable other with 
responsibility, generosity, fraternity and solidarity, while leaving his or her absolute 
otherness intact and, what is more, empowering rather than simply assisting the other. 
The parliamentary statute through which the constitutional guarantee is to be 
practiced must provide for a concrete benefit claim ‘on the part of the citizen towards 
the competent benefit institution […]’2046; this duty ‘already emerges from the 
principles of the rule of law and democracy.’2047  
This particularly applies if and to the degree that it is a matter of 
ensuring human dignity and human existence [cited cases 
omitted].2048 
 
Commitment to de facto ensuring that the other can exercise the benefit claim 
is evinced in the Court’s rebuttal of conceivable alternatives, such as the Budget Act, 
on the grounds of their insufficiency as foundations for the benefit claim, precisely 
‘because the citizen is unable to derive any direct claims’2049 from them.  
 
What is more, the margin of appreciation that is afforded to 
Parliament by the constitution may only develop and take on 
concrete form in the context of a statute […].2050 
 
How can the requirement of embodiment in statutory provisions of the 
concrete content of the constitutional guarantee of a subsistence minimum in line with 
human dignity be understood in light of phenomenological insights in Chapter One? 
In the text of the Subsistence Minimum Case one finds both the totality and the 
infinity story. This emphasizes how totality portrayals represent clearly only one, 
indeed valuable in various respects, side of the story told of the practice of the law of                                                         
2043 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
2044 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
2045 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
2046 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
2047 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223); Wallerath (2008) 157, 160 
2048 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
2049 BVerfGE 125, 175 (224) 
2050 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223f.) 
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human dignity. Notwithstanding their embodiment in the totality structure of a 
statutory provision, the results of inquiry into and development of the concrete 
content of the dignified subsistence minimum, noted the Court, should ‘be reviewed 
and refined on an ongoing basis because a person’s elementary requirement for life 
can in principle only be satisfied at the moment when it arises […].’2051 The Court 
thus opened up an intersubjective space and, thereby, enabled the generation of 
pluralism. Impressively, in the Subsistence Minimum Case the pluralism associated 
with the intersubjective space is made possible in the practice of the law of human 
dignity in a context marked by the motif of sameness. Emphasis on sameness in 
producing the legal language game could have led the Court to disregard the 
particulars of lived experience.  
The margin of appreciation of the legislature2052 is narrower when it 
concretizes needs related to the physical existence of human beings and broader 
‘when it comes to the nature and scope of the possibility to participate in social 
life.’2053 The difference in scope reflects and explains the manifestation of both the 
sameness and the otherness of human being-ness in the Subsistence Minimum Case. 
Apropos needs associated with physical existence, all human beings are in the main 
same; the narrower margin of appreciation suggests the limited possibility of the 
occurrence of dissensus, hence, in a sense, of real conversation in an intersubjective 
space. Inter-human relations and participation in social life evoke the otherness of 
human being-ness. While certain such needs could be in principle considered vital 
and, oversimplifiedly put, same for all, the concrete form they receive is contingent 
on the viewpoint of the other as an absolutely other. The process of concretely 
determining a social, cultural and political subsistence minimum in line with human 
dignity involves, to a considerable extent, dissensus within an intersubjective space, 
that is, alludes to ‘something always missing’ as the meta-dimension of practicing the 
law of human dignity, and ‘something missing’ as a Leerstelle concretely filled with 
meaning apropos ad hoc context. 
 
iv. Two instances of face-to-face encounter  
                                                        
2051 BVerfGE 125, 175 (225) 
2052 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) [‘This margin encompasses the evaluation of the actual circumstances, 
just like the valuing assessment of the necessary needs […].’] 
2053 BVerfGE 125, 175 (223) 
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 Two more instances of non-subsumption under the totality of the 
constitutional order beg separate discussion. The paradox they introduce is 
interwoven with the paradox of practicing human dignity language in law, namely the 
guarantee of infinity through totality structures. It has been established that infinity 
constitutes an aspect of the meaning of human being-ness and, consequently, of the 
law of human dignity. Listening and learning from experience is key to ensuring the 
correspondence between law and life and, particularly, to detecting real and actual 
cases of vulnerability. The Court drew attention to the lack of provision for special 
needs in the statute, and demanded that these needs be attended to through statutory 
law within the set time limit in view of their urgent nature and the state’s commitment 
to de facto guaranteeing a subsistence minimum in line with human dignity that 
corresponds to reality.2054 It, moreover, noticed the neglect of child-specific needs. 
Accepting that the amount of social benefits may diverge depending on who the other 
is, and stating, ‘each member of a joint household – including children – has an 
individual right to this, and presumes a need that is absolutely necessary’2055, the FCC 
emphasized:  
Their need […] must be orientated in line with child development 
phases and towards what is necessary for the development of a 
child’s personality. The legislature omitted to carry out any 
investigation of this.2056 
 
The FCC noted that the legislature failed to inquire into child-specific needs 
and deduced the 40% lower standard benefit for children freely, namely without 
grounding the amount in empirical findings and specified methods. The subsistence 
minimum in line with human dignity should be tailored to the needs of school-age 
children.2057 From a hermeneutic and literary perspective, the portrayal of children 
ensuing from the text of the Subsistence Minimum Case can be viewed as the                                                         
2054 BVerfGE 125, 175 (259f.) [‘The legislature is further obliged to create a provision in the Second 
Book of the Code of Social Law by 31 December 2010 at the latest ensuring that special needs 
according to the statements made at C. IV. are covered. Those eligible for benefits according to § 7 of 
the Second Book of the Code of Social Law with regard to whom such a special need exists must 
however also receive the necessary benefits in kind or money prior to the adoption of the new 
provisions. Otherwise, there would be a violation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, which may not be accepted even 
on a temporary basis. […] In order to avoid the risk of a violation of Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction 
with Art. 20 sec. 1 GG in the transitional period until the introduction of a corresponding hardship 
clause, the unconstitutional gap for the period from the promulgation of the judgment must be closed 
by a corresponding order from the Federal Constitutional Court.’] 
2055 BVerfGE 125, 175 (232) 
2056 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) 
2057 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) 
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discernment of otherness within sameness, the breaking of the totality of the same. It 
testifies the endorsement of ongoing critical reflection as the humane practice of the 
law of human dignity. The child as the other is encountered face-to-face. The Court 
analyzed the significance of adapting the response to the other by means of statutory 
measures. The analysis conveys a hands-on approach to the needs of school children 
and the implications of customized social benefits for their future, as well as a 
pragmatic appreciation of the allocation of benefits in households.2058   
4. Concluding observations 
The ontological, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological portrayals 
propose another reading and understanding of the textual practice of the law of human 
dignity in the Subsistence Minimum Case. A few remarks are deemed necessary: 
similarly to imponderabilities in the Aviation Security Act Case, the atypical, 
identified with ‘something missing’, intimate the nature of circumstances in the world 
of lived experience. The unpredictable, the unforeseeable, what cannot be grasped or 
subject to our vision ‘is there’ as ‘something missing’ awaiting to be filled with 
content ad hoc. In the Subsistence Minimum Case the Court engaged in a face-to-face 
encounter with the other, namely two concrete instances of human being-ness and 
lived experience, in the recent subsistence minimum case before the FCC2059 the aim 
has been to extend the subjective scope of the statutory law on the basis of sameness 
as regards the guarantee of one’s livelihood, regardless of the status under which 
someone lives in Germany. 
 
 
                                                        
2058 BVerfGE 125, 175 (246) [‘An additional need is to be anticipated above all with school-age 
children. Necessary expenditure to comply with school obligations is part of their need in line with the 
subsistence minimum. Without covering these costs, children in need of assistance are threatened by 
being excluded from chances in life because they cannot successfully attend school without purchasing 
the necessary school material, such as school books, exercise books or calculators. The danger exists 
with school-age children whose parents draw benefits according to the Second Book of the Code of 
Social Law that their development will be compromised if they do not receive adequate state benefits, 
restricting their future capability to support themselves by their own efforts. This is not compatible 
with Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in conjunction with the principle of the social welfare state contained in Art. 20 
sec. 1 GG.’] 
2059 BVerfGE 132, 134 (2012) [Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz] 
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VI. ‘Something missing?’ A case-focused summary 
 
This case-focused summary recapitulates the major points raised in the 
analysis of the texts of five seminal instances of practice of the law of human dignity 
in FCC jurisprudence, and puts forward the gist of derived insights into the meaning 
of the law of human dignity and the auxiliary pillars of the Menschenbild and the 
meta-dimension of law in this hermeneutic and literary exercise.  
The hermeneutic and literary portrayal of the practice of the law of human 
dignity points to the demarcated realms of life and law. The distinction between the 
two spaces is evident in the Abortion I Case, where abortion is labeled a 
‘phenomenon of social life’ and in the Transsexual I Case, where the Court stated that 
the constitutional question problematized belongs to the ‘innermost sphere of life’, 
distinguishing between the image of transsexuals at the level of law and their lived 
experience in life. The Abortion I Case and the Transsexual I Case are illustrative 
examples of inconsistency between the two realms. The portrayal of the relationship 
of the child en ventre sa mere to the mother and the nexus between the Physis and the 
Psyche within the realm of law is different than the portrayal within the realm of life. 
Sometimes these manifestations of human being-ness are even left unattended to 
within law. Similarly, in the Aviation Security Act Case imponderabilities marking the 
circumstances, that is, the realm of life, influence the appreciation of the situation, 
hence, consequently, also the practice of the law of human dignity by responsible 
actors. The identification of demarcating lines is presupposed by a figurative 
rendering of the traversal of limits or transcendence as transascendence, namely the 
processual understanding of human being-ness as. That the dignity of the human 
being is the highest value of the German constitutional order alludes to the notion of 
height and signals that the process of practicing the law of human dignity operates 
necessarily also on a vertical axis. 
The mobilization of human dignity language in law precipitates practice of the 
dual sense of ‘something missing’. The abstractness and universality of the concept 
permit ad hoc concretizations, which can be perceived as the building of cases of 
verification. The infinity of concrete particular images of human being-ness, a taste of 
their richness being illustrated in examples brought forth by the dissenters in the 
Abortion I Case, presupposes ‘something always missing’, what can never be filled 
with content, the meta-dimension. The meta-dimension is also evinced in the practice 
 451
of the principle of proportionality in texts, regardless of whether such balancing is 
doctrinally relevant and significant. The principle of proportionality can be 
understood by analogy with the Wittgensteinian logical form or Levinas’ 
intersubjective space. The order of values of the Basic Law is a concept on the 
borderline between totality and infinity. Reference to the moral law in the text of the 
cases under scrutiny alludes to the transcendental, ethics and aesthetics, in 
Wittgenstein’s early work. Finally, morality in Levinas’ thought and the absolute 
constitutional guarantee of inviolable human dignity paralleled to morality, are 
delivered to us as tautological propositions, namely possessing human dignity by 
virtue of being human. The tautology, a propositional limit, is breached in the texts 
analyzed supra by the Objektformel. In turn, the Objektformel is perceived in light of 
the ladder-metaphor as the trigger of critical reflection in view of reality, and the 
measure of the extent to which human dignity is guaranteed in actuality. 
Surveyance of the subject matter and of the range of viewpoints within, and 
beyond, legal language games establishes the soundness of legal arguments. The 
breadth achieved through surveyance, the horizontal axis, enhances the depth of 
demonstrated understanding, the vertical axis. The humane practice of the law of 
human dignity requires that surveyance extends beyond the legal language game, law, 
to the content of the rest of the field of sight, life and that self-reflection of legal 
actors feeds on life to permit the evolution of the self as an ipse in relation to the other 
and the world. The self absorbs the alterity of the world, and the world changes in 
accordance with the good or bad willing of the self with authority over language and 
meaning. Contextual changes effectuate the disruption of identity. Self-reflection is 
key to practicing responsibility as the ability to respond to the other. Constitutional 
review and the principle of the separation of powers can be perceived as a self-
reflection mechanism of the state. Through dissenting opinions, as in the Abortion I 
Case, the Court casts a self-reflective glance at the majority opinion, namely the 
collective voice with the critical authority over the meaning enforced. The linguistic-
analytical layer of the introduced model allows for the portrayal of the majority 
opinion as a subtotal of the legal language game of the dissenting opinion.  
In practicing the law of human dignity, the FCC as the speaking self and 
author of decisions produces the meaning of the law of human dignity and sketches 
the Menschenbild. Scrutinizing the cases through the lens of the introduced model 
focuses attention on both process and substance. As regards the former, the standard 
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for assessing compliance with processual requirements generated by the law of human 
dignity is responsibility as, elementally, the ability to respond to the other. At the 
same time, critical reflection on the ability to respond is called for to ensure 
cognizance and appreciation of the actuality, the ‘face’ of the other and the 
circumstances. The variety of images evoked in practicing the law of human dignity 
intimates the multifariousness of portrayals of the Menschenbild and verifies the 
aptness of telling a story of ‘something missing’, rather than insisting univocally on 
consensus or correspondence definitions. Provision for the multiplicity of 
concretizations of the Menschenbild surfaces, most paradigmatically, in the 
discussions of atypical needs and children’s needs in the Subsistence Minimum Case. 
This is so, because this case concerns aspects of human being-ness with respect to 
which one would at first assume that all are same and, hence, portray a consistently 
empty Menschenbild and consider the tautology of the law of human dignity a 
representation of reality.  
Potentiality and continuity are the critical qualities of unborn life as a concrete 
imprint on the Menschenbild in the Abortion I Case. On the other side of the weighing 
scale, the self-determination of the pregnant woman, at the same time the self and the 
other, also merits the protection guaranteed by the law of human dignity. State 
paternalism lurks in remarks on the legal consciousness of the pregnant woman and 
the general populace with respect to the value of human life. Considering penalization 
as an expression of legal condemnation the appropriate means to the shaping of legal 
consciousness suggests how the self perceives of the individual and the collective 
other. In the dissenting opinion, the circumstances and experience of the pregnant 
woman are extensively and vividly portrayed and her status as an absolutely other in 
line with the law of human dignity is reflected on to a greater degree. Comparably, in 
the Aviation Security Act Case the perpetrators of the crime are responded to both as 
the self who harms the other, namely the innocent on board the airplane, and, in an 
alternative portrayal, as the other, namely themselves bearers of human dignity and 
fundamental rights.  
Thanks to the phenomenological insights deduced from Levinas’ account of 
the pluralism of the intersubjective space, where absolute distances are observed and 
fraternity, solidarity, generosity, hospitality, freedom tempered by justice, equality, 
and morality set the terms of a relation instituted in language, and of the face-to-face 
encounter, self-determination can be understood anew. In the interplay between state 
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powers, entrusting the legislature with the treatment of particulars, namely specific 
issues framed as human dignity concerns, can be associated with the guarantee of 
self-determination on account of the democratic pedigree of statutory regulation. The 
law of human dignity, on the borderline between fact and law, proclaims that human 
dignity cannot be jeopardized; rather, the claim ensuing from the law demands state 
protection. Reflections on sacrifice in the Abortion I Case and the Aviation Security 
Act Case show that, in guaranteeing and fostering self-determination and assuming 
self-responsibility, the constitutional order does not go so far as to expect of the 
human being to assume and demonstrate a surplus of responsibility.  
The human image sketched in the Life Imprisonment Case is an individual 
related to the community and bound by it, rather than an isolated and autocratic entity. 
In line with the social dimension of human being-nesss, the law of human dignity is 
interpreted in that case as the guarantee of the hope to return to the society of free 
citizens. In the Aviation Security Act Case the FCC is occupied with the more basal 
distinction between the human image and an object. Under the circumstances of 
deadlock experienced by innocent individuals on board a hijacked airplane, 
objectification evokes a portrayal on the borderline between the literal and the non-
literal. In portrayals of the absolutely other the Court employs the figure of spheres of 
responsibility. The dissenters in the Abortion I Case depicted absolute separation by 
stressing that the life of the unborn child falls within the sphere of responsibility of 
the pregnant woman. Similarly, in the Aviation Security Act Case the FCC delineated 
spheres of responsibility to deal with the imponderabilities rendering the situation 
ungraspable by legal actors in the decision-making system and to afford each human 
being involved in the case the respect and protection of human dignity corresponding 
to its self-determination and self-responsibility.  
The negative delineation of the Menschenbild in the Transsexual I Case 
indicates how the Court seeks to understand who the human being is where this 
understanding has not been established and could be loaded with bias as to its 
compatibility with the moral law. Recourse to the authority of viewpoints other than 
that of the speaking self, namely engagement in external justification and cognizance 
of the viewpoint of the metaphysical subject in concretizing the Menschenbild, are 
instantiations of the processual understanding of responding to the other. Pragmatism, 
not just humanism, is a crucial parameter of responsibly answering to the other. The 
self has to demonstrate the ability to address pragmatic considerations so as to 
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respond in actuality to the other as in the Abortion I Case and the Subsistence 
Minimum Case. In line with this requirement, noted the Court in the Life 
Imprisonment Case, law is not to be practiced ‘for its own sake’. The statement 
denotes not only something higher than criminal law within the constitutional order 
and beyond it, but also points to the human being as the ultimate end of the humane 
practice of law; as Levinas assures us both are one, the Other is encountered in the 
face of the other. The sociological insights brought forth in the Abortion I Case are an 
example of how a paternalistic stance can be adopted on the pretext of humanism. 
Paternalism can be rendered in view of the proposed hermeneutic and literary 
model as the guarantee of the inviolability of the limit, in other words the position of 
the metaphysical subject vis-à-vis its world, rather than the guarantee of the 
inviolability of the metaphysical subject per se, as a concrete and unique face, the 
face of the absolutely other. In other words, if the state lingers on guaranteeing that 
human beings are positioned at the limit, adopting the stance of a totalizer self, and 
forgets the infinity of the face, namely the absolutely other human being at the limit, 
the state as self might become unbendable and stringent, forcing a certain ethical 
positioning of human beings as legal subjects, rather than permitting them their own 
viewpoint on the world as a field of meaning. 
The humane practice of the law of human dignity amounts to a guarantee of 
protection against forced and forceful interference with the self-determined unfolding 
of human being-ness. Whereas this unfolding requires the polemos, unconcealment of 
the φύσις of human beings is not to be externally forced; a minore ad maius the law of 
human dignity forbids forceful attacks causing the ex negativo manifestation of 
human being-ness. The forced and the forceful are not always as clearly 
distinguishable as in the Life Imprisonment Case; drawing a line between the two 
modes of interference, in most cases a question of intensity, rests on whose 
perspective determines the ‘how’ of the protection called for in response to a violation 
that generated the ad hoc practice of the law of human dignity. The disparity between 
the majority and the dissenting opinion as regards what counts as forced and forceful 
in the Abortion I Case are illustrative of the definitional difficulty.  
Applying the hermeneutic and literary model and concepts deduced from the 
philosophical grounds drawn upon to the text of the cases under scrutiny affords the 
analysis language for portraying aspects of the practice of the law of human dignity. 
Compatibility or incompatibility with the constitution can be depicted respectively as 
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subsumption or non-subsumption under the totality of the legal language game 
emanating from the eye of the constitutional judge looking through the lens of the 
Basic Law. As the linguistic-analytical reading of the text of the Abortion I Case 
indicates, the judge can resort to lenses other than law, that is, extra-legal sources or 
the moral law, and other than the Basic Law, namely other fields of law. The 
boundaries of the legal language game fluctuate when the Court engages in negative 
delineation of the human image or a particular subject matter as in the Transsexual I 
Case, in juxtaposition as in the Life Imprisonment Case, where the Court discussed 
life imprisonment sentencing vis-à-vis death penalty, and in external justification. The 
law of human dignity as the critical lens operates as a mediating term. Mediation can 
be perfunctorily understood in light of equation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus; the imperative that mediation should not destroy the radical distance 
between the self and the other found in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity sets restrictions 
on the employment of the law of human dignity as a mediating term, for instance in 








‘Something missing’ is premised on a three-pronged philosophically grounded 
hermeneutic and literary account of human dignity that is sparked by the empirical 
observation of ambiguity and controversy in portrayals of the practice of the law of 
human dignity. The three accounts are conceivable responses to the question ‘How is 
the concept empty?’ In framing the practice of the law of human dignity apropos the 
dual sense of ‘something missing’ rather than what is there, namely the range of 
theoretical and empirical particulars defining its meaning, we abstract ourselves from 
the projects of adequation, verification and falsification of theoretical accounts and 
legal arguments encountered in practicing that law, as well as discord and circulus in 
probando argumentative schemata in the broader discourse, and reveal the nexus 
between ‘something always missing’, the meta-dimension of law, and ‘something 
missing’, identified within what is there, our world. The dual sense of ‘something 
missing’ furthers an affirmative stance towards what escapes our grasp and stresses 
that ‘something missing’ within legal language games comprising human dignity 
language must be filled by recourse to context and through critical reflection and self-
reflection. The introduced model portrays the practice of human dignity and permits 
emphasis on the human factor within legal language games. 
The analysis can sensitize legal actors practicing the law of human dignity to 
the language they employ and, consequently, the meaning they produce. The present 
inquiry aims only to advance ontological, linguistic-analytical and phenomenological 
accounts of the law of human dignity and to apply them in portray the practice of that 
law in the text of seminal instances of FCC jurisprudence, all established in cross-
Atlantic legal discourse as prevalent human dignity case law. In view of the distinct 
emphasis on the human factor wherever it can be traced in the portrayal of practice, 
this project is of pertinence to legal sociology and cultural studies. The thesis and the 
arguments composing it can offer impetus for further research in other disciplinary 
directions.  
Research on the law of human dignity commenced in September 2009. Since 
then the European crisis has brought to the forefront of concern the relation between 
institutions and human beings. Who really serves whom? This thesis demonstrates 
how human dignity can be perceived, in light of the dual sense of ‘something 
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missing’, as a Trojan Horse within the walls of the institution of law. I propose 
revisiting this relation by understanding lawmaking as the building of totalities that 
foster – among many things – infinity. The new understanding introduced in this 
thesis is that the guarantee of human dignity in law constitutes an a priori 
commitment to an affirmative stance on the breach of totality. Human beings escape 
totalities, transcending towards infinity, so that they be human, and so that they 
portray the world and question its boundaries, limits and meaning. At the same time 
they fill their world, the plane extending in front of their eyes, with meaning. In doing 
so, they act as metaphysical subjects at the limit of their world, namely the place 
identified with the transcendental, ethics and aesthetics in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. 
[…] [T]he world must thereby [by good and bad willing] become 
quite another. It must so to speak wax or wane as a whole. The 
world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.2060  
The law of human dignity guarantees the possibility to continually rename the 
world. The human dignity story of ‘something missing’ is an affirmative stance 
towards guaranteeing empty space within legal language games in order for new 
language originating infinitely in the practice of the law of human dignity to come-
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